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Barry P. BarbashWillkie Farr & Gallagher LLP Copyright © 2017 by Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP. All rights reserved. These materials may not be reproduced or disseminated in any form without the express permission of Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP. The information included in this Summary Chart is current as of December 31, 2016. The author appreciates the efforts of Charles F. Gyer, an associate in Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP’s office in the District of Columbia, in the preparation of this Chart. Mr. Gyer has yet to be admitted to the Washington D.C. Bar and is practicing under the supervision of members of Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP who are current members of that Bar. If you find this article helpful, you can learn more about the subject by going to www.pli.edu to view the on demand program or segment for which it was written. |
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RECENT TRENDS IN SEC INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS:
A SUMMARY CHART
Investment Management Institute 2017
Practising Law Institute
New York Conference Center
1177 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10036
March 23-24, 2017
Barry P. Barbash
Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP
787 Seventh Avenue
New York, N.Y. 10019-6099
BBarbash@willkie.com
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INTRODUCTION
The Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC” or “Commission”) continues to take an aggressive enforcement stance with respect to the asset management industry, filing 807 enforcement actions in 2015 and 868 enforcement actions in 2016 against investment advisers and investment companies over the last two years. These actions targeted diverse areas including: investment advisers’ compliance programs; investment advisers’ fiduciary duties; alleged misappropriation of client assets, misallocation of expenses, fraudulent investment performance track records, misvalued portfolio assets, violations of cybersecurity requirements, non-disclosure of conflicts of interest; violations of best execution obligations; and engaging in other activities deemed by the SEC to be fraudulent within the meaning of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940. The Commission, in what seems to be an ever increasing number of these actions, appears to have focused on obtaining acknowledgements of wrongdoing by individuals as part of settlement agreements. In a 2016 speech, the SEC’s Chair acknowledged the priority the Commission has placed on establishing individual liability.
The Summary Chart below covers recent SEC administrative actions and certain court cases involving asset management firms and associated individuals. The Chart, which is current as of December 31, 2016, sets out selected actions in reverse chronological order and covers the period beginning on January 1, 2015. Actions of particular significance because of their subject matter are highlighted in shaded text.
Set out as appendices to provide context with respect to the Chart are relatively recent statements of: the SEC; the Chair of the SEC; and current high ranking SEC staff members. Taken together, the statements indicate the current examination and enforcement themes of the SEC and its priorities in the asset management area.
The following abbreviations for statutes are used throughout the Summary Chart:
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Recent Enforcement Actions Summary Chart | ||||
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Date Filed | Type of Action | Summary of Allegations | Charges | Settlement/Relief Sought |
12/14/16 | Alleged Failure by Private Equity Fund Manager to Obtain Advisory Board Consent for Co-Investments Presenting Conflicts of Interest | In New Silk Route Advisors, L.P., Advisers Act Release No. 4,587 (Dec. 14, 2016), the SEC settled public administrative and cease-and-desist proceedings against New Silk Route Advisors, L.P. (“NSR”), an investment adviser registered under the Advisers Act, for allegedly failing to obtain advisory board consent for certain co-investments made by two private equity funds managed by NSR (the “NSR Funds”), as required by each NSR Fund’s limited partnership agreement. According to the SEC, each NSR Fund’s limited partnership agreement required NSR to obtain the consent of the Fund’s advisory board before making any investments in portfolio companies in which NSR or its affiliates were also investing or had invested. The SEC alleged that NSR’s co-founder and chief executive officer was a co-founder and chief executive officer of a separate Advisers Act-registered investment adviser, which managed other private equity funds (each, an “NSR Affiliate Fund”). According to the SEC, from approximately 2008 to 2014, NSR caused the NSR Funds to invest over $250 million in four portfolio companies in which an NSR Affiliate Fund also invested. The SEC alleged that these co-investments posed a conflict of interest for NSR, as NSR’s chief executive officer also owed fiduciary duties to each NSR Affiliate Fund. | The SEC alleged that NSR willfully violated Sections 206(2) and 206(4) of, and Rules 206(4)-7 and 206(4)-8 under, the Advisers Act. | NSR agreed to cease and desist from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of the charges, to censure, and to pay a civil money penalty of $275,000. |
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The SEC asserted that NSR negligently failed to obtain the required advisory board consent for each NSR Fund’s co-investments with the NSR Affiliate Fund. The SEC alleged that NSR also failed to disclose, until May 2014, that it caused the NSR Funds to fund approximately $1.3 million in capital installments that were originally committed to one of the portfolio companies by the NSR Affiliated Fund, after the NSR Affiliated Fund exhausted its capital. According to the SEC, NSR failed to adopt policies and procedures reasonably designed to prevent violations of the Advisers Act arising from making co-investments with an affiliate without client consent as required by each NSR Fund’s limited partnership agreement. | ||||
12/12/16 | Alleged Material Misstatements and Omissions of Material Fact by Bank Custodian in Connection with Foreign Exchange Rate Pricing | In State Street Bank and Trust Company, 1940 Act Release No. 32,390 (Dec. 12, 2016), the SEC settled public administrative and cease-and-desist proceedings against State Street Bank and Trust Company (“SSBTC”), which serves as custodian for investment companies registered under the 1940 Act, for allegedly making materially misleading statements and omissions in connection with SSBTC’s methodology of pricing certain foreign currency exchange transactions. According to the SEC, SSBTC offered a service under which SSBTC automatically processed and executed custody client purchases and sales of foreign currencies without requiring clients to negotiate prices on a trade- | The SEC alleged that SSBTC willfully violated Section 34(b) of the 1940 Act. The SEC alleged that SSBTC caused certain of its registered investment company clients to violate Section 31(a) of, and Rule | SSBTC agreed to cease and desist from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of the charges, to pay disgorgement of $75,000,000, prejudgment interest of $17,369,416.51, and a civil money penalty of $75,000,000. |
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Alleged Failure to Maintain Accurate Transaction Records | by-trade basis (“Non-Negotiated Transactions”). The SEC alleged that SSBTC represented to its custody clients that, with respect to Non-Negotiated Transactions, it provided “best execution,” guaranteed the most competitive rates available, priced transactions at prevailing interbank or market rates, and that rates were based on, among other things, the size of the trade and SSBTC’s inventory of the currency. According to the SEC, SSBTC failed to disclose that it priced most Non-Negotiated Transactions at the applicable interbank market rate near the end of each trading day, regardless of when trade orders were received, after which SSBTC would then apply a predetermined, uniform markup (for purchases) or markdown (for sales), limited only to fall within the highest and lowest interbank rates of the day. The SEC alleged that, as a result of these practices, SSBTC often executed Non-Negotiated Transactions with custody clients at or near the highest and lowest rates in the interbank market between the time the market opened in the morning and the time that SSBTC priced the transactions. According to the SEC, SSBTC provided certain registered investment company clients with daily records of all transactions, as well as periodic transaction reports. The SEC alleged that these records and reports routinely contained the dates of Non-Negotiated Transactions and the prices at which SSBTC executed the transactions, but were materially misleading in light of SSBTC’s misstatements about | 3la-1(b) under, the 1940 Act. | ||
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how it priced Non-Negotiated Transactions, as the reports and records omitted information about the time of day at which trades were executed and how the prices were determined. | ||||
12/1/16 | Alleged Improper Valuation of Securities by Investment Adviser to Exchange-Traded Funds Alleged Failure to Adopt and Implement Policies and Procedures Reasonably Designed to Prevent Improper Valuation of Securities | In Pacific Investment Management Company LLC, Advisers Act Release No. 4,577 (Dec. 1, 2016), the SEC settled public administrative and cease-and-desist proceedings against Pacific Investment Management Company LLC (“PIMCO”), an investment adviser registered under the Advisers Act, for alleged improper valuation of certain positions held by an actively managed exchange-traded fund. The SEC alleged that PIMCO, in its management of the ETF, utilized an “odd lot strategy,” which involved purchasing relatively small blocks of securities, termed “odd lot” positions, that traded at a discount to larger institutional blocks of the same securities, termed “round lot” positions. According to the SEC, PIMCO would purchase odd lot positions of certain securities at a discount, and then value these positions at the higher round lot prices. The SEC alleged that, as a result of the odd lot strategy, PIMCO caused the ETF to overstate its net asset value. According to the SEC, the ETF regularly recorded performance increases reflected by the difference between the purchase price for an odd lot position and the higher round lot price used to value the position held | The SEC alleged that PIMCO willfully violated Sections 206(2) and 206(4) of, and Rules 206(4)-7 and 206(4)-8 under, the Advisers Act, and willfully violated Section 34(b) of, and Rule 22c-1 under, the 1940 Act. | PIMCO agreed to cease and desist from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of the charges, to censure, to pay disgorgement of $1,331,628.74, prejudgment interest of $198,179.04, and a civil money penalty of $18,300,000. PIMCO also agreed to certain undertakings, including retaining an independent compliance consultant and adopting that compliance consultant’s recommendations. |
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by the ETF. The SEC alleged that PIMCO did not have a reasonable basis to believe that the round lot price accurately reflected the exit price the ETF would receive for those positions and therefore did not accurately value certain odd lot positions it purchased for the ETF. According to the SEC, PIMCO did not perform any contemporaneous analyses to determine whether the use of round lot prices for the ETF’s odd lot positions appropriately reflected fair value. The SEC alleged further that PIMCO’s pricing policy was not reasonably designed to ensure that odd lots purchased for the ETF were accurately priced and that the ETF’s net asset value was accurately calculated. According to the SEC, PIMCO’s pricing policies and procedures inappropriately relied on PIMCO’s traders to determine when to report position prices that did not reasonably reflect market value, without providing sufficient oversight of the traders’ determinations or any guidance regarding when to elevate significant pricing issues to PIMCO’s pricing committee or the valuation committee of the ETF’s Board of Trustees. The SEC asserted that PIMCO made materially misleading statements to the ETF’s Board of Trustees, as well as certain investors, by failing to disclose that the odd lot strategy was a significant source of the ETF’s performance. According to the SEC, PIMCO negligently provided monthly and annual disclosures that failed to disclose the effect of the odd lot strategy on the ETF’s performance and that the performance | ||||
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resulting from this strategy was not sustainable as the ETF grew in size. The SEC alleged that these disclosures implied that the ETF’s performance resulted from price appreciation in certain market sectors, while internal PIMCO reports indicated – and many of the drafters and reviewers of these disclosures understood – that a significant portion of the ETF’s favorable performance was attributable to initial gains from valuing odd lots at round lot prices. According to the SEC, PIMCO also failed to disclose the existence or effect of the odd lot strategy to the ETF’s Board of Trustees, which had specifically inquired about why the ETF outperformed PIMCO’s flagship mutual fund and its benchmark index. | ||||
11/21/16 | Auditor’s Alleged Failure to Comply with Professional Standards Auditor’s Alleged Cause of Advisers Act Violations | In Grassi & Co., CPAs, P.C, Advisers Act Release No. 4,572 (Nov. 21, 2016), the SEC settled public administrative and cease-and-desist proceedings against Grassi & Co., CPAs, P.C. (“Grassi”), a public accounting firm registered with the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, for allegedly failing to comply with professional standards in connection with audits of a private fund client, and for allegedly failing to detect investment adviser fraud. This case arises from the same set of facts discussed in Apex Fund Services (US), Inc., below. According to the SEC, Grassi served, from January 2012 until January 2013, as independent auditor for several private funds advised by ClearPath Wealth | The SEC alleged that Grassi caused ClearPath’s and ClearPath’s President’s violations of Sections 206(2) and 206(4) of, and Rule 206(4)-8 under, the Advisers Act. The SEC alleged that Grassi engaged in | Grassi agreed to cease and desist from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of the charges, to censure, to pay disgorgement of $130,000, prejudgment interest of $11,510.41, and a civil money penalty of $260,000, and to comply with certain undertakings, including engaging an independent |
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Management, LLC (“ClearPath”), an investment adviser registered by the State of Rhode Island. The SEC alleged that Grassi issued during this period nine audit reports, for years ended 2009 through 2011, containing unqualified opinions on the financial statements for four different funds advised by ClearPath. According to the SEC, from 2010 forward, ClearPath and ClearPath’s president were defrauding the funds they advised, and the investors in those funds, by misappropriating fund assets and making repeated misstatements to investors about the value and existence of fund investments. The SEC alleged that Grassi failed to detect evidence of the fraud by, among other things, neglecting to note the commingling of assets among multiple fund series when a restriction in each fund’s governing documents prohibited the assets and liabilities of each series from being commingled with that of any other series. According to the SEC, Grassi failed to make adjustments to financial statements it had provided earlier after its discovery of a previously undisclosed account for one of the funds that showed a $4.1 million margin loan had been taken against the fund’s assets. The SEC alleged that this conduct constituted a failure to detect fraud, thereby allowing the advisers to materially inflate the values of their investments without contradiction and to conceal use of limited partners’ investments for their own benefit. According to the SEC, as a result of Grassi’s failure to address ClearPath’s indications of fraud, five of Grassi’s nine audit reports were materially false, and those | improper professional conduct within the meaning of Section 4C(a)(2) of the Exchange Act and Rule 102(e)(1)(ii) of the Commission’s Rules of Practice. | compliance consultant to oversee compliance with all applicable securities laws. | ||
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reports enabled ClearPath and its principal to continue to report to limited partners materially inflated values of their investments without contradiction, to conceal use of limited partners’ investments for their own benefit, and continue their scheme to defraud the funds and their investors unimpeded. | ||||
11/10/16 | Alleged Affiliate Transactions by Unregistered Investment Adviser | In Derik J. Todd, Advisers Act Release No. 4,567 (Nov. 10, 2016), the SEC settled public administrative and cease-and-desist proceedings in connection with affiliate transactions allegedly conducted by Derik J. Todd, an unregistered investment adviser, and four limited liability companies, controlled, directly or indirectly, by Mr. Todd: Madison Capital Energy Income Fund II GP LLC (“Fund II GP”), Big Horn Minerals LLC (“Big Horn”), Madison Capital Investments LLC (“MCI”), and Madison Royalty Management LLC (“MRM”). According to the SEC, in 2010 Mr. Todd formed a private fund (“Fund II”) for the purpose of acquiring oil and gas royalty interests to generate a return for its investors. The SEC alleged that Fund II’s offering materials represented to investors, among other things, that Mr. Todd and Fund II’s general partner, Fund II GP, would use the assets and funds of Fund II for the “exclusive benefit” of Fund II, conduct transactions with affiliates on an “arms-length basis,” and that Mr. Todd, through MCI, would negotiate with sellers to purchase assets for Fund II at the “best price possible.” | The SEC alleged that Mr. Todd and Fund II GP willfully violated Section 17(a) of the Securities Act. The SEC alleged that Mr. Todd and Fund II GP willfully violated Section 10(b) of, and Rule 10b-5 under, the Exchange Act. The SEC alleged that Mr. Todd and Fund II GP willfully violated Sections 206(1) and 206(2) of the | Mr. Todd, Fund II GP, MCI, Big Horn, and MRM agreed to cease and desist from committing any violations of and any future violations of the charges, and to pay disgorgement of $205,673, prejudgment interest of $21,581, and a civil money penalty of $50,000. Mr. Todd agreed to be barred from association with, among others, any broker, dealer, investment adviser, or municipal adviser, and to be prohibited from serving as, among other |
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According to the SEC, Mr. Todd raised $11,125,500 from approximately 150 investors during Fund II’s offering period, October 2010 through January 2012. According to the SEC, from late 2011 through 2014, Mr. Todd and Fund II GP used their affiliates as intermediaries for many of Fund II’s sales and purchases of oil and gas royalty interests. The SEC alleged that Mr. Todd sold portions of Fund II’s assets to Big Horn and MRM at cost, and then sold those same interests to an independent third party at a profit. According to the SEC, Mr. Todd and Fund II GP enabled Mr. Todd to profit in the amount of $308,638 at the expense of Fund II and its investors through these affiliate transactions. The SEC asserted that, in taking these actions, Mr. Todd and Fund II GP acted inconsistently with the representations set out in Fund II’s offering materials regarding conducting transactions on an arms-length basis for the exclusive benefit of, and at the best price possible for, Fund II. | Advisers Act. The SEC alleged that MCI, Big Horn, and MRM willfully aided and abetted and caused Mr. Todd’s and Fund II GP’s violations of Section 17(a) of the Securities Act, Section 10(b) of, and Rule 10b-5 under, the Exchange Act, and Sections 206(1) and 206(2) of the Advisers Act. | things, an employee of any advisory board or investment adviser for five years. Fund II GP, MCI, Big Horn, and MRM agreed to censure. | ||
10/31/16 | Auditors’ Alleged Failure to Comply with Professional Standards in Connection With an Audit of a Venture Capital | In Adrian D. Beamish, CPA, Exchange Act Release No. 79,193 (Oct. 31, 2016), the SEC instituted public administrative proceedings against Adrian D. Beamish, CPA, an audit partner at PricewaterhouseCoopers (“PwC”), for allegedly failing to comply with professional standards in connection with his audits of a private venture capital fund. | The SEC alleged that Mr. Beamish engaged in improper professional conduct within the meaning of Section 4C of the | The SEC instituted proceedings to determine what, if any, remedial action should be taken, including whether Mr. Beamish should be censured, or denied, temporarily or |
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Fund | According to the SEC, PwC was retained in 2006 by a venture capital fund to conduct annual audits of its financial statements. The SEC alleged that Mr. Beamish served as the audit partner and was responsible for the planning, execution, and supervision of the audits, including the PwC audit team’s compliance with appropriate professional standards. According to the SEC, Mr. Beamish authorized PwC to issue audit reports on the fund’s financial statements with unqualified opinions for the year-end 2009 through year-end 2012 audits, even though the audits failed to comply with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (“GAAP”) and the audits failed to comply with Generally Accepted Accounting Standards (“GAAS”). The SEC in particular alleged that the fund’s investment adviser had improperly advanced management fees from the fund and that these advances were not properly accounted for or disclosed on the fund’s financial statements. According to the SEC, Mr. Beamish failed to meet GAAS standards by failing to seek the business rationale for why the advanced management fees balance increased each year between 2009 and 2011. The SEC alleged that, if the PwC audit team had investigated this increase, it would have discovered that the adviser had used these fees for the business operations of the fund’s affiliates and for the personal expenses of the adviser’s principal. According to the SEC, the fund’s financial statements violated GAAP by inconsistently and inaccurately | Exchange Act and Rule 102(e)(1)(ii) of the Commission’s Rules of Practice. | permanently, the privilege of appearing or practicing before the Commission as an accountant. | |
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disclosing the nature of the advanced management fees. The SEC alleged, for example, that the PwC audit team proposed a footnote that would have disclosed in the fund’s 2012 year-end financial statements that the amount advanced to the adviser exceeded all future expected management fees contractually owed to the adviser. According to the SEC, the fund’s adviser rejected this disclosure, and Mr. Beamish subsequently signed the fund’s unqualified opinion. https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2016/34-79193.pdf This action is related to a settlement discussed in greater detail below, Burrill Capital Management, LLC, Advisers Act Release No. 4,360 (Mar. 30, 2016), in which the SEC settled public administrative and cease-and-desist proceedings against Burrill Capital Management, LLC, a now-defunct investment adviser, and certain of its principals, for allegedly misappropriating funds from a venture capital fund advisory client. | ||||
10/18/16 | Alleged Cross-Border Brokerage and Investment Advisory Services | In Bank Leumi le-Israel B.M., Advisers Act Release No. 4,555 (Oct. 18, 2016), the SEC settled public administrative and cease-and-desist proceedings against Bank Leumi le-Israel B.M. (“Leumi Israel”), an Israeli corporation, and two of its wholly-owned subsidiaries, Leumi Private Bank and Bank Leumi (Luxembourg) | The SEC alleged that Leumi violated Section 15(a) of the Exchange Act. | Leumi agreed to cease and desist from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of the charges, to censure, to |
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S.A. (“Leumi Luxembourg” and, collectively with Bank Leumi and Leumi Private Bank, “Leumi”), for allegedly providing brokerage and investment advisory services to U.S. customers without registering as a broker-dealer under the Exchange Act and an investment adviser under the Advisers Act. According to the SEC, between at least 2002 through 2009, Leumi provided brokerage services to U.S. customers without registering as a broker-dealer with the Commission, and Leumi Private Bank provided investment advisory services to U.S. customers for compensation without registering as an Investment Adviser with the Commission. The SEC alleged that, during this period, at least 11 different representatives from Leumi traveled to the U.S. on 65 occasions to provide investment advice or solicit securities transactions at some 245 individual meetings. According to the SEC, Leumi became aware in at least 2008 that it faced the risk of violating federal securities laws by providing these services to U.S. customers without being registered as a broker-dealer and investment adviser. The SEC alleged that Leumi began to adopt policies and procedures designed to bring Leumi in compliance with federal securities laws, such as discontinuing travel by Leumi representatives to the U.S. in April 2009. Despite these policies, according to the SEC, from 2009 to 2013, Leumi continued to provide brokerage services to at least 711 separate customer accounts with securities holdings beneficially | The SEC alleged that Leumi Private Bank violated Section 203(a) of the Advisers Act. | pay disgorgement of $3,372,700, and a civil money penalty of $1,526,228. | ||
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owned by U.S. customers. The SEC alleged that, between 2002 and 2013, Leumi held securities in brokerage accounts for U.S. customers with an aggregate peak value of $537 million and generated a pre-tax income of $3.37 million from U.S. cross-border securities business. | ||||
10/18/16 | Alleged Improper Valuation of Illiquid Securities by Adviser to Open-End Fund | In Calvert Investment Management, Inc., Advisers Act Release No. 4,554 (Oct. 18, 2016), the SEC settled public administrative and cease-and-desist proceedings against Calvert Investment Management, Inc. (“Calvert”), an investment adviser registered under the Advisers Act, in connection with alleged improper fair valuation of certain illiquid securities held by mutual funds advised by Calvert. Calvert is a well-known investment adviser of, among other clients, investment companies registered under the 1940 Act. The SEC alleged that, between March 2008 and October 2011, certain of these investment companies held securities issued by Toll Road Investors Partnership II, L.P. (the “Toll Road Bonds”), which were illiquid securities and with respect to which only limited information was publicly available from which to value the securities. According to the SEC, during this time, Calvert’s calculation of the Toll Road Bonds’ fair value was | The SEC alleged that Calvert willfully violated Sections 206(2) and 206(4) of, and Rule 206(4)-8 under, the Advisers Act. The SEC alleged that Calvert caused certain mutual funds advised by Calvert to violate Section 34(b) of, and Rules 22c-1 and 38 a-1 under, the 1940 Act. The SEC alleged that Calvert caused | Calvert agreed to cease and desist from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of the charges, to censure, and to pay a civil money penalty of $3.9 million. Calvert also agreed to recalculate its valuation of the Toll Road Bonds for the relevant period, using a methodology approved by the SEC. |
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improper as Calvert failed to include certain data in making its calculations, including, among other things, the prices at which the investment companies traded the Toll Road Bonds, values assigned by other holders of the Toll Road Bonds, and other market data. The SEC alleged that Calvert instead relied primarily on a third-party analytical tool that did not properly account for the Toll Road Bonds’ future cash flows and, as a result, inflated Calvert’s fair value prices for the securities. According to the SEC, the inaccurate valuations of the Toll Road Bonds caused the investment companies to execute shareholder transactions at an incorrect net asset value and for Calvert to collect inflated asset-based fees. The SEC alleged that, during the relevant time period, certain shareholders redeemed fund shares at an overstated net asset value at the expense of the remaining shareholders. The SEC alleged that, in October 2011, Calvert discovered that its valuation of the Toll Road Bonds was inaccurate and made adjustments to its valuations that caused a markdown of each investment company’s net asset value. According to the SEC, in December 2011, Calvert sought to compensate the affected shareholders and investment companies for any losses resulting from its markdown of net asset value. The SEC alleged that the methodology used by Calvert to compensate affected shareholders was based on an insufficient process that was not based on full transactional data and was not consistent with Calvert’s own policies and procedures relating to net asset value correction. Over | a mutual fund advised by Calvert to violate Section 17(a) of the 1940 Act. | |||
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half of the SEC’s settlement order was an effective critique of the process used by Calvert to compensate shareholders. According to the SEC, Calvert’s compensation calculations were based on a netting out of subscription and redemption activity at the intermediary account level and did not include data concerning underlying shareholder activity in subaccounts held through certain intermediaries. The SEC alleged that this compensation methodology likely understated the effects of the improper valuation. The SEC separately alleged that, in July 2011, Calvert separately caused one of its investment company clients to engage in a prohibited transaction in violation of Section 17(a) of the 1940 Act. The SEC alleged that Calvert caused an investment company to purchase certain Toll Road Bonds from another investment company that Calvert sub-advised, and did not timely report this transaction to the first investment company’s board of trustees. | ||||
10/13/16 | Alleged Failure by a Registered Investment Adviser to Supervise a Research Analyst | In Artis Capital Management, L.P., Advisers Act Release No. 4,550 (Oct. 13, 2016), the SEC settled public administrative and cease-and-desist proceedings against Artis Capital Management, L.P. (“Artis”), an investment adviser registered under the Advisers Act until it withdrew its registration in April 2016, and a former senior analyst at Artis, for allegedly failing to | The SEC alleged that Artis and Artis’s former senior analyst failed reasonably to supervise Mr. Teeple within the | Artis agreed to censure, and to pay disgorgement of $6,295,084 and a civil money penalty of $2,582,991. |
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Alleged Failure by a Registered Investment Adviser to Adopt and Implement Policies and Procedures to Detect and Prevent Insider Trading | detect insider trading by an Artis analyst. According to the SEC, in 2007 Artis hired Matthew Teeple as a research analyst to evaluate potential investments in certain types of technology companies. The SEC alleged that, unlike other research analysts at Artis, Mr. Teeple did not work out of Artis’s San Francisco office, did not construct analytical models regarding the companies he covered, did not provide written research reports, and did not maintain research files available for review by anyone at Artis. According to the SEC, Mr. Teeple instead worked exclusively out of his Southern California home and provided his recommendations, which were based exclusively on industry sources, to Artis by telephone. The SEC alleged that Artis’s policies and procedures relating to insider trading required any employee that believed he or she was in possession of material nonpublic information to immediately cease recommending any transaction in the security and to consult with Artis’s chief compliance officer. According to the SEC, even though Artis was aware that Mr. Teeple based his recommendations on industry sources, Artis did not take additional steps to ensure its insider trading policies and procedures were complied with, such as by requiring Mr. Teeple to log his interactions with employees of public companies. The SEC alleged further that, on at least two separate occasions in 2008, Mr. Teeple obtained material non- | meaning of Section 203(e)(6) of the Advisers Act. The SEC alleged that Artis willfully violated Section 204A of the Advisers Act. | Artis’s former senior analyst agreed to pay a civil money penalty of $130,000, and to be suspended from association with, among others, any broker, dealer, or investment adviser for a period of one year. | |
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public information in connection with the impending acquisition of a technology company whose securities were publicly traded by another company. According to the SEC, Mr. Teeple made recommendations to a senior analyst at Artis based on this information, which resulted in profitable trades for Artis. The SEC alleged that Artis and its senior analyst should have been aware that these timely recommendations, which preceded a major public announcement by the company, may have been based on material non-public information in light of Mr. Teeple’s industry connections. A reasonable supervisor, according to the SEC, would have investigated whether Mr. Teeple had access to inside information to support these recommendations. The SEC alleged that Artis and its senior analyst failed to ask questions about the sources of the information and failed to inform Artis’s chief compliance officer of the possibility that the recommendations were made on inside information. This action is related to the civil proceeding SEC v. Teeple, et al, 13-cv-2010 (S.D.N.Y.), in which the SEC successfully sued Mr. Teeple for insider trading, and the criminal case U.S. v. Teeple, 13-cr-339 (S.D.N.Y.), in which Mr. Teeple pled guilty to one count of criminal conspiracy to commit securities fraud. | ||||
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10/4/16 | Alleged Materially False and Misleading Statements by a Registered Investment Adviser in Connection with Allocation of Trades | In Oracle Investment Research, Advisers Act Release No. 4,545 (Oct. 4, 2016), the SEC instituted public administrative and cease-and-desist proceedings against Laurence Isaac Baiter, doing business as Oracle Investment Research (“Oracle”), an investment adviser registered under the Advisers Act until it withdrew its registration in August 2013, for alleged breaches of its fiduciary duties in connection with the allocation of trades and false disclosures provided to advisory clients. According to the SEC, Oracle provided investment advisory services to separate accounts and to a registered investment company under the 1940 Act (the “Oracle Mutual Fund”). The SEC alleged that Oracle began, in May 2012, to execute a day-trading strategy in which it executed trades on behalf of itself in the same omnibus account as other separately managed account clients. According to the SEC, this strategy violated Oracle’s written policies and procedures, which required Oracle to provide clients with priority on all purchases and sales prior to the execution of proprietary accounts, and was also contrary to Oracle’s disclosures in its Form ADV Part 2A. The SEC alleged that Oracle’s practice of allocating trades after execution resulted in profitable trades being allocated to Oracle’s proprietary account while unprofitable trades were disproportionately allocated to client accounts. According to the SEC, Oracle’s misrepresentations and omissions constituted a breach of its fiduciary duty. The SEC alleged further that Oracle falsely represented | The SEC alleged that Oracle willfully violated Section 17(a) of the Securities Act, Section 10(b) of, and Rule 10b-5 under, the Exchange Act, and Sections 206(1), 206(2), 206(4), and 207 of, and Rule 206(4)-8 under, the Advisers Act. The SEC alleged that Oracle willfully aided and abetted and caused the Oracle Mutual Fund’s violations of Section 13(a) of the 1940 Act. The SEC alleged that Oracle willfully violated, aided and abetted and caused the Oracle Mutual | The SEC instituted cease-and-desist proceedings to determine what, if any, remedial action, including, but not limited to, disgorgement, interest and civil penalties, is appropriate against Oracle. |
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to clients invested through separately managed accounts that they would not be charged additional management fees if their assets were invested in the Oracle Mutual Fund. According to the SEC, Oracle then manually deducted the Fund’s management fees from these accounts. The SEC alleged that the Oracle Mutual Fund’s statement of additional information disclosed to investors that the Fund was diversified, as defined in Section 5(b)(1) of the 1940 Act, and that the Fund would not invest 25% or more of the Fund’s net assets in securities of issuers in a single industry. According to the SEC, however, in numerous fiscal quarters Oracle caused the Oracle Mutual Fund to become non-diversified and/or to invest 25% or more of the Fund’s net assets in securities of issuers in a single industry. | Fund’s violations of Section 34(b) of the 1940 Act. | |||
9/29/16 | Alleged Use of Fund Assets by Advisers Act-Registered Investment Adviser to Pay Bribes to Foreign Government Officials in Violation of Foreign Corrupt | In Och-Ziff Capital Management Group LLC, Advisers Act Release No. 4,540 (Sept. 29, 2016), the SEC settled public administrative and cease-and-desist proceedings against Och-Ziff Capital Management Group LLC (“Och-Ziff”), an institutional alternative asset manager, OZ Management LP (“OZ”), a subsidiary of Och-Ziff and an investment adviser registered under the Advisers Act, Och-Ziff’s chief executive officer, and Och-Ziff’s chief financial officer, in connection with numerous transactions in which Och-Ziff allegedly paid bribes to high-ranking government officials in Africa. | The SEC alleged that Och-Ziff willfully violated Sections 30A, 13(b)(2)(A), and 13(b)(2)(B) of the Exchange Act. The SEC alleged that OZ violated Section 206(4) of, | Och-Ziff, OZ, Och-Ziff’s chief executive officer, and Och-Ziff’s chief financial officer agreed to cease and desist from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of the charges. |
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Practices Act | The SEC alleged that, from 2007 through 2011, Och-Ziff entered into a series of transactions and investments in which Och-Ziff paid bribes through intermediaries, agents and business partners to high-ranking government officials in several African countries, including Libya, Chad, Niger, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (“DRC”). According to the SEC, a majority of these bribes involved the use of Och-Ziff client assets managed by OZ, rather than Och-Ziff’s own capital, and were paid to foreign government officials to obtain or retain business for Och-Ziff and its business partners. The SEC alleged that, in 2007, the head of Och-Ziff’s European office secured an investment mandate from a Libyan sovereign wealth fund by funneling Och-Ziff client assets through a shell company established by a third-party intermediary, which then used the assets to pay bribes to Libyan government officials. According to the SEC, Och-Ziff authorized these transactions even though it was aware that doing business with the intermediary presented risks of violating anti-corruption laws, as the intermediary had connections to high-ranking government officials in Libya and business interests that were difficult to accurately discern. The SEC further alleged that, beginning in 2008, Och-Ziff entered into a partnership with an Israeli businessman (“DRC Partner”) with close ties to high-ranking government officials within the DRC. | and Rule 206(4)-8 under, the Advisers Act, and willfully violated Sections 206(1) and 206(2) of the Advisers Act. The SEC alleged that Och-Ziff’s chief executive officer and Och-Ziff’s chief financial officer each caused Och-Ziff’s violations of Section 13(b)(2)(A) of the Exchange Act. The SEC alleged that Och-Ziff’s chief financial officer caused Och-Ziff’s violations of Section 13(b)(2)(B) of the Exchange Act. | Och-Ziff and OZ agreed to censure and to pay disgorgement of $199,045,167. Och-Ziff’s chief executive officer agreed to pay disgorgement of $2,173,718. | |
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According to the SEC, the purpose of this partnership was ostensibly for Och-Ziff to fund the DRC Partner’s mining-related interests while he used his government contacts to acquire assets and navigate the DRC business environment for his and Och-Ziff’s benefit. The SEC alleged, however, that the head of Och-Ziff’s European office and at least one other Och-Ziff employee were aware that the DRC Partner would use the funds Och-Ziff provided to him to pay bribes to government officials, acquire assets with the help of government benefactors at a significant discount to the value of the asset, and gain favor for his mining interests in the DRC. According to the SEC, Och-Ziff entered into several transactions, between 2008 and 2011, with certain entities controlled by the DRC Partner, including more than $250 million in loans, through which Och-Ziff client assets were used for payments to DRC government officials. The SEC alleged that Och-Ziff’s senior executives, including its chief executive officer and chief financial officer, reviewed due diligence regarding the DRC Partner, which revealed a history of suspicious transactions, allegations of illegal conduct, and close connections with high-ranking government officials in the DRC. According to the SEC, Och-Ziff’s chief executive officer, after reviewing this diligence, directed subordinates to continue moving forward with potential transactions with the DRC Partner. | ||||
