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28

The Top Two Ground Lease Financing Flaws: Deficient “New Lease” Clauses and Superior Fee Mortgages (January 6, 2016)

Submitted by

Daniel B. Rubock

Senior Vice President Moody’s Investors Service, Inc.

© 2016 Moody’s Corporation, Moody’s Investors Service, Inc., Moody’s Analytics, Inc. and/or their licensors and affiliates (collectively, “MOODY’S”).

All rights reserved.

Reprinted with permission.

Reprinted from the PLI Course Handbook, CMBS and the Real Estate Lawyer 2017: Lender and Borrower Issues in the Capital Market (Order #185854)

If you find this article helpful, you can learn more about the subject by going to www.pli.edu to view the on demand program or segment for which it was written.

 

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SECTOR IN-DEPTH
6 January 2016

__________

Contacts

 

Daniel Rubock
Senior Vice President
daniel.rubock@moodys.com

212-553-4683

Joel M Omansky
AVP-Analyst
joel.omansky@moodys.com

212-553-7168

CMBS - US

The Top Two Ground Lease Financing Flaws: Deficient “New Lease” Clauses and Superior Fee Mortgages

Executive Summary

Credit neutral provisions in ground leases supporting mortgage debt 1) require the ground landlord to offer a new lease to a ground-tenant’s lender in all cases when a ground lease has been terminated after default or when the lease is rejected by a bankrupt tenant, and 2) insure that present or future fee mortgages will be subordinate in all cases to an existing, modified or new ground lease.

Unlike a fee ownership interest, where the property owner possesses all ownership rights in the land and building for an unlimited time, a ground tenant may only use and occupy the land and building for a finite, terminable period. When the term of the ground lease ends or the ground lease goes away for any reason, the ground tenant’s possessory interest reverts to the ground landlord and the leasehold lender then no longer has any collateral. This binary nature of the property interest (the collateral either exists or it does not), makes leasehold financing inherently more involved than fee financing and necessitates a complex array of “financeability” provisions in loan documentation to assure that a leasehold lender’s collateral will not vanish like a popped balloon.

The vast majority of ground lease mortgages contain such provisions, but, surprisingly, many do not have fully credit-neutral versions of two key lender protections: a robust new lease clause and provisions ensuring the superiority in all situations of the ground lease to fee mortgages. These two issues are neither new nor cutting-edge, but they arise again and again.

Lenders’ Rights to a New Ground Lease Are Comprehensive in Credit-Neutral Ground Lease Financings

New Lease After Termination for Any Reason

Among credit-neutral protections are “new lease” provisions1 that require the ground landlord to offer the leasehold lender a new ground lease if the ground lease terminates after a tenant default, even if the lender has failed to cure within its own separate, additional cure period. The new lease acts as an unambiguous no-fault “do-over” granted the lender. The equities of a catastrophic loss of the lender’s collateral far outweigh the burden to the ground landlord, especially because the destruction of the lender’s collateral would give the ground landlord a huge windfall by obtaining possession of the tenant’s improvements

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possibly decades earlier than anticipated and free of the encumbrance of the ground lease. Credit-neutral new lease clauses require a new lease offer after a tenant default for any reason whatsoever and are not conditioned on terminations for particular reasons.

Some argue that extraordinarily robust lender cure rights can make up for the lack of a new lease clause. We disagree. The new lease clause mitigates three significant risks: first, ordinary operational failures and imperfections; second, the uncertainty, drama and loss of control that can arise when landlord and tenant litigate over what the lease requires; and third, the possibility of inadequate efforts to cure for whatever reason.

New Lease After Rejection in Bankruptcy

The incompleteness of even “termination for any cause” new lease provision may become evident if the ground tenant were to file for bankruptcy. Under §365(a) of the Bankruptcy Code (Code), a tenant may “reject” its unexpired ground lease.2 When this occurs and the ground lease is rejected,3 is it terminated?

Bankruptcy courts have been inconsistent in their application of the term “reject.” Commentators have proposed that Congress should clarify the meaning of rejection,4 but in the meantime the ambiguity still exists.5 There is a strong school of thought in court decisions that a rejection merely breaches but does not terminate the ground lease. Under this theory, the leasehold estate is not terminated but merely, as one court put it, “placed…outside the bankruptcy administration without destroying the underlying estate and, therefore, the mortgage.”6 Courts have often relied on Code §365(g) – which applies to a landlord’s rejection of a lease and characterizes rejection of a lease as a breach without saying it is a termination – for this rationale. Other courts have disagreed,7 however, and there is no settled doctrine on the issue.

If the ground lease is rejected in bankruptcy and considered by the court as breached but not terminated, a provision calling for a new lease solely upon termination would not apply. This creates a problematic situation for the leasehold lender. The landlord could hold the desperate leasehold lender hostage by asking for additional payments before giving the lender its desired new lease, or it could completely refuse to give a new lease. While the lender may attempt to foreclose on the vestigial lease that may exist after rejection, subtenants, title insurers and potential purchasers may be skeptical of what the leasehold lender actually has. Maybe the lender still has a lien on whatever vestigial lease still remains after rejection. But that is a slender reed and no case law affirms this theory. The uncertainty could tie up the collateral in litigation for years.

Others argue that a provision calling for a new lease after termination following an event of default, where the “event of default” definition includes filing for bankruptcy, is sufficient. We disagree. Ipso facto clauses are unenforceable in bankruptcy, and in particular, Code §365(e)(1) says that such a provision in an unexpired lease is unenforceable. Basing a right to a new lease on an unenforceable clause is untenable. Moreover, any new lease clause has time limits, and a landlord would argue (and a court might agree) that they lapsed during the bankruptcy proceeding.

