Evidence Code section 352 reads in its entirety that: “The court in its discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its

admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.”

The relevant phrase from the statute is “substantial danger of undue prejudice.” Undue prejudice springs from evidence which has “ ’ ”very little effect on the issues.“ ’ ” ( People v. Minifie (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1055, 1071 [56 Cal.Rptr.2d 133, 920 P.2d 1337]; People v. Wright (1985) 39 Cal.3d 576, 585 [217 Cal.Rptr. 212, 703 P.2d 1106] [“ ‘The ”prejudice“ referred to in Evidence Code section 352 applies to evidence which uniquely tends to evoke an emotional bias against … [one party] as an individual and which has very little effect on the issues.’ ”].)

Evidence Code section 210 provides: “‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence, including evidence relevant to the credibility of a witness or hearsay declarant, having any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action.”

In defining the limitation on the permissible grounds for eviction from subsidized housing, 24 C.F.R. § 247.6(b) provides: “In any judicial action instituted to evict the tenant, the landlord must rely on grounds which were set forth in the termination notice served on the tenant under this subpart. The landlord shall not, however, be precluded from relying on grounds about which he or she had no knowledge at the time the termination notice was sent.”

Plaintiff has enumerated nine allegations in the termination notice that was served on December 8, 2008. Plaintiff may not present evidence of any other conduct not stated in the notice to substantiate the allegation that Defendant and her household members breached the lease agreement. Allegations of other conduct by household members that could be construed as breaches of the lease present a substantial danger of evoking an emotional bias against Defendant and her household members, without any probative value.

Evidence Code section 1101(a) which requires the exclusion of character evidence in civil cases, reads in its entirety that: “Except as provided in this section and in Sections 1102,

1103, 1108, and 1109, evidence of a person’s character or a trait of his or her character (whether in the form of an opinion, evidence of reputation, or evidence of specific instances of his or her conduct) is inadmissible when offered to prove his or her conduct on a specified occasion.” Evid. Code § 101(a). Case law interpreting 1101(a) has consistently held that character evidence is simply not admissible in a civil case. See Deevy v. Tassi 21 Cal.2d 109, 130 P.2d 389 (1942) (assault; evidence of defendant’s bad character for peace and quiet held inadmissible); Vance v. Richardson, 110 Cal. 414, 42 Pac. 909 (1895) (assault; evidence of defendant’s good character for peace and quiet held inadmissible); Van Horn v. Van Horn 5 Cal.App. 719, 91 Pac. 260 (1907) (divorce for adultery; evidence of defendant’s and the nonparty-correspondent’s good character held inadmissible).

To the extent that Plaintiff wishes to introduce fact of argument that Tenant’s Son has engaged in other conduct not enumerated in the notice that could be construed as criminal or disruptive of the residents of the property, that evidence should be excluded as is raises the inference that he has the character trait of a criminal.

Item one of the “TEN DAY NOTICE TO QUIT” alleges conduct that breached the terms of the written lease agreement in May 2003. The complaint was filed on December 29, 2008. This allegation is clearly barred by the statute of limitations, and must be excluded from the evidence presented to the jury.

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In this case, two of the nine enumerated alleged acts are insufficient to meet these criteria. Specifically, in items 2 and 3, Plaintiff states:

Item 2 states no actual facts related to the alleged conduct, but merely stated a legal conclusion that “Tenant’s Son committed a violation of Penal Code section 487c.” Item 3

states that another resident was injured, but does not identify the alleged victim.

Plaintiff had the opportunity to provide additional facts to support these allegations in discovery, when Defendant propounded a Special Interrogatory seeking a statement of all facts upon which Plaintiff bases the allegation the Tenant’s Son has engaged in repeated criminal activity on the property (See Exhibit A attached hereto, “Defendant TENANT’s Special Interrogatories, Set One.”). However, Plaintiff’s response merely parroted the exact language of the notice, and provided no other facts. (See Exhibit B attached hereto, “Plaintiff’s Responses to Defendant’s First Set of Specially Prepared Interrogatories.”)

As a result, items 2 and 3 of the “TEN DAY NOTICE TO QUIT” are not drawn in conformity with the Code of Federal Regulations, and are insufficient to form a basis for termination of tenancy in subsidized housing. Plaintiff’s deficient pleading and discovery response deprived Defendant of sufficient notice to prepare a defense. Defendant therefore requests that these allegations be excluded from the evidence presented to the jury.

Item 6 of the notice states, “On or about February 28, 2008, and March 9, 2008, Tenant’s Son recklessly operated his motor scooter on the property of LANDLORD, Inc., in

violation of the property rules, endangering the health and safety of Other Neighbor, and disturbed the peace of Other Neighbor by cursing and yelling at her.” The allegation is at worst a violation of Reckless Driving (Veh. Code, § 23103(a) & (b)), a misdemeanor, and Penal code section 415(2), a misdemeanor, or an infraction.

Item 7 of the notice states, “On or about March 11, 2008, Tenant’s Son displayed a knife in a threatening manner and terrorized Neighbors, while on the property of LANDLORD, Inc.” Taken in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, this item alleges a misdemeanor violation of Penal Code 417(a)(1).

Item 8 of the notice states, “On or about March 16, 2008, Tenant’s Son trespassed on property possessed by Neighbor, specifically the front porch of Neighbor’s residence, on the property of LANDLORD, Inc.” This item of the notice alleges facts sufficient to establish a misdemeanor violation of Penal Code section 602(m).

Finally, Item 9 of the notice states, “From at least March, 2008, and continuing through the present, Tenant’s Son has disturbed the peace of your immediately adjacent neighbors, by loud yelling, arguing, and audible physical fighting within your residence, late at night. The frequency of these occurrences has fluctuated but averages at least three or four nights each week.” This allegation may establish a misdemeanor under Penal Code section 415(2), but only if the noise in question is directed to the victim. (See Jefferson v. Superior Court (1975) 51 CalApp3d 721, 725).

To the extent that Plaintiff wishes to introduce fact or argument that Tenant’s Son has engaged in the above conduct that does not constitute felonious criminal activity, that evidence should be excluded as improper character evidence. Plaintiff’s evidence can serve no purpose other than create innuendo as to Tenant’s Son’s character.

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In this case, the Plaintiff’s alleges specific instances of alleged criminal activity by Defendant’s son Tenant’s Son between May 2003 and March 2008. Tenant’s Son was born August 12, 1989, and was a minor until he turned 18 on August 12, 2007. Absent a court order permitting use of documents in this particular proceeding, any evidence derived from or relating to a juvenile case file must be excluded.

A proposed redacted copy of the “TEN DAY NOTICE TO QUIT” is attached hereto as Exhibit C.

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Dated: March 16, 2009