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The SEC alleged separately that Och-Ziff caused client assets invested in an Africa-focused fund controlled by Och-Ziff to be used in self-dealing transactions to benefit an Och-Ziff employee, Och-Ziff’s business partners, and Och-Ziff itself. According to the SEC, an Och-Ziff employee caused the fund to make investments in a London-based mining holding company controlled by the third-party intermediary in Libya so that the intermediary could pay back an $18 million personal loan owed to the Och-Ziff employee. The SEC alleged that the Africa-focused fund’s assets were also used in 2011 to purchase shares of a London-based oil and gas company, and that this transaction was designed to provide $50 million to a business partner of Och-Ziff to further the partner’s and Och-Ziff’s interests in the Republic of Guinea. According to the SEC, OZ failed to disclose all material facts and conflicts of interest arising from these transactions in its communications with the fund’s investors. The SEC alleged that Och-Ziff failed to impose procedures or measures sufficient to prevent corruption or provide reasonable assurance that transaction documents appropriately reflected third-party use of funds. According to the SEC, Och-Ziff adopted in 2008 an anti-corruption policy and procedures, which applied to OZ and all of OZ’s affiliates, and required rigorous due diligence and anti-corruption measures designed to provide reasonable assurances that transactions would be executed in accordance with management’s authorization and accurately recorded. The SEC alleged that Och-Ziff failed to follow these procedures in connection with the | ||||
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transactions described above despite indications of substantial corruption risks. | ||||
9/23/16 | Alleged Prohibited Cross Trading by a Registered Investment Adviser Alleged Failure to Implement Compliance Policies and Procedures to Identify Impermissible Cross Trading | In Aviva Investors Americas, LLC, Advisers Act Release No. 4,534 (Sept. 23, 2016), the SEC settled public administrative and cease-and-desist proceedings against Aviva Investors Americas, LLC (“Aviva”), an investment adviser registered under the Advisers Act, in connection with allegedly inappropriate cross trades arranged by Aviva Investors North America, Inc. (“AINA”), an investment adviser that withdrew its registration under the Advisers Act in 2014 and was succeeded by Aviva, which assumed certain of AINA’s asset management functions. According to the SEC, between March 2010 and December 2011, three AINA traders arranged to sell fixed income securities from certain AINA advisory clients to counterparty broker-dealers and then repurchased the same securities the following day on behalf of different AINA advisory clients. The SEC alleged that AINA conducted these trades without obtaining an exemptive order as required by Sections 17(a)(1) and 17(a)(2) of the 1940 Act. According to the SEC, 161 of these trades were between registered investment company clients of AINA and their affiliates, which required an exemptive order from the Commission. | The SEC alleged that AINA caused certain of its advisory clients to violate Sections 17(a)(1) and 17(a)(2) of the 1940 Act. The SEC alleged that AINA violated Sections 206(3) and 206(4) of, and Rule 206(4)-7 under, the Advisers Act. | Aviva agreed to cease and desist from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of the charges, and to pay a civil money penalty of $250,000. |
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The SEC further alleged that AINA’s compliance department failed to detect these trades even though the department had identified cross trading as a risk and took steps to identify and prevent impermissible cross trading. According to the SEC, the individuals working on cross trading within AINA’s compliance department were underqualified and lacked resources to effectively detect impermissible cross trading, even though senior members of the compliance department had made requests for additional resources to AINA senior management. | ||||
9/14/16 | Alleged Failure by a Private Equity Firm to Disclose Conflicts of Interest Related to Fees and Expenses | In First Reserve Management, L.P., Advisers Act Release No. 4,529 (Sept. 14, 2016), the SEC settled public administrative and cease-and-desist proceedings against First Reserve Management, L.P. (“First Reserve”), an investment adviser registered under the Advisers Act, for allegedly failing to appropriately disclose conflicts of interest to its private equity fund clients. According to the SEC, in late 2013, First Reserve caused two of its private equity fund clients to collectively become 75% owners of First Reserve Momentum L.P. (“FRM”), an entity that was itself a pooled investment vehicle formed by First Reserve to invest in small oil field equipment and services companies. The SEC alleged that FRM had two subsidiaries that were formed by First Reserve to provide investment management services to FRM. | The SEC alleged that First Reserve violated Sections 206(2) and 206(4) of, and Rules 206(4)-7 and 206(4)-8 under, the Advisers Act. | First Reserve agreed to cease and desist from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of the charges, and to pay a civil money penalty of $3.5 million. First Reserve also voluntarily reimbursed its private fund clients that were affected by these violations, including: $7,435,737 to two private funds in connection with the subsidiaries of FRM; |
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According to the SEC, First Reserve caused the private equity funds invested in FRM to pay a proportionate share of the subsidiary’s organizational and startup expenses. The SEC alleged that, between 2013 and 2015, over $7 million (approximately 15%) of the private equity funds’ capital contribution to FRM were used to pay the expenses of the subsidiaries, including the cost of each entity’s formation, and general operating costs such as rent, utilities, and salaries. According to the SEC, this structure allowed First Reserve to avoid incurring certain expenses in connection with providing investment advisory services to the funds, which created a conflict of interest that was not disclosed to the funds’ investors or advisory boards. The SEC alleged that First Reserve did not disclose to the funds prior to commitment of capital or prior to the expenses being incurred, that the funds’ capital commitment would be used to pay these expenses. The SEC asserted that First Reserve also inappropriately allocated insurance premium expenses to several of its private fund clients. The SEC alleged that the governing documents for these funds allowed insurance premium expenses to be borne by the funds for insurance that related to the affairs of the funds. According to the SEC, beginning in at least 2008, First Reserve allocated all of the premiums for an insurance policy that covered First Reserve for certain risks that did not pertain to its management of these funds. | $733,012 to various funds in connection with the allocation of insurance premiums; and $179,466 to various funds in connection with legal fee discounts. | |||
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The SEC further alleged that, between 2010 and 2014, First Reserve retained a law firm to provide services to First Reserve and its various funds. According to the SEC, First Reserve requested and obtained from the law firm a discount for legal services provided to First Reserve, even though the majority of work performed by the law firm was related to the funds. The SEC alleged that the funds did not receive a discount on the same kind of services that had been discounted for First Reserve, which created a conflict of interest that was not disclosed. According to the SEC, in 2013 First Reserve disclosed in its Form ADV the possibility that it could receive service provider discounts that could be more favorable than those of the funds, but at no time disclosed to the funds or its investors that it was receiving a discount for legal services. | ||||
9/8/16 | Alleged Failure to Track Additional Commission Costs Charged by Subadvisers Trading Outside of Wrap-Fee Program | In Raymond James & Associates, Inc., Advisers Act Release No. 4,525 (September 8, 2016), the SEC settled public administrative and cease-and-desist proceedings against Raymond James & Associates, Inc. (“Raymond James”), an investment adviser registered under the Advisers Act, for allegedly failing to appropriately disclose commission costs charged to clients invested in a wrap-fee program. According to the SEC, Raymond James offered advisory clients access to third-party managers through a wrap-fee program in which each client invested in the | The SEC alleged that Raymond James violated Section 206(4) of, and Rule 206(4)-7 under, the Advisers Act. | Raymond James agreed to cease and desist from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of the charges, and to pay a civil money penalty of $600,000. |
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program would select a participating third-party manager to act as Raymond James’ subadviser. The SEC alleged that clients in the wrap-fee program were not charged for commissions on trades executed by Raymond James, but were charged for commissions on trades executed by all other broker-dealers. According to the SEC, Raymond James disclosed to clients that certain subadvisers participating in the program executed nearly all client trades with a broker-dealer other than Raymond James, but failed to disclose the amount of additional commission costs incurred by clients invested in the program. According to the SEC, the additional commission costs were instead embedded in the security price reported for each purchase or sale on periodic account statements that Raymond James provided to clients in the program. The SEC alleged that this practice meant that clients in the program were unable to take these costs into consideration when negotiating a wrap-fee with Raymond James. The SEC alleged further that Raymond James did not collect any information from the subadvisers regarding the amount of the embedded commission costs and failed to adopt and implement written policies and procedures to make this cost information available to clients invested in the wrap-fee program. In determining to accept Raymond James’ offer, the SEC considered remedial acts undertaken by Raymond James and cooperation afforded the SEC staff. In | ||||
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particular, Raymond James indicated that it would disclose on its periodic statements to clients whenever additional commissions may have been charged and also maintain a website that discloses the trading practices of subadvisers participating in the program. | ||||
9/8/16 | Alleged Failure to Track Additional Commission Costs Charged by Subadvisers Trading Outside of Wrap-Fee Program | In Robert W. Baird & Co. Incorporated, Advisers Act Release No. 4,526 (September 8, 2016), the SEC settled public administrative and cease-and-desist proceedings against Robert W. Baird & Co. Incorporated (“Robert Baird”), an investment adviser registered under the Advisers Act, for allegedly failing to appropriately disclose commission costs charged to clients invested in a wrap-fee program. The facts of this case are similar to the facts of the above case, Raymond James & Associates, Inc., Advisers Act Release No. 4,525 (September 8, 2016). The SEC alleged that Robert Baird, like Raymond James, failed to adopt and implement policies and procedures reasonably designed to track and disclose the trading practices of certain of the subadvisers participating in Robert Baird’s wrap-fee programs. | The SEC alleged that Robert Baird violated Section 206(4) of, and Rule 206(4)-7 under, the Advisers Act. | Robert Baird agreed to cease and desist from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of the charges, and to pay a civil money penalty of $250,000. |
8/25/16 | Alleged Omissions of Material Fact in Application for Exemptive Relief | In Orinda Asset Management, LLC, Advisers Act Release No. 4,513 (August 25, 2016), the SEC settled public administrative and cease-and-desist proceedings against Orinda Asset Management, LLC (“Orinda”), an investment adviser registered under the Advisers Act, | The SEC alleged that Orinda willfully violated, and caused the funds’ sponsoring | Orinda agreed to cease and desist from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of the |
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Under the 1940 Act Alleged Failure to Disclose Side Agreement that Waived Adviser’s Ability to Terminate Subadviser | for allegedly omitting material facts in an application for exemptive relief and other disclosures filed with the Commission. According to the SEC, Orinda advised two 1940 Act-registered investment companies through a manager-of-managers structure, allocating assets of the investment companies among unaffiliated investment managers that served as subadvisers to the funds. The SEC alleged that Orinda engaged a lead subadviser to assist in managing the investment companies and select and monitor other subadvisers to the investment companies. According to the SEC, Orinda and the subadviser negotiated an agreement under which Orinda would pay the subadviser “termination payments” if Orinda were to terminate the subadviser for any reason other than “for cause.” Section 15(a) of, and Rule 18f-2 under, the 1940 Act require the approval of a registered investment company’s shareholders before retaining a subadviser or making any material changes to an existing subadvisory agreement. The SEC alleged that Orinda sought an order from the Commission exempting it from compliance with these shareholder approval obligations. Such an order is not unusual, and many such orders have been granted by the SEC. According to the SEC, after reviewing the application, the SEC’s Division of Investment Management communicated to Orinda and the investment companies’ board of directors that it would not support the application for an exemptive | administrators’ violations of, Section 34(b) of the 1940 Act. | charges, to censure, and to pay a civil money penalty of $75,000. | |
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order if the agreement providing for termination payments to the subadviser were included. The SEC alleged that Orinda then terminated this aspect of its agreement with the subadviser and informed the SEC of its action. According to the SEC, Orinda then reached a new agreement with the subadviser under which Orinda waived its right to terminate the subadviser for any reason. The SEC alleged further that Orinda then filed a new application for exemptive relief that did not disclose the new agreement. According to the SEC, the prospectus and statement of additional information filed with the Commission for each investment company failed to disclose the second agreement and falsely indicated that all of the subadvisory agreements could be terminated at any time by Orinda without penalty. The Orinda settlement is noteworthy as it reflects one of only a few instances over time in which the SEC commenced an enforcement case relating to non-compliance with a Commission exemptive order under the 1940 Act. | ||||
8/24/16 | Alleged Failure by a Private Equity Advisory Firm to Disclose Transaction Fee Allocation Methodology | In WL Ross & Co. LLC, Advisers Act Release No. 4,494 (August 24, 2016), the SEC settled public administrative and cease-and-desist proceedings against WL Ross & Co. LLC (“WL Ross”), an investment adviser registered under the Advisers Act, for allegedly failing to appropriately disclose its method of allocating transaction fees received from portfolio companies owned by WL Ross’s private equity fund clients. | The SEC alleged that WL Ross violated Sections 206(2) and 206(4) of, and Rule 206(4)-8 under, the Advisers Act. | WL Ross agreed to cease and desist from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of the charges, and to pay a civil money penalty of $2.3 million. |
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According to the SEC, WL Ross advised private equity funds under the terms of governing documents that permitted WL Ross to receive certain transaction fees from the portfolio companies owned by the funds including break-up, broken deal, and monitoring fees. The SEC alleged that the funds’ governing documents required that the transaction fees received by WL Ross would be offset with a corresponding reduction in the management fee charged to a fund by 50% or 80% of the amount of the transaction fee, depending on the fund. According to the SEC, WL Ross allocated a percentage of the transaction fees it received directly to the funds to offset the quarterly management fees it received. The SEC alleged that the governing documents of each fund were unclear as to how the transaction fees would be allocated when co-investors, which are not advised by WL Ross and therefore not subject to any offsetting provisions, invested in the same portfolio company. According to the SEC, WL Ross interpreted the ambiguity in the governing documents to allow it to allocate the transaction fees based on each WL Ross-advised fund’s proportionate ownership of a portfolio company, with WL Ross retaining the portion of the transaction fees allocable to any co-investor’s relative ownership share. The SEC alleged further that each WL Ross-advised fund would have received a greater allocation of | WL Ross also voluntarily reimbursed the private equity funds, with interest, $11,873,571 in management fee credits resulting from its retroactive application of the revised allocation methodology to the inception of the funds. | |||
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transaction fees had WL Ross excluded the co-investor’s ownership percentage when allocating the transaction fees. According to the SEC, under the allocation method used, WL Ross received approximately $10.4 million in additional management fees from the WL Ross-advised funds between 2001 and 2011. In determining to accept WL Ross’ offer, the SEC considered remedial acts undertaken by WL Ross and cooperation afforded the SEC staff. In particular, WL Ross voluntarily revised its fee allocation methodology to exclude the ownership interest of co-investors, and self-reported the transaction fee allocation issue to the SEC. This case is noteworthy as another example of the SEC’s continuing focus on the fees charged by private equity advisers to portfolio companies. | ||||
8/23/16 | Alleged Failure by a Private Equity Firm to Disclose Conflicts of Interest Related to Fees and Expenses Alleged Failure | In Apollo Management V, L.P., Advisers Act Release No. 4,493 (August 23, 2016), the SEC settled public administrative and cease-and-desist proceedings against four private equity fund advisers: Apollo Management V, L.P., Apollo Management VI, L.P., Apollo Management VII, L.P., and Apollo Commodities Management, L.P. (collectively, “Apollo”), each an investment adviser registered under the Advisers Act, for allegedly failing to disclose certain conflicts of interest relating to monitoring fees paid by | The SEC alleged that Apollo violated Sections 206(2) and 206(4) of, and Rules 206(4)-7 and 206(4)-8 under, the Advisers Act. | Apollo agreed to cease and desist from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of the charges, and to pay disgorgement of $40,254,552 and a civil money penalty of $12,500,000. |
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to Supervise Expense Reimbursement Practices | fund clients to Apollo, and to supervise a senior partner who improperly charged personal items to Apollo-advised funds. According to the SEC, each fund advised by Apollo owned multiple portfolio companies, each of which agreed to pay monitoring fees to Apollo for providing management, consulting, and other services. The SEC alleged that Apollo’s monitoring agreements with the portfolio companies commonly covered a ten year period and provided for acceleration of monitoring fees when triggered by certain events such as the private sale or initial public offering of a portfolio company, in which case Apollo would receive a present value lump-sum payment of the remaining years under the agreement. According to the SEC, Apollo disclosed to the funds and investors in the funds before investors committed capital that it had the ability to collect monitoring fees, but Apollo did not fully disclose to the funds or the funds’ investors its practice of accelerating monitoring fees until after Apollo had received the fees. The SEC alleged that Apollo’s receipt of accelerated monitoring fees created a conflict of interest that was not fully disclosed, and that prevented Apollo from effectively consenting on behalf of the funds to its receipt of accelerated monitoring fees. The SEC alleged separately from the facts relating to Apollo’s charging of monitoring fees that a general partner of an Apollo-advised fund entered into an agreement in 2008 with a fund and four parallel funds under which the funds loaned the general partner approximately $19 | |||
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million, which was equal to the carried interest owed to the general partner. The SEC alleged that the loan was designed to defer the taxes owed on the carried interest by the investors in the general partner. According to the SEC, the funds’ financial statements noted the loan, but failed, until March 2014, to disclose that the loan’s accrued interest would be allocated solely to the capital account of the general partner. The SEC alleged further, and separate from the facts noted above, that, between 2010 and 2013, a former senior partner at Apollo improperly charged personal items and services to Apollo-advised funds and the funds’ portfolio companies. According to the SEC, Apollo first discovered the partner’s improper charges in 2010 and then again in 2012 but failed to take any remedial steps or disciplinary action beyond a verbal warning to the partner after the partner had reimbursed Apollo. The SEC alleged that Apollo’s response to the partner’s conduct demonstrated a failure to appropriately supervise the partner. According to the SEC, Apollo failed to reasonably implement policies and procedures to prevent the above alleged conduct. In determining to accept Apollo’s offer, the Commission considered remedial acts taken by Apollo and cooperation afforded the Commission staff. In particular, Apollo initiated several reviews of the former partner’s expenses and voluntarily reported the improperly charged personal expenses to the Commission staff. | ||||
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8/15/16 | Alleged Failure by a Registered Investment Adviser to Disclose Conflicts of Interest Alleged Misappropriation of Client Assets by Investment Adviser Representative Alleged Failure to Supervise Investment Adviser Representative | In Fortius Financial Advisors, LLC, Advisers Act Release No. 4,483 (Aug. 15, 2016), the SEC settled public administrative and cease-and-desist proceedings against Fortius Financial Advisors, LLC (“Fortius”), an investment adviser registered under the Advisers Act, Fortius’ managing member, and a former investment adviser representative of Fortius, for allegedly failing to disclose conflicts of interest and misappropriating client assets. According to the SEC, Fortius was the investment adviser to two trust entities established to manage the assets of an elderly client who was in poor health and suffering from dementia, with the understanding that the assets would be distributed to a charitable foundation upon the client’s death. The SEC alleged that the Fortius investment adviser representative acted as trustee to the trusts pursuant to a separate service agreement between the client and the representative. According to the SEC, during the period from 2006 until 2008, Fortius invested the trusts’ assets in traditional securities such as publicly traded stocks, bonds, and mutual funds, for which it charged an asset-based fee of between 1.0% and 1.5%. The SEC alleged that, during the period from 2008 until 2009, Fortius began to invest the trusts’ assets in unsuitable, illiquid investments in which Fortius had an undisclosed financial interest. According to the SEC, Fortius invested $500,000 of the trusts’ funds into one of Fortius’ private fund entities, | The SEC alleged that Fortius, Fortius’ managing member, and Fortius’ investment adviser representative willfully violated Section 206(2) of the Advisers Act. The SEC alleged that Fortius willfully violated, and its managing member caused its violation of, Section 206(4) of, and Rules 206(4)-2 and 206(4)-7 under, the Advisers Act. The SEC alleged that Fortius willfully violated, and its investment adviser representative caused its violation of, Section 207 of the Advisers Act. | Fortius, Fortius’ managing member, and Fortius’ investment adviser representative agreed to cease and desist from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of the charges. Fortius and Fortius’ managing member agreed to censure. Fortius agreed to pay disgorgement of $24,070, and a civil money penalty of $70,000. Fortius’ managing member agreed to pay disgorgement of $1,969, and a civil money penalty of $25,000. Fortius’ investment adviser representative agreed to be barred from association with, |
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which charged a higher asset-based fee of 2% to 2.5%. The SEC alleged further that Fortius caused the trusts to loan approximately $245,000 to two private companies in which Fortius had a large financial stake. According to the SEC, Fortius, its managing member, and its representative, had a financial incentive in each of these transactions creating several conflicts of interest. The SEC alleged that the Fortius representative’s conflicts of interest prevented him from effectively consenting to these transactions on behalf of the trusts as trustee. According to the SEC, Fortius’ investment adviser representative misappropriated approximately $137,000 from the trust accounts over a four-year period. The SEC alleged that this misappropriation indicated that Fortius failed to appropriately supervise the representative and to adopt policies and procedures reasonably designed to prevent this conduct. | The SEC alleged that Fortius’ investment adviser representative willfully violated Section 206(1) of the Advisers Act. The SEC alleged that Fortius and Fortius’ managing member failed reasonably to supervise Fortius’ investment adviser representative within the meaning of Section 203(e)(6) of the Advisers Act. | among others, any broker, dealer, investment adviser, or municipal adviser. | ||
8/12/16 | Federal Court Decision Relating to Advisers Act’s Definition of Compensation | In United States v. Everett C. Miller, No. 15-2577 (3d Cir. 2016), Everett C. Miller, a formerly registered investment adviser representative under New Jersey securities law, appealed his sentence after being convicted in a criminal proceeding of securities fraud and tax evasion in connection with a Ponzi scheme he allegedly orchestrated by selling “promissory notes” through unregistered offerings. Mr. Miller entered into a plea agreement and cooperation agreement in which | Mr. Miller pled guilty to one count of securities fraud, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), and one count of tax evasion, 26 U.S.C. § 7201. | Mr. Miller was sentenced to 120 months in prison. |
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the government agreed to recommend a reduction in the length of Mr. Miller’s prison sentence under the applicable sentencing guidelines in exchange for Mr. Miller’s acceptance of responsibility. A Federal District Court granted the penalty reduction, but also imposed on Mr. Miller a penalty enhancement applicable to an “investment adviser.” The issue before the Court was in effect whether Mr. Miller met the definition of an “investment adviser.” Mr. Miller argued on appeal before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (the “Third Circuit”) that the District Court’s application of the investment adviser enhancement was in error, because he was not an investment adviser as that term is defined in Section 202(a)(ll) of the Advisers Act. In particular, Mr. Miller argued that he did not provide securities advice “for compensation.” The Advisers Act does not define compensation, but the SEC has interpreted the term broadly to include any direct or indirect benefit, including the reimbursement for services performed or costs incurred. Mr. Miller argued that he did not receive any compensation because he was not reimbursed for services performed or costs incurred, and he did not collect a management or incentive fee from purchasers of the promissory notes. The Third Circuit rejected Mr. Miller’s argument and held that the “for compensation” requirement in Section 202(a)(ll)’s definition of investment adviser was satisfied “when he commingled investors’ accounts and | ||||
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spent the money for his own purposes.” This case is particularly noteworthy as the Third Circuit’s holding that compensation for the purposes of the definition of an investment adviser included the economic benefit Mr. Miller received from misappropriating assets appears in effect to expand the reach of the definition. | ||||
7/21/16 | Alleged Materially False and Misleading Statements made by a Registered Investment Adviser to Clients in Connection with Common Stock Offering of Adviser’s Parent Company Alleged Failure by Adviser to Implement Policies and Procedures to Ensure Parent Company Stock | In Concert Global Group Limited, Advisers Act Release No. 4,459 (July 21, 2016), the SEC settled public administrative and cease-and-desist proceedings against Concert Global Group Limited (“Concert Global”), the parent company of Concert Wealth Management, Inc. (“Concert Wealth”), an investment adviser registered under the Advisers Act, and Concert Global’s chief executive officer, arising from alleged materially false and misleading statements made in connection with offerings of Concert Global’s common stock. According to the SEC, Concert Global raised $2.2 million between 2010 and 2013 through sales of its common stock to approximately 21 investors in multiple states, including 12 of Concert Wealth’s advisory clients. The SEC alleged that Concert Global and its chief executive officer provided these investors with private placement memoranda that contained material misstatements and omissions, such as overstating Concert Global’s revenues by as much as 50% and its subsidiaries’ total assets by approximately $1 billion. | The SEC alleged that Concert Global and its chief executive officer violated Sections 5(a), 5(c), 17(a)(2), and 17(a)(3) of the Securities Act. The SEC alleged that Concert Wealth and Concert Global’s chief executive officer willfully violated Section 206(2) of the Advisers Act. The SEC alleged | Concert Global, Concert Global’s chief executive officer, and Concert Wealth agreed to cease and desist from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of the charges. Concert Global’s chief executive officer and Concert Wealth agreed to censure. Concert Global and Concert Wealth agreed to pay, jointly and severally, a civil money |
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Offering Documents Provided to Advisory Clients were Accurate | According to the SEC, the private placement memoranda also failed to disclose conflicts of interest arising from Concert Global’s use of the offering proceeds to repay its debt to related entities that Concert Global’s chief executive officer controlled and to pay quarterly dividends to the chief executive officer on his preferred stock. The SEC alleged further that Concert Global and its chief executive officer made these offerings without filing a registration statement under the Securities Act with the Commission or relying on an applicable exemption from registration. According to the SEC, Concert Wealth failed to implement policies and procedures reasonably designed to prevent the above conduct. The SEC alleged that Concert Wealth’s policies failed to address the selling of its parent entity’s common stock to advisory clients or to ensure the accuracy of statements made in connection with such offerings. https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2016/33-10113.pdf In a related case, in Dennis Navarra, Advisers Act Release No. 4,460 (July 21, 2016), the SEC settled public administrative and cease-and-desist proceedings against Concert Global’s former chief financial officer for allegedly making materially misleading statements and omissions in connection with the offerings | that Concert Wealth willfully violated, and Concert Global’s chief executive officer caused the violations of, Section 206(4) of, and Rule 206(4)-7 under, the Advisers Act. The SEC alleged that Concert Wealth’s former chief financial officer violated Sections 5(a), 5(c), 17(a)(2), and 17(a)(3) of the Securities Act, and willfully aided and | penalty of $120,000. Concert Global’s chief executive officer agreed to pay a civil money penalty of $60,000. Concert Wealth’s former chief financial officer agreed to cease and desist from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of the | |
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described in the above case. | abetted and caused Concert Wealth’s violation of Section 206(2) of the Advisers Act. | charges, and to censure. | ||
7/18/16 | Alleged Failure by Investment Adviser to Disclose Loans from Broker-Dealer | In Washington Wealth Management, LLC, Advisers Act Release No. 4,456 (July 18, 2016), the SEC settled public administrative and cease-and-desist proceedings against Washington Wealth Management, LLC (“WWM”), an investment adviser registered under the Advisers Act, for allegedly failing to disclose conflicts of interest relating to loans it received from a broker-dealer. According to the SEC, in 2012, WWM entered into an agreement with a broker-dealer to provide clearing, custody, and other services for WWM’s clients. The SEC alleged that WWM also received more than $1.8 million in loans from the broker-dealer to cover costs associated with transitioning its business from another broker-dealer. According to the SEC, $1.1 million of these loans were forgivable over a five-year period if the relationship continued during this period. The SEC alleged that for nearly a year after the loans were received, WWM failed to appropriately disclose these loans to investors. During this time, according to the SEC, WWM’s Form ADV, Part 2A brochure under the Advisers Act disclosed its relationship with the broker-dealer and other loans WWM had received, but did not disclose the loans from the broker-dealer. The | The SEC alleged that WWM willfully violated Sections 206(2) and 207 of the Advisers Act. | WWM agreed to cease and desist from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of the charges, to censure, and to pay a civil money penalty of $50,000. |
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SEC alleged that the loans created a conflict of interest that should have been disclosed to investors. According to the SEC, the disclosure failure was discovered after the SEC’s Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations (“OCIE”) conducted an examination and informed WWM in July 2013 of its failure to disclose the loans. | ||||
7/14/16 | Alleged Failure to Promptly Update Form ADV to Disclose Changes in Wrap-Fee Trading | In RiverFront Investment Group, LLC, Advisers Act Release No. 4,453 (July 14, 2016), the SEC settled public administrative and cease-and-desist proceedings against RiverFront Investment Group, LLC (“RiverFront”), an investment adviser registered under the Advisers Act, for allegedly failing to accurately disclose its trading practices under a wrap-fee program. According to the SEC, in 2008 RiverFront began serving as a subadviser to advisory clients participating in a wrap-fee program, in which the clients paid a fee covering the cost of several services wrapped together, such as trade execution, portfolio management, and back office services. The SEC alleged that RiverFront had sole responsibility for selecting the broker-dealers that would execute the clients’ transactions and could select broker-dealers not included under the wrap-fee program, whose commission costs would be charged to clients in addition to the wrap-fee, so long as RiverFront determined the transaction to be in the best interests of the clients. | The SEC alleged that RiverFront willfully violated Sections 204(a) and 207 of, and Rule 204-1(a) under, the Advisers Act. | RiverFront agreed to cease and desist from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of the charges, to censure, and to pay a civil money penalty of $300,000. |
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According to the SEC, RiverFront’s investor disclosures through its Form ADV, Part 2A brochure stated that some trading with broker-dealers not covered by the wrap-fee program could occur, but that RiverFront would “generally” execute trades through the wrap-fee program’s designated broker-dealers. The SEC alleged that RiverFront executed the majority of trades through designated broker-dealers during 2008 and most of 2009, but subsequently began decreasing the proportion of trades executed through designated broker-dealers such that, by early 2010, the majority of wrap-fee program trades were executed by broker-dealers not covered by the program. According to the SEC, RiverFront’s use of the designated broker-dealers for the majority of its wrap-fee program trading made RiverFront’s disclosures materially inaccurate. The SEC alleged that RiverFront failed to promptly amend its Form ADV as is required when information is materially inaccurate. According to the SEC, RiverFront’s subsequent amendments to its Form ADV, Part 2A brochure continued to be materially inaccurate until August 2011. In determining to accept RiverFront’s offer, the SEC considered remedial acts undertaken by RiverFront and cooperation afforded the SEC staff. In particular, RiverFront agreed to disclose on its public website relevant cost information for trading executed through broker-dealers outside the wrap-fee program. | ||||
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7/12/16 | Alleged Failure to Provide Accurate Trading Data to the Commission | In Citigroup Global Markets, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 78,291 (July 12, 2016), the SEC settled public administrative and cease-and-desist proceedings against Citigroup Global Markets, Inc. (“CGMI”), an Exchange Act-registered broker-dealer and an investment adviser registered under the Advisers Act, for allegedly providing inaccurate trading data to the Commission for over 15 years. Exchange Act Rules 17a-4(j), 17a-3(a)(1), and 17a-3(a)(6) provide that firms registered under the Exchange Act are required, in response to routine requests from Commission staff, to submit promptly information concerning transactions by all proprietary and customer accounts that bought or sold a particular security during a specified period, including information regarding the time of the trade, the type of trade, the number of securities traded, the price, and other customer identifying information. The SEC alleged that, from 1999 until 2014, CGMI had a coding error in its reporting systems that excluded 34,412 trades reported from certain of its offices. According to the SEC, CGMI discovered and corrected the coding error in April 2014. The SEC alleged further that CGMI did not disclose the error to the Commission until January 2015, nine months after it was first discovered. According to the SEC, the error affected a total of 3,528 submissions made by CGMI to the Commission and | The SEC alleged that CGMI willfully violated Section 17(a) of, and Rules 17a-4(j) and 17a-25 under, the Exchange Act. | CGMI agreed to cease and desist from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of the charges, to censure, and to pay a civil money penalty of $7 million. |
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FINRA. The SEC alleged that CGMI failed to report the incident to the SEC because it did not have in place a reasonable process to check the accuracy and completeness of these submissions. | ||||
6/16/16 | Alleged Failure by Fund Administrator to Detect or Act Upon Evidence of Fraud and Misconduct by Adviser | In Apex Fund Services (US), Inc., Advisers Act Release No. 4,428 (June 16, 2016), the SEC settled public administrative and cease-and-desist proceedings against Apex Fund Services (US), Inc. (“Apex”), a fund administration company providing services to private funds, for allegedly failing to detect or act upon indications of fraud and misconduct committed by the Advisers Act-registered investment adviser to four of Apex’s fund clients. The SEC instituted the proceedings against Apex under Section 203(k) of the Advisers Act, which gives authority to the Commission to, among other things, enter an order requiring any person that is, was, or would be a cause of a violation of any Advisers Act provision, rule, or regulation, to cease and desist from causing any violations or any future violations of the same provision, rule, or regulation. According to the SEC, Apex was retained by four private funds advised by ClearPath Wealth Management, LLC (“ClearPath”), to provide various accounting and administrative services on behalf of the funds including record keeping, creating periodic financial reports, and providing financial information to the funds’ independent auditor. | The SEC alleged that Apex was a cause of ClearPath’s and its employee’s violations of Sections 206(2) and 206(4) of, and Rule 206(4)-8 under, the Advisers Act. | Apex agreed to cease and desist from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of the charges, to pay disgorgement of $105,613, and to comply with certain undertakings, including engaging an independent compliance consultant to oversee compliance with all applicable securities laws. |
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The SEC alleged that Apex’s accounting systems failed to reflect a restriction in each fund’s governing documents that prohibited the assets and liabilities of each series from being commingled with any other series. According to the SEC, this failure caused the capital account statements that Apex generated to reflect inaccurately ClearPath’s use of each series’ assets and made possible the misappropriation and use of these assets for unauthorized investments by ClearPath and a ClearPath employee. The SEC alleged that the funds’ auditor contacted Apex in July 2012 after discovering a previously undisclosed account for one of the funds that showed a $4.1 million margin loan had been taken against the fund’s assets. According to the SEC, Apex responded a week later that it was not aware of the margin account and contacted ClearPath’s managing director of fund operations, who responded that she was also unaware of the account. The SEC alleged that no evidence indicated that Apex followed up beyond this communication and that Apex failed to make adjustments to its previously provided financial statements, which still showed a balance of $4.8 million in the series instead of less than $650,000 reflecting the margin loan. According to the SEC, ClearPath provided Apex, in January 2012, with an account statement that indicated for the first time that a certain investment, which represented the largest investment for two of the funds, | ||||