For all of these reasons, we believe that credit-neutral new lease provisions cover not only lease terminations under all circumstances but also expressly cover the rejection of a ground lease in bankruptcy.

Fee Mortgages Are Subordinate to the Ground Lease Under All Circumstances in Credit-Neutral Ground Lease Financings

The leasehold position is not the only interest that can be financed on a property encumbered by a ground lease. The ground landlord could also finance its fee interest; the collateral would be the rent payable by the ground tenant and the reversionary interest in the land when the ground lease ends.

Typically the fee mortgagee’s interest is subordinate in all cases to the ground lease.8 Because a fee lender’s collateral is solely the ground lease rental payments and the reversionary interest, and a leasehold lender’s collateral is its borrower’s possessory right to the land and to the improvements for the term of the ground lease subject to compliance with the terms of the ground lease, those interests, and those interests alone, are what each lender expects to separately acquire upon a foreclosure of its respective borrower’s

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estate. Neither lender economically or legally expects to acquire the other party’s estate. The fee lender does not economically or legally need to extinguish the ground lease in any foreclosure of its fee interest.

There is a slight benefit to a fee mortgagee having a superior lien to the ground lease, thereby being able to wipe it out in a fee mortgage foreclosure: the advantage of time. It may be able to dispense with filing a landlord/tenant summary proceeding to evict a defaulting ground tenant after prevailing in its mortgage foreclosure, and it may directly name the ground tenant in its mortgage foreclosure action, saving a litigation step. But that is a small benefit against the larger harm that may befall a ground lease lender losing its entire collateral to the foreclosing fee lender.

Some feel that the existence of a Subordination, Nondisturbance and Attornment (SNDA) agreement negates any need for the landlord to subordinate its fee mortgage to the ground lease. An SNDA subordinates the tenant’s interest to the fee owner/landlord’s mortgage. In exchange, the fee lender agrees not to disturb the tenant’s leasehold interest and the tenant also agrees to “attorn” to the lender, that is, agrees to accept the fee lender or its assignee as its new landlord if the fee lender forecloses. Because the lender promises not to disturb the tenant, the argument goes, there should be no concern about the ground lease being extinguished in a fee foreclosure.

However, an SNDA does not sufficiently mitigate the risks inherent when fee financing is superior to the lease and leasehold mortgage. The SNDA may be deemed an executory contract that could be rejected under Code §365 by the fee lender in its own bankruptcy or declared unenforceable upon the fee lender’s insolvency and takeover by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) under 12 US Code §1823(e).9 Poorly drafted SNDAs may not mention or may mangle essential leasehold lender protections, such as the lenders’ ability to cure defaults. Also, the SNDA may not bind fee lenders to ground lease modifications or new ground leases (under the new lease provision described above) that are recorded subsequently.

Certain attempted workarounds in SNDAs may be insufficient, such as making the subordination to the fee mortgage operative “only so long as the SNDA is effective against the fee mortgagee and has not been rejected in bankruptcy.” For example, the foregoing provision itself may be unenforceable as an ipso facto clause and also rejectible as executory.

In summary, credit-neutral financeable ground leases are not subordinate to fee mortgages; neither an SNDA nor any other documentation or provision will generally mitigate a problematic, subordinate ground lease.

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Contacts

 

Tad Philipp
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212-553-1992

 

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MD-Structured Finance
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1.

See Appendix C, Sample Ground Lease Representations and Warranties, #11 in Approach to Sustainable Net Cash Flow and Value for CMBS and CRE CDO CLO Real Estate Collateral in the Americas and ex-Japan Asia Pacific, 10 December 2014 (Moody’s Ground Lease Reps): “The ground lease requires that the landlord enter into a new ground lease on substantially similar terms upon termination of the ground lease or upon rejection of the ground lease in a bankruptcy proceeding.”

2.

Alternatively, the tenant may fail to assume or reject the lease within a statutory 60-day time limit and it would be deemed rejected.

3.

Why would a bankrupt tenant reject a ground lease that had economic value? Probably for hard-ball, strategic reasons, if the borrower’s equity was so far underwater that it had nothing to lose by doing so.

4.

AM. BANKR. INST. COMM’N TO STUDY REFORM OF CHAPTER 11, FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS SECTION V.A.3

5.

“Courts, however, have differed on whether rejection terminates the contract or lease, or, rather, constitutes a breach by the debtor in possession, of such contract or lease.” Ibid.

6.

In re Garfinkle, 577 F.2d 901, 904 (5th Cir. 1978); see also In Matter of Austin Development Co., 19 F.3d 107, 1082 (5th Cir. 1994).

7.

In re. Hawaii Dimensions Inc., 47 Bankr. 425 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1985).

8.

See Moody’s Ground Lease Reps, #4: ““The ground lease is, and shall remain, prior to any mortgage or other lien upon the fee interest. The owner of the fee interest has not entered into any agreement to subordinate the ground lease to any future mortgages or other liens on the fee interest.”Supra fn. 1.

9.

See, e.g., Kimzey Wash, LLC v. LG Auto Laundry, LP, 418 SW 3d 291-Tex: Court of Appeals, 5th Dist. 201) (using 12 US Code §1823(e) and the D’Oench, Duhme doctrine to declare the SNDA unenforceable).