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was pledged by ClearPath. The SEC alleged that Apex failed to update its records to reflect that the asset was pledged and did not discuss the pledge agreement with ClearPath. According to the SEC, had Apex followed up with ClearPath, Apex would have discovered that one of these funds had entered into a line of credit with a bank collateralized by the investment, and that ClearPath had borrowed $3.75 million against the line of credit and used the proceeds for investments that were not recorded in the books and records of any of the funds. The SEC alleged further that Apex failed to detect misconduct by ClearPath and a ClearPath employee arising from transfers of capital between series and between funds in violation of the funds’ offering documents, including misappropriations by the ClearPath employee for a private equity investment and to cover ClearPath’s administrative expenses in violation of a fund’s governing documents. According to the SEC, even though all of the cash flows from the prohibited transactions were reflected on ClearPath’s bank statements and schedules provided to Apex, Apex failed to account properly for the transactions and correct investors’ capital account statements to reflect the economic condition of their investments. https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2016/ia-4428.pdf In a separate settlement entered into on the same day, Apex Fund Services (US), Inc., Advisers Act Release | The SEC alleged that Apex was a | Apex agreed to cease and desist from | ||
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No. 4,429 (June 16, 2016), the SEC settled similar charges against Apex for alleged failures in connection with another investment adviser, EquityStar Capital Management, LLC. | cause of EquityStar and its employee’s violations of Sections 206(2) and 206(4) of, and Rule 206(4)-8 under, the Advisers Act. | committing or causing any violations and any future violations of the charges, and to pay disgorgement of $96,836. | ||
6/13/16 | Alleged Improper Receipt of Confidential Information by a Municipal Adviser Relating to a Prospective Client | In Keygent LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 78,053 (June 13, 2016), the SEC settled public administrative and cease-and-desist proceedings against Keygent LLC (“Keygent”), a municipal adviser registered under the Exchange Act, and two of its managing directors, for allegedly engaging in a scheme to obtain confidential information about prospective school district clients. According to the SEC, Keygent retained a consulting firm, School Business Consulting, Inc. (“SBCI”), to advise Keygent’s management and facilitate introductions to school districts that Keygent identified as potential clients. The SEC alleged that SBCI previously provided separate services to five of these potential clients including drafting interview questions for, and reviewing proposals from, prospective municipal advisers. According to the SEC, each school district chose to select municipal advisers through a competitive bidding process and, in seeking to ensure that all competitors were on an equal footing, expressly directed Keygent | The SEC alleged that Keygent and one of the managing directors willfully violated Section 15B(c)(1) of, and Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (“MSRB”) Rule G-17 under, the Exchange Act. The SEC alleged that two managing directors were a cause of Keygent’s violation of Section 15B(c)(1) of, and MSRB Rule G-17 under, the Exchange Act. | Keygent and two of its managing directors agreed to cease and desist from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of the charges, and to each pay a civil money penalty: Keygent will pay $100,000, and the managing directors will pay $30,000 and $20,000, respectively. Keygent and one of its managing directors agreed to censure. |
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not to make contact with anyone at the district other than a single official designated to provide and solicit information on the bidding process. The SEC alleged further that, without each school district’s consent or awareness, Keygent received confidential information from SBCI including information on specific questions Keygent would be asked in interviews as well as the proposed fees of competitor municipal advisers bidding to provide the same services. According to the SEC, this confidential information was not provided to any of the other competitors and all five of the school districts eventually hired Keygent. https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2016/34-78053.pdf In a related case, School Business Consulting, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 78,054 (June 13, 2016), the SEC settled public administrative and cease-and-desist proceedings against SBCI for providing confidential information to Keygent as discussed above, and failing to register with the Commission as a municipal adviser. https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2016/34-78054.pdf These actions are notable as the SEC’s first enforcement actions brought under the municipal adviser antifraud provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act. | The SEC alleged that Keygent and two of its managing directors were a cause of SBCI and its president’s violations of Sections 15B (c)(1) and 15B(a)(5) of, and MSRB Rule G-17 under, the Exchange Act. The SEC alleged that SBCI and its president willfully violated Sections 15B(a)(5) and 15B(c)(1) of, and MSRB Rule G-17 under, the Exchange Act. The SEC alleged that SBCI willfully violated, and SBCI’s president caused SBCI’s | SBCI and its president agreed to cease and desist from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of the charges, and to each pay a civil money penalty: SBCI will pay $30,000, and SBCI’s president will pay $20,000. SBCI agreed to censure. | ||
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violation of, Section 15B(a)(1)(B) of the Exchange Act. | SBCI’s president agreed to be barred from association with, among others, any broker, dealer, investment adviser, or municipal adviser. | |||
6/8/16 | Alleged Failure to Adopt and Implement Written Policies and Procedures Reasonably Designed to Protect Customer Records and Information | In Morgan Stanley Smith Barney LLC, Advisers Act Release No. 4,415, the SEC settled public administrative and cease-and-desist proceedings against Morgan Stanley Smith Barney LLC (“MSSB”), an investment adviser registered under the Advisers Act, for allegedly failing to adopt and implement written policies and procedures reasonably designed to protect customer records and information in compliance with Rule 30 of the SEC’s Regulation S-P (the so-called Safeguard Rule). The SEC alleged that, between 2011 and 2014, a former MSSB employee inappropriately accessed and misappropriated confidential data for 730,000 MSSB client accounts associated with 330,000 different households. According to the SEC, this data included client names, addresses, account numbers and balances, and securities holdings. The SEC alleged that MSSB had adopted policies and procedures that enabled employees to access only customer data necessary to enable an employee to fulfill his or her responsibilities. According to the SEC, an MSSB employee discovered and exploited certain programming flaws in two of | The SEC alleged that MSSB willfully violated Rule 30(a) of Regulation S-P. | MSSB agreed to cease and desist from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of the charges, to censure, and to pay a civil money penalty of $1,000,000. |
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MSSB’s internal systems that allowed him unauthorized access to confidential customer data. The SEC alleged that MSSB failed, for at least 10 years after the systems were created, to appropriately audit or test the systems; such an audit may have enabled MSSB to have discovered the systems’ vulnerabilities. The SEC alleged further that, even though MSSB restricted its employees’ ability to download data onto removable storage devices, the employee was able to circumvent MSSB’s internet filtering systems and download confidential data to his personal server through his personal website. According to the SEC, portions of this data were subsequently posted to at least three internet sites, purportedly for sale to third parties. In settling the case, the SEC specifically considered the remedial efforts promptly undertaken by MSSB and cooperation afforded the SEC Staff. In a related case, Galen J. Marsh, Advisers Act Release No. 4,414 (June 8, 2016), the SEC settled public administrative and cease-and-desist proceedings against the employee who had misappropriated the client data. The SEC’s order followed a criminal conviction in United States v. Galen Marsh, No. 15 Cr. 641 (KTD) (S.D.N.Y.), in which the employee pled guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(A) by exceeding his authorized access to a computer and thereby obtaining confidential customer information with a value exceeding $5,000. | The employee pled guilty to one count of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(A). | The employee agreed to be to be barred from association with, among others, any broker, dealer or investment adviser, and to be barred from participating in any offering of a penny stock, for five years. | ||
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6/1/16 | Alleged Operation by a Private Equity Firm as an Unregistered Broker-Dealer Alleged Failure to Disclose Conflict of Interest Arising from Operating Partner Oversight Fee Alleged Failure to Disclose Specific Use of Fund Assets Alleged Failure to Adopt Proper Written Compliance Policies and Procedures | In Blackstreet Capital Management, LLC, Advisers Act Release No. 4,411 (June 1, 2016), the SEC settled public administrative and cease-and-desist proceedings against Blackstreet Capital Management, LLC (“Blackstreet”), an investment adviser registered under the Advisers Act, and Murry N. Gunty, the managing member and principal owner of Blackstreet, for allegedly undertaking brokerage services for private equity fund clients while not being registered as a broker with the Commission and failing to appropriately disclose certain fees. According to the SEC, Blackstreet provided brokerage services to its clients in connection with the acquisition and disposition of portfolio companies even though it has never been registered with the Commission as, nor affiliated with, a registered broker. The SEC alleged that Blackstreet’s brokerage services included soliciting deals, identifying counterparties, arranging financing, and executing transactions some of which involved the purchase or sale of securities. According to the SEC, Blackstreet received $1,877,000 in compensation for providing brokerage services to its clients. The SEC alleged further that Blackstreet used client funds to purchase interests in two portfolio companies that paid Blackstreet operating partner oversight fees of $450,000. According to the SEC, the use of client | The SEC alleged that Blackstreet willfully violated, and Mr. Gunty caused Blackstreet’s violations of, Section 15(a) of the Exchange Act. The SEC alleged that Blackstreet willfully violated, and Mr. Gunty caused Blackstreet’s violations of, Sections 206(2) and 206(4) of, and Rules 206(4)-7 and 206(4)-8 under, the Advisers Act. | Blackstreet and Mr. Gunty agreed to cease and desist from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of the charges, to censure, to pay disgorgement of $2,622,737, and to pay a civil money penalty of $500,000. |
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assets to compensate itself created a conflict of interest for Blackstreet, which was not disclosed to the investors in the funds until after the oversight fees were collected. The SEC alleged that between 2005 and 2012, Blackstreet used fund assets to make political and charitable contributions, and to pay for entertainment expenses, including the cost of maintaining a luxury box at a sports arena which was not expressly authorized by investors. Mr. Gunty, the SEC also alleged, personally acquired limited partner interests from eight limited partners in a Blackstreet fund; each limited partner was either in default or seeking to sell his, her, or its interest. According to the SEC, Mr. Gunty should have caused the defaulting limited partners to forfeit their shares to the fund instead of purchasing them personally. The SEC alleged that Mr. Gunty subsequently caused the fund’s general partner to waive his obligation to satisfy future capital calls with respect to these limited partner interests, and failed to disclose this waiver to the funds. This settlement is significant as it raises the issue of the need for private equity firms to register as broker-dealers under the Exchange Act. The settlement, however, does not shed light on the specific transactions that could result in such a firm’s needing to be a registered broker-dealer. | ||||
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77959.pdf | ||||
5/27/16 | Alleged Failure to Adopt and Implement Policies and Procedures that Cover Outside Consultants | In Federated Global Investment Management Corp., Advisers Act Release No. 4,401 (May 27, 2016), the SEC settled public administrative and cease-and-desist proceedings against Federated Global Investment Management Corp. (“FGIMC”), an investment adviser registered under the Advisers Act, for allegedly failing to adopt and maintain written policies and procedures reasonably designed to prevent the misuse of non-public information by outside consultants in connection with FGIMC’s securities research and analysis activities. According to the SEC, FGIMC engaged, from 2001 until 2010 outside consultants who provided securities analysis for FGIMC investment personnel managing certain FGIMC-advised mutual funds. The SEC alleged that at least one of the consultants also provided those investment management personnel with recommendations as to specific securities to buy, sell, and hold. The SEC alleged that FGIMC’s Code of Ethics failed to specifically define consultants as “access persons” for purposes of Rule 204A-1 under the Advisers Act, which would have, among other things, required the consultants to disclose conflicts of interest and prohibited them from serving on outside boards without written authorization from FGIMC’s chief compliance officer. According to the SEC, this failure resulted in the consultants not being appropriately covered under | The SEC alleged that FGIMC willfully violated Section 204A of the Advisers Act. | FGIMC agreed to cease and desist from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of the charges, to censure, and to pay a civil money penalty of $1,500,000. |
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FGIMC’s policies and procedures regarding individual use of material non-public information and personal trading activities of individuals with access to confidential information relating to the FGIMC funds. The SEC further alleged that, between 2005 and 2010, a consultant served as a board member of four companies in which the FGIMC funds were shareholders. The consultant, according to the SEC, was not required to pre-clear his personal securities trades with FGIMC and on more than one occasion traded in certain stocks that the funds also traded. This settlement is noteworthy as it shows the SEC’s continued willingness to bring enforcement cases for alleged violations of the Advisers Act’s compliance provisions even in the absence of any alleged further wrongdoing by registered investment advisers or alleged harm to the clients of the advisers. | ||||
5/19/16 | Alleged Materially False and Misleading Statements in Connection with Offerings of Interests in Advisory Business | In Blue Ocean Portfolios, LLC, Advisers Act Release No. 4,389 (May 19, 2016), the SEC instituted public administrative and cease-and-desist proceedings against Blue Ocean Portfolios, LLC. (“Blue Ocean”), an investment adviser registered under the Advisers Act, and James A. Winkelmann, Blue Ocean’s chief executive officer, chief compliance officer, and manager, for allegedly making materially false and misleading statements in connection with offerings of interests in Blue Ocean’s advisory business. | The SEC alleged that Blue Ocean and Mr. Winkelmann willfully violated Sections 17(a)(1), 17(a)(2), and 17(a)(3) of the Securities Act, Section 10(b) of, | The SEC instituted cease-and-desist proceedings to determine what, if any, remedial action including, but not limited to, disgorgement, interest and civil penalties is appropriate against |
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According to the SEC, in April 2011, Blue Ocean and Mr. Winkelmann began offering and selling interests in Blue Ocean that provided investors with a percentage of the revenue arising out of Blue Ocean’s investment advisory business. The SEC alleged that Winkelman raised $1.4 million, primarily from Blue Ocean’s advisory clients, by creating and distributing offering memoranda. According to the SEC, Blue Ocean and Mr. Winkelmann made materially false and misleading statements in four offering memoranda and failed to disclose material information to investors. The SEC alleged that the memoranda materially overstated Blue Ocean’s success in converting advertising spending into new revenue, made materially misleading statements claiming an alignment of Mr. Winkelmann’s and the investors’ interests, and failed to disclose and explain Blue Ocean’s inherent conflicts of interests in the offerings. According to the SEC, Blue Ocean and Mr. Winkelmann failed to appropriately disclose their financial incentive to pay investors the minimum amount of Blue Ocean’s advisory income allowed under the terms of the offering memoranda. The SEC further alleged violations of the Advisers Act’s custody, compliance and reporting provisions in connection with the commingling of client and firm assets, and the failure of Blue Ocean to adopt and implement written policies and procedures reasonably | and Rule 10b-5 under, the Exchange Act, and Sections 206(1), 206(2), and 207 of the Advisers Act. The SEC alleged that Blue Ocean willfully violated Section 206(4) of, and Rules 206(4)-2 and 206(4)-7 under, the Advisers Act. The SEC alleged that Mr. Winkelmann caused and willfully aided and abetted Blue Ocean’s violations of Section 17(a)(1) of the Securities Act, Section 10(b) of, and Rule 10b-5 under, the Exchange Act, and Section 206(1) of the Advisers Act. | Blue Ocean and Mr. Winkelmann. | ||
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designed to prevent those violations. What is significant about this proceeding is that it appears to be one of the few instances in recent memory in which the SEC brought an action against a registered investment adviser in connection with its own corporate transaction. | The SEC alleged that Winkelmann caused Blue Ocean’s violations of Sections 17(a)(2) and 17(a)(3) of the Securities Act, and Sections 206(2) and 206(4) of, and Rules 206(4)-2 and 206(4)-7 under, the Advisers Act. | |||
5/13/16 | Alleged Fraudulent Concealment of Transition Management Fees | In SEC v. Ross McLellan (D. Mass. filed May 13, 2016), the SEC filed civil fraud charges against Ross McLellan, a former executive of State Street Corporation (“SSC”), for allegedly engaging in a scheme to defraud investors who or that were customers of SSC’s transition management line of business. According to the SEC, SSC provides, among other things, transition management services to pension funds, endowments, and other large clients needing to buy and sell large quantities of securities when undergoing a transition such as changing fund managers or investment strategies. The SEC alleged that, from February 2010 to September 2011, Mr. McLellan undertook a strategy to charge and conceal hidden markups for transition management services provided to certain clients. | The SEC alleged that Mr. McLellan violated Sections 17(a)(1) and 17(a)(3) of the Securities Act, and Section 10(b) of, and Rules 10b-5(a) and (c) under, the Exchange Act, and aided and abetted violations of Section 10(b) of, and Rule 10b-5(b) under, the Exchange Act. | The SEC is seeking to obtain a permanent injunction against Mr. McLellan from future violations of the charges, disgorgement of all ill-gotten gains in connection with the alleged scheme, payment of a civil money penalty, and any other award as the court deems just and proper. |
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According to the SEC, Mr. McLellan personally directed traders to increase fees on trades executed for certain larger clients who or that were less likely to focus on the fees. Mr. McLellan, the SEC alleged, also directed SSC traders to add mark-ups to certain fixed income trades that contradicted written instructions to the traders not to charge commissions for those trades. According to the SEC, Mr. McLellan also directed certain subordinates to alter documentation provided to clients to conceal these mark-ups. The SEC alleged further that, in June 2011, a transition management client discovered that SSC had charged it additional undisclosed mark-ups. According to the SEC, McLellan directed his subordinates to mislead the client by claiming the mark-ups were inadvertent. The SEC alleged that Mr. McLellan then attempted to conceal a reimbursement to the client by circumventing the usual processes and procedures that would have recorded the payment in SSC’s loss event tracking system. https://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2016/comp23540.pdf | ||||
5/4/16 | Federal Court Decision Relating to Criminal Liability for Advisers Act Violation | In United States v. James Tagliaferri, No. 15-536 (2d Cir. 2016), James Tagliaferri, a formerly registered investment adviser under the Advisers Act, appealed a 2014 criminal conviction for investment adviser fraud under Section 206 of the Advisers Act. At Mr. Tagliaferri’s trial, the judge instructed the jurors that | Mr. Tagliaferri was convicted of, among other things, a criminal violation of investment adviser | Mr. Tagliaferri was sentenced to 72 months in prison, to pay restitution of approximately $21,000,000, to forfeit |
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“intent to defraud” under Section 206 is established if the jury finds Mr. Tagliaferri acted “knowingly with intent to deceive.” Mr. Tagliaferri argued on appeal before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (the “Second Circuit”) that the judge’s instruction was in error, because a criminal conviction for investment adviser fraud requires a showing of an intent to harm investors. Mr. Tagliaferri argued that, although his actions were unlawful and dishonest, they did not constitute investment adviser fraud, because the government failed to prove that he intended to harm his investors. The Second Circuit rejected Mr. Tagliaferri’s argument and held that intent to harm is not an element of a criminal conviction under Section 206 of the Advisers Act. In doing so, the Second Circuit cited the U.S. Supreme Court’s landmark decision in SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963) (“Capital Gains”) in which the Court found that a violation of Section 206 does not require a showing of an intent to harm clients. Mr. Tagliaferri argued that Capital Gains was not applicable, because that case dealt with an SEC request for an injunction and not a criminal prosecution. The Second Circuit acknowledged this difference but disagreed that it requires that the statute, which provides for criminal enforcement of a civil liability, must add an additional essential element. | fraud under Section 206 of the Advisers Act. | $2,500,000 and certain real property, and to be permanently barred from association with, among others, any broker, dealer or investment adviser, and to be prohibited from serving as, among other things, an employee of any advisory board or investment adviser. | ||
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4/29/16 | Alleged Deficient Surprise | Central to the court’s holding were the express terms of Section 217 of the Advisers Act, which provides that “[a]ny person who willfully violates any provisions of [the Advisers Act] or any rule, regulation, or order promulgated by the Commission under authority [provided by the Advisers Act] shall, upon conviction, be fined not more than $10,000, imprisoned for not more than five years, or both.” The Second Circuit noted that the criminal enforcement of Section 206 through the means of Section 217 differs from the civil enforcement mechanism with the inclusion in Section 217 of the word “willfully.” The court explained that the word willfully must be considered in the context of the overall statute and found that the addition of the term does not require an intent to harm one’s clients. The court held instead that the term “willfully” as used in Section 217 requires only that a defendant acted with “knowledge that his conduct was unlawful.” This decision arises from conduct that was originally alleged in an SEC enforcement action brought in February 2013. It is particularly noteworthy as it demonstrates the relatively low burden of proof that the SEC and criminal prosecutors must meet to support a claim of investment adviser fraud under the Advisers Act. http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/15-536/15-536-2016-05-04.html In Santos, Postal & Company, P. C., Advisers Act Release No. 4,380 (Apr. 29, 2016), the SEC settled | The SEC alleged that SPC and one | SPC and the partner agreed to cease and |
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Examinations by Auditing Firm | public administrative and cease-and-desist proceedings against Santos, Postal & Company, P.C. (“SPC”), an accounting firm, and one of SPC’s partners, for allegedly performing deficient examinations of an investment adviser registered under the Advisers Act. According to the SEC, in 2010 and 2011, SFX Financial Advisory Management Enterprises, Inc. (“SFX”) engaged SPC to provide examinations of SFX’s client funds and securities to satisfy Rule 206(4)-2 under the Advisers Act (the Advisers Act’s so-called Custody Rule), which requires investment advisers to follow certain procedures when they control or have access to client money or securities. The SEC alleged that examinations undertaken by SPC and its partner were deficient, as SPC failed: to identify significant risk factors arising from SFX’s management structure; to obtain sufficient evidence to reasonably support SPC’s conclusions; and to appropriately document the examinations so as to enable a reviewer to understand the nature, time and extent of the testing performed. The SEC alleged further that two reports filed with the Commission on behalf of SFX in connection with SPC’s examinations contained untrue statements. According to the SEC, SFX’s report to the Commission relating to SPC’s 2010 examination contained the false statement that SPC had confirmed with SFX’s clients contributions to and withdrawals from client accounts. According to the SEC, this report also falsely claimed that all testing procedures were performed for a period | of its partners willfully violated Section 207 of the Advisers Act, and engaged in improper professional conduct within the meaning of Section 4C(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 102(e)(1)(iv) of the Commission’s Rules of Practice. | desist from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of the charges. The partner agreed to pay a civil money penalty of $15,000 and to be barred from appearing or practicing before the Commission as an accountant for five years. SPC agreed to pay a civil money penalty of $15,000, disgorgement of $29,076.76, and to be barred from appearing or practicing before the Commission as an accountant for one year. | |
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three months longer than was tested. The SEC alleged further that SPC and its partner were informed that SFX’s vice president had misappropriated client assets prior to filing a report with the Commission relating to SPC’s 2011 examination. According to the SEC, this report included SPC’s unqualified opinion that SFX’s assertion that it complied with all requirements of the Custody Rule was fairly stated in all material respects, even though SPC and the SPC partner knew this to be false. This enforcement action arises from the conduct described in a previous case, SFX Financial Advisory Management Enterprises, Inc., Advisers Act Release No. 4,116 (June 15, 2015) described below, and demonstrates a willingness by the SEC to bring actions against independent auditors in connection with violations of investment advisers engaging the auditors. | ||||
4/14/16 | Alleged Violation of the Advisers Act’s Custody Rule | In Reid S. Johnson, Advisers Act Release No. 4,368 (Apr. 14, 2016) the SEC settled cease-and-desist proceedings against the former sole owner and president (the “Executive”) of The Planning Group of Scottsdale, LLC (“TPGS”), an investment adviser formerly registered under the Advisers Act, for alleged violations of the Advisers Act’s Custody Rule. According to the SEC, from at least 2010 until March | The SEC alleged that the Executive willfully violated Section 207 of the Advisers Act. The SEC alleged that the Executive willfully aided and | The Executive agreed to cease and desist from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of the charges, to be barred from association with, among others, any |
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2013, TPGS had custody of certain client funds and securities, including funds and securities of pooled investment vehicles whose managing members were entities owned and controlled by the Executive. The SEC alleged that TPGS failed to accurately determine that it had custody of certain client’s assets under the Custody Rule. According to the SEC, TPGS also failed to ensure that its client’s securities were maintained by a qualified custodian. The SEC alleged that the Executive stored certain client assets, including paper stock certificates, in a file cabinet within his home and in a local storage facility. According to the SEC, TPGS failed to obtain appropriate surprise examinations, as required under the Custody Rule. The SEC alleged that, even though the Executive engaged an accounting firm to comply with the Custody Rule, TPGS violated the Custody Rule’s independent verification requirement for 2010, 2011, and 2012. According to the SEC, each year’s engagement letter failed to meet certain requirements under the Custody Rule, including language regarding the accountant’s filing of Form ADV-E under the Advisers Act or concerning the tasks that the accountant was required to perform. This action, along with Santos, Postal & Company, P. C. immediately above, demonstrates the SEC’s continuing willingness to bring enforcement cases for violations of the Custody Rule notwithstanding the lack of a showing that the client assets were misappropriated. | abetted and caused TPGS’s violation of Section 206(4) of, and Rules 206(4)-2 and 206(4)-7 under, the Advisers Act. | broker, dealer or investment adviser, and to be prohibited from serving as, among other things, an employee of any advisory board or investment adviser for one year, and to pay a civil money penalty of $45,000. | ||
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4/5/16 | Alleged Failure to Supervise an Investment Advisory Representative Alleged Failure to Adopt and Implement Internal Controls to Prevent and Detect Violations of the Advisers Act | In Cambridge Investment Research Advisors, Inc., Advisers Act Release No. 4,361 (Apr. 5, 2016), the SEC settled public administrative and cease-and-desist proceedings against Cambridge Investment Research Advisors, Inc. (“CIRA”), an investment adviser registered under the Advisers Act, for allegedly failing to appropriately supervise an employee who defrauded advisory clients and engaged in unsuitable trading in clients’ accounts. The SEC alleged that, between 2009 and 2011, an investment adviser representative at CIRA misappropriated client funds through a consistent practice of fraudulently overbilling clients for financial planning services that were never agreed to, nor provided. According to the SEC, the representative also engaged in options trading during this period that was unsuitable for certain advisory accounts. The SEC alleged further that, in 2009, CIRA’s compliance department determined that the representative should be placed on heightened supervision given his poor credit, a home in foreclosure, and an investigation instituted by the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority into his termination by his prior employer. According to the SEC, even though CIRA’s compliance department sent a heightened supervision plan to the representative’s supervisor, the supervisor failed to implement any part of the plan or discuss the | The SEC alleged that CIRA violated Section 203(e)(6) of the Advisers Act, which provides for the imposition of sanctions against supervisors for failing to reasonably supervise a person who violates the federal securities laws. The SEC alleged that CIRA willfully violated Section 206(4) of, and Rule 206(4)-7 under, the Advisers Act. | CIRA agreed to cease and desist from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of the charges, to censure, and to pay a civil money penalty of $225,000. |
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plan with the representative’s subsequent supervisor. The SEC alleged that CIRA’s compliance department lacked systems to ensure that the representative’s supervisor fully implemented the heightened supervision plan. According to the SEC, CIRA failed to adopt policies and procedures that would reasonably be expected to prevent the representative’s fraud including surveillances, reports, or reviews designed to detect suspicious activity in the representative’s financial planning activities. https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2016/ia-4361.pdf In a related case, Alexander R. Bastron, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 4,362 (Apr. 5, 2016), the SEC settled public administrative and cease-and-desist proceedings against Alexander R. Bastron, a former Regional Director at CIRA for allegedly failing to reasonably supervise a subordinate with a view to prevent the employee’s violations of the Advisers Act. The CIRA and Bastron settlements are noteworthy for their focus on supervisory liability under the Advisers Act. | The SEC alleged that Mr. Bastron violated Section 203(e)(6) of the Advisers Act. | Mr. Bastron agreed to be barred from association with, among others, any broker, dealer or investment adviser in any supervisory capacity, for at least one year, and to pay a civil money penalty of $20,000. | ||
3/30/16 | Alleged Misappropriation | In Burrill Capital Management, LLC, Advisers Act Release No. 4,360 (Mar. 30, 2016), the SEC settled | The SEC alleged that BCM and Mr. | BCM, Mr. Burrill, Mr. Hebert, and Ms. Sen |
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of Client Assets by Adviser to Venture Capital Funds Exempt from Registration under the Advisers Act | public administrative and cease-and-desist proceedings against: Burrill Capital Management, LLC (“BCM”), a now-defunct investment adviser that was exempt from registration under the Advisers Act in reliance on Advisers Act Rule 203(l)-1, G. Steven Burrill, BCM’s sole owner; Victor A. Hebert, BCM’s Chief Legal Counsel; and Helena C. Sen, BCM’s Controller. BCM and its employees were alleged by the SEC to have misappropriated funds from a venture capital fund advised by BCM. According to the SEC, BCM advised a venture capital fund that paid quarterly management fees to BCM. The SEC alleged that, in late 2007, BCM began experiencing cash flow shortages, and that Mr. Burrill directed Ms. Sen to transfer money from the venture capital fund before it was due under the fund’s limited partnership agreement as an “advance on management fees.” According to the SEC, Ms. Sen transferred the funds and recorded the transfer as “prepaid expense.” The SEC alleged that Mr. Burrill and Ms. Sen continued to take money from the venture capital fund before it was owed, in seeking to cover BCM and Mr. Burrill’s cash shortages. In 2009, according to the SEC, Mr. Hebert became aware of Mr. Burrill and Ms. Sen’s actions, but did not tell Ms. Sen to stop the transfers. The SEC alleged further that, by 2012, the fund had paid the entire amount of management fees contemplated by its limited partnership agreement, but that Mr. Burrill, | Burrill willfully violated, and Mr. Hebert willfully aided and abetted and caused violations of, Section 206(1), 206(2), and 206(4) of, and Rule 206(4)-8 under, the Advisers Act. The SEC alleged that Ms. Sen willfully aided and abetted and caused violations of Section 206(4) of, and Rule 206(4)-8 under, the Advisers Act. | agreed to cease and desist from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of the charges. Mr. Burrill, Mr. Hebert, and Ms. Sen agreed to be barred from association with, among others, any broker, dealer, or investment adviser. BCM and Mr. Burrill agreed to pay disgorgement of $4,785,000 and a civil money penalty of $1,000,000. Mr. Hebert agreed to pay a civil money penalty of $185,000. Ms. Sen agreed to pay a civil money penalty of $90,000. BCM agreed to censure. | |
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Mr. Hebert, and Ms. Sen continued to take money from the fund as advance management fees. By May 2013, according to the SEC, the venture capital fund had paid BCM and Mr . Burrill at least $13 million more than was owed over the entire life of the fund. The SEC alleged that approximately $4.6 million of this money was used by Mr. Burrill to pay for, among other things, family vacations, jewelry, charitable contributions, private jets, and gifts. The action taken by the SEC against BCM and its employees is significant as it shows a willingness on the part of the Commission to bring an enforcement proceeding against an Advisers Act exempt reporting adviser. | ||||
3/15/16 | Alleged Failure by Municipal Adviser to Disclose Conflict of Interest to Municipal Client | In Central States Capital Markets, LLC, Advisers Act Release No. 4,352 (Mar. 15, 2016), the SEC settled public administrative and cease-and-desist proceedings against Central States Capital Markets, LLC (“Central States”), an investment adviser registered under the Advisers Act and a municipal adviser registered under the Exchange Act, Mark R. Detter, a former vice president at Central States, David K. Malone, a vice president at Central States, and John D. Stepp, the chief executive officer of Central States, for allegedly failing to disclose a conflict of interest to a municipal client relating to municipal bond offerings. | The SEC alleged that Central States, Mr. Stepp, Mr. Detter and Mr. Malone willfully violated Section 15B(c)(1) of, and Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (“MSRB”) Rule G-17 under, the Exchange Act. | Central States, Mr. Stepp, Mr. Detter and Mr. Malone agreed to cease and desist from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of the charges. Central States agreed to censure, to pay disgorgement of $289,827.80, and to |
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Under Section 15B(c)(1) of the Exchange Act, as amended by Section 975 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”), municipal advisers and their associated persons have a fiduciary duty to municipal entity clients, and are prohibited from engaging in any act, practice or course of business that is not consistent with this fiduciary duty. According to the SEC, in April 2011 a municipal entity hired Central States to serve as its municipal adviser in connection with three separate municipal debt offerings. The SEC alleged that Mr. Stepp, Mr. Detter and Mr. Malone, on behalf of Central States, arranged to have these offerings underwritten by a broker-dealer in which each also worked as a registered representative. According to the SEC, Mr. Stepp, Mr. Detter and Mr. Malone’s relationship with the underwriting broker-dealer created a conflict of interest, as they had a financial incentive to choose the underwriting broker-dealer over all other broker-dealers. The SEC alleged that Central States, Mr. Stepp, Mr. Detter and Mr. Malone failed to disclose their relationship with the broker-dealer and the conflict of interest created by this relationship. According to the SEC, 90 percent of the underwriting fees paid to the broker-dealer in connection with the three offerings was remitted to Central States. The action against Central States and its employees is noteworthy as it is the first instance of the SEC | The SEC alleged that Mr. Stepp, Mr. Detter and Mr. Malone willfully violated MSRB Rule G-23 under the Exchange Act. | pay a civil money penalty of $85,000. Mr. Stepp agreed to not act in a supervisory capacity with, among others, any broker, dealer, investment adviser, or municipal adviser for six months. Mr. Stepp also agreed to pay a civil money penalty of $17,500. Mr. Detter agreed to be barred from association with, among others, any broker, dealer, investment adviser, or municipal adviser for two years. Mr. Detter also agreed to pay a civil money penalty of $25,000. Mr. Malone agreed to be barred from association with, among others, any broker, dealer, investment adviser, or | ||
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enforcing the fiduciary duty created for municipal advisers by the Dodd-Frank Act. | municipal adviser for one year. Mr. Malone also agreed to pay a civil money penalty of $20,000. | |||
3/14/16 | Alleged Failure to Disclose Conflict of Interest Arising From Receipt of 12b-1 Fees Alleged Failure to Implement Policies and Procedures to Prevent Reverse Churning | In Royal Alliance Associates, Inc., Sagepoint Financial, Inc. and Fsc Securities Corporation, Advisers Act Release No. 4,351 (Mar. 14, 2016), the SEC settled public administrative and cease-and-desist proceedings against Royal Alliance Associates, Inc., Sagepoint Financial, Inc. and Fsc Securities Corporation (together, the “AIG Advisers”), each an investment adviser under the Advisers Act and indirectly owned by American International Group, Inc., for allegedly failing to disclose conflicts of interest relating to 12b-1 fees and failing to implement policies and procedures to prevent “reverse churning.” The SEC alleged that the AIG Advisers invested on behalf of clients in certain mutual funds registered under the 1940 Act that offered two share classes, one that charged 12b-1 fees and one that did not. These 12b-1 fees created a conflict of interest, according to the SEC, as the AIG Advisers had an economic incentive to invest client assets in the share class that charged clients higher fees. The SEC alleged that between 2012 and 2014, the AIG Advisers failed to adequately disclose in their Forms ADV that these fees created a conflict of interest. According to the SEC, the AIG Advisers received approximately $2 million from 12b-1 fees than would have been received from investing client assets in | The SEC alleged that the AIG Advisers willfully violated Sections 206(2), 206(4), and 207 of, and Rule 206(4)-7 under, the Advisers Act. | The AIG Advisers agreed to cease and desist from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of the charges, to censure, to pay disgorgement of $2,049,859, and to pay a civil money penalty of $7,500,000. |
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the share classes without 12b-1 fees. The SEC also alleged that the AIG Advisers failed to implement policies and procedures that required a quarterly review of advisory accounts that traded securities infrequently. According to the SEC, these procedures were meant to prevent “reverse churning,” a practice of charging a client a wrap fee that covers advisory services and trading costs even though the client trades infrequently. The actions against the AIG Advisers appears to be a part of a broader Commission effort designed to review selling practices relating to mutual funds offering multiple share classes. See Melanie Waddell, SEC to Launch 12b-1 Fee Share Class Initiative, ThinkAdVISOR (Apr. 19, 2016), https://www.thinkadvisor.com/2016/04/19/sec-to-launch-12b-1-fee-share-class-initiative | ||||
1/19/16 | Alleged Material Misstatements and Omissions in Exchange Act Forms 10-K and 10-Q | In Equinox Fund Management, LLC, Advisers Act Release No. 4,315 (Jan. 19, 2016), the SEC settled public administrative and cease-and-desist proceedings against Equinox Fund Management, LLC (“Equinox”), an investment adviser registered under the Advisers Act, for alleged material misstatements and omissions made in the offer and sale of units in The Frontier Fund (“TFF”), a Delaware statutory trust and publicly | The SEC alleged that Equinox willfully violated Sections 17(a)(2) and 17(a)(3) of the Securities Act, and caused TFF to violate Section 13(a) of, and Rules | Equinox agreed to cease and desist from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of the charges, to censure, to pay a civil money penalty in the amount of $400,000, and to |
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registered managed futures fund. The SEC alleged that, from 2004 through March 2011, TFF’s registration statements indicated that Equinox charged management fees based upon the net asset value (“NAV”) of each series. Equinox, however, charged TFF management fees based upon the notional trading value of the assets—the invested amount plus leverage used in the underlying investments. According to the SEC, Equinox’s use of the notational methodology, caused TFF to be charged $5.4 million more than what would have been charged based upon NAV. The SEC also alleged that TFF’s disclosures in its Exchange Act Form 10-K for 2010 and its Forms 10-Q for the first and second quarters of 2011 that it valued certain derivatives at fair value were misleading. According to the SEC, TFF’s reported quarterly valuation for these options was materially higher than the option counterparty’s valuation of each of the same options. The SEC alleged that Equinox failed to consider pricing information that conflicted with its own valuations, including a report provided by the option counterparty each business day, audit confirmations from the option counterparty showing materially lower valuations, and additional transactions with the option counterparty in which the parties used the option counterparty’s bid or ask prices to increase or decrease the amounts invested in the options. The SEC alleged further that TFF’s Form 10-Q for the | 12b-20, 13a-1, and 13a-13 under, the Exchange Act. | administer a disgorgement fund into which it will pay a total of $6,000,067, consisting of disgorgement and prejudgment interest to compensate TFF investors for losses arising from the alleged conduct. | ||
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third quarter of 2011 was misleading, as it disclosed that a certain option had been transferred between two of TFF’s series in accordance with TFF’s valuation policies, when the option had been transferred using a different valuation methodology. According to the SEC, TFF’s valuation procedures required TFF when effecting transfers between series to take into account whether the same or similar securities were held by other funds managed by Equinox and the method used to price those securities. The SEC alleged that, contrary to this policy, Equinox transferred the option using the midpoint price of the valuation agent’s range, and that on the following business day the transferee series wrote down the valuation of the option to the lower bound price of the valuation agent’s range. The SEC also alleged that TFF’s Form 10-Q for the second quarter of 2011 failed to disclose a material subsequent event: the early termination of an option, the series’ largest investment, at a valuation that was materially different from what had been recorded for that option. | ||||
12/22/15 | Alleged Aiding and Abetting of Prohibited Cross Trades Alleged Failure | In Morgan Stanley Investment Management Inc., Advisers Act Release No. 4,299 (Dec. 22, 2015), the SEC settled public administrative and cease-and-desist proceedings against Morgan Stanley Investment Management, Inc. (“MSIM”), an investment adviser registered under the Advisers Act, and Sheila Huang, a | The SEC alleged that MSIM willfully violated Section 17(a)(3) of the Securities Act and Sections | MSIM and Ms. Huang agreed to cease and desist from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of the |
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to Implement Compliance Policies and Procedures to Identify Impermissible Cross Trading | MSIM portfolio manager for allegedly arranging trades favoring certain advisory accounts over others. According to the SEC, from late 2011 through early 2012, Ms. Huang engaged in a series of unlawful prearranged sales and buybacks, commonly known as “parking,” of fixed-income securities, with SG Americas Securities, LLC (“SGAS”), a broker-dealer registered under the Exchange Act. The SEC alleged that Ms. Huang placed five sets of these transactions while effecting sales for MSIM client accounts that needed to liquidate certain securities. The SEC alleged that Ms. Huang did not sell these securities in the open market, but instead sold to and prearranged a repurchase from SGAS at prices that were based on the initial sale price plus a minimal markup in attempting to “buyback” the positions into other MSIM-advised accounts. According to the SEC, this arrangement with SGAS favored the purchasing clients over the selling clients and deprived the selling clients of their share of the market savings, an amount totaling approximately $387,186. The SEC alleged that the arrangement with SGAS was not disclosed to any of the MSIM clients involved in the transactions. The SEC alleged further that in a sixth set of transactions, Ms. Huang arranged to sell securities from certain accounts subject to ERISA with SGAS at prearranged prices approximately $600,000 above the market prices for the securities. According to the SEC, Ms. Huang then caused a client fund not registered | 206(2) and 206(4) of, and Rule 206(4)-7 under, the Advisers Act. The SEC alleged that MSIM violated Section 203(e)(6) of the Advisers Act. The SEC alleged that MSIM willfully aided and abetted and caused a violation of Section 17(a)(2) of the Investment Company Act. The SEC alleged that Ms. Huang willfully violated Sections 17(a)(1) and 17(a)(3) of the Securities Act, and Section 10(b) of, and Rules 10b-5(a) and (c) under, the Exchange Act, and willfully aided and | charges. MSIM agreed to disgorgement of $857,534 to administer a distribution fund, to censure, and to pay a civil money penalty of $8 million. Ms. Huang agreed to be barred from association with, among others, any broker, dealer or investment adviser, and to pay a civil money penalty of $125,000. | |
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under the 1940 Act to purchase the securities from SGAS. The SEC alleged that these transactions kept the ERISA accounts from realizing a loss on the securities, but the unregistered fund purchased securities at prices that were over $600,000 above the pricing vendor’s mid-market price. This arrangement, according to the SEC, was not disclosed to any of the MSIM clients involved in the transactions. According to the SEC, Ms. Huang and her team in using the buyback arrangements effectively crossed bonds outside of MSIM’s cross trade procedures, avoiding MSIM’s and regulatory requirements governing cross trades. In determining to accept MSIM’s offer, the SEC considered remedial acts promptly undertaken by MSIM and cooperation afforded the SEC staff. In particular, MSIM enhanced its policies, procedures, controls and training; voluntarily retained a compliance consultant; and assisted the SEC’s staff in its investigation. https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2015/33-9998.pdf In a related case, SG Americas Securities LLC, Investment Company Act Release No. 31,948 (December 22, 2015), the SEC instituted cease-and-desist proceedings against SGAS, a registered broker-dealer, and Yimin Ge, a former senior trader at SGAS, for allegedly participating in Ms. Huang’s scheme by failing to keep accurate books and records and for aiding and abetting Ms. Huang’s violations. | abetted and caused violations of Sections 206(1) and 206(2) of the Advisers Act. The SEC alleged that SGAS violated Section 15(b)(4)(E) of the Exchange Act, and willfully violated Section 17(a) of, and Rule 17 a-3(a)(2) under, the Exchange Act. | SGAS and Ms. Ge agreed to cease and desist from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of the charges. SGAS agreed to | ||
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The SEC alleged that Ms. Ge willfully aided and abetted and caused SGAS’s violations of Section 17(a) of, and Rule 17a-3(a)(2) under, the Exchange Act. The SEC also alleged that Ms. Ge willfully aided and abetted and caused Ms. Huang’s violations of Sections 17(a)(1) and 17(a)(3) of the Securities Act, and Section 10(b) of, and Rules 10b-5(a) and (c) under, the Exchange Act. | censure. Ms. Ge agreed to be barred from association with, among others, any broker, dealer or investment adviser, for at least three years. | |||
12/18/15 | Alleged Failure to Disclose Conflicts of Interest Alleged Breach of Fiduciary Duty | In JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., Advisers Act Release No. 4,295 (Dec. 18, 2015), the SEC settled public administrative and cease-and-desist proceedings against J.P. Morgan Securities LLC (“JPMS”), an investment adviser registered under the Advisers Act, and JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (“JPMCB”), a nationally chartered bank, for allegedly failing to disclose conflicts | The SEC alleged that JPMS willfully violated Sections 206(2), 206(4), and 207 of, and Rule 206(4)-7 under, the | JPMS and JPMCB agreed to cease and desist from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of the charges, and to pay |
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of interest relating to investments in proprietary investment products. The SEC alleged that both JPMS and JPMCB failed, in connection with a program contemplating investing client assets in shares of mutual funds registered under the 1940 Act, to disclose conflicts of interest arising from preferences for JPMorgan-managed mutual funds. The Commission further alleged that JPMCB failed to disclose a preference for JPMorgan-managed private hedge funds, and third-party-managed private hedge funds that shared client fees with a JPMCB affiliate. According to the SEC, from 2008 to 2013, JPMS failed to adequately disclose to clients invested in its Chase Strategic Portfolio (“CSP”), a retail unified managed account program designed and operated by JPMS, conflicts of interest JPMS faced with respect to CSP. The SEC alleged that JPMS failed to disclose its preference and economic incentive to invest CSP assets in JPMorgan mutual funds. According to the SEC, a JPMS affiliate that provided services to CSP offered discounts on its services based on the amount of CSP assets that JPMS invested in JPMorgan mutual funds. These discounts, the SEC alleged, created a conflict of interest as they incentivized JPMS to favor JPMorgan mutual funds over other investments. The SEC alleged further that JPMS failed to disclose the availability of certain less expensive JPMorgan mutual fund share classes. The SEC alleged that this resulted in a breach of its fiduciary duty to CSP clients. | Advisers Act. The SEC alleged that JPMCB willfully violated Sections 17(a)(2) and 17(a)(3) of the Securities Act. | disgorgement of $127,500,000, prejudgment interest of $11,815,000, and a civil money penalty of $127,500,000. JPMS also agreed to censure. | ||
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From 2008 to 2012, according to the SEC, JPMS’s written policies and procedures required that JPMS avoid any actual or potential conflict of interest and that any such conflict be disclosed to clients with discretionary managed accounts. The SEC alleged that, on certain occasions, the disclosure concerning the use of JPMorgan mutual funds in CSP was raised, and discussed among JPMS personnel, but was not adequately addressed, resulting in a failure to implement JPMS’s written policies and procedures in seeking to ensure appropriate disclosure of its conflicts of interest. According to the SEC, JPMS’s Forms ADV did not appropriately disclose these conflicts of interest. The SEC alleged further that JPMCB did not satisfy its disclosure duty by failing to disclose its preference for investing clients’ discretionary portfolio assets in JPMorgan mutual funds in its fund disclosure statements, account opening documents, and marketing materials. The SEC alleged that, from 2008 until 2014, JPMCB failed to disclose to certain clients with discretionary managed accounts its preference for JPMorgan-managed hedge funds and, from 2008 until August 2015, failed to disclose its preference for third-party-managed hedge funds that shared their management and/or performance fees with a JPMCB affiliate. In determining to accept JPMS and JPMCB’s offers, the SEC considered remedial acts undertaken by both JPMS | ||||
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and JPMCB, including the retention of an independent compliance consultant to renew policies and procedures, and cooperation afforded the SEC staff. | ||||
12/14/15 | Alleged Non-Disclosure of Revenue Sharing Fees Alleged Breach of Fiduciary Duty for Failing to Disclose Conflicts of Interest Advisers Act Violation of the Custody Rule Alleged False and Misleading Statements | In Total Wealth Management, Inc., Advisers Act Release No. 4,291 (Dec. 14, 2015), the SEC settled public administrative and cease-and-desist proceedings against Total Wealth Management, Inc. (“TWM”), an investment adviser registered under the Advisers Act, in connection with an alleged fraudulent scheme to collect revenue sharing fees derived from investments recommended to clients. The SEC alleged that TWM entered into revenue sharing agreements with certain funds under which the funds paid TWM fees when TWM placed its clients’ investments in the funds. According to the SEC, TWM paid certain other employees a portion of the revenue sharing fees earned for every TWM client they placed into the underlying funds. The SEC alleged that these revenue fee sharing arrangements created a conflict of interest as they created an incentive for TWM to invest its clients into certain funds regardless their performance or the appropriateness of the investment. According to the SEC, TWM had a persistent and pervasive practice of recommending and making investments in the underlying funds that paid revenue sharing fees. The SEC alleged that TWM structured a series of | The SEC alleged that TWM willfully violated Section 17(a) of the Securities Act, Section 10(b) of, and Rule 10b-5 under, the Exchange Act, and Sections 206(1), 206(2), 206(4), and 207 of, and Rules 206(4)-8 and 206(4)-2 under, the Advisers Act. | TWM agreed to cease and desist from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of the charges, and to have its registration as an investment adviser revoked. |
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unregistered funds known as the “Altus Funds,” and their disclosures so that investors would not know that the Altus Funds held investments paying revenue sharing fees back to TWM. According to the SEC, disclosures in all of the Altus Funds’ offering memoranda and in TWM’s Forms ADV informed clients that TWM “may” receive revenue sharing fees, but failed to inform TWM clients that TWM was receiving revenue sharing fees. The SEC alleged further that the documents failed to inform investors about the sources, recipients, amounts and duration of the fees. TWM, the SEC alleged, funneled the revenue sharing fees through entities created by the principals of TWM to mask these fees. These entities, according to the SEC, sent invoices to give the appearance that the fees were payments for consulting work, even though virtually no consulting work was ever done. According to the SEC, none of TWM’s Forms ADV filings contained any reference to these entities or their affiliations with TWM. The SEC alleged further that TWM materially misrepresented to investors and clients the extent of the due diligence conducted on the investments recommended by TWM. According to the SEC, TWM received promotional materials, subscription agreements, and the self-reported and unverified performance history of funds, but failed to review or analyze the documents or obtain any third-party due diligence of the funds. | ||||
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The SEC also alleged that, beginning in 2011, TWM falsely claimed in its Form ADV filings that it had complied with Rule 206(4)-2, the Advisers Act’s custody rule. https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2015/33-9989.pdf In a related case, Total Wealth Management, Investment Company Act Release No. 4,292 (Dec. 14, 2015), the SEC settled public administrative and cease-and-desist proceedings against Nathan McNamee, TWM’s former president, and Douglas David Shoemaker, a co-founder and former chief compliance officer at TWM for, among other things, allegedly causing and aiding and abetting TWM’s violations. | The SEC alleged that Mr. McNamee and Mr. Shoemaker willfully violated Section 207 of the Advisers Act, and willfully aided and abetted and caused TWM’s violations of Sections 206(1), 206(2), and 206(4) of, and Rule 206(4)-8 under, the Advisers Act. The SEC alleged that Mr. McNamee willfully aided and abetted and caused TWM’s violations of Section 206(4) of, and Rule 206(4)-2 under, the Advisers Act. | Mr. McNamee and Mr. Shoemaker agreed to cease and desist from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of the charges, and to be barred from association with, among others, any broker, dealer or investment adviser, for at least five years. Mr. McNamee agreed to pay disgorgement of $107,393 and a civil money penalty of $307,500. Mr. Shoemaker agreed to pay disgorgement of $132,405 and a civil money penalty of $300,000. | ||
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11/24/15 | Alleged Deficiencies in Compliance Policies and Procedures | In Marwood Group Research, LLC, Advisers Act Release No. 4,279 (Nov. 24, 2015), the SEC settled public cease-and-desist proceedings against Marwood Group Research, LLC (“Marwood”), a regulatory and legislative policy firm and Exchange Act-registered broker-dealer and investment adviser registered with the State of New York, for allegedly failing to inform compliance officers of instances in which analysts obtained potential material non-public information from U.S. Government employees. Section 15(g) of the Exchange Act requires broker-dealers registered under the Act to establish, maintain, and enforce written policies and procedures, to prevent the misuse of material non-public information (“MNPI”). Section 204A of the Advisers Act provides a similar requirement for both SEC-registered and state-registered investment advisers. According to the SEC, Marwood provided as part of its business regulatory and policy updates (“research notes”) to hedge funds and other securities market participants concerning likely outcomes of future U.S. Government actions. The SEC alleged that Marwood’s analysts would meet with, call or otherwise communicate with representatives of the Government who were often in possession of potential MNPI and that these interactions created a substantial risk for MNPI to be obtained and misused by Marwood’s clients. According to the SEC, Marwood had written policies and procedures that prohibited the dissemination of | The SEC alleged that Marwood violated Section 15(g) of the Exchange Act and Section 204A of the Advisers Act. | Marwood agreed to cease and desist from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of the charges, and to pay a civil money penalty of $375,000. Marwood also agreed to comply with certain undertakings, including engaging an independent compliance consultant to oversee compliance with all applicable securities laws. |
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MNPI and required any potential MNPI to be brought to the attention of Marwood’s chief compliance officer. The SEC alleged that, in 2010, Marwood employees received potential MNPI relating to pending regulatory approvals at the U.S. Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services and the U.S. Food and Drug Administration. According to the SEC, this information was not brought to the attention of the chief compliance officer despite a substantial risk that the information was MNPI. The SEC alleged further that Marwood’s procedures failed to reasonably ensure that the chief compliance officer was provided with sufficient information to assess whether a research note may have been influenced by improperly obtained MNPI or to evaluate independently other employees’ assessments that any information they had received from a Government employee was not MNPI, as Marwood’s policy principally relied on employees and managers to make this assessment with limited review by the chief compliance officer. In determining to accept Marwood’s offer, the SEC considered the remedial acts promptly undertaken by Marwood, including enhancement of its policies and procedures made in 2013 and 2014 covering the potential misuse of MNPI. | ||||
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11/19/15 | Alleged Repeated Violations of the Advisers Act’s Custody Rule Action Against Senior Officials of Investment Adviser, including Chief Compliance Officer Alleged Failure to Implement Procedures and Safeguards in Seeking to Ensure Compliance with a Cease-and-Desist Order | In Sands Brothers Asset Management, LLC, Advisers Act Release Nos. 4,273 and 4,274 (Nov. 19, 2015), the SEC settled public administrative and cease-and-desist proceedings brought in October 2014 against Sands Brothers Asset Management, LLC (“SBAM”), an investment adviser registered under the Advisers Act, and its controlling persons and chief compliance officer (the “Principals”), for alleged violations of Rule 206(4)-2 under the Advisers Act (the “Custody Rule”), which requires firms to follow certain procedures when they control or have access to client money or securities. The SEC alleged that SBAM violated the Custody Rule by being repeatedly late in providing investors with audited financial statements of the private funds managed by SBAM, and that the Principals were responsible for SBAM’s failures to comply with the Custody Rule. The Commission originally instituted public administrative and cease-and-desist proceedings against these parties on October 29, 2014. The Custody Rule effectively requires, among other things, that investors in a private fund managed by a registered investment adviser receive an audited financial statement of the fund within a specific time period. According to the SEC, SBAM was at least 40 days late in distributing audited financial statements to investors in ten private funds for fiscal year 2010. In 2011, audited financial statements for those same funds were delivered from six months to eight months late. In 2012, the same materials were distributed to investors approximately three months late. The SEC alleged that | The SEC alleged that SBAM willfully violated Section 206(4) of, and Rule 206(4)-2 under, the Advisers Act. The SEC alleged that the Principals willfully aided and abetted and caused SBAM’s violations of Section 206(4) of, and Rule 206(4)-2 under, the Advisers Act. | SBAM and the Principals agreed to cease and desist from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of the charges. SBAM and its controlling persons agreed to be suspended from acting as an investment adviser for a period of 12 months, to pay a civil money penalty of $1 million, and to comply with certain undertakings, including engaging an independent monitor to oversee compliance with all applicable securities laws and providing the Commission with evidence of SBAM’s compliance with the Custody Rule. The chief compliance officer agreed to be |
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the Principals aided, abetted and caused SBAM’s Custody Rule violations, and did not comply with a 2010 cease-and-desist order issued by the Commission (which specifically found that SBAM’s controlling persons had aided and abetted and caused SBAM’s Custody Rule violations) when they failed to implement any procedures or safeguards to ensure compliance. According to the SEC, none of the Principals made adequate efforts to ensure that SBAM satisfied its Custody Rule obligations, either by disseminating the audited financial statements that investors in certain of SBAM’s-managed funds were entitled to receive or by submitting to a surprise examination to verify client assets. The Commission noted particularly that the chief compliance officer who was responsible for compliance and for all of SBAM’s non-investment operations implemented no policies or procedures to ensure compliance with the Custody Rule — even after the 2010 Order and after SBAM continued to miss its Custody Rule deadline year after year. At most, he simply reminded people of the Custody Rule deadline without taking any more substantial action. He did not make any attempt to notify the staff of the Commission of any difficulties SBAM was encountering in meeting the Custody Rule deadline. http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2015/ia-4273.pdfhttp://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2015/ia-4274.pdf | suspended from serving as a chief compliance officer of any broker, dealer or investment adviser for 12 months, and to pay a civil money penalty of $60,000. | |||
11/16/15 | Alleged False and Misleading Statements and | In Virtus Investment Advisers, Inc., Advisers Act Release No. 4,266 (Nov. 16, 2015), the SEC instituted cease-and-desist proceedings against Virtus Investment | The SEC alleged that Virtus willfully violated | Virtus agreed to cease and desist from committing or causing |
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Advertisements Regarding Subadviser Performance | Advisers, Inc. (“Virtus”), an Advisers Act-registered investment adviser, for making material misstatements to its clients on the basis of a materially overstated performance track record provided by Virtus’s subadviser, F-Squared Investments, Inc. (“F-Squared”). The SEC brought an administrative proceeding against F-Squared for making materially misleading statements on December 22, 2014. In 2009, according to the SEC, Virtus and F-Squared began to discuss having F-Squared subadvise two Virtus-advised mutual funds registered under the 1940 Act using F-Squared’s “AlphaSector” strategy, a major exchange-traded fund sector rotation strategy. The SEC alleged that F-Squared and its president and chief executive officer falsely described AlphaSector to Virtus, indicating that the strategy had been used to manage client assets from April 2001 to September 2008, and that it had significantly outperformed the S&P 500 Index during that time period. The SEC said that no assets, however, tracked the strategy until 2008, and its back-tested performance record had been substantially overstated. According to the SEC, Virtus recommended that the boards of trustees and shareholders of certain Virtus mutual funds approve a change in management and strategy to F-Squared and AlphaSector based on F-Squared’s misrepresentations. The SEC alleged that Virtus was negligent (1) in not knowing that F-Squared’s track record and performance numbers were false, (2) in failing to investigate adequately concerns about the legitimacy of F- | Sections 204, 206(2), and 206(4) of, and Rules 204-2(a)(16), 206(4)-1(a)(5), 206(4)-7, and 206(4)-8 under, the Advisers Act. The SEC alleged that Virtus caused certain registered investment companies to violate Section 34(b) of the 1940 Act. | any violations and any future violations of the charges, to censure, and to pay disgorgement of $13.4 million, prejudgment interest of $1.1 million, and a civil money penalty of $2 million. | |
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Squared’s statements, and (3) in accepting F-Squared’s misrepresentations at face value. The SEC also alleged that, from May 2009 to September 2013, Virtus presented F-Squared’s false performance information in client presentations, marketing materials, filings with the Commission, and other communications. In doing so, according to the SEC, Virtus advertised the AlphaSector strategy by using hypothetical and substantially inflated back-tested historical performance records. The SEC alleged further that Virtus failed to adopt and implement written compliance policies and procedures reasonably designed to prevent violations of the Advisers Act, as Virtus’s policies regarding performance advertising and the retention of books and records failed to address performance obtained by other advisers or subadvisers. In determining to accept Virtus’s offer, the SEC considered Virtus’s retention of an independent compliance consultant in April 2015 to conduct a comprehensive review of Virtus’s written compliance policies and procedures. | ||||
11/5/15 | Alleged Failure by Private Fund Advisers to Properly Disclose Allocation of | In Cherokee Investment Partners, LLC, Advisers Act Release No. 4,258 (Nov. 5, 2015), the SEC instituted cease-and-desist proceedings against Cherokee Investment Partners, LLC (“CIP”), an Advisers Act-registered investment adviser, and Cherokee Advisers, | The SEC alleged that CIP and CA violated Sections 206(2) and 206(4) of, and Rules | CIP and CA agreed to cease and desist from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of the |
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Expenses to Clients | LLC (“CA”), a “relying adviser” (within the meaning of an Advisers Act interpretation) of CIP, for allegedly improperly allocating consulting, legal and compliance-related expenses to private funds managed by CIP and CA. The SEC alleged that, between July 2011 and March 2015, CIP and CA caused funds they managed to pay for $455,698 of expenses related to CIP’s registration as an investment adviser under the Advisers Act, expenses related to a third-party compliance consultant, and expenses incurred in preparing responses to comments provided by the SEC staff in connection with an examination of CIP. According to the SEC, while the private funds’ organizational documents disclosed that the funds would bear expenses arising out of their operations and activities, the documents did not indicate that the funds would be charged for the advisers’ legal and compliance expenses. The SEC alleged further that CIP and CA failed to adopt written policies and procedures reasonably designed to prevent violations of the Advisers Act arising from the allocation of expenses, and that they failed to conduct an annual review of the adequacy of these policies and procedures. | 206(4)-7 and 206(4)-8 under, the Advisers Act. | charges, and to jointly and severally pay a civil money penalty of $100,000. | |
11/3/15 | Alleged Failure by a Private Equity Firm to Disclose Conflicts of | In Fenway Partners, LLC, Advisers Act Release No. 4,253 (Nov. 3, 2015), the SEC instituted cease-and-desist proceedings against Fenway Partners, LLC (“Fenway Partners”), an Advisers Act-registered investment adviser, Peter Lamm, a managing director | The SEC alleged that Fenway Partners, Mr. Lamm, Mr. Smart, and Mr. Mayhew | Fenway Partners, Mr. Lamm, Mr. Smart, Mr. Mayhew, and Mr. Wiacek agreed to cease and desist from |
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Interest Related to Fees and Expenses | and member of Fenway Partners, William Gregory Smart, a managing director and member of Fenway Partners, Timothy Mayhew, Jr., a managing director and member of Fenway Partners, and Walter Wiacek, vice president, chief financial officer and chief compliance officer of Fenway Partners, for allegedly failing to disclose to a private equity fund managed by Fenway Partners and its investors certain conflicts of interest relating to monitoring fees paid by the fund to a Fenway Partners-affiliated entity and incentive compensation paid upon a portfolio company exit with respect to Fenway Partners employees. At the center of the Fenway Partners action were certain management services agreements into which, according to the SEC, Fenway Partners had entered with portfolio companies held by the private equity fund. The SEC alleged that the portfolio companies paid monitoring fees to Fenway Partners for rendering management and other services; the fund’s organizational documents provided for an offset of 80 percent of those fees against the management fee paid to Fenway Partners by the private equity fund. According to the SEC, beginning in December 2011, Fenway Partners and its executives caused portfolio companies to end their payment obligations to Fenway Partners and enter into new agreements with Fenway Consulting Partners, LLC (“Fenway Consulting”), an entity affiliated with Fenway Partners and principally owned and operated by three of its executives. Under these new agreements, according to the SEC, Fenway Consulting provided services that | willfully violated, and Mr. Wiacek caused the violations of, Sections 206(2) and 206(4) of, and Rule 206(4)-8 under, the Advisers Act. | committing or causing any violations and any future violations of the charges, and to pay a total of $1,525,000 of civil money penalties, with $1,000,000 by Fenway Partners, $150,000 each by Messrs. Lamm, Smart, and Mayhew, and $75,000 by Mr. Wiacek. Fenway Partners, Mr. Lamm, Mr. Smart and Mr. Mayhew agreed to censure and to pay $7,892,000 of disgorgement penalties and $824,471 of prejudgment interest. Fenway Partners, Mr. Lamm and Mr. Smart agreed to be responsible for administering a distribution fund containing the full amount of the | |
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were similar to those provided under the original agreements and often used the same employees; however, the fees paid to Fenway Consulting (totaling $5.74 million) were not offset against the management fee that the fund paid to Fenway Partners. The SEC alleged that Fenway Partners did not disclose the conflicts of interest caused by rerouting these fees to an affiliate and adopting payment agreements without the benefit of a management fee offset. Press accounts appearing at the time at which the Fenway Partners settlement was announced, but not the SEC order, suggest that the performance of Fenway Partners was challenged throughout this timeframe. The SEC highlighted two other instances in which Fenway Partners and its executives failed to disclose conflicts of interest related to fees and expenses. One related to the conflict of interest caused when, according to the SEC, Fenway Partners asked investors in a private equity fund advised by Fenway Partners to provide $4 million in connection with an investment in a portfolio company without disclosing that $1 million of the investment would be used to pay Fenway Consulting. Another related to incentive compensation that the SEC alleged that one of the executives and two former Fenway Partners employees received when the private equity fund exited a portfolio company. The SEC noted that this compensation was provided for services that were almost entirely performed while the individuals were Fenway Partners employees. According to the SEC, the individuals receiving these payments, which | disgorgement, prejudgment interest and civil money penalties. | |||
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totaled $15 million, were employees of Fenway Consulting at the time the payments were made. The SEC alleged that Fenway Partners and its executives did not disclose the conflict of interest triggered by these payments to the private equity fund’s advisory board or its limited partners, and that they also failed to disclose these payments as related party transactions in their financial statements provided to investors. It is notable that certain conduct forming the basis for the violations detailed in the settled order occurred before Fenway Partners became registered as an investment adviser with the SEC in March 2012, underscoring an SEC position that the relevant violations of the Advisers Act apply to all investment advisers, not just those registered with the SEC. | ||||
10/26/15 | Alleged Failure to Disclose Principal Trades Made Through Affiliated Broker-Dealers Alleged Deficiencies in Compliance Policies and Procedures | In National Asset Management, Inc., Advisers Act Release No. 4,243 (Oct. 26, 2015), the SEC instituted cease-and-desist proceedings against National Asset Management, Inc. (“NAM”), an Advisers Act-registered investment adviser, for failing to disclose to its advisory clients trades undertaken in a principal capacity through its affiliated broker-dealers and failing to enforce and implement proper compliance procedures. According to the SEC, NAM engaged in over 21,000 principal trades through broker-dealers that were wholly owned subsidiaries of NAM’s parent company without disclosing the potential conflicts of interest to NAM’s | The SEC alleged that NAM willfully violated Sections 204, 204A, 206(3), 206(4), and 207 of, and Rules 204-1, 204-3, 204A-1, 206(4)-7(a), and 206(4)-7(b) under, the Advisers Act. | NAM agreed to cease and desist from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of the charges, to censure, to pay a civil money penalty of $200,000, and to comply with certain undertakings, including retaining an independent compliance consultant, |
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10/19/15 | Alleged Failure by Adviser to Disclose a Change in an Investment | advisory clients and without obtaining their written consent as required under Section 206(3) of the Advisers Act. The SEC alleged that NAM’s compliance policies and procedures were not reasonably designed to prevent NAM’s affiliated broker-dealers from selling or purchasing securities to or from NAM clients, that NAM failed to conduct an annual review of these policies and procedures, and that NAM’s compliance manual did not include any policies or procedures addressing principal transactions. The SEC also alleged that NAM failed to report in filings with the Commission the disciplinary history of several of its investment adviser representatives, and that NAM failed to timely disclose this information to its clients. In addition, according to the SEC, NAM failed to enforce part of its code of ethics when its chief executive officer and other employees failed to submit over 500 required reports relating to their personal securities trading. In determining to accept NAM’s offer, the Commission considered remedial acts undertaken by NAM and cooperation afforded the SEC staff. http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2015/34-76264.pdf In UBS Willow Management L.L.C., Advisers Act Release No. 4,233 (Oct.16, 2015), the SEC instituted cease-and-desist proceedings against UBS Willow Management L.L.C. (“UBS Willow Management”), a formerly Advisers Act-registered investment adviser, | The SEC alleged that UBS Willow Management willfully violated Sections 17(a)(2) | submitting a report to the Commission for the next three years assessing the effectiveness of NAM’s policies and procedures, and posting a summary of and link to this order on the homepage of its website. UBS Willow Management and UBS Fund Advisor agreed to cease and desist from committing or causing |
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Company’s Investment Strategy | and UBS Fund Advisor L.L.C. (“UBS Fund Advisor”), an Advisers Act-registered investment adviser, for failing to disclose a material change in a 1940 Act-registered investment company’s investment strategy. According to the SEC, UBS Willow Management advised a 1940 Act-registered investment company that was marketed as primarily investing in distressed debt and utilized a long-credit investment strategy based on the premise that the debt would increase in value. The SEC alleged that UBS Willow Management invested the investment company’s assets in a manner consistent with this strategy until 2008 when it began to make large purchases of credit default swaps, switching to an investment strategy based on the premise that the debt would decrease in value. According to the SEC, this change led to a dramatically different portfolio profile; instead of primarily investing in distressed debt as advertised, the investment company was primarily shorting distressed debt. According to the SEC, the investment company’s considerable exposure to credit default swaps resulted in significant losses, and the investment company was liquidated in 2012. The SEC alleged that, when the investment company’s investment strategy changed, UBS Willow Management failed to provide adequate disclosure of the change or of the risks inherent in large exposure to credit default swaps to investors in the investment company or to the investment company’s board of directors. The SEC alleged that, from Fall 2008 to May 2009, UBS Willow | and 17(a)(3) of the Securities Act, Sections 206(2) and 206(4) of, and Rules 206(4)-8(a)(1) and 206(4)-8(a)(2) under, the Advisers Act, and Section 34(b) of the 1940 Act, and caused violations of Section 34(b) of, and Rule 8b-16 under, the 1940 Act. The SEC alleged that UBS Fund Advisor violated Section 203(e)(6) of the Advisers Act. | any violations and any future violations of the charges, to censure, and to pay disgorgement of $8,223,110, prejudgment interest of $1,373,436, and a civil money penalty of $3,000,000. UBS Willow Management and UBS Fund Advisor also agreed to comply with certain undertakings, including administering a total distribution of $13,126,730 to compensate investment company investors for their losses. | |
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Management provided a marketing brochure to potential investors that misstated the investment company’s strategy, and letters sent to investors from Fall 2008 to August 2011 contained false or misleading information about the investment company’s exposure to credit default swaps. The SEC alleged further that UBS Willow Management caused the investment company to misrepresent its investment strategy in investment reports filed with the SEC from Fall 2008 until the investment company’s liquidation. The SEC alleged that UBS Fund Advisor was aware of the change in strategy and failed to supervise UBS Willow Management, allowing the change to occur without adequate disclosure. According to the SEC, UBS Fund Advisor had contractual control and supervisory authority over UBS Willow Management and was obligated to ensure that UBS Willow Management adhered to the stated investment strategy and made adequate disclosures to the investment company’s board of directors and to its investors. | ||||
10/7/15 | Alleged Failure by Private Equity Fund Manager to Disclose Accelerated Monitoring Fees Alleged Failure | In Blackstone Management Partners L.L.C., Advisers Act Release No. 4,219 (Oct. 7, 2015), the SEC instituted cease-and-desist proceedings against Blackstone Management Partners L.L.C., an Advisers Act-registered investment adviser, Blackstone Management Partners III L.L.C, an Advisers Act-registered investment adviser, and Blackstone Management Partners IV L.L.C, an Advisers Act-registered | The SEC alleged that Blackstone violated Sections 206(2) and 206(4) of, and Rules 206(4)-7 and 206(4)-8 under, | Blackstone agreed to cease and desist from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of the charges, and to pay disgorgement of $26,225,203, |
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to Disclose Disparate Discounted Legal Fees | investment adviser (collectively, “Blackstone”), for failing to adequately disclose to private funds managed by Blackstone, and to investors in those private funds prior to their commitment of capital, that (1) Blackstone had the authority to accelerate future monitoring fees and exercised that authority upon termination of monitoring agreements and (2) Blackstone had negotiated with its primary outside law firm a discount for external legal fees paid to the firm that was substantially greater than the discount received by the Blackstone funds. According to the SEC, Blackstone had a practice of entering into monitoring agreements with the private funds’ portfolio companies under which Blackstone charged monitoring fees (i.e., fees in exchange for rendering certain consulting and advisory services to those portfolio companies). The SEC acknowledged that the funds’ documents disclosed Blackstone’s potential receipt of monitoring fees, but the SEC alleged that Blackstone failed to disclose that the monitoring agreements provided for the acceleration of monitoring fees to be triggered by certain events (e.g., upon either the private sale or initial public offering of a portfolio company), and that from 2010 to 2015, Blackstone had terminated certain monitoring agreements and accelerated the payment of future monitoring fees. The SEC alleged particularly that, in some instances, Blackstone had accelerated the monitoring fees, notwithstanding that a fund had completely exited the portfolio company and Blackstone would no longer be | the Advisers Act. | prejudgment interest of $2,686,553, and a civil money penalty of $10,000,000. | |
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providing any monitoring services. The SEC also alleged that, although Blackstone disclosed its ability to collect monitoring fees to the funds and to their investors prior to their commitment of capital, Blackstone did not disclose to the funds, their investors or the funds’ limited partnership advisory committees its practice of accelerating monitoring fees until Blackstone had taken the accelerated fees. Perhaps most noteworthy, the SEC alleged that the receipt of the accelerated monitoring fees presented Blackstone with a conflict of interest such that Blackstone could not effectively consent to the practice on behalf of the funds. A second matter underlying the settlement order was an alleged undisclosed discount of legal fees that Blackstone had negotiated with its primary outside counsel. Under the agreement, according to the SEC, Blackstone received a discount for external legal fees that was substantially greater than the discount received by the funds. Although Blackstone maintained that the discount rate reflected a “different mix of work” performed by the law firm for the funds and for Blackstone, the SEC alleged that Blackstone failed to adequately disclose the disparate legal fee discounts to the funds and their investors. The SEC also alleged that Blackstone faced a conflict of interest as the beneficiary of the discounts and could not effectively consent to the practice on behalf of the funds. The settlement principally involves inadequate | ||||
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disclosure of practices by Blackstone that appear to have since been curtailed, eliminated and/or disclosed to investors. The SEC’s order acknowledges remedial efforts by Blackstone, including voluntarily ending the disparate legal fee arrangement and modifying practices relating to the acceleration of monitoring fees (both practices were not uncommon in the industry in the past). | ||||
9/30/15 | Alleged Failure to Supervise an Investment Advisory Representative Alleged Failure to Adopt and Implement Internal Controls to Prevent and Detect Violations of the Advisers Act Alleged Failure to Disclose Conflicts of Interest in Fund Investments | In Securus Wealth Management, LLC, Advisers Act Release No. 4,213 (Sept. 30, 2015), the SEC instituted cease-and-desist proceedings against Securus Wealth Management, LLC (“Securus”), an Advisers Act-registered investment adviser, and James Goodland, president and owner of Securus, for failure to supervise an investment advisory representative and failure to adopt and implement an adequate system of internal compliance controls. According to the SEC, from January 2010 through July 2013, an investment advisory representative associated with Securus conducted a scheme using client accounts to support the market price of the common stock of a start-up company in which the representative personally owned shares. The SEC alleged that the representative bought shares on behalf of client accounts on a discretionary basis to influence the start-up’s stock price and prevented sales of shares that could place downward pressure on the market price. The representative, according to the SEC, ultimately caused his clients to | The SEC alleged that Securus willfully violated, and Mr. Goodland willfully aided and abetted and caused Securus’ violations of, Section 206(4) of, and Rule 206(4)-7 under, the Advisers Act. | Mr. Goodland and Securus agreed to cease and desist from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of the charges. Securus agreed to censure. Mr. Goodland agreed to be barred from association with, among others, any broker, dealer or investment adviser, and to pay a civil money penalty of $30,000. |
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invest over $1 million in shares of stock in the start-up, notwithstanding that Securus’ primary business model involved investing in mutual funds as opposed to purchasing individual stocks and bonds. The SEC alleged that, in furtherance of the scheme, the representative made material misrepresentations to clients about the market for the start-up’s stock and failed to disclose the significant conflicts of interest arising from his personal ownership of shares of and close involvement with the start-up company. The SEC alleged that Securus failed to reasonably implement policies and procedures for reviewing internal e-mails and for monitoring trades for potential market manipulation. The SEC also alleged that Securus failed to develop and implement policies and procedures to monitor conflicts of interest and ensure full disclosure to clients. Mr. Goodland, according to the SEC, failed to adequately respond to suspicious activity concerning the investment advisory representative’s conflicts of interest, his unusual trading, and his numerous e-mails with an insider at the start-up. | ||||
9/23/15 | Allegedly Defrauding Private Equity Fund Investors Alleged Misuse of Private Equity Client | In Covenant Partners, L.P., Advisers Act Release No. 4,206 (Sept. 23, 2015), the SEC instituted cease-and-desist proceedings against Covenant Partners, L.P. (“Covenant”), a now-defunct private equity fund, Covenant Capital Management Partners, L.P. (“CCMP”), the general partner of Covenant and non-Advisers Act-registered investment adviser, William B. | The SEC alleged that Mr. Fretz, Mr. Freeman and CCMP willfully violated, and Covenant violated, Sections 10(b) and | Mr. Fretz, Mr. Freeman, CCMP and Covenant agreed to cease and desist from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of the |
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Investments | Fretz, Jr., limited partner of CCMP and investment adviser to Covenant, and John P. Freeman, limited partner of CCMP and investment adviser to Covenant, for defrauding private equity fund investors and misusing investor funds. According to the SEC, Mr. Fretz and Mr. Freeman made a series of statements to Covenant investors indicating that Covenant’s proceeds would only be invested in securities or otherwise applied to business expenses, that the general partners would not unfairly profit from any transaction, and that Covenant would only pay the adviser performance fees if certain conditions were met. The SEC alleged that Mr. Fretz and Mr. Freeman, through CCMP, however, used the majority of investor funds for their own personal use, to repay debt obligations, and to provide $1.1 million to a failing broker-dealer that they operated and controlled. According to the SEC, Mr. Fretz and Mr. Freeman failed to disclose these payments to Covenant investors and paid themselves nearly $600,000 in performance fees that they had not earned. As Covenant filed for bankruptcy in September 2014, its offer of settlement is subject to bankruptcy court approval. | 17(a) of, and Rule 10b-5 under, the Securities Act. The SEC alleged that Mr. Fretz, Mr. Freeman and CCMP willfully violated Sections 206(1), 206(2), and 206(4) of, and Rule 206(4)-8 under, the Advisers Act. | charges, and to pay disgorgement of $5,476,928 and prejudgment interest of $353,582. Mr. Fretz and Mr. Freeman agreed to be barred from association with, among others, any broker, dealer or investment adviser, and to be prohibited from serving as, among other things, an employee of any advisory board or investment adviser, and to each pay a civil penalty of $500,000. | |
9/22/15 | Alleged Violation of the Safeguards | In R. T. Jones Capital Equities Management, Inc., Advisers Act Release No. 4,204 (Sept. 22, 2015), the SEC instituted first of its kind cease-and-desist | The SEC alleged that R.T. Jones willfully violated | R.T. Jones agreed to cease and desist from committing or causing |
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Rule Alleged Failure to Adopt Written Policies and Procedures Reasonably Designed to Safeguard Customer Information | proceedings against R.T. Jones Capital Equities Management, Inc. (“R.T. Jones”), an Advisers Act-registered investment adviser, for failing to adopt written policies and procedures reasonably designed to protect customer records and information. According to the SEC, in facilitating R.T. Jones’ advisory agreements with retirement plan participants, R.T. Jones possessed non-public personal information including names, dates of birth, and social security numbers for over 100,000 individuals. The SEC alleged that, from at least September 2009 through July 2013, R.T. Jones stored this sensitive, personally identifiable information on its third-party-hosted web server without adopting written policies and procedures regarding the security and confidentiality of that information or the protection of that information from anticipated threats or unauthorized access. In July 2013, according to the SEC, R.T. Jones’ web server was attacked by an unauthorized intruder who gained access to the data. The SEC alleged that, as a result, the sensitive and personally identifiable information of thousands of R.T. Jones’ clients was made vulnerable to threat. The SEC alleged that R.T. Jones’ failure to adopt written policies and procedures reasonably designed to safeguard customer information was in violation of Rule 20(a) of Regulation S-P (the “Safeguards Rule”), which requires that every investment adviser registered with the Commission adopt policies and procedures reasonably designed to: (1) ensure the security and | Rule 30(a) of Regulation S-P. | any violations and any future violations of the charges, to censure, and to pay a civil money penalty of $75,000. | |
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confidentiality of customer records and information; (2) protect against any anticipated threats or hazards to the security or integrity of customer records and information; and (3) protect against unauthorized access to, or use of, customer records or information that could result in substantial harm or inconvenience to any customer. In determining to accept R.T. Jones’ offer, the SEC considered the remedial acts promptly undertaken by R.T. Jones, including the appointment of an information security manager to oversee data security, the retention of a cybersecurity firm to provide ongoing reports and advice, and R.T. Jones’ overall cooperation with SEC staff. | ||||
9/21/15 | Alleged Improper Use of Fund Assets to Pay Distribution Fees Allegedly Misleading Investors Regarding Use of Fund Assets Distribution-in-Guise Initiative | In First Eagle Investment Management, LLC, Advisers Act Release No. 4,199 (Sept. 21, 2015), the SEC instituted cease-and-desist proceedings against First Eagle Investment Management, LLC (“First Eagle”), an Advisers Act-registered investment adviser, and FEF Distributors, LLC (“FEF”), an Exchange Act-registered broker-dealer and wholly-owned subsidiary of First Eagle, for improperly using approximately $25 million in mutual fund assets to pay for the distribution and marketing of fund shares outside of a written plan approved in accordance with Rule 12b-1 under the 1940 Act. Section 12(b) of, and Rule 12b-1 under, the 1940 Act | The SEC alleged that First Eagle willfully violated Section 206(2) of the Advisers Act and Section 34(b) of the 1940 Act. The SEC alleged that First Eagle and FEF caused violations of Section 12(b) of, and Rule 12b-1 | First Eagle and FEF agreed to cease and desist from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of the charges, to pay a civil money penalty of $12,500,000, to deposit $39,747,879 into a distribution fund, to facilitate distribution fund payments to shareholder accounts |
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make it unlawful to use a registered investment company’s assets to “engage directly or indirectly in financing any activity which is primarily intended to result in the sale of” the investment company’s shares outside of a written Rule 12b-1 plan approved by the investment company’s board. If no Rule 12b-1 plan that permits the investment company’s adviser to use the investment company’s assets to pay for distribution is adopted and approved, then assets cannot be used to pay for the activity. The SEC alleged that FEF entered into agreements with two financial intermediaries to provide distribution and marketing services to registered investment companies but treated the agreements as though they were for sub-transfer agency services, allowing FEF and First Eagle to use the investment companies’ assets to pay for distribution and marketing in violation of Section 12(b) of, and Rule 12b-1 under, the 1940 Act. According to the SEC, First Eagle inaccurately reported to the investment companies’ boards that these distribution and marketing fees were sub-transfer agency fees. The SEC also alleged that the investment companies’ prospectus disclosures inaccurately indicated that FEF and its affiliates were bearing distribution expenses not covered by the investment companies’ Rule 12b-1 plan, when the investment companies themselves were bearing these expenses. In accepting the offer of settlement, the SEC considered remedial acts undertaken by First Eagle and FEF and | under, the 1940 Act. | that held shares during the relevant period, and to complete the disbursement of all amounts payable within 90 days of the Commission’s approving the calculation of payments. First Eagle agreed to censure and to pay disgorgement of $24,907,354 and prejudgment interest of $2,340,525. FEF agreed to certain undertakings, including retaining an independent compliance consultant and adopting that compliance consultant’s recommendations. | ||
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their cooperation with SEC staff. According to the SEC, First Eagle and FEF aided the investigation by voluntarily providing information and producing documents to the staff. The First Eagle settlement is particularly noteworthy as it appears to be the first arising out of the Distribution-in-Guise Initiative, a recent SEC examination staff initiative designed to protect registered investment company shareholders from bearing the costs when firms improperly use investment company assets to pay for distribution-related services. | ||||
9/15/15 | Alleged Failure to Disclose Personal Expense Reimbursements Alleged Submission of False Expenses | In Jeffrey B. Rubin, Advisers Act Release No. 4,196 (Sept. 15, 2015), the SEC instituted cease-and-desist proceedings against Jeffrey B. Rubin, a former Advisers Act-registered investment adviser, for allegedly defrauding his professional athlete clients and failing to disclose expense reimbursements that he used for personal luxury purchases. According to the SEC, in 2007, Mr. Rubin started Pro Sports Financial, Inc. (“Pro Sports”) as a service designed to both assist professional athletes with their everyday needs and to serve as their investment adviser. The SEC alleged that, starting in 2008, at least 30 of Mr. Rubin’s clients, upon his recommendation, invested a total of $40 million in the development of an entertainment complex and casino. Mr. Rubin, according to the SEC, actively marketed offerings in the | The SEC alleged that Mr. Rubin willfully violated Sections 17(a)(1) and 17(a)(3) of the Securities Act, and Sections 206(1) and 206(2) of the Advisers Act. | Mr. Rubin agreed to cease and desist from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of the charges, to censure, to be barred from association with, among others, any broker, dealer or investment adviser, and to be prohibited from serving as, among other things, an employee of any advisory board or investment adviser, and to pay a civil money |
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project to investors around the country, and in turn was reimbursed by the casino project developer for marketing costs. The SEC alleged that Mr. Rubin submitted $600,000 in false expenses to the developer under the guise of legitimate marketing expenses and used them to fund lavish purchases including a mortgage on a multi-million dollar home, a stake in a Florida nightclub, and other luxury items. According to the SEC, Mr. Rubin did not disclose to Pro Sports’ Clients that he had been reimbursed from the offering proceeds for these personal expenses. In January 2010, according to the SEC, law enforcement shut down the casino due to issues related to the legality of electronic bingo; the project developer and Mr. Rubin nonetheless continued to solicit investor proceedings to reopen the establishment, but it never reopened. | penalty of $250,000. | |||
9/9/15 | Alleged Material Misstatements and Omissions Regarding Client Investments Alleged Fraudulent Inflation of Data Related to Managed Assets and Investment | In Bennett Group Financial Services, LLC, Advisers Act Release No. 4,191 (Sept. 9, 2015), the SEC instituted cease-and-desist proceedings against Bennett Group Financial Services, LLC (“Bennett Group”), a formerly Advisers Act-registered investment adviser, and Dawn J. Bennett, Bennett Group’s founder, majority owner, and chief executive officer, for fraudulently exaggerating both Bennett Group’s amount of managed assets and the investment returns obtained on behalf of its clients. The SEC alleged that, from at least 2009 through 2011, | The SEC alleged that Ms. Bennett and Bennett Group willfully violated Section 17(a) of the Securities Act, Section 10(b) of, and Rule 10b-5 under, the Exchange Act, and Sections 206(1) and 206(2) of the | The SEC instituted cease-and-desist proceedings to determine what, if any, remedial action including, but not limited to, disgorgement, interest and civil penalties is appropriate against Ms. Bennett and Bennett |
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Returns | Ms. Bennett and Bennett Group made various material misstatements and omissions in an effort to attract new clients to Bennett Group’s investment advisory business. According to the SEC, Ms. Bennett and Bennett Group, for example, overstated managed assets by at least $1.5 billion to a national financial advisor ranking service, knowing that the ranking service would then publish the fraudulent statements. The SEC also alleged that Ms. Bennett told both her clients and listeners of her paid radio program that Bennett Group’s investment returns placed it in the “top 1 percent” of firms worldwide, failing to disclose that these profitable returns were calculated for a model portfolio and were not based on actual investor performance. The SEC alleged further that Ms. Bennett and Bennett Group made multiple fraudulent submissions to Barron’s magazine, exaggerating the value of managed assets and typical client account values, knowing that these reports would be reprinted and distributed to the public. According to the SEC, Ms. Bennett and Bennett Group then promoted the publication’s misrepresented rankings and articles on Bennett Group’s website and in social media. The SEC alleged that, while their misstatements were under investigation, Ms. Bennett and Bennett Group made additional false statements in an attempt to cover up their fraud, including saying that Bennett Group provided advice regarding short-term cash management to three clients covering more than $1.5 billion in assets, when Bennett Group never provided any form of | Advisers Act. The SEC alleged that Bennett Group willfully violated, and Ms. Bennett willfully aided and abetted and caused violations of, Section 206(4) of, and Rules 206(4)-1(a)(5) and 206(4)-7 under, the Advisers Act. | Group. | |
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management for assets greater than $107 million. The SEC alleged that, in addition to the material misstatements noted above, Ms. Bennett and Bennett Group failed to adopt and implement full and complete written policies and procedures related to the calculation and advertisement of assets managed and of investment returns. | ||||
9/2/15 | Alleged Improper Retention of Fees from Collateralized Debt Obligation Clients Alleged Failure to Disclose Conflicts of Interest Related to Fee Arrangements | In Taberna Capital Management, LLC, Advisers Act Release No. 4,186 (Sept. 2, 2015), the SEC instituted cease-and-desist proceedings against Taberna Capital Management, LLC (“Taberna”), a former Advisers Act-registered investment adviser, Michael Fralin, Taberna’s former managing director, and Raphael Licht, Taberna’s former chief legal officer and chief administrative officer, for the impermissible retention of fees and for failure to disclose related conflicts of interest to clients. According to the SEC, Taberna managed a series of collateralized debt obligations (“CDOs”), special-purpose vehicles that issue debt to investors and use the proceeds to invest in fixed income securities or loans. Between 2009 and 2012, Taberna began charging issuers in the CDOs’ underlying debt obligations a special fee in connection with exchanges involved in restructuring their portfolios (“Exchange Fee”). An exchange, according to the SEC, is a transaction in which the CDO returns an issuer’s securities in exchange for new securities and/or consideration. The | The SEC alleged that Taberna willfully violated Section 15(a) of the Exchange Act, and Sections 206(1), 206(2), and 207 of, and Rule 206(4)-8 under, the Advisers Act. The SEC alleged that Mr. Fralin and Mr. Licht willfully aided and abetted and caused Taberna’s violations of Section 206(2) of | Taberna, Mr. Fralin and Mr. Licht agreed to cease and desist from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of the charges. Mr. Fralin and Mr. Licht agreed to be barred from association with, among others, any broker, dealer or investment adviser, and to be prohibited from serving as, among other things, an employee of any advisory board or investment adviser, with the right to apply for reentry after five |
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SEC alleged that Taberna executed over 50 exchange transactions during the period in question and retained over $15 million in Exchange Fees, even though the CDOs’ governing documents said that the retention of these Exchange Fees was impermissible and that any such fees should go directly to the CDOs. According to the SEC, Taberna instead obscured the nature of these fees in the CDOs’ documents, characterizing them as compensation for third-party expenses or omitting them entirely. The SEC alleged that Taberna’s use of Exchange Fees caused a conflict of interest, as Taberna retained the fees in connection with exchanges but not with other types of restructurings. Taberna, according to the SEC, had, as a result, an incentive to steer issuers towards exchanges over other forms of restructuring. According to the SEC, Taberna failed to disclose this conflict of interest to its clients and to its investors in its Forms ADV. The SEC alleged that Mr. Fralin and Mr. Licht were key contributors to Taberna’s misconduct, with Mr. Fralin responsible for the exchange negotiations and the resulting documents, and Mr. Licht approving of and supervising Mr. Fralin’s efforts to generate Exchange Fees. | the Advisers Act. The SEC alleged that Mr. Fralin willfully aided and abetted and caused Taberna’s violations of Section 206(4) of, and Rule 206(4)-8 under, the Advisers Act. The SEC alleged that Mr. Taberna willfully violated, and Mr. Licht willfully aided and abetted and caused Mr. Taberna’s violation of, Section 207 of the Advisers Act. | years, and to be denied the privilege of appearing or practicing before the Commission as an attorney. Mr. Licht agreed to pay a civil money penalty of $75,000. Taberna agreed to pay disgorgement of $13,000,000, prejudgment interest of $2,000,000, and a civil penalty of $6,500,000. Taberna also agreed to comply with certain undertakings, including not acting or seeking to act as an investment adviser for three years, posting prominently on its website a summary of and hyperlink to the order, and providing a copy of the order to all current managers of the CDOs. | ||
8/17/15 | Alleged Material Misstatements in | In Citigroup Alternative Investments LLC, Advisers Act Release No. 4,174 (Aug. 17, 2015), the SEC instituted | The SEC alleged that CAI and | CAI and CGMI agreed to cease and desist |
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the Offer and Sale of Securities | cease-and-desist proceedings against Citigroup Alternative Investments LLC (“CAI”), an Advisers Act-registered investment adviser, and Citigroup Global Markets Inc. (“CGMI”), an Advisers Act-registered investment adviser and Exchange Act-registered broker-dealer, for allegedly misrepresenting fund risk and performance to advisory clients of two hedge funds, collectively raising nearly $3 billion in capital from approximately 4,000 investors before the funds collapsed. According to the SEC, CGMF’s financial advisers and CAI’s fund manager misrepresented the risks and performance of two now-defunct hedge funds to advisory clients, telling them that the investments were “safe,” “low-risk” “bond substitutes” that were suitable for traditional bond investors, when the funds were not low-risk investments or bond substitutes, and investment carried significantly greater risk than a bond investment. The SEC also alleged that CAI misrepresented the results of back-testing analysis of one of the funds that demonstrated that an investment carried far greater risk than was described to investors. The SEC alleged that, in making these misrepresentations, the financial advisers and the fund manager minimized the significant risk of loss resulting from the funds’ investment strategy and use of leverage. According to the SEC, as the funds began experiencing liquidity and leverage problems, the financial advisers and the fund manager continued to offer and sell the | CGMI willfully violated Sections 17(a)(2) and 17(a)(3) of the Securities Act. The SEC alleged that CGMI willfully violated Section 206(2) of the Advisers Act. The SEC alleged that CAI willfully violated Section 206(4) of, and Rules 206(4)-7 and 206(4)-8 under, the Advisers Act. | from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of the charges, to censure, and to pay disgorgement of $139,950,239 and prejudgment interest of $39,612,089. | |
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funds as a safe, low-risk investment. The SEC alleged further that CAI failed to adopt and implement policies and procedures preventing the financial advisers and fund manager from making contradictory and false representations. | ||||
8/12/15 | Alleged Misuse of Confidential Trade Information by a Broker-Dealer in Connection with a Dark Pool Alleged Fraudulent Business Practices by a Broker-Dealer Alleged Failure to Disclose Proprietary Trading Activities | In ITG Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 75,672 (Aug. 12, 2015), the SEC instituted cease-and-desist proceedings against ITG Inc., an Exchange Act-registered broker-dealer, and AlterNet Securities, Inc., a subsidiary of ITG Inc. providing sell-side services (collectively, “ITG”), for allegedly operating a secret trading desk and misusing clients’ confidential trading information. According to the SEC, ITG operated between April 2010 and July 2011 an undisclosed proprietary trading desk known internally as “Project Omega.” The SEC alleged that, through Project Omega, ITG accessed live feeds of confidential order and execution information from its customers and from subscribers to its dark pool alternative trading system, POSIT. According to the SEC, ITG then made proprietary algorithmic trades through strategies based on that information, including instances in which ITG traded against its own POSIT subscribers. The SEC alleged that Project Omega was managed by an ITG senior executive who designed and led its trading strategies notwithstanding that these strategies violated ITG’s written compliance policies | The SEC alleged that ITG violated Sections 17(a)(2) and 17(a)(3) of the Securities Act. The SEC alleged that ITG Inc. violated Rules 301(b)(2) and 301(b)(10) of the SEC’s Regulation ATS. | ITG agreed to cease and desist from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of the charges, to censure, and to pay disgorgement of $2,081,304, prejudgment interest of $256,532, and a civil money penalty of $18,000,000. ITG Inc. agreed to cease and desist from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of the charges. |
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restricting Project Omega’s access to customer information. According to the SEC, Project Omega traded approximately 1.3 billion shares, resulting in gross trading revenues of approximately $2,081,304. According to the SEC, ITG was, while the trading was occurring, misleadingly promoting itself and POSIT as an independent “agency-only” broker that did not engage in proprietary trading on its own account, did not have conflicts of interest with its customers, and protected the confidentiality of its customers’ trade information. The SEC alleged that ITG Inc. failed to file an amendment on Form ATS at least 20 days before launching Project Omega to disclose its proprietary trading activities and to indicate that one of its strategies would involve accessing and trading off of subscribers’ confidential information. The SEC also alleged that ITG Inc. failed to establish adequate safeguards and procedures to protect POSIT subscribers’ confidential information by failing to limit access only to employees operating POSIT or responsible for its compliance. | ||||
8/11/15 | Alleged Improper Account Redemptions Alleged Breach | In Acadia Asset Management, LLC, Advisers Act Release No. 4,165 (Aug. 11, 2015), the SEC instituted cease-and-desist proceedings against Acadia Asset Management, LLC (“Acadia”), a company providing investment advisory services, and Eric D. Jacobs, | The SEC alleged that Mr. Jacobs and Acadia willfully violated Section 17(a) of | Mr. Jacobs and Acadia agreed to cease and desist from committing or causing any violations and any |
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of Fiduciary Duties by a Hedge Fund Adviser Alleged Misrepresentation of Investment Risk | principal owner and managing member of Acadia, for breaching their fiduciary duties as investment advisers and misrepresenting certain risks to investors. According to the SEC, Mr. Jacobs had a personal account with one of Acadia’s private fund clients. The SEC alleged that, in 2010, Mr. Jacobs made a series of redemption requests with respect to the fund, knowing that his capital account balance was insufficient to cover the redemptions. According to the SEC, Mr. Jacobs, as a result, received $57,000 in redemptions to which he was not entitled. The SEC also alleged that Mr. Jacobs directed the same fund to pay Acadia excess management fees that he knew, or was reckless in not knowing, that Acadia was not entitled to, as Acadia and Mr. Jacobs owed the fund money due to their over-redemptions, management fee over-payments, and pending expense reimbursements. According to the SEC, the private fund was rendered illiquid in the aftermath of the financial crisis, and in 2008 began to offer “in-kind” redemptions to investors. The SEC alleged that Mr. Jacobs proceeded to redeem his own investment interest and that of his father in preference over those of other fund investors, and in an amount exceeding the redemption caps placed on the other liquidating partners. The SEC alleged that Mr. Jacobs and Acadia disseminated materially false and misleading statements misrepresenting the risk involved with investment in | the Securities Act, Section 10(b) of, and Rule 10b-5 under, the Exchange Act, and Sections 206(1), 206(2), and 206(4) of, and Rule 206(4)-8 under, the Advisers Act. | future violations of the charges, and to pay disgorgement of $321,365 and prejudgment interest of $32,750. Acadia agreed to censure. Mr. Jacobs agreed to be barred from association with, among others, any broker, dealer or investment adviser, and to be prohibited from serving as, among other things, an employee of any advisory board or investment adviser, and to pay a civil money penalty of $300,000. | |
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one of the funds that Acadia advised, manipulating historical performance tables, misrepresenting the levels of volatility, and downplaying the fund’s high use of leverage. | ||||
8/10/15 | Alleged Breach of Fiduciary Duty for Failing to Disclose a Senior Executive’s Conflicts of Interest Surrounding a Personal Loan Received From an Advisory Client Alleged Miscategorization of Investments as Managed Assets Alleged Failure to Implement Adequate Compliance Policies and Procedures | In Guggenheim Partners Investment Management, LLC, Advisers Act Release No. 4,163 (Aug. 10, 2015), the SEC instituted cease-and-desist proceedings against Guggenheim Partners Investment Management, LLC (“GPIM”), an Advisers Act-registered investment adviser, for failing to disclose a $50 million loan that one of its senior executives received from an advisory client, billing a client for asset management fees on non-managed assets, and failing to implement adequate compliance policies and procedures. According to the SEC, a senior GPIM executive obtained in July 2010 a $50 million loan from a GPIM client in seeking to personally participate in an acquisition led by GPIM’s parent company. The SEC alleged that, in August 2010, GPIM then invested nine other advisory clients in two transactions with the same client with which the GPIM executive had executed his loan, failing to disclose the executive’s loan to the other clients participating in the transaction. The SEC alleged that senior officials at GPIM knew of the loan, but that they failed to alert the firm’s compliance staff of its existence; as a result, GPIM failed to disclose the loan or the potential conflict of interest that it created. The SEC alleged further that GPIM did not act reasonably in | The SEC alleged that GPIM willfully violated Sections 204A, 204(a), 206(2), and 206(4) of, and Rules 204A-1, 204-2(a)(3), 204-2(a)(5), and 206(4)-7 under, the Advisers Act. | GPIM agreed to cease and desist from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of the charges, to censure, and to pay a civil money penalty of $20 million. GPIM also agreed to certain undertakings, including retaining the services of an independent compliance consultant, adopting all of the consultant’s recommendations, ensuring the consultant’s independence, and preserving a record of its compliance with the undertakings set out in the SEC’s order for at |
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connection with the loan, as it had failed to adopt measures to provide meaningful oversight of the GPIM executive’s non-advisory business dealings. The SEC alleged that, over a multi-year period, GPIM billed a client for asset management fees on non-managed assets, charging the client approximately $6.5 million in asset management fees for investments it did not manage. According to the SEC, GPIM had coded certain non-managed investments incorrectly in its books and records, resulting in the inclusion of non-advisory fees, including back-office processing, pricing, and recordkeeping, in the calculation of asset management fees for managed investments. The SEC alleged further that, after GPIM identified the error, it did not issue a credit to the client for another two years. According to the SEC, GPIM did not properly implement its compliance policies and procedures, resulting in a compliance program that was not reasonably designed to prevent violations of the federal securities laws. According to the SEC, GPIM also failed to enforce its code of ethics, as evidenced by its nondisclosure of the GPIM executive’s loan with its client. The SEC alleged that additional code of ethics violations included GPIM employees accepting inappropriate gifts from clients, including 44 unreported flights on private planes. The SEC alleged that GPIM failed to properly document trade errors and neglected to maintain sufficient books and records. | least six years. | |||
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8/6/15 | Auditors’ Alleged Failure to Complete Surprise Examinations Auditors’ Allegedly Causing an Investment Adviser to Violate the Advisers Act’s Custody Rule | In StarkSchenkein, LLP, Advisers Act Release No. 4,162 (Aug. 6, 2015), the SEC instituted cease-and-desist proceedings against StarkSchenkein, LLP (“StarkSchenkein”), a public accounting firm registered with the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, and Wesley N. Stark, CPA, a founding partner and former owner of StarkSchenkein, LLP, for failing to adequately complete surprise examinations pursuant to Section 206(4) of, and Rule 206(4)-2 under, the Advisers Act. According to the SEC, a former registered investment adviser retained StarkSchenkein to perform surprise examinations, as required by the Custody Rule, to verify client funds and securities for the years 2010, 2011 and 2012. The SEC alleged that Mr. Stark and StarkSchenkein accepted this responsibility despite lacking knowledge of, or experience with, the Custody Rule, and that the lack of knowledge caused them to fail to adequately complete the surprise examinations. According to the SEC, StarkSchenkein had never performed a surprise examination for an Advisers Act-registered investment adviser prior to the 2010 examination, and the engagement team assigned to the examination had no prior experience performing surprise examinations for registered investment advisers. The SEC alleged that, for both the 2010 and 2011 examinations, StarkSchenkein filed a Form ADV-E under the Advisers Act and Report of Independent | The SEC alleged that Mr. Stark and StarkSchenkein caused an investment adviser’s violation of Section 206(4) of, and Rule 206(4)-2 under, the Advisers Act, and engaged in improper professional conduct within the meaning of Section 4C of the Exchange Act and Rule 102(e)(1)(ii) of the Commission’s Rules of Practice. | Mr. Stark and StarkSchenkein agreed to cease and desist from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of the charges. Mr. Stark agreed to be denied the privilege of appearing or practicing before the Commission as an accountant, with the ability to request reinstatement after three years, and to pay a civil money penalty of $15,000. StarkSchenkein agreed to be denied the privilege of appearing or practicing before the Commission as an accountant, with the ability to request reinstatement after one year, and to pay |
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Registered Accountant certifying that the investment adviser was in compliance with the Custody Rule when it was not. The SEC alleged further that, for the 2012 examination, StarkSchenkein did not complete its work and failed to file any report or document relating to that examination. According to the SEC, Mr. Stark also failed to obtain sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that the investment adviser was in compliance with the Custody Rule, and StarkSchenkein failed to obtain engagement quality control review for the completed 2010 and 2011 surprise examinations at any time before or after the reports of those examinations were released. The failure to conduct surprise examinations in accordance with applicable standards, according to the SEC, caused the investment adviser to violate the Custody Rule. The SEC alleged further that Mr. Stark’s conducting the surprise examinations violated the professional standards for certified public accountants set out in the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants’ Attestation Standards and Compliance Attest Procedures. | disgorgement of $12,750, prejudgment interest of $1,353, and civil penalties of $15,000. | |||
8/6/15 | Alleged Undisclosed Principal Transactions Alleged Violation | In Parallax Investments, LLC, Advisers Act Release No. 4,159 (Aug. 6, 2015), the SEC instituted cease-and-desist proceedings against Parallax Investments, LLC (“Parallax”), an investment adviser registered under the Advisers Act during the relevant periods, John P. Bott, II, Parallax’s sole owner and manager, and F. Robert | The SEC alleged that Parallax willfully violated Sections 204A, 206(3) and 206(4) of, and Rules | Parallax agreed to cease and desist from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of the charges, to censure, to |
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of the Advisers Act’s Custody Rule Alleged Failure of a Registered Investment Adviser to Implement Written Compliance Procedures and a Written Code of Ethics | Falkenberg, Parallax’s CCO, for willfully violating the principal transaction prohibitions and the custody and compliance rules under the Advisers Act. The Commission originally instituted public administrative and cease-and-desist proceedings against these parties on November 26, 2013. The SEC alleged that Parallax engaged in at least 2,000 undisclosed principal transactions without obtaining client consent on a transaction-by-transaction basis. According to the SEC, Parallax engaged Tri-Star Financial (“TSF”), an affiliated broker-dealer (by virtue of Mr. Bott’s owning 40 percent of TSF), to execute trades and provide fixed income analysis without previously providing disclosure to and obtaining informed consent from clients in violation of Section 206(3) of the Advisers Act. Section 206(3), by its express terms, prohibits an investment adviser from purchasing from a client or selling securities to a client on a principal basis without disclosing to the client in writing prior to the completion of the transaction the capacity in which the adviser is acting and obtaining the client’s informed consent. The SEC has in the past indicated that, notwithstanding the Section’s express terms, it can be applied to an entity affiliated with an Advisers Act-registered investment adviser. Mr. Bott personally received approximately $1 million of the $1.9 million in fees that Parallax paid TSF. The SEC also alleged that Parallax had implemented the terms of a compliance manual that contained a chapter that described the Section 206(3) prohibition on principal | 204A-1, 206(4)-2 and 206(4)-7 under, the Advisers Act. The SEC alleged that Mr. Bott and Mr. Falkenberg willfully aided and abetted and caused Parallax’s violations of Sections 204A and 206(4) of, and Rules 204A-1 and 206(4)-7 under, the Advisers Act. The SEC alleged that Mr. Bott willfully aided and abetted and caused Parallax’s violations of Section 206(3) of the Advisers Act. | pay a civil money penalty of $200,000, prejudgment interest of $5,604, and a civil money penalty of $70,000, and to retain a compliance consultant or an independent compliance consultant to render compliance services for a period of at least one year from the entry of the SEC’s order. Mr. Falkenberg agreed to cease and desist from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of the charges, to censure, and to pay prejudgment interest of $5,604 and a civil money penalty of $70,000. Mr. Bott agreed to cease and desist from committing or causing any violations and any | |
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transactions, but that Mr. Bott had failed to read the chapter. The SEC alleged that Parallax violated the Custody Rule, as Parallax had failed to either obtain an annual surprise exam or distribute audited financial statements to investors in a private fund managed by Parallax within 120 days of the fund’s fiscal year end. Parallax, the SEC asserted, had elected to distribute the audited financial statements but missed the deadline by a month and failed to use, as required by the Custody Rule, an auditor registered with the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board. The SEC alleged that Parallax failed for two years to adopt and implement written compliance policies and procedures designed to prevent violations of the Advisers Act’s prohibition on principal transactions as required by Advisers Act Rule 206(4)-7 and failed to maintain and enforce a written code of ethics as required by Advisers Act Rule 204A-1. Parallax also, the SEC maintained, failed to perform the required annual compliance reviews, and the SEC alleged that Mr. Falkenberg created a memo purporting to show the review had been done after the SEC requested to review the records. | future violations of the charges and to censure. Parallax and Mr. Bott agreed to distribute $450,000 to compensate certain advisory clients as an approximation of a portion of certain sales credits Mr. Bott received in connection with the principal transactions. Mr. Falkenberg also agreed to complete 30 hours of compliance training. | |||
8/6/15 | Allegedly Engaging in Principal | In Tri-Star Advisors, Inc., Advisers Act Release No. 4,160 (Aug. 6, 2015), a companion case to Parallax Investments, LLC described above, the SEC instituted | The SEC alleged that TSA willfully violated Sections | TSA agreed to cease and desist from committing or causing |
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Transactions Through a Broker-Dealer Without Providing Written Disclosure or Obtaining Consent | cease-and-desist proceedings against Tri-Star Advisors, Inc. (“TSA”), an Advisers Act-registered investment adviser, William T. Payne, TSA’s chief executive officer, and Jon C. Vaughan, TSA’s president. The SEC alleged that TSA engaged in approximately 2,212 undisclosed principal transactions between July 2009 and July 2011 involving Tri-Star Financial (“TSF”), an affiliated broker-dealer (by virtue of Mr. Payne and Mr. Vaughan’s collectively owning 60 percent of TSF). The Commission originally instituted public administrative and cease-and-desist proceedings against these parties on November 26, 2013. The SEC asserted that TSA executed securities trades and provided fixed income analysis without providing disclosure to TSA’s clients and obtaining their consent on a transaction-by-transaction basis in violation of Section 206(3). Mr. Vaughn and Mr. Payne, according to the SEC, received 55 percent of the sales credits generated by the undisclosed principal trades. The SEC alleged that TSA failed to adopt and implement written compliance policies and procedures designed to prevent violations of the Advisers Act’s provisions relating to affiliated principal transactions as required by Rule 206(4)-7 under the Advisers Act, known as the “Compliance Rule.” | 206(3) and 206(4) of, and Rule 206(4)-7 under, the Advisers Act. The SEC alleged that Mr. Payne and Mr. Vaughn caused TSA’s violations of Sections 206(3) and 206(4) of, and Rule 206(4)-7 under, the Advisers Act. | any violations or any future violations of the charges, to censure, and to pay a civil money penalty of $150,000. Mr. Payne agreed to cease and desist from committing or causing any violations or any future violations of the charges, and to pay disgorgement of $142,500, prejudgment interest of $3,235, and a civil money penalty of $195,735. Mr. Vaughan agreed to cease and desist from committing or causing any violations or any future violations of the charges, and to pay disgorgement of $232,500 and a civil money penalty of $50,000. TSA also agreed to certain undertakings, | |
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including retaining a compliance consultant for at least one year, requiring the consultant to conduct a comprehensive compliance review, submitting a report approved by the consultant to the staff of the Commission, and posting prominently on its principal website a summary of the SEC’s order with a hyperlink to the order. | ||||
7/31/15 | Alleged False and Misleading Material Statements to Investors Alleged Fraudulent or Deceitful Practices in Advising a Pooled Investment Vehicle | In Reliance Financial Advisers, LLC, Advisers Act Release No. 4,152 (July 31, 2015), the SEC instituted cease-and-desist proceedings against Reliance Financial Advisors, LLC (“Reliance Financial”), an Advisers-Act registered investment adviser, and Walter F. Grenda, Jr., a co-founder and managing partner of Reliance Financial, for knowingly or recklessly making or using false and misleading statements to advisory clients in recommending and selling investments in a hedge fund managed by an investment advisory firm not registered with the SEC under the Advisers Act. The Commission originally instituted public administrative and cease-and-desist proceedings against these parties on December 10, 2014. | The SEC alleged that Reliance Financial and Mr. Grenda violated Section 17(a) of the Securities Act, Section 10(b) of, and Rule 10b-5 under, the Exchange Act, and Sections 206(1) and 206(2) of the Advisers Act. The SEC alleged | Reliance Financial and Mr. Grenda agreed to cease and desist from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of the charges and to dissolve Reliance Financial. Reliance Financial agreed to censure and to have its registration as an investment adviser revoked. |
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According to the SEC, Timothy S. Dembski, co-founder and managing partner of Reliance Financial, and the principal of the unregistered firm, Scott M. Stephan, established a fund not registered under the 1940 Act to trade on the basis of an automated trading strategy designed by Mr. Stephan. The SEC alleged that neither Mr. Dembski nor Mr. Stephan had experience managing a private fund on the basis of such a strategy and that neither had conducted any real-time testing of the strategy. The SEC alleged that, in recommending that clients invest in the private fund, Mr. Grenda knew or recklessly disregarded: (1) that the fund was a speculative investment; (2) that Mr. Stephan had no prior experience operating an automated trading strategy or advising a private fund and had virtually no experience trading or investing; and (3) that Mr. Grenda’s advisory clients did not know Mr. Stephan and, thus, had no reason to trust or invest with Mr. Stephan. The SEC further alleged that Mr. Grenda knew or recklessly disregarded that Mr. Stephan’s biography in the private fund’s private placement memorandum was false and misleading. The Commission asserted that, by failing to inform their advisory clients of the shortcomings of the manager of the private fund—Mr. Stephan—and by disseminating a private placement memorandum that falsely described Mr. Stephan’s experience, Mr. Grenda failed to act as a reasonably careful person would in similar | that Mr. Grenda willfully aided and abetted and caused the private fund’s violations of Section 17(a) of the Securities Act, Section 10(b) of, and Rule 10b-5 under, the Exchange Act, Section 206(4) of, and Rule 206(4)-8 under, the Advisers Act, and Reliance Financial’s violations of Section 17(a) of the Securities Act, Section 10(b) of, and Rule 10b-5 under, the Exchange Act, and Sections 206(1) and 206(2) of the Advisers Act. | Mr. Grenda agreed to be barred from association with, among others, any broker, dealer or investment adviser, and to be prohibited from serving as, among other things, an employee of any advisory board or investment adviser, with the right to apply for reentry after three years; and to pay disgorgement of $25,000, prejudgment interest of $2,410, and civil penalties totaling $50,000. | ||
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circumstances. In addition, the SEC asserted that Mr. Grenda made false and misleading statements and omissions to two advisory clients in seeking to borrow approximately $250,000 from them, using a large portion of the money to pay personal expenses and debts. | ||||
7/24/15 | Alleged Failure to Disclose Conflicts of Interest Related to Third-Party Compensation Arrangements Alleged Omission of Material Facts Regarding Compensation Arrangements in Form ADV Filings | In Dion Money Management, LLC, Advisers Act Release No. 4,146 (July 24, 2015), the SEC instituted cease-and-desist proceedings against Dion Money Management, LLC (“DMM”), an Advisers Act-registered investment adviser, for failing to disclose conflicts of interest related to compensation arrangements under which the adviser received payments from third parties. According to the SEC, DMM entered into a series of service agreements with (1) an adviser to a family of mutual funds registered under the 1940 Act that DMM recommended to its clients, (2) a distributor for another family of mutual funds that DMM recommended to its clients, and (3) a broker. The SEC alleged that DMM received, with respect to these agreements, payments based on a percentage of its client’s assets, including those (1) invested in mutual funds that were advised by the adviser, (2) advised by an affiliate of the distributor, or (3) held in custody by the broker. The broker’s platform, according to the SEC, carried mutual funds that were also a part of the adviser’s and the distributor’s families of funds, which meant that the | The SEC alleged that DMM willfully violated Sections 206(2) and 207 of the Advisers Act. | DMM agreed to cease and desist from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of the charges, to censure, and to pay a civil money penalty of $50,000. DMM was further required to comply with certain undertakings, including making additional disclosures in its Form ADV, providing notice to advisory clients including a copy of the SEC’s order, and issuing a certification of compliance certifying its compliance with its |
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possibility existed that DMM would be paid from multiple sources based on the same client assets. The SEC alleged that, although DMM made certain disclosures referring to its agreements with the adviser, the distributor and the broker in its Form ADV, DMM did not disclose the possibility of payments from multiple sources on the same assets. The SEC also alleged that DMM misstated the maximum rate of compensation that DMM could receive under the service agreements. According to the SEC, DMM was at least negligent in failing to make complete and accurate disclosures to clients about the compensation terms of the services agreements and the potential conflicts of interest. The SEC alleged further that DMM omitted in its 2011 and 2013 Forms ADV material information about compensation terms under the service agreements and failed to disclose the rate of compensation under the agreement with the broker. | undertakings. | |||
7/14/15 | Alleged Distribution of Inaccurate Trade Data to Prime Brokers Allegedly Causing Brokers to Produce | In OZ Management, LP, Exchange Act Release No. 75,445 (July 14, 2015), the SEC instituted cease-and-desist proceedings against OZ Management, LP (“OZ Management”), an Advisers Act-registered investment adviser, for providing inaccurate trade data to its prime brokers and for causing them to produce inaccurate books and records. According to the SEC, between January 2008 and | The SEC alleged that OZ Management violated Rule 105 of the SEC’s Regulation M under the Exchange Act and caused violations | OZ Management agreed to cease and desist from causing any violations and any future violations of the charges, and to pay a civil money penalty of $4.25 million, disgorgement of |
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Inaccurate Books and Records Allegedly Engaging in Short Sales During a Restricted Period | December, 2013, OZ Management provided brokers acting on behalf of private funds advised by OZ Management with trade files that inaccurately listed the trade type (long or short) of sales. The SEC alleged that OZ Management’s in-house accounting software platform generated trade files for four prime brokers identifying sales as long or short based on the relevant fund’s position in the stock at the prime broker to which the trade was sent for settlement, and not based on whether the sale had been marked long or short when OZ Management sent it to the market through its executing brokers. According to the SEC, these actions sometimes caused trade types to be misidentified in the prime brokers’ view of the trade files, and OZ Management failed to inform the prime brokers that it sometimes did not provide the trade type accurately. The SEC alleged that strategy-based filters in the trade files misreported long and short trade types if a fund had positions in a security firm-wide and also at the prime broker, and the strategy in that fund at the prime broker had no position in the security. OZ Management, according to the SEC, did not realize that this strategy-based filter was causing trades to be misidentified until October 2013 when SEC staff identified the discrepancies. The SEC alleged that the inaccurate trade files led OZ Management’s prime brokers to produce inaccurate books and records, along with inaccurate blue sheet reports produced to the Commission and FINRA. | of Section 17(a) of, and Rules 17a-3(a)(3) and 17a-25 under, the Exchange Act. | $214,380, and prejudgment interest of $29,047. | |
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The SEC alleged further that OZ Management purchased shares in a secondary offering after engaging in short sales during the restricted period prior to the pricing of the offering. Under Rule 105 of Exchange Act Regulation M, this “restricted period” is defined as the shorter of the period (1) beginning five business days before the pricing of the offered securities and ending with the pricing; or (2) beginning with the initial filing of a registration statement on Form 1-A or Form 1-E and ending with the pricing. Because OZ Management had executed short sales during the restricted period, its purchase of shares in that offering violated Rule 105. In determining to accept the offer of settlement, the SEC considered remedial acts undertaken by OZ Management and cooperation afforded the SEC staff. | ||||
7/8/15 | Alleged Failure to Obtain Notice and Consent Prior to Completing Transactions with an Affiliate Allegedly Wrongfully Diverting Funds to a Subsidiary | In VERO Capital Management, LLC, Advisers Act Release No. 4,138 (July 8, 2015), the SEC instituted cease-and-desist proceedings against: VERO Capital Management, LLC (“VERO Capital”), an Advisers Act-registered investment adviser; Robert Geiger, co-owner, managing member, and president of VERO Capital; George Barbaresi, co-owner and general counsel of VERO Capital; and Steven Downey, co-owner and chief financial officer of VERO Capital. The Commission originally instituted public administrative and cease-and-desist proceedings against these parties on December 29, 2014. | The SEC alleged that VERO Capital, Mr. Geiger, Mr. Barbaresi and Mr. Downey violated Sections 206(2) and 206(4) of, and Rule 206(4)-8 under, the Advisers Act. | VERO Capital, Mr. Geiger, Mr. Barbaresi and Mr. Downey agreed to cease and desist from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of the charges, to jointly and severally pay disgorgement of $2,879,623 and |
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Alleged Violation of the Custody Rule | According to the SEC, between late 2010 and 2011, private funds managed by VERO Capital purchased notes from an entity affiliated with VERO Capital. The purchases were approved on behalf of the private funds by an investment committee that included Messrs. Geiger, Barbaresi and Downey, but included no person independent of VERO Capital. In following a longstanding interpretive position, the SEC concluded that the note transactions were principal transactions that should have been undertaken in accordance with Section 206(3) of the Advisers Act. The Commission concluded further that the approval of the note transactions by the investment committee did not meet the requirements of Section 206(3). A second allegation made by the SEC was that VERO Capital, while serving as the private funds’ investment manager, was undertaking two new business initiatives, a risk management business and a financial services technology company. The SEC alleged that, beginning in December 2012 and continuing through October 2013, Messrs. Geiger, Barbaresi and Downey improperly diverted $2.8 million of the private funds’ assets to finance the operations of the new business initiatives by causing the funds to make a series of undocumented, undisclosed bridge loans with respect to the initiatives. The SEC alleged that the three men took no action to disclose the loans to investors in the private funds. | The SEC alleged that VERO Capital violated Sections 206(3) and 206(4) of, and Rule 206(4)-2 under, the Advisers Act. The SEC alleged that Mr. Geiger, Mr. Barbaresi, and Mr. Downey willfully aided and abetted and caused VERO Capital’s violations of Sections 206(2), 206(3), and 206(4) of, and Rules 206(4)-2 and 206(4)-8 under, the Advisers Act. | prejudgment interest of $189,083, and to each pay a civil money penalty of $300,000. Messrs. Geiger, Barbaresi and Downey agreed to be barred from association with, among others, any broker, dealer or investment adviser, and to be prohibited from serving as, among other things, an employee of any advisory board or investment adviser, except that they could participate in completing the wind down of the private funds and continue to be associated with VERO Capital while VERO Capital acts as an investment adviser. VERO Capital agreed to censure and to comply with certain undertakings including | |
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The SEC further alleged that VERO Capital failed to comply with the Custody Rule by failing to provide notice to VERO Capital’s clients regarding transactions conducted on their behalf. | ceasing investment advisory operations and deregistration as an investment adviser. Mr. Downey agreed to be denied the privilege of appearing or practicing before the Commission as an accountant, with the ability to request reinstatement after three years. Mr. Barbaresi agreed to be denied the privilege of appearing or practicing before the Commission as an attorney for three years. | |||
7/1/15 | Fraudulent Undisclosed Valuation of Securities Resulting in Increased Fees Due to Higher Net Asset Values | In AlphaBridge Capital Management, LLC, Advisers Act Release No. 4,135 (July 1, 2015), the SEC instituted cease-and-desist proceedings against AlphaBridge Capital Management, LLC (“AlphaBridge”), an Advisers Act-registered investment adviser, Thomas T. Kutzen, AlphaBridge’s founder, majority owner, president, chief executive officer and chief investment officer, and Michael J. Carino, AlphaBridge’s chief compliance officer and minority owner, for (1) valuing | The SEC alleged that AlphaBridge willfully violated, and Mr. Carino willfully aided and abetted and caused AlphaBridge’s violation of, Sections 206(1), | AlphaBridge, Mr. Kutzen and Mr. Carino agreed to cease and desist from causing any violations or any future violations of the charges, to jointly and severally pay disgorgement of |
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Charges Against Chief Compliance Officer for Valuation Violations Related Action Against Registered Representative of a Broker-Dealer for its Role in Valuation Violations | the securities held by private fund clients in contravention of the disclosed method and (2) breaching their fiduciary duties to their advisory clients. According to the SEC, from 2001 through at least April 2013, AlphaBridge made various misrepresentations to its private investment fund investors, administrator and auditor concerning AlphaBridge’s process for valuing mortgage-backed securities in the funds’ portfolio. AlphaBridge disclosed that it obtained monthly price quotes from two independent and reputable broker-dealers and used the average of these quotes as the prices for securities held by private fund clients. The SEC alleged that, since 2011, AlphaBridge provided valuations AlphaBridge generated to broker-dealer representatives who indicated that the valuations were their own. The broker-dealer representatives in turn provided the valuations as their own to the auditor and administrator. According to the SEC, when AlphaBridge’s prices increasingly differed from other valuation sources in 2011 and 2012, the auditor asked to speak directly with the broker-dealer representatives to provide market support for their prices. The SEC alleged that AlphaBridge subsequently scripted the representatives’ responses in seeking to continue to mislead and deceive the auditor and fund investors. The alleged inflating of the valuation of mortgage-backed securities, according to the SEC, caused the funds to pay AlphaBridge higher management and performance fees than had the securities been priced using other valuation sources. | 206(2), and 206(4) of, and Rules 206(4)-7 and 206(4)-8 under, the Advisers Act. The SEC alleged that Mr. Kutzen willfully aided and abetted and caused AlphaBridge’s violations of Sections 206(2) and 206(4) of, and Rule 206(4)-8 under, the Advisers Act. The SEC alleged that AlphaBridge and Mr. Carino willfully violated Section 207 of the Advisers Act. | $4,025,000, and to comply with certain undertakings, including winding down operations of AlphaBridge’s funds, administering a Distribution Fund to reimburse affected current and former investors, engaging an independent compliance monitor, and causing AlphaBridge to withdraw its registration as an Advisers-Act registered investment adviser. AlphaBridge agreed to censure and to pay a civil money penalty of $725,000. Mr. Carino agreed to be barred from association with, among others, any broker, dealer or investment adviser, and to be prohibited from | |
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The SEC alleged that AlphaBridge overstated its funds’ net assets and AlphaBridge’s assets under management in its Form ADV and annual amendments filed with the Commission, as the funds’ net asset value was inflated by the misvaluation of fund assets. In addition, according to the SEC, AlphaBridge failed to implement a valuation policy reasonably designed to prevent violations of the Advisers Act, and Mr. Carino aided and abetted and caused AlphaBridge’s failure to implement such policies and procedures. The AlphaBridge case is noteworthy, as it reflects the SEC’s willingness to take action against an investment adviser’s chief compliance officer and against an outsider with respect to alleged misevaluation of assets by a registered investment adviser. http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2015/ia-4135.pdf In a related case, Richard Lawrence Evans, Advisers Act Release No. 4,136 (July 1, 2015), the SEC instituted cease-and-desist proceedings against Richard Lawrence Evans, one of the registered broker-dealer representatives who passed on AlphaTitans’ valuations as the broker-dealer’s own independent valuation, for his role in the alleged scheme. Between 2000 and 2013, AlphaBridge was consistently one of Mr. Evans’ largest customers. | The SEC alleged that Mr. Evans willfully aided and abetted and caused AlphaBridge’s violations of Sections 206(2) and 206(4) of, and Rule 206(4)-8 under, the Advisers Act. | serving as, among other things, an employee of any advisory board or investment adviser, with the right to apply for reentry after three years, subject to an exemption under which Mr. Carino could continue to be associated with AlphaBridge for select activities reasonably necessary to complete the winding down of the funds; and to pay a civil money penalty of $200,000. Mr. Kutzen agreed to censure and to pay a civil money penalty of $50,000. Mr. Evans agreed to cease and desist from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of the charges; to be barred from association with, | ||
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among others, any broker, dealer or investment adviser and prohibited from serving as, among other things, an employee of any advisory board or investment adviser with the right to reapply after one year; and to pay a civil money penalty of $15,000. | ||||
7/1/15 | Alleged Violation of Auditor Independence Rule Under Regulation S-X Action Taken Against Mutual Fund Independent Board Member Action Taken Against Mutual Fund Administration | In Deloitte & Touche LLP, 1940 Act Release No. 31,703 (July 1, 2015), the SEC instituted cease-and-desist proceedings against the accounting firm of Deloitte & Touche LLP (“D&T”), ALPS Fund Services, Inc. (“ALPS”), an administrative service provider to 1940-Act registered investment companies, and Andrew C. Boynton, a non-interested member of the board of trustees and member of the audit committee of three registered investment companies audited by D&T and administered by ALPS, in connection with D&T’s violating the auditor independence rule under the Commission’s Regulation S-X. An auditor independence violation in Regulation S-X consists of (1) an independence-impairing relationship; (2) existing during all or part of the period covered by the audit; followed by (3) issuance of an audit report asserting the auditor’s independence from the client. According to the SEC, in May of 2006, Mr. Boynton | The SEC alleged that D&T engaged in improper professional conduct in violation of Section 4C(a)(2) of the Exchange Act and Rule 102(e)(1)(ii) of the Commission’s Rules of Practice; violated Rule 2-02(b) of Regulation S-X; and caused its clients to violate Sections 20(a) and 30(a) of, and Rule | D&T agreed to censure, to cease and desist from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of the charges, and to pay disgorgement of $497,438, prejudgment interest of $116,478, and a civil money penalty of $500,000. ALPS agreed to pay a civil money penalty of $45,000. Mr. Boynton agreed to cease and desist from |
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entered into a business and consulting relationship with a D&T affiliate while he was serving on the boards and audit committees of three registered investment company audit clients of D&T. The SEC alleged that, although the policies for Deloitte LLP, D&T’s parent company, required an independence consultation prior to entering a new business relationship with a consultant, an independence consultation was not performed before Mr. Boynton entered into this business relationship or at any subsequent time. According to the SEC, D&T represented that it was independent in its audit reports for all three investment companies of which Mr. Boynton was a board member, despite his business relationship with a D&T affiliate, and included these reports of independence with the registered investment companies’ annual reports on 1940 Act Form N-CSR and proxy statements filed with the SEC. In addition, the SEC alleged that D&T expressly confirmed to the registered investment companies that it was “independent” and therefore able to serve as each investment company’s external auditor, failing to disclose Mr. Boynton’s relationship. The SEC alleged that the registered investment companies failed to adopt written policies and procedures reasonably designed to prevent auditor independence violations, as the investment companies’ trustee and officer questionnaires did not expressly cover business relationships with the auditor’s affiliates, and the investment companies did not provide sufficient written policies or procedures designed to prevent | 20a-1 under, the 1940 Act. The SEC alleged that ALPS caused its registered investment company clients to violate Rule 38 a-1 under the 1940 Act, and that Mr. Boynton caused these clients to violate Sections 20(a) and 30(a) of, and Rule 20a-1 under, the 1940 Act. | causing any violations and any future violations of the charges, and to pay disgorgement of $30,000, prejudgment interest of $5,328, and a civil money penalty of $25,000. | ||
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violations of auditor independence or sufficient training to assist board members in discharging their responsibilities as to auditor independence. According to the SEC, Mr. Boynton did not identify his relationship with the D&T affiliate in his responses in his annual trustee and officer questionnaire or seek guidance on whether the relationship created a conflict. The D&T case reflects one of a number of recent SEC proceedings in which the Commission has cited favorably remedial actions taken by industry participants. In particular, the SEC, in determining to accept D&T’s offer of settlement, considered the steps taken by D&T and its associated entities both before and after its detection of the independence issue, to enhance its independence quality and control systems. The SEC also cited favorably remedial steps undertaken by ALPS in determining to accept its offer of settlement. Another noteworthy aspect of the D&T case is the SEC’s willingness to take action against a registered investment company independent trustee. | ||||
6/29/15 | Alleged Misallocation of Broken Deal Expenses to Private Equity Funds | In Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. L.P., Advisers Act Release No. 4,131 (June 29, 2015), the SEC instituted cease-and-desist proceedings against the well-known and well-regarded private equity firm, Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. L.P. (“KKR”), for allegedly misallocating broken deal expenses to its flagship private equity fund and for failing to implement a | The SEC alleged that KKR violated Sections 206(2) and 206(4) of, and Rule 206(4)-7 under, the Advisers Act. | KKR agreed to cease and desist from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of the charges, to pay disgorgement of |
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Alleged Breach of Fiduciary Duty for Failing to Expressly Disclose Expense Allocation Practices Alleged Failure to Adopt Compliance Policies and Procedures Governing Expense Allocation Practices | written compliance policy governing its expense allocation practices. According to the SEC, during a six-year period ending in 2011, KKR, an Advisers Act-registered investment adviser, incurred $338 million in “broken deal expenses” related to unsuccessful buyout opportunities and similar expenses incurred in connection with private funds managed by KKR. Broken deal expenses generally include research costs, travel costs, professional fees, and other expenses incurred in deal sourcing activities related to deals that never materialize. The SEC alleged that KKR’s co-investment vehicles participated in private equity transactions undertaken on behalf of KKR private funds during the six-year time period and benefited from KKR’s deal sourcing efforts. KKR did not, however, according to the SEC, allocate any portion of the broken deal expenses to the co-investment vehicles. The SEC alleged moreover that the co-investment vehicles were, at least in part, owned by KKR executives, consultants, and certain others. Neither the limited partnership agreements nor the offering materials related to KKR’s private funds, according to the SEC, included express disclosure that KKR did not allocate broken deal expenses to KKR co-investment vehicles. KKR’s written policies did not address broken deal expense allocations between funds and co-investment vehicles, according to the SEC. The KKR case is perhaps the most publicized of the | $14,165,968 and prejudgment interest of $4,511,441 to compensate the applicable funds, and to pay a civil money penalty of $10 million. | ||
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SEC’s recent efforts of taking a hard look at practices that have long been followed in the private equity business. | ||||
6/23/15 | Alleged Failure to Enforce and Provide Appropriate Resources to Enforce Compliance Policies and Procedures Failure to Seek Best Execution in the Context of a Mutual Fund’s Class of Shares for Investments Failure to Comply with Adviser’s Policies and Procedures Self-Reporting of Settling Parties Cited by SEC | In Pekin Singer Strauss Asset Management Inc., Advisers Act Release No. 4,126 (June 23, 2015), the SEC instituted cease-and-desist proceedings against Pekin Singer Strauss Asset Management Inc. (“Pekin Singer”), an Advisers Act-registered investment adviser, Ronald L. Strauss (“Mr. R. Strauss”), former president of Pekin Singer, William A. Pekin, portfolio manager and current chairman of Pekin Singer, and Joshua D. Strauss (“Mr. J. Strauss”), portfolio manager and current co-chief executive officer of Pekin Singer, for allegedly failing to conduct timely annual compliance program reviews, failing to implement and appropriately enforce compliance policies and procedures, and failing to seek best execution for Pekin Singer’s clients. According to the SEC, in 2009 and 2010, Pekin Singer’s chief compliance officer (“CCO”) informed Mr. R. Strauss multiple times that the CCO needed help to fulfill his compliance responsibilities and expressed concern that Pekin Singer had not completed certain compliance testing. Mr. R. Strauss in his response, however, directed the CCO to prioritize other responsibilities and maintained that Pekin Singer could address compliance issues at a later time. The SEC alleged that, as a result of these actions, the CCO was unable to complete timely annual compliance program | The SEC alleged that Pekin Singer willfully violated Sections 204A, 206(2), 206(4), and 207 of, and Rules 204A-1 and 206(4)-7 under, the Advisers Act. The SEC alleged that Mr. R. Strauss willfully violated Section 207 of the Advisers Act, and caused Pekin Singer’s violations of Sections 204A and 206(4) of, and Rules 204A-1 and 206(4)-7 under, the Advisers Act. The SEC alleged that Mr. Pekin and Mr. J. Strauss | Pekin Singer agreed to cease and desist from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of the charges, to censure, and to pay a civil money penalty of $150,000. Mr. R. Strauss agreed to cease and desist from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of the charges, to be suspended from association in a compliance or supervisory capacity with, among others, any broker or investment adviser for a period of 12 months, and to pay a civil money penalty of |
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reviews for 2009 or 2010 as required by Rule 206(4)-7 under the Advisers Act. In January of 2011, according to the SEC, Pekin Singer engaged a compliance consultant to review Pekin Singer’s compliance processes. The consultant issued a report in June of 2011 outlining several compliance deficiencies. The SEC began in May 2011 an examination of Pekin Singer and cited the firm for several compliance deficiencies, including the failure to conduct annual compliance program reviews for two years and code of ethics violations by a Pekin Singer analyst related to personal trading. The SEC alleged that it took the firm an additional six months after receiving the report to complete its compliance reviews covering 2009 and 2010 and that the delay reflected Pekin Singer’s unwillingness to provide assistance to the CCO. According to the SEC, Pekin Singer violated a number of its policies and procedures and its code of ethics between 2009 and 2011, and these violations were not detected until the compliance consultant and SEC exam staff examined Pekin Singer’s compliance program. The SEC also alleged that Pekin Singer made misleading disclosures in its Form ADV filings resulting from its failing to meet certain requirements and prohibitions outlined in the description of Pekin Singer’s code of ethics. Pekin Singer, according to the SEC, reported to the | caused Pekin Singer’s violations of Sections 206(2) and 207 of the Advisers Act. | $45,000. Mr. Pekin and Mr. J. Strauss agreed to cease and desist from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of the charges, to censure, and to each pay a civil money penalty of $45,000. | ||
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Commission that it invested its separately managed account clients in the investor share class of a mutual fund advised by Pekin Singer, despite these clients’ eligibility for conversion or placement in the fund’s institutional share class at a lower cost to the clients. The SEC alleged that in making these investments, Pekin Singer failed to seek best execution for it clients, and that the fees paid directly benefited Pekin Singer by $307,242. According to the SEC, the higher fees and the conflict of interest they created were not disclosed to the clients. In determining to accept the offers of settlement, the SEC considered that Pekin Singer self-reported the best execution issue to the SEC, cooperated with SEC staff, and promptly undertook the various remedial acts. | ||||
6/17/15 | Alleged Failure to Provide the Board of a Registered Investment Company Information Reasonably Necessary for the Board to Evaluate Fund Advisory Contracts | In Commonwealth Capital Management, LLC, 1940 Act Release No. 31,678 (June 17, 2015), the SEC instituted cease-and-desist proceedings against: Commonwealth Capital Management, LLC (“CCM”), an Advisers Act-registered investment adviser; Commonwealth Shareholder Services, Inc. (“CSS”), a mutual fund administrator; John Pasco, III, owner of CCM and CSS; and J. Gordon McKinley, III, Robert R. Burke, and Franklin A. Trice, III, non-interested trustees of a 1940 Act-registered investment company to which CCM and CSS provide services. The Commission alleged that all of these parties failed to satisfy their duties under Section 15(c) of the 1940 Act in evaluating fund | The SEC alleged that CCM, Mr. McKinley, Mr. Burke, and Mr. Trice willfully violated, and Mr. Pasco caused violations of, Section 15(c) of the 1940 Act. The SEC also alleged that CSS caused violations of | CCM, Mr. Pasco, Mr. McKinley, Mr. Burke, Mr. Trice, and CSS agreed to cease and desist from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of the charges. Mr. McKinley, Mr. Burke, and Mr. Trice agreed to pay a civil |
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Failure to Include the Board’s Material Factors and Conclusions for Approving the Advisory Contract in Shareholder Report | advisory contracts. According to the SEC, Mr. Pasco formed CCM and CSS as turnkey investment company platforms designed to provide services to registered investment companies including investment advisory services, fund accounting, fund administration, and distribution services. According to the SEC, turnkey platforms are designed to enable investment company advisers to manage registered investment companies without having to administer day-to-day operations such as the management of corporate governance and regulatory compliance. Mr. McKinley, Mr. Burke and Mr. Trice all served as non-interested trustees of a 1940 Act-registered investment company that used CCM and CSS’s services. Section 15(c) of the 1940 Act requires the members of a registered investment company’s board to request and evaluate such information as may be reasonably necessary for the board to evaluate the terms of any contract under which a person or entity is to serve or act as an investment adviser to the investment company. According to the SEC, Section 15(c) does not define what may be “reasonably necessary” to evaluate a contract’s terms, but that analysis may be informed by factors known as the Gartenberg Factors, which include (1) the adviser’s cost in providing services to the investment company; (2) the nature and quality of the adviser’s services; (3) the extent to which the adviser realizes economies of scale as the investment company | Section 30(e) of, and Rule 30e-l under, the 1940 Act. | penalty of $3,250. CCM, CSS, and Mr. Pasco agreed to be jointly and severally liable for a civil penalty of $50,000. | |
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grows larger; (4) the adviser’s profitability in advising the investment company; (5) fee structures for comparable investment companies; (6) so-called “fallout” benefits accruing to the adviser or its affiliates; and (7) the independence, expertise, care and conscientiousness of the board. According to the SEC, Messrs. McKinley, Burke and Trice requested information from CCM and Mr. Pasco to evaluate before approving an advisory contract between the investment company they served and CCM. The SEC alleged that CCM did not provide comparable fund fee information or a sufficient evaluation of the nature and quality of services provided by the adviser. The SEC alleged further that CCM provided another 1940 Act-registered investment company with inaccurate and incomplete comparable fund analysis tables, insufficient financial statements, inaccurate fee waiver information, and insufficient detail related to economies of scale and fund breakpoints. According to the SEC, both investment companies’ trustees approved the advisory contracts despite a lack of necessary information. The SEC alleged that CSS violated fund reporting requirements by failing to include a summary of the process by which the advisory contracts of the registered investment companies it served were evaluated in registered investment company shareholder reports it prepared. | ||||
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6/15/15 | Alleged Failure to Adopt and Implement Policies and Procedures Reasonably Designed to Prevent the Misappropriation of Client Assets Alleged Material Misstatements in Form ADV Filings Alleged Failure of Chief Compliance Officer to Implement Compliance Policies | In SFX Financial Advisory Management Enterprises, Inc., Advisers Act Release No. 4,116 (June 15, 2015), the SEC instituted cease-and-desist proceedings against SFX Financial Advisory Management Enterprises, Inc. (“SFX”), a former Advisers Act-registered investment adviser, and Eugene S. Mason, its chief compliance officer, for allegedly failing to supervise SFX’s former president and for related compliance violations. The SEC alleged that SFX failed to supervise its former vice president and president, Brian Ourand, who misappropriated $670,000 from three clients. According to the Commission, SFX’s policies enabled Mr. Ourand to circumvent secondary review of the unauthorized payments he made from client accounts. The SEC asserted that Mr. Mason learned that Mr. Ourand had misappropriated client assets when a client complained that he could not use one of his credit cards; SFX and Mr. Mason then conducted an internal investigation, terminated Mr. Ourand and reported his conduct to criminal authorities. According to the SEC, individuals at SFX including Mr. Ourand had full signatory power over client bank accounts, resulting in a significant risk that those individuals could misappropriate funds. The SEC alleged that SFX’s compliance policies and procedures were not reasonably designed or effectively implemented to prevent this misappropriation. The SEC | The SEC alleged that SFX willfully violated Sections 203(e)(6), 206(2), and 207 of, and Rules 206(4)-2 and 206(4)-7 under, the Advisers Act. The SEC also alleged that Mr. Mason caused SFX’s violations of Section 206(4) of, and Rule 206(4)-7 under, the Advisers Act, and that Mr. Mason willfully violated Section 207 of the Advisers Act. | SFX and Mr. Mason agreed to cease and desist from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of the charges and to be censured, and SFX agreed to pay a civil penalty of $150,000. |
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acknowledged that SFX’s compliance policy contemplated a review of “cash flows in client accounts,” but alleged that SFX and Mr. Mason did not effectively implement this provision for the client accounts used for bill-paying services. According to the Commission, SFX’s Form ADV indicated that client bill-paying accounts would be reviewed several times each week by senior management. The Commission alleged that no one other than Mr. Ourand, however, reviewed the bill-paying accounts over which he had signing authority. In addition, according to the SEC, Mr. Mason failed to ensure that SFX completed an annual review of its compliance program in 2011. The SFX Financial settlement is one of a number of recent enforcement actions directed at chief compliance officers of registered investment companies. http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2015/ia-4116.pdf In a related case, Brian J. Ourand, Advisers Act Release No. 4,115, the SEC instituted cease and desist proceedings against Mr. Ourand for his misappropriation of fund assets. | The SEC alleged that Mr. Ourand willfully violated, or willfully aided and abetted and caused violations of, Sections 206(1) and 206(2) of the Advisers Act. | The SEC instituted cease-and-desist proceedings to seek, among other things, disgorgement and civil penalties. | ||
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6/4/15 | Dismissal of an SEC Administrative Proceeding by an Administrative Law Judge Determination that the SEC failed to show a failure to disclose a conflict of interest Determination that the SEC failed to show inadequate disclosure on the part of a registered investment adviser | On June 4, 2015, an SEC administrative law judge (“ALJ”) issued an Initial Decision in The Robare Group, LTD., Admin Proc. File No. 3-16047, Initial Decision Release No. 806 (June 4, 2015), concluding that the SEC failed to carry its burden of showing that a registered investment adviser violated certain provisions of the Advisers Act. The decision related to an administrative proceeding instituted by the SEC against The Robare Group Ltd. (“Robare Group”), an investment adviser registered under the Advisers Act, Mark Robare, its founder, co-owner and chief compliance officer, and Jack Jones Jr., its co-owner. The SEC had alleged that Robare Group violated provisions of the Advisers Act by failing to disclose conflicts of interest to investors. Robare Group, according to the SEC, entered into an agreement with a broker-dealer registered under the Exchange Act under which Robare Group received compensation in connection with purchases of shares of open-end investment companies registered under the 1940 Act distributed by the broker-dealer. The SEC alleged that this arrangement was not appropriately disclosed to Robare Group’s clients. In particular, the SEC asserted that the Robare Group’s Form ADV filings indicated that it “may” receive compensation in connection with purchases of investment company shares made on behalf of its client, when the disclosure should have indicated that Robare Group did receive compensation. | The SEC alleged that Robare Group and Mr. Robare willfully violated Sections 206(1), 206(2), and 207 of the Advisers Act. The SEC alleged that Mr. Jones aided and abetted and caused the violations of Sections 206(1) and 206(2) of the Advisers Act and willfully violated Section 207 of the Advisers Act. | The ALJ ordered that the administrative proceeding be dismissed. |
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The ALJ determined that the SEC failed to carry its burden of showing violations of Sections 206(1), 206(2), and 207 of the Advisers Act based on the alleged failure to disclose conflicts of interest and dismissed the allegations. The ALJ agreed with the SEC’s position that “all conflicts of interest are material and must be disclosed,” and that the compensation from the broker-dealer is a conflict of interest that must be disclosed. The ALJ, however, determined that the SEC failed to show that Robare Group or Mr. Robare had acted with the required scienter or recklessness for a violation of Section 206(1) of the Advisers Act, which makes it unlawful to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud any client. In coming to this conclusion, the ALJ found that Mr. Robare and Mr. Jones did not have the requisite intent to defraud, as the evidence presented to the ALJ indicated that the two men had relied on multiple compliance consultants and that their reliance on the consultants “belies any argument that [they] acted with an intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud anyone.” The ALJ also noted in his decision that reliance on compliance professionals, and following their advice, prevents a showing of recklessness. The ALJ further concluded that the SEC failed to show that Robare Group or Mr. Robare had acted with the required negligence for a violation of Section 206(2) of the Advisers Act, which makes it unlawful to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates as a fraud or deceit upon any client or | ||||
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prospective client. The ALJ, in doing so, found that neither Mr. Robare nor Mr. Jones had expertise in preparing Form ADV disclosure and relied on the compliance experts to do so. According to the ALJ, the SEC did not show that Mr. Robare and Mr. Jones’ reliance on the compliance consultants violated an applicable reasonable care standard. The ALJ took the position that the SEC failed to make the necessary showing that Robare Group, Mr. Robare and Mr. Jones made an untrue statement in filings with the SEC in violation of Section 207 of the Advisers Act. Section 207 makes it unlawful to willfully make any untrue statement of material fact in a filing with the SEC. The ALJ concluded that the diligence shown by the Robare Group and the two men together with the SEC’s failure to meet the burden of proving that they failed to act with reasonable care prevented them from having made a willful untrue statement. https://www.sec.gov/alj/aljdec/2015/id806jeg.pdf The Robare Group decision is most noteworthy, as it is relatively infrequent for the SEC to lose a case before an ALJ. The lasting effects of the Robare decision on disclosure practices under the Advisers Act is difficult to assess at present, as the SEC’s Division of Enforcement has petitioned the Commission to review the ALJ’s initial decision. The Division of Enforcement argues in its petition, among other things, that the ALJ’s conclusions as discussed above disregard well- | ||||
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established law and create a new standard. http://www.sec.gov/litigation/apdocuments/3-16047-event-57.pdf | ||||
5/21/15 | Alleged Unsuitable Investment Recommendations Material Misrepresentations to Pension Plan Clients | In a well-publicized case, Gray Financial Group, Inc., Advisers Act Release No. 4,094 (May 21, 2015), the SEC instituted cease-and-desist proceedings against Gray Financial Group, Inc. (“Gray Financial”), an Advisers Act-registered investment adviser, Laurence 0. Gray, president and former chief executive officer of Gray Financial, and Robert C. Hubbard, IV, chief operating officer and current chief executive officer of Gray Financial, for providing unsuitable investment recommendations to Gray Financial’s public pension clients and for making material misrepresentations in connection with these recommendations. In July of 2012, the State of Georgia allowed, for the first time, most of its public pension plans to invest in alternative investments subject to specific restrictions as to investment size and timing. The SEC alleged that, between July 2012 and August 2013, Gray Financial recommended and sold interests in an alternative investment fund of funds advised by Gray Financial to four Georgia public pension clients, despite the fact that they knew, were reckless in not knowing, or should have known that these investments did not comply with the restrictions on alternative investments imposed by Georgia law. According to the SEC, by recommending and selling the fund, Gray Financial breached its fiduciary duty to its advisory clients. | The SEC alleged that Gray Financial and Mr. Gray willfully violated Section 17(a) of the Securities Act, Section 10(b) of, and Rule 10b-5 under, the Exchange Act, and Sections 206(1), 206(2), and 206(4) of, and Rule 206(4)-8 under, the Advisers Act. The SEC alleged that Mr. Hubbard willfully violated Section 17(a) of the Securities Act and Section 10(b) of, and Rule 10b-5 under, the Exchange Act; or, alternatively, that Mr. Hubbard | The SEC instituted cease-and-desist proceedings to seek, among other things, disgorgement and civil penalties. |
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The SEC further alleged that, in October 2012, when recommending investment in the alternative investment fund to one of its clients, Gray Financial gave assurance concerning the investment’s compliance with Georgia law and the number and identity of prior investors in the fund. According to the SEC, Mr. Gray noted in this connection, for example, that the investment was “absolutely” consistent with the law. The SEC alleged that Mr. Gray was reckless in not knowing, or should have known that his claim was false. | willfully aided, abetted, and caused Gray Financial and Mr. Gray’s violations of such sections and rules. The SEC alleged that Mr. Hubbard willfully aided, abetted and caused Gray Financial and Mr. Gray’s violations of Sections 206(1), 206(2), and 206(4) of, and Rule 206(4) under, the Advisers Act. | |||
5/18/15 | Failure to Correct Ongoing Securities Violations Allegations of Recidivist Conduct | In Trust & Investment Advisors, Inc., Advisers Act Release No. 4,087 (May 18, 2015), the SEC instituted cease-and-desist proceedings against Trust & Investment Advisors, Inc. (“TIA”), an Advisers Act-registered investment adviser, Larry K. Pitts, chief executive officer, sole owner and portfolio manager of TIA, and George M. Prugh, senior vice president and chief financial officer of TIA, for failing to correct advertising and compliance deficiencies identified during previous examinations of TIA. | The SEC alleged that TIA willfully violated, and Mr. Pitts and Mr. Prugh willfully aided and abetted and caused TIA’s violations of, Sections 206(2) and 206(4) of, and Rules | TIA, Mr. Pitts and Mr. Prugh agreed to cease and desist from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of the charges and to censure. TIA and Mr. Pitts agreed to pay a civil money penalty of |
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According to the SEC, its Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations (“OCIE”) cited, during on-site examinations, numerous deficiencies, including TIA’s failure to complete an annual compliance review or develop a compliance manual as required by Advisers Act Rule 206(4)-7, and TIA’s use of misleading performance numbers that were gross of fees in its marketing materials without appropriate disclosures on the effect of the fees on performance. The SEC alleged that, despite OCIE’s warnings of deficiencies resulting in possible securities law violations and assurances from TIA that its errors would be corrected after the 2005 and 2007 exams, OCIE identified the same deficiencies in a 2011 exam. The SEC alleged that TIA’s marketing materials after the 2007 exam compared its performance with dividends reinvested against the S&P 500 index without actual dividends reinvested. | 206(4)-1(a)(5) and 206(4)-7 under, the Advisers Act. | $50,000. Mr. Prugh agreed to pay a civil money penalty of $10,000. TIA, Mr. Pitts and Mr. Prugh were further required to comply with certain undertakings, including compliance training and engaging a compliance consultant. | ||
5/14/15 | Failure to Price Redemption Orders on Day Delivered Intentionally Delaying Receipt of Orders | In Nationwide Life Insurance Company, 1940 Act Release No. 31,601 (May 14, 2015), the SEC instituted cease-and-desist proceedings against Nationwide Life Insurance Company (“Nationwide”), a life insurance company, for intentionally delaying receipt of orders for shares of investment companies registered under the Act received by mail in attempting to process the orders at the next day’s price. The SEC alleged the intentional delay was in violation of Rule 22c-1 under the 1940 Act. Rule 22c-1(a) under the 1940 Act requires, among other | The SEC alleged that Nationwide willfully violated Rule 22c-1 under the 1940 Act. | Nationwide agreed to cease and desist from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of the charges and pay a civil money penalty of $8,000,000. |
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things, that a registered investment company issuing any redeemable security sell, redeem, or purchase the security based on the next net asset value (“NAV”) of the security computed after receipt of the order. Rule 22c-1(b) under the 1940 Act requires that a registered investment company’s current NAV be computed at least once daily, Monday through Friday. Orders received prior to the investment company’s NAV calculation must be priced at that day’s price, with orders received after the calculation priced at the next day’s price. Nationwide was subject to Rule 22c-1, as it was designated in Nationwide’s variable insurance contract prospectuses as authorized to consummate transactions in shares of registered investment companies underlying the variable insurance contracts. According to the SEC, Nationwide, despite having access to orders contained in a post office box early each morning, delayed the retrieval of the orders and waited until 4:00 p.m. to deliver the orders to its offices. The SEC alleged that Nationwide then processed the orders using the next day’s variable contract accumulation unit value (“AUV”) and transmitted the orders to the underlying investment companies for processing using the next day’s NAV, notwithstanding prospectus disclosure indicating a 4:00 p.m. cutoff for determining whether an order was assigned the current day’s AUV and NAV or the next day’s AUV and NAV. According to the SEC, Nationwide had the Post Office separate the redemption orders from its other mail in attempting to control the time at which any orders | ||||
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related to its variable contracts were delivered to its office. The SEC alleged that Nationwide also stressed to the Post Office that it needed “late delivery” of redemption orders “due to regulations that require Nationwide to process any mail received by 4:00 p.m. the same day.” | ||||
5/12/15 | Fraud and Misrepresentation | In Paul Tabet, Advisers Act Release No. 4,082 (May 12, 2015), the SEC instituted cease-and-desist proceedings against Paul Tabet for raising at least $9.9 million from approximately 110 investors as investments in several limited liability companies (“LLCs”) affiliated with Mr. Tabet on the basis of false representations and misappropriating the offering proceeds to pay previous investors and cover Mr. Tabet’s personal expenses. The SEC alleged that Mr. Tabet and his business partner Craig Berkman, when offering and selling membership interests in the various LLCs, made numerous material misrepresentations to investors that Messrs. Tabet and Berkman knew, or were reckless in not knowing, were false. According to the SEC, Mr. Tabet told investors in several LLCs that their investments would be used to acquire highly desired, pre-initial public offering (“IPO”) shares of Facebook, Inc., Linkedln, Inc., Groupon, Inc., and Zynga Inc. The SEC alleged that Mr. Berkman instead used investor money to make payments to investors in his earlier investment schemes to cover his own personal expenses. According to the | The SEC alleged that Mr. Tabet, his associated investment advisers, and their associated LLCs committed violations of, and Mr. Tabet willfully violated and aided and abetted and caused violations of, Section 17(a) of the Securities Act, Section 10(b) of, and Rule 10b-5 under, the Exchange Act, and Sections 206(1), 206(2), and 206(4), and Rule 206(4)-8 under, the Advisers Act. | Mr. Tabet agreed to cease and desist from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of the charges; to be barred from association with, among others, any broker, dealer or investment adviser and prohibited from serving as, among other things, an employee of any advisory board or investment adviser; to pay disgorgement of $502,368 and prejudgment interest of $30,945; and to pay a civil money penalty of $376,776. |
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SEC, Mr. Berkman used $600,000 of the $9.9 million raised with respect to the LLCs to purchase a small interest in an unrelated fund that had acquired pre-IPO Facebook stock. The interest in the fund did not provide any of the LLCs with ownership of Facebook shares. The SEC alleged that Mr. Tabet forged a law firm letter about that investment in falsely representing to investors that an LLC owned nearly half a million shares of Facebook stock. According to the SEC, as the end of the lock up period for pre-IPO Facebook stock approached and investors began making requests for their distributions, Mr. Tabet and others knowingly or recklessly made, or caused to be made, misrepresentations to investors to keep the investors from learning of the fraud and demanding the return of their funds. | ||||
4/29/15 | Improper Allocation of Private Fund Assets to Pay Adviser-Related Operating Expenses Breach of Fiduciary Duty Action Against | In Alpha Titans, LLC, Advisers Act Release No. 4,073 (Apr. 29, 2015), the SEC instituted cease-and-desist proceedings against Alpha Titans LLC (“Alpha Titans”), an Advisers Act-registered investment adviser, its principal Timothy P. McCormack, and its general counsel Kelly D. Kaeser, for improper allocation of fund assets to pay adviser-related expenses. According to the SEC, Alpha Titans and Mr. McCormack used assets of two private funds managed by Alpha Titans to pay more than $450,000 in office rent, employee salaries and benefits, and similar | The SEC alleged that Alpha Titans and Mr. McCormack willfully violated, and Mr. Kaeser willfully aided and abetted and caused their violation of, Sections 206(2) and 206(4) of, and Rule 206(4)-8 | Alpha Titans agreed to be censured, and along with Mr. McCormack agreed to cease and desist from committing or causing any future violations of the charges, to pay disgorgement of $469,522 and prejudgment interest of $28,928 on a joint and |
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an Adviser’s General Counsel Failure to Comply with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles in Violation of the Custody Rule | expenses without clear authorization in the funds’ operating agreements and without accurate and complete disclosures that fund assets were being used for these purposes. The SEC further alleged that Alpha Titans’ Forms ADV did not disclose that Alpha Titans’ clients paid most of Alpha Titans’ operating expenses. The SEC alleged that audited financial statements provided to investors in the private funds failed to disclose almost $3 million in expenses tied to transactions involving other entities controlled by Mr. McCormack. According to the SEC, Alpha Titans violated the Custody Rule by distributing financial statements that were not in accordance with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (“GAAP”), as the statements failed to disclose related party relationships and material related party transactions concerning the payment of adviser-related operating expenses. According to the SEC, Alpha Titans’ policies and procedures lacked provisions reasonably designed to prevent violations of the Advisers Act arising from failures to disclose material conflicts of interest or to act in the best interest of clients in connection with related party transactions involving Alpha Titans’ private fund clients. http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2015/34-74828.pdf In a related case, Simon Lesser, Advisers Act Release No. 4,071 (Apr. 29, 2015), the SEC instituted cease- | under, the Advisers Act. The SEC alleged that Alpha Titans willfully violated, and Mr. McCormack and Mr. Kaeser willfully aided and abetted and caused Alpha Titans’ violations of, Sections 206(4) of, and Rules 206(4)-2 and 206(4)-7 under, the Advisers Act. The SEC alleged that Alpha Titans and Mr. McCormack willfully violated Section 207 of the Advisers Act. | several basis, to pay a civil money penalty of $200,000 on a joint and several basis, and to administer a fund to compensate investors. Mr. Kaeser agreed to cease and desist from committing or causing any future violations of the charges and to be suspended from appearing or practicing before the SEC as an attorney for 12 months. Mr. McCormack and Mr. Kaeser agreed to be barred from association with, among others, any broker, dealer or investment adviser and prohibited from serving as, among other things, an employee of any advisory board or investment adviser for a period of 12 months. | |
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and-desist proceedings against Mr. Lesser, a certified public accountant, alleging that Mr. Lesser issued audit reports containing unqualified opinions that Alpha Titans’ financial statements were presented fairly in conformity with GAAP when the statements did not adequately disclose related party relationships or material related party transactions. According to the SEC, Mr. Lesser engaged in improper professional conduct in performing the audits for the funds. | Alpha Titans and Mr. McCormack were further required to comply with certain undertakings (including winding down fund operations and discontinuing the solicitation of or acceptance of any investments). | |||
4/20/15 | Undisclosed Conflict of Interest Breach of Fiduciary Duty Sanctioning of a Chief Compliance Officer Failure to Report a Material Compliance Matter to the Board of an Investment Company Registered under | In BlackRock Advisors, LLC, Advisers Act Release No. 4,065 (Apr. 20, 2015), the SEC instituted cease-and-desist proceedings against BlackRock Advisors, LLC (“BlackRock”), an Advisers Act-registered investment adviser, and Bartholomew A. Battista, former chief compliance officer of BlackRock, for failing to disclose to the boards of 1940 Act-registered investment companies managed by BlackRock that a BlackRock portfolio manager involved with the day-to-day management of the investment companies had a significant interest in an entity in which the investment companies invested. According to the SEC, a well-known BlackRock portfolio manager responsible for managing the assets of registered investment companies and other clients founded an oil-and-natural gas company. In particular, according to the SEC, the portfolio manager was the general partner of the oil and gas company and personally invested $50 million in the company; the | The SEC alleged that BlackRock willfully violated Sections 206(2) and 206(4) of, and Rule 206(4)-7 under, the Advisers Act. The SEC alleged that BlackRock and Mr. Battista caused violations of Rule 38a-1(a) under the 1940 Act, and that Mr. Battista caused BlackRock’s violations of Section 206(4) of, | BlackRock agreed to cease and desist from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of the charges, accept censure, and pay a civil money penalty of $12 million. Mr. Battista agreed to cease and desist from committing any future violations of the charges and to pay a civil money penalty of $60,000. BlackRock was further required to comply |
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the 1940 Act. | company later formed a joint venture with a publicly-traded coal company that eventually became the largest holding of the largest registered investment company managed by the portfolio manager. The SEC alleged that BlackRock knew and approved of the portfolio manager’s investment and involvement in the oil and gas company as well as the joint venture, but failed to disclose the potential conflict of interest associated with the investment and involvement to the board of the registered investment company and to the boards of other investment companies holding interests in the joint venture. The lack of disclosure, the SEC asserted, was in violation of an applicable BlackRock compliance policy. In settling the action against BlackRock, the SEC observed significantly that: “[a]s an investment adviser, BlackRock ha[d] a fiduciary duty to exercise the utmost good faith in dealing with its clients – including to fully and fairly disclose all material facts and to employ reasonable care to avoid misleading its clients. It is the client, not the investment adviser, who is entitled to determine whether a conflict of interest might cause a portfolio manager – consciously or unconsciously – to render advice that is not disinterested.” The SEC alleged that neither BlackRock nor Mr. Battista reported the portfolio manager’s violations, which, according to the SEC, were a “material compliance matter” under 1940 Act Rule 38a-1, to the boards of the investment companies. According to the | and Rule 206(4)-7 under, the Advisers Act. | with certain undertakings (including increased compliance procedures and retaining an independent compliance consultant). | |
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SEC, BlackRock also failed to adopt and implement policies and procedures that addressed how the outside activities of BlackRock employees were to be assessed for conflicts purposes. | ||||
4/17/15 | Material Misrepresentations and Failure to Disclose Material Facts to Investors Breach of Fiduciary Duty by an Unregistered Investment Adviser Unregistered Offers and Sales of Securities Inability to Rely on Regulation D when Securities are Offered and Sold to Unsophisticated Persons without Access to | In Joseph John Labadia, Advisers Act Release No. 4,064 (Apr. 17, 2015), the SEC instituted cease-and-desist proceedings against Joseph John Labadia, an investment adviser not registered under the Advisers Act, for making material misrepresentations and failing to disclose material facts to investors and advisory clients in connection with unregistered offers and sales of securities. According to the SEC, Mr. Labadia was a one-third owner and management committee member of Raintree Racing, LLC (“Raintree Racing”), a company engaged in the purchase and sale of thoroughbred horses; and was the president and control person of Atlanta Rehab Capital, LLC (“Atlanta Rehab”), a company that was principally engaged in the business of real estate lending. The SEC alleged that, from 2007 to at least 2010, Mr. Labadia solicited at least $1,973,000 from investors in Raintree Racing and approximately $1,137,000 from Atlanta Rehab, and characterized their investments as “loans” that were “extremely low risk,” providing written statements that investors would receive an annualized return of 20 percent on their investment and that invested principal would be returned at the maturity date. According to the SEC, | The SEC alleged that Mr. Labadia willfully violated Sections 5(a), 5(c), and 17(a) of the Securities Act; Section 10(b) of, and Rule 10b-5 under, the Exchange Act; and Sections 206(1) and 206(2) of the Advisers Act. | Mr. Labadia agreed to cease and desist from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of the charges; to be barred from association with, among others, any broker, dealer or investment adviser and prohibited from serving as, among other things, an employee of any advisory board or investment adviser; and to pay a disgorgement penalty of $48,337 and prejudgment interest of $4,797. |
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Information | Mr. Labadia knew, or was reckless in not knowing, that the investment in Raintree Racing involved significant risk, as Raintree Racing did not have cash flow or other resources to pay the promised 20 percent interest and return their principal. The SEC alleged that Mr. Labadia engaged in the offer and sale of Raintree Racing’s securities without filing an effective registration statement under the Securities Act in violation of Section 5 of the Securities Act, which generally requires an issuer, in the absence of an applicable exemption, to file a registration statement made effective by the SEC prior to the offer and sale of securities. According to the SEC, the offer and sale of Raintree Racing’s securities did not comply with the private placement exemption in Section 4(a)(2) of the Securities Act, as Mr. Labadia sold the securities to unsophisticated investors, and also violated Regulation D under the Securities Act by selling to investors who were not qualified as “accredited investors,” within the meaning of Regulation D, and by failing to provide these investors with appropriate non-financial and financial information. The SEC also asserted that Mr. Labadia offered and sold $362,000 in securities of Raintree Thoroughbred Farm, Inc., a company that Raintree Racing invested in, in reliance on Regulation D, but that the offering did not qualify for Regulation D, as sales were made to investors that were not sophisticated investors or qualified as accredited investors. According to the SEC, investors were also not provided with access to the type of information | |||
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contemplated by Regulation D. The SEC alleged that Mr. Labadia made misrepresentations in connection with Atlanta Rehab, leading its investors to believe that their funds were invested in real estate located in Atlanta, Georgia when a substantial portion of the funds were invested in Raintree Racing. Mr. Labadia, according to the SEC, breached his fiduciary duty to clients by charging them advisory fees based on inflated portfolio values that overstated the value of investments in Raintree Racing and by making misrepresentations about these values. | ||||
4/1/15 | Violation of Whistleblower Protections | In KBR, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 74,619 (Apr. 1, 2015), the SEC instituted cease-and-desist proceedings against KBR, Inc. (“KBR”), a corporation formed under Delaware law having common stock registered with the SEC under the Exchange Act, for violating whistleblower protections established by Rule 21F-17 under the Exchange Act. KBR, according to the SEC, required witnesses in investigations conducted by KBR to sign confidentiality statements warning that they could face disciplinary actions including termination of their employment if they discussed matters relating to the negotiations with outside parties without the prior approval of KBR’s legal department. Rule 21F-17 prohibits any person, which includes companies, from taking any actions that impede an individual from communicating directly with | The SEC alleged that KBR violated Rule 21F-17 under the Exchange Act. | KBR agreed to cease and desist from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of the charges and to pay a civil money penalty of $130,000. KBR was further required to comply with certain undertakings, including making reasonable efforts to contact employees who signed the confidentiality |
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the SEC about possible securities law violations, including enforcing, or threatening to enforce, a confidentiality agreement with respect to such communications. The SEC noted that KBR’s internal investigations could involve allegations of possible securities law violations. As a result, the SEC took the position that the terms of the KBR confidentiality statement violated Rule 21F-17. The SEC did not allege that KBR at any time prevented employees from communicating with the SEC about securities law violations, but did allege that a blanket prohibition against witnesses discussing the substance of an interview has a potential chilling effect on whistleblowers’ willingness to report illegal conduct to the SEC. KBR agreed to amend the language of its confidentiality agreement to include the following statement: “Nothing in this Confidentiality Statement prohibits me from reporting possible violations of federal law or regulation to any governmental agency or entity, including but not limited to the Department of Justice, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Congress, and any agency Inspector General, or making other disclosures that are protected under the whistleblower provisions of federal law or regulation. I do not need the prior authorization of the Law Department to make any such reports or disclosures and I am not required to notify the company that I have made such reports or disclosures.” | statement and providing them with a statement that KBR does not require the employee to seek permission before communicating with any governmental agency or entity. | |||
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The SEC’s action against KBR is noteworthy as it appears to be the first time that the SEC has asserted a violation of Rule 2 1F-17 on the basis of a blanket prohibition on disclosing confidential information and reflects the SEC’s support of whistleblowers as a vital source of SEC information. | ||||
3/30/15 | Failure to File Timely and Accurate Form ADV Filings Failure to Maintain Required Books and Records | In Aegis Capital, LLC, Advisers Act Release No. 4,054 (Mar. 30, 2015), the SEC instituted cease-and-desist proceedings against Aegis Capital, LLC (“Aegis Capital”), an investment adviser registered with the State of North Carolina and at one time an adviser registered under the Advisers Act; Circle One Wealth Management, LLC (“Circle One”), also at one time an Advisers Act-registered investment adviser and affiliate of Aegis Capital; Strategic Consulting Advisors, LLC (“SC Advisors”), an investment management consulting firm; Diane W. Lamm, chief operating officer of Aegis Capital and Circle One; and David I. Osunkwo, a compliance consultant who acted as chief compliance officer of Aegis Capital during the relevant period. Aegis Capital and Circle One, according to the SEC, failed to file timely and accurate reports with the Commission and to maintain required books and records. According to the SEC, the two entities outsourced their compliance responsibilities to SC Advisors and Mr. Osunkwo and Mr. Osunkwo reported to, and worked closely with, Ms. Lamm. | The SEC alleged that Aegis Capital willfully violated, and SC Advisors and Mr. Osunkwo caused violations of, Section 204 of, and Rule 204-1(a)(1) under, the Advisers Act. The SEC alleged that Aegis Capital and Circle One willfully violated, and Ms. Lamm willfully aided and abetted and caused violations of, Section 204 of, and Rule 204-2(a) under, the | The SEC instituted cease-and-desist proceedings in seeking, among other things, disgorgement and civil penalties. |
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The SEC alleged that, in Form ADV filings in March 2010 and March 2011, Aegis Capital and Circle One each overstated its assets under management and total number of client accounts. According to the SEC, Mr. Osunkwo requested the information from Aegis Capital’s and Circle One’s chief investment officer, who had little to no involvement with the entities’ investment advisory client accounts, only hours before the filing was due and falsely claimed that the chief investment officer had certified the assets under management and number of client accounts, forging a signature to that effect. According to the SEC, Aegis Capital and Circle One failed to keep their books and records maintained in a segregated fashion. The SEC alleged that they mixed records related to, among other things, financial statements, financial journals, and bank statements with affiliated entities. Aegis Capital and Circle One were unable to produce the books and records requested by the SEC. The action against Aegis Capital and Circle One is noteworthy because it reflects a willingness on the part of the SEC to assert relatively technical violations of the Advisers Act against entities not registered under the Act. | Advisers Act. The SEC alleged that Aegis Capital, Circle One, Ms. Lamm, SC Advisors, and Mr. Osunkwo willfully violated Section 207 of the Advisers Act. | |||
3/30/15 | Undisclosed Valuation | In Lynn Tilton, Advisers Act Release No. 4,053 (Mar. 30, 2015), the SEC instituted cease-and-desist | The SEC alleged that Ms. Tilton, | The SEC instituted cease-and-desist |
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Methodologies False and Misleading Statements Undisclosed Conflicts of Interest Financial Statement not in Compliance with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (“GAAP”) | proceedings against Patriarch Partners, LLC (“Patriarch”), an Advisers Act-registered investment adviser, certain advisers affiliated with Patriarch (the “Affiliated Advisers”), and Lynn Tilton, the control person of Patriarch and the Affiliated Advisers, for (1) allegedly using undisclosed valuation methodologies on loan assets in three collateralized loan obligation (“CLO”) funds managed by Patriarch and (2) providing investors in the funds with financial statements not in compliance with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (“GAAP”). The SEC alleged that Ms. Tilton, Patriarch and the Affiliated Advisers failed to value assets using the objective valuation methodologies described to investors in offering documents for the CLO funds. According to the SEC, Ms. Tilton was principally responsible for valuing the assets held by the CLO funds and reported the values as unchanged to investors in the funds, notwithstanding that many of the companies to which the loans were made contributed only partial or no interest payments to the funds for several years. The SEC alleged that Ms. Tilton did not provide for the valuations to be made on the basis of objective criteria but instead based the valuations on subjective criteria. The SEC further alleged that Ms. Tilton caused a loan’s value to be lowered only when she changed her view of the company to which the loan was made and that Ms. Tilton did not disclose this discretionary approach to valuation to investors in the funds. Ms. Tilton, according to the SEC, did not disclose the conflict of | Patriarch, and other Patriarch personnel willfully violated Sections 206(1), 206(2), and 206(4) of, and Rule 206(4)-8 under, the Advisers Act. The SEC alleged that Patriarch alternatively willfully aided and abetted and caused violations of Sections 206(1), 206(2), and 206(4) of, and Rule 206(4)-8 under, the Advisers Act. | proceedings to seek, among other things, disgorgement and civil penalties. | |
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3/16/15 | Failure to Disclose | interest inherent in the valuation methodology she used and received almost $200 million more in fees as a result of her subjective valuation methodologies. The SEC alleged that these actions prevented investors from benefiting from additional control over the funds’ investments that they would have gained had the investments’ value been lowered. The SEC further alleged that Ms. Tilton, Patriarch and the Affiliated Advisers were responsible for misstatements in the funds’ quarterly financial statements and for failing to conduct an impairment analysis required under GAAP on the funds’ assets despite disclosing that such GAAP compliant analysis had occurred. According to the SEC, the financial statements also falsely stated that the assets of the funds were reported at fair value. The SEC’s action against Ms. Tilton, who is a well-known money manager, has been well publicized largely as a result of Ms. Tilton’s filing suit against the SEC on constitutional grounds. In particular, she argued that the SEC should have brought the allegations against her in federal court as opposed to in an administrative proceeding. On June 30, 2015, a federal judge struck down her suit, allowing the case to move forward before an administrative law judge. http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2015/ia-4053.pdf In Joseph Stilwell, Advisers Act Release No. 4,049 (Mar. 16, 2015), the SEC instituted cease-and-desist | The SEC alleged that Stilwell Value | Stilwell Value and Mr. Stilwell agreed to cease |
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Conflicts of Interest Failure to Adopt Proper Written Compliance Policies and Procedures | proceedings against Stilwell Value LLC (“Stilwell Value”), an Advisers Act-registered investment adviser, and Joseph Stilwell, owner and managing member of Stilwell Value, alleging that Stilwell Value and Mr. Stilwell failed to appropriately disclose the existence and terms of loans made between certain private funds managed by Stilwell Value as well as the related conflicts of interest presented by the loans. According to the SEC, from at least 2003 to 2013, Stillwell Value directed certain funds it managed to make a series of loans totaling approximately $20 million to other funds it managed to help finance significant aspects of the borrowing funds’ investment strategies. The SEC alleged that all of the loans were repaid, but that the existence and terms of the loans were not appropriately disclosed to the funds or to the investors in the funds. These loans, according to the SEC, presented potential or actual conflicts of interest because Stillwell Value was solely responsible for (a) directing the lender funds to make the loans, (b) determining the loan terms, and (c) determining when and whether the borrower funds repaid those loans. The SEC alleged that, by virtue of the lender funds not receiving pertinent information about the loans, the lender funds were exposed to the risk that they would have no recourse should the borrower funds default, and that the default of the loans was at the discretion of Stillwell Value. The Stillwell settlement appears to represent a case of the SEC’s “broken windows” enforcement as the SEC did not allege that any investors | and Mr. Stilwell willfully violated Sections 206(2) and 206(4) of, and Rule 206(4)-8 under, the Advisers Act. The SEC alleged that Stilwell Value willfully violated, and Mr. Stilwell willfully aided and abetted and caused Stilwell Value’s violations of, Section 207 of, and Rule 206(4)-7 under, the Advisers Act. | and desist from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of the charges, and pay a disgorgement of $193,356 and prejudgment interest of $45,801. Stilwell Value agreed to censure and to pay a civil penalty of $250,000. Mr. Stilwell agreed to be suspended from association with, among others, any broker or investment adviser and prohibited from serving as, among other things, an employee of any advisory board or investment adviser for a period of 12 months; and to pay a civil penalty of $100,000. Stilwell Value was | |
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were harmed as a result of the loans. The SEC alleged that Stilwell Value’s compliance manual did not contain policies and procedures sufficient to address the compliance risks posed by the inter-fund loans, and that Stilwell Value failed to adopt and implement written policies and procedures reasonably designed to prevent violations of the Advisers Act. According to the SEC, Stilwell Value also failed to disclose the practice of inter-fund lending or the potential or actual conflicts of interest presented by such lending in its Form ADV filings. | further required to comply with certain undertakings including increased compliance procedures and retaining an independent monitor to conduct a comprehensive ongoing review of Stilwell Value’s compliance and control systems for three years. | |||
3/10/15 | Undisclosed Conflict of Interest Filing False and Misleading Documents | In Edgar R. Page, Advisers Act Release No. 4,044 (Mar. 10, 2015), the SEC instituted cease-and-desist proceedings against PageOne Financial, Inc. (“PageOne”), an Advisers Act-registered investment adviser, and Edgar R. Page, its principal owner, control person, and chief compliance officer. The SEC alleged that PageOne and Mr. Page hid serious conflicts of interest from their advisory clients in connection with recommending investments in three private investment funds to their advisory clients. The SEC alleged that, from early 2009 through approximately September 2011, PageOne and Mr. Page knowingly or recklessly failed to tell their advisory clients that the manager of certain private funds that PageOne was recommending was in the process of acquiring at least 49 percent of PageOne for | The SEC alleged that PageOne and Mr. Page willfully violated, and Mr. Page willfully aided and abetted and caused PageOne’s violations of, Sections 206(1), 206(2), and 207 of the Advisers Act. | PageOne and Mr. Page were ordered to cease and desist from committing or causing any violations or any future violations of the charges, and were censured. The administrative proceeding is continued to determine what, if any, additional remedial action including, but not limited to, disgorgement, interest |
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approximately $2.7 million and that, as part of that acquisition, Mr. Page had agreed to raise millions of dollars for such private funds. According to the SEC, the manager of the private funds was paying for the acquisition by making a series of installment payments over time, the timing and amounts of which were at least partially tied to PageOne’s ability to direct client money into the private funds. The Form ADVs filed by Mr. Page on behalf of PageOne, according to the SEC, materially misrepresented both the nature and amounts of the fund manager’s payments to PageOne. One Form ADV indicated, for example, that PageOne would receive a referral fee on the amounts invested by PageOne’s clients when PageOne knew, or should have known, that the payments were installment payments. The SEC alleged that, as a result of the misleading disclosure, PageOne’s clients were unaware of the nature and extent of the conflicts of interest when the private funds were recommended to them. | and civil penalties is appropriate against PageOne and Mr. Page. | |||
2/19/15 | Improper Registration Overstating of Assets Under Management Deficient | In Logical Wealth Management, Inc., Advisers Act Release No. 4,027 (Feb. 19, 2015), the SEC instituted cease-and-desist proceedings against Logical Wealth Management, Inc. (“Logical Wealth”), an Advisers Act-registered investment adviser; and Daniel J. Gopen, its owner, president, and chief compliance officer. The SEC alleged that Logical Wealth falsely claimed eligibility for registration, failed to implement adequate | The SEC alleged that Logical Wealth willfully violated Sections 203A, 204(a), 204A, 206(4), and 207 of, and Rules 204-2(a)(2), | Logical Wealth and Mr. Gopen were ordered to cease and desist from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of the |
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Compliance Procedures Recordkeeping Violations | compliance procedures, and failed to comply with certain recording requirements. According to the SEC, between 2006 and 2011, Logical Wealth overstated its assets under management in filings with the SEC, creating the appearance that it qualified under Section 203 A of the Advisers Act for registration with the SEC. The SEC also alleged that, in June 2012, Logical Wealth represented that its principal office and principal place of business was in Wyoming, a state that does not regulate investment advisers, to maintain its registration even though Logical Wealth had never operated from any location in Wyoming. According to the SEC, Logical Wealth was never qualified to be registered with the SEC; and these false filings were a violation of Section 207 of the Advisers Act, which makes it unlawful to make any untrue statement of material fact in a registration application filed with the SEC. The SEC alleged that Logical Wealth, as a registered investment adviser, had failed to adopt and implement the required compliance policies and procedures as required under Rule 206(4)-7 and failed to establish policies designed to deter inside trading and a code of ethics as required under Section 204A of, and Rule 204A-1 under, the Advisers Act. Logical Wealth also, according to the SEC, failed to make and keep accurate books and records required under the Advisers Act. | 204-2(a)(6), 204-2(a)(8), 204A-1, and 206(4)-7 under, the Advisers Act The SEC alleged that Mr. Gopen willfully violated Section 207 of the Advisers Act, and willfully aided and abetted and caused Logical Wealth’s violations of Sections 203A, 204(a), 204A, and 206(4) of, and Rules 204-2(a)(2), 204-2(a)(6), 204-2(a)(8), 204A-1, and 206(4)-7 under, the Advisers Act. | charges. The SEC revoked Logical Wealth’s registration under the Advisers Act and barred Mr. Gopen from the securities industry. Mr. Gopen was ordered to pay civil penalties of $25,000. | |
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2/19/15 | Fraud in Securities Auctions | In VCAP Securities, LLC, Advisers Act Release No. 4,026 (Feb. 19, 2015), the SEC instituted cease-and-desist proceedings against VCAP Securities, LLC (“VCAP”), a broker-dealer registered with the SEC, and Brett Thomas Graham, VCAP’s chief executive officer, alleging that they fraudulently deceived the trustees of certain collateralized debt obligations (“CDOs”) and other investors while acting as liquidation agent of the CDOs. The SEC alleged that the fraudulent activities improperly benefited an auction participant known by Mr. Graham and funds managed by Vertical Capital, LLC (“Vertical”), VCAP’s affiliated investment adviser. According to the SEC, VCAP and Mr. Graham indirectly acquired CDOs in CDO auctions that VCAP was conducting as liquidation agent. The SEC alleged that, after Mr. Graham had discussed bidding arrangements with a third-party broker-dealer, VCAP and Mr. Graham falsely represented in engagement agreements that they and their affiliates would not bid in the auctions or misuse confidential bidding information. The SEC alleged further that VCAP and Mr. Graham arranged for the third-party broker-dealer to secretly bid at these auctions on behalf of Vertical based on confidential information VCAP received as liquidation agent, then sold the CDOs to Vertical shortly after the auction. According to the SEC, under engagement agreements with the CDO trustees, VCAP and its affiliates were prohibited from bidding while serving as liquidation agent for these auctions. According to the SEC, VCAP provided the various trustees with | The SEC alleged that VCAP and Mr. Graham willfully violated Section 10(b) of, and Rule 10b-5 under, the Exchange Act. | VCAP agreed to cease and desist from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of the charges, accept censure, and pay a disgorgement penalty of $1,064,555 and prejudgment interest of $85,044. Mr. Graham agreed to cease and desist from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of the charges; to be barred from association with, among others, any broker or investment adviser and prohibited from serving as, among other things, an employee of any advisory board or investment adviser with the right to reapply after three years, except that Mr. Graham was able to be employed by |
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documents that did not disclose that Vertical was the winning bidder in five auctions. The SEC alleged that, during the course of a CDO liquidation, Mr. Graham used confidential information to give preferential treatment to an auction participant. According to the SEC, Mr. Graham instructed the participant to cut its bid in half, which resulted in the trustee only receiving half as much in proceeds as it otherwise would have received. Mr. Graham had not requested permission to disclose the confidential information from the trustee. | Vertical in a limited capacity for one year; and pay a disgorgement penalty of $118,284, prejudgment interest of $9,449, and a civil money penalty of $200,000. Mr. Graham was further required to comply with certain undertakings (including increased compliance procedures). | |||
2/12/15 | Violation of 1940 Act Custody Rules 1940 Act Compliance Deficiencies | In Water Island Capital, LLC, 1940 Act Release No. 31,255 (Feb. 12, 2015), the SEC instituted cease-and-desist proceedings against Water Island Capital LLC (“Water Island”), an Advisers Act-registered investment adviser that manages investment companies registered under the 1940 Act that engage in alternative investment strategies (the “Funds”). These funds are commonly referred to as “alternative investments mutual funds.” Section 17(f)(5) of the 1940 Act generally requires that a registered investment company maintain its securities and similar investments in the custody of a qualified bank, along with the cash proceeds from the sale of such securities and investments. According to the SEC, from at least January 2012 to September 2012, Water Island violated this requirement by allowing the Funds’ broker- | The SEC alleged that Water Island willfully violated Sections 12(b) and 17(f) of, and Rules 12b-1 and 38a-1 under, the 1940 Act. | Water Island agreed to cease and desist from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of the charges and pay a civil penalty of $50,000. |
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dealer counterparties to hold assets consisting of approximately $247 million in cash collateral relating to certain total return and portfolio return swaps in which the Funds had entered. The SEC further alleged that Water Island failed to create and maintain an approved list of executing brokers for the Funds pursuant to Rule 12b-1(h) under the 1940 Act and also failed to maintain documentation reflecting monitoring of the Funds’ compliance with the Rule 12b-1(h) policies and procedures. Under Rule 12b-1(h), a registered investment company is prohibited from compensating a broker-dealer for promoting or selling shares of the investment company by directing brokerage transactions to the broker. The rule also specifies, however, that a broker-dealer that can provide best execution with respect to certain types of portfolio transactions undertaken on behalf of a registered investment company can sell shares of the investment company. The SEC alleged that Water Island failed to implement policies and procedures adopted by the funds in connection with Rule 12b-1(h). The SEC alleged further that Water Island failed to adopt and implement written policies and procedures reasonably designed to prevent violations of the federal securities laws as mandated under Rule 38a-1. This case is particularly noteworthy as it shows the SEC’s willingness to bring enforcement cases for very technical provisions of the 1940 Act even in the absence of harm to shareholders of registered investment | ||||
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companies. | ||||
1/21/15 | Repeated Failure to Adopt Proper Written Compliance Policies and Procedures | In du Pasquier & Co., Inc., Advisers Act Release No. 4,004 (Jan. 21, 2015), the SEC instituted cease-and-desist proceedings against du Pasquier & Co., Inc. (“du Pasquier”), a formerly Advisers Act-registered investment adviser and Exchange Act-registered broker-dealer, alleging that du Pasquier had failed to maintain adequate investment advisory compliance policies and procedures and to ensure proper and timely disclosures about its investment advisory business. The SEC alleged that, at various times from at least 2007 forward, du Pasquier failed to adopt and implement written policies and procedures reasonably designed to prevent violations of the Advisers Act and its rules, including relying on an “off-the-shelf” template for a compliance manual without modifying certain sections of the template to take into consideration the nature of du Pasquier’s investment advisory business. The SEC further alleged that du Pasquier failed to implement procedures it did adopt, for example, failing to conduct adequate “best execution” reviews and failing to adequately review the firm’s marketing materials. According to the SEC, du Pasquier also failed to annually review the adequacy of its compliance policies and procedures and the effectiveness of their implementation, failed to amend its Form ADV under the Advisers Act to correct certain misstatements in the Form, and failed to deliver its Form ADV Part 2A and Part 2B to various clients. | The SEC alleged that du Pasquier violated Sections 204, 204A, 206(4) and 207 of, and Rules 204-1(a)(1), 204-1(a)(2), 204-3(b), 204A-1, and 206(4)-7(a) and (b) under, the Advisers Act. | Du Pasquier agreed to cease and desist from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of the charges and to pay a civil penalty of $50,000. |
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According to the SEC, a number of the violations were recurring, continuing from at least 2007, despite du Pasquier’s being alerted to potential compliance failures through examinations conducted by the SEC’s Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations (“OCIE”) in 2004 and 2007. Du Pasquier remediated some deficiencies identified in those examinations, but failed to prevent the violations described above. Most noteworthy about the du Pasquier proceeding is that it is one of only a very small number of actions the sole basis of which is a violation of the Advisers Act’s compliance and recordkeeping requirements. In short, the proceeding appears to reflect the importance the SEC currently places on a registered investment adviser’s compliance and recordkeeping procedures and policies. | ||||
1/16/15 | Failure to Disclose Conflicts of Interest | In Consulting Services Group, LLC, Advisers Act Release No. 4,000 (Jan. 16, 2015), the SEC instituted cease-and-desist proceedings against Consulting Services Group, LLC (“CSG”), an Advisers Act-registered investment adviser until October 4, 2013. In October 2007, the Commission had censured CSG and ordered it to pay a civil penalty of $20,000 for: failing to adopt a code of ethics compliant with applicable rules; failing to adopt written policies and procedures reasonably designed to prevent violations of the Advisers Act; and the backdating of written code of | The SEC alleged that CSG violated Sections 206(2) and 207 of the Advisers Act. | CSG agreed to cease and desist from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of the charges and to pay a civil penalty of $150,000. |
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ethics acknowledgment forms by CSG’s supervised persons in violation of Sections 204 and 206(4) of, and Rules 204-2(a)(12), 204A-1(a)(5), and 206(4)-7 under, the Advisers Act. The SEC alleged that CSG either failed to disclose or mischaracterized in its Forms ADV a 2009 $50,000 personal loan between its then chief executive officer and a third party investment adviser that CSG had recommended to certain of its public pension and other clients. According to the SEC, in August 2009, the compliance unit of CSG discovered the loan through regular e-mail surveillance but did not disclose it to clients. The SEC alleged that CSG then continued to file false and misleading Forms ADV Part 2A that failed to disclose key information about the loan. | ||||
1/13/15 | Failure to Disclose Compensation Received Conflicts of Interest | In Shelton Financial Group, Inc., Advisers Act Release No. 3,993 (Jan. 13, 2015), the SEC instituted cease-and-desist proceedings against Shelton Financial Group, Inc. (“SFG”), an Advisers Act-registered investment adviser; and Jeffrey Shelton, founder, sole owner, president, and former chief compliance officer of SFG. According to the SEC, during an on-site exam in 2012, Commission staff discovered that SFG had inadequate policies and procedures regarding, among other things, conflicts of interest, and that its compliance policies were not tailored to its business. In addition, according to the SEC, a brokerage firm became a custodian for | The SEC alleged that SFG and Mr. Shelton violated Sections 206(2) and 207 of the Advisers Act. The SEC alleged that SFG violated Section 206(4) of, and Rule 206(4)-7 under, the Advisers Act, and | SFG and Shelton agreed to cease and desist from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of the charges, accept censure, pay a disgorgement penalty of $99,114.19 and prejudgment interest of $20,952.91, and pay a civil penalty of |
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SFG clients in 2008, and as part of fee negotiations proposed an addendum to its contract in which the brokerage firm agreed to pay SFG a certain percentage of every dollar that its client invested in no transaction fee mutual funds other than proprietary funds advised by affiliates of the brokerage firm. SFG agreed in exchange to perform certain “custodial support services” for the brokerage firm. The addendum was memorialized in an agreement, which was not formally signed until November 2013. The SEC alleged that, from May 2009 through March 2010, SFG did not disclose the existence of the agreement in its Forms ADV. The SEC also alleged that SFG failed to disclose fully compensation received from third parties for providing investment advisory services to clients, as well as the conflicts of interests inherent in an agreement relating to those services or how SFG would address such conflicts. | that Mr. Shelton caused these violations by SFG. | $70,000. SFG was further required to comply with certain undertakings (including increased compliance procedures). |
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Chair Mary Jo White
Before the Subcommittee on Financial Services and General Government Committee on Appropriations United States Senate
April 12, 2016
Chairman Boozman, Ranking Member Coons, and Members of the Subcommittee:
Thank you for inviting me to testify today in support of the President’s fiscal year 2017 budget request for the Securities and Exchange Commission.[1] At the outset, I want to thank the Chairman, the Ranking Member, and all of the Subcommittee for your support of the SEC’s important mission in previous budget cycles. And today, I very much appreciate the opportunity to discuss with you why funding the SEC at a level of $1.781 billion for Fiscal Year (FY) 2017 is necessary for the agency to continue to fulfill its critical responsibilities to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation.[2]
The SEC has made great strides in recent years to strengthen its operations and programs, adopting strong measures that protect investors and our markets, and aggressively enforcing the securities laws to punish wrongdoers.
With respect to rulemaking, the agency has proposed or adopted nearly all of the mandatory rulemakings required by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act) and the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (JOBS Act), in addition to advancing other key rules in mission critical areas. Actions implementing the Congressional mandates have included final rules governing credit rating agencies and the public securitization markets; rules to address over-the-counter derivatives; new means for small businesses to access capital (including rules to expand the Regulation A exemption and permit securities-based crowdfunding offerings); executive compensation disclosures; and the removal of references to credit ratings from SEC rules. In addition to the Congressional mandates, the SEC has also advanced other important policy objectives, including rules to enhance oversight of high-frequency traders; the agency’s supervision of investment advisers and mutual funds; and the structure and resiliency of money market funds. The agency has also adopted requirements for comprehensive new controls at critical market participants to strengthen key technological systems.
Beyond the specific rulemakings, the SEC has intensified its review of equity and fixed income market structure issues; undertaken a comprehensive disclosure effectiveness initiative seeking ways to improve the public company disclosure regime for investors and companies; and undertaken the modernization and enhancement of our regulatory regime for the asset management industry. We also have continued to hold securities law violators accountable by bringing cutting-edge cases in record numbers and in all market strata. Systemic enhancements in the SEC’s National Examination Program (NEP) – including increased recruitment of industry experts, the augmentation of data analytics capacities,
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While these accomplishments and enhancements clearly evidence a stronger and more effective agency, challenges remain if we are to be successful in addressing the growing size and complexities of the securities markets and fulfill the SEC’s broad mandates and responsibilities. Currently, the SEC is charged with overseeing approximately 27,000 market participants, including nearly 12,000 investment advisers, almost 11,000 mutual funds and exchange-traded funds, over 4,000 broker-dealers, and over 400 transfer agents. The agency also oversees 18 national securities exchanges, 10 credit rating agencies, and six active registered clearing agencies, as well as the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB), the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC), and the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB). In addition, the SEC is responsible for selectively reviewing the disclosures and financial statements of over 9,100 reporting companies. In recent years, the SEC’s responsibilities have also dramatically increased, adding new duties or expanded jurisdiction over securities-based derivatives, hedge fund and other private fund advisers, credit rating agencies, municipal advisors, and clearing agencies, as well as a responsibility to implement a new regime for crowdfunding offerings.
The size and complexity of the entities the SEC regulates has also expanded exponentially. From 2001 to 2015, assets under management of SEC-registered advisers more than tripled from approximately $21.5 trillion to approximately $66.8 trillion, and assets under management of mutual funds more than doubled from $7 trillion to over $15 trillion. Trading volume in the equity markets from 2001 through 2015 nearly tripled to over $70 trillion.
While the SEC greatly appreciates the confidence that Congress has placed in it in recent appropriation cycles, additional funding is imperative if we are to continue the agency’s progress in fulfilling its responsibilities over our increasingly fast, complex, and growing markets. Funding at the requested level will permit the agency to hire an additional 250 staff in critical, core areas and continue to improve our information technology so that we can better oversee today’s markets with the sophisticated tools necessary to safeguard investors. Specifically, as described in more detail below and consistent with the planning reflected in our recent requests, the budget for FY 2017 seeks to:
• | Increase examination coverage of investment advisers and other key entities who interact with retail and institutional investors; |
• | Further leverage cutting-edge technology to permit the SEC to better keep pace with the entities, markets, and products we regulate; |
• | Protect investors by enhancing our enforcement program’s investigative capabilities and strengthen our ability to litigate against wrongdoers; |
• | Further bolster the SEC’s economic and risk analysis functions; and |
• | Hire market and other experts to enable the SEC to more expertly and efficiently discharge its current rulemaking and oversight responsibilities. |
As the Subcommittee is aware, the SEC’s funding is deficit-neutral, which means that any amount
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Last year was one of important achievements for the SEC, but significant work remains. Below is a summary of some of the accomplishments of the SEC in fiscal year 2015 and of the principal challenges ahead, as well as a more detailed description of key aspects of the FY 2017 budget request.
Many Accomplishments, But Significant Work Remains
Fiscal year 2015 was one of great accomplishment for the agency. The SEC brought an unprecedented number of enforcement cases (807 in total), secured an all-time high for orders directing the payment of penalties and disgorgement (over $4.2 billion), performed exams at a level not seen for the past five years (over 2,200), and, even more importantly, continued to develop cutting-edge cases and smarter, more efficient exams. Aided by enhanced technology to identify and analyze suspicious activity and strengthened by initiatives like self-reporting, SEC staff was able to identify and target the most significant risks for investors across the market. Areas of focus included cybersecurity, market structure requirements, dark pools, microcap fraud, financial reporting failures, insider trading, disclosure deficiencies in municipal securities offerings, and protection of retail investors and retiree savings.
The imperative of investor protection and market fairness was carried forward by all of our divisions and offices. While numbers of course only tell part of the story, the Division of Corporation Finance reviewed the annual and periodic reports of thousands of issuers last year, helping to ensure that investors receive full and fair disclosure about the public companies in which they invest. The Division of Trading and Markets reviewed more than 2,100 filings from exchanges and other self-regulatory organizations (SROs), standing guard for investors over major changes to the markets in which they entrust their savings. The Division of Investment Management reviewed filings covering more than 12,500 mutual funds and other investment companies, where the great majority of individual investors send their hard-earned money. And our economists in the Division of Economic and Risk Analysis produced more than 30 incisive papers and publications, including two major analyses to inform our work on asset management rules.
The agency’s accomplishments on the rulemaking front in FY 2015 were particularly noteworthy. The SEC has now executed a vast majority of the voluminous congressional mandates for a wide range of complex rulemakings. In 2015, with the adoption of Regulation A+ and Regulation Crowdfunding, the agency completed all of the major rulemakings directed by the JOBS Act. The SEC also moved into the final phase of implementing the Dodd-Frank Act, focusing on the two major remaining areas of mandates: security-based swaps and executive compensation. We marked two key milestones in the first area: first, with the adoption of rules for reporting and disseminating security-based swap information; and second, with final rules for registering security-based swap dealers. We proposed a process for dealing with bad actors in the security-based swap market and adopted rules to help ensure that non-U.S. dealers participating in the U.S. market play by our rules. These reforms will give us powerful tools to oversee an $11 trillion market and provide investors with unprecedented transparency into trading that had long been dangerously opaque.
During the past year, we also issued proposals for the remaining executive compensation rulemakings required by the Dodd-Frank Act, including disclosure of whether a company allows executives to hedge the company’s stock, disclosure of pay versus performance measures of executive compensation, and new disclosures and rules for clawing back incentive compensation erroneously
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Significant, high-priority work for the SEC will continue in FY 2017: from completing the implementation of our mandated rulemakings,[4] to continuing the core initiatives described above,[5] to further strengthening our economic and risk analysis functions, to continuing to improve our technology and operations to make the agency more agile and effective, to ensuring that both our examination and enforcement function are strong and effective to match and address current markets. Outlined below is a brief overview of some of the key components of our budget request that would provide the funding for that work.
Expanding Oversight of Investment Advisers and Strengthening Compliance
The need for significant additional resources to permit the agency to increase its examination coverage of registered investment advisers and investment companies cannot be overstated. Increasing this examination coverage is vital to the SEC’s ability to protect investors and the nation’s securities markets.
The largest increase in entities registered with the SEC has occurred among investment advisers: a decade ago, there were approximately 9,000 investment advisers managing $28 trillion in assets, while the current projection is that these figures will grow to 12,500 investment advisers managing more than $70 trillion in assets by FY 2017. Beyond an increase in the number of advisers and amount of assets under management, additional challenges to examination staff are posed by the increased use of new and complex products by both investment advisers and broker-dealers, an increasing use of technology in registrants’ operations that facilitate activities such as high-frequency and algorithmic trading, and the growth of complex “families” of financial services companies with integrated operations that include both broker-dealer and investment adviser affiliates. As a point of reference, a decade ago we had approximately 17 OCIE staff per trillion dollars in investment adviser assets under management, but today have only approximately 8 OCIE staff per trillion dollars.
In FY 2015, SEC staff, through risk-targeted exams, examined approximately 10 percent of registered investment advisers managing more than 30 percent of the assets under management of currently registered advisers. The program also continued its emphasis on the roughly 40 percent of all registered investment advisers that have never been examined through the continuation of the NEP’s never before examined adviser initiative started in 2014. Significant additional resources are critical to improve the examination coverage of this important industry. Under the FY 2017 request, a top priority will be to hire 127 additional examiners, primarily to conduct additional examinations of investment advisers, but also to improve oversight and examination functions related to broker-dealers; clearing agencies; transfer agents; SROs, including FINRA and the PCAOB; swap data repositories; municipal advisors; and crowdfunding portals; among others.
Continue to Leverage Technology
The SEC has made substantial progress in modernizing its technology systems, streamlining operations, increasing our use of data analytics, and increasing the effectiveness of its programs. The SEC’s FY 2017 budget request, which includes full use of the Reserve Fund, seeks to build on this progress by supporting a number of key information technology (IT) initiatives, including:
• | Expanding data analytic tools that assist in the integration and analysis of huge volumes of financial market data, employing algorithms and quantitative models that can lead to earlier ====== 2-477 ====== |
• | Increasing investments in Information Security to address, as a top priority, the ability to monitor and avoid advanced persistent threats. The SEC’s IT security program plans to focus its efforts on improved risk management and monitoring and continuing to invest in modernizing and securing the SEC’s infrastructure to enhance workflow and document management, the SEC’s electronic discovery program, operational resiliency, and internal communications to staff. |
• | Redesigning the Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis and Retrieval (EDGAR) system, an ongoing, multi-year effort to simplify and optimize the financial reporting process to promote automation and reduce filer burden. With a more modern EDGAR, both the investing public and SEC staff will benefit from having improved access to better data. We are also making incremental enhancements to the existing system to improve the user experience, accommodate new submission requirements, and other improvements that are needed prior to the full redesign. |
• | Improving examinations through risk assessment and surveillance tools that will help staff monitor for trends and emerging fraud risks, as well as improving the efficiency of the examination program so it can cover higher risk areas with its resources. |
• | Enhancing the Tips, Complaints, and Referral system (TCR) to bolster its flexibility, configurability, and adaptability. TCR investments will provide more flexible and comprehensive intake, triage, resolution tracking, searching, and reporting functionalities, with full auditing capabilities. |
• | Improving enforcement investigation and litigation tracking to better handle the substantial volume of materials produced during investigations and litigation. Among other initiatives, the SEC needs to build capacity to electronically transmit data for tracking and loading (versus the current practice of receiving content via the mail); implement a document management system for Enforcement’s internal case files; and revamp the tools used to collect trading data from market participants. |
• | Further modernize SEC.gov to make one of the most widely used Federal Government websites more flexible, informative, easier to navigate, and secure for investors, public companies, registrants, and the general public. |
• | Invest in further business process automation and improvements to build workflow applications that will improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the agency in serving the public. |
To better execute these and other technology initiatives, the FY 2017 request includes eight new positions for the Office of Information Technology (OIT). These staff would serve as project managers, business analysts, and technical resources who will improve technology and data management support for the SEC’s business areas. In addition, the positions will enhance information security through monitoring, and drive further improvements in IT equipment management and reporting.
Bolster Enforcement Resources to Address Wrongdoing in Today’s Markets
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It is vital to the SEC’s mission to bring timely, high-quality enforcement actions when violations of the Federal securities laws are identified. In FY 2015, the SEC brought a record number of enforcement actions against those who defrauded investors and violated the law – including many first of their kind actions – and obtained orders for monetary remedies exceeding $4 billion. Building on these very strong efforts, the agency must continue to enhance its enforcement function to keep pace with the growing size and complexity of the nation’s markets and to swiftly and aggressively address misconduct.
For FY 2017, the SEC is requesting 52 additional positions for the Enforcement Division. The Division will use the additional requested positions to support its three core functions: intelligence analysis, investigation, and litigation. Specifically, these additional resources will support the Enforcement program’s current and future initiatives by, among other things:
• | increasing the experienced forensic accountants, attorneys, industry experts, and information technology and support staff needed to promptly detect, prioritize, and investigate areas appropriate for enhanced enforcement efforts (30 positions); |
• | adding experienced trial attorneys to prosecute the growing number of highly-complex enforcement actions (12 positions); |
• | enhancing Enforcement’s data analytics expertise to assist in the implementation of data intensive projects, state-of-the-art investigative tools (such as eDiscovery and knowledge management), and improved forensic capabilities (5 positions); and |
• | bolstering staffing for intelligence functions, including the collection, analysis, triage, referral, monitoring, and follow-through on the thousands of TCRs received each year (5 positions). |
With respect to the latter two priorities, analysis of large datasets, including SEC filings and trading data in equities, options, municipal bonds, and other securities, helps to limit investor harm by increasing the chances of detecting misconduct and detecting it earlier. The SEC’s Enforcement program expects the improved data analysis capabilities derived from the agency’s investments in IT will yield additional important case leads in FY 2017. As a result, the Enforcement program would dedicate 10 of the requested positions to further develop its data analytic function, increasing the number of staff responsible for reviewing and triaging incoming TCRs and bolstering the number of staff to whom TCRs are sent for further investigation.
The Enforcement program also requires additional staffing to promptly detect complex frauds and other difficult-to-detect misconduct, whether it occurs at hedge funds, broker-dealers, or “boiler rooms”; respond to misconduct in the changing equity markets relating to algorithmic trading and dark pools; address large-scale insider trading and stock manipulation; and keep pace with a rapidly evolving industry. As a result, 30 of the positions the SEC is seeking in FY 2017 would be to reinforce its investigative functions. These new positions will help the Division continue progress on existing investigations and handle its increasing case load, while quickly investigating and bringing emergency actions as necessary in matters where investors’ money may dissipate if immediate action is not taken.
Finally, 12 of the new positions the SEC is requesting in FY 2017 would reinforce its litigation operations nationwide. This increased allocation will enable the SEC to handle the higher proportion of enforcement actions that are being filed as contested matters as well as to follow through on its commitment to litigate any case where it believes admissions of wrongdoing are necessary to achieve greater public accountability.
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Focus on Economic and Risk Analysis to Support Rulemaking and Oversight
The SEC remains committed to strengthening the economic and risk analysis functions of its Division of Economic and Risk Analysis (DERA) and for FY 2017 plans to add six new positions to DERA. DERA is our fastest growing division, and this additional growth would continue to deepen the Division’s expertise in support of rulemaking initiatives affecting the capital markets as well as initiatives to detect violations of the securities laws.
The DERA positions requested would focus on areas including exchange-traded funds, microcap stocks, the derivatives markets, and asset-backed securities. These staff would work with colleagues across the SEC to proactively monitor these markets from a systemic perspective, as well as to develop analytical tools to assist the Division of Enforcement in analyzing and identifying potential illicit activity in these areas.
Meet Expanded Rulemaking and Oversight Responsibilities
The agency is also requesting seven additional positions in FY 2017 for its Division of Trading and Markets. In FY 2017, the Division plans to use the additional positions requested to undertake new market-related responsibilities resulting from ongoing or recently completed rulemakings, as well as continuing to improve the agency’s market supervision. Three of these positions would help the Division implement its new or enhanced responsibilities to oversee clearing agencies and swap data repositories. The other four would help improve the SEC’s analytics and reporting on broker-dealers’ finances, internal controls, and risk management practices; process rule proposals from a growing number of SROs; and provide interpretive guidance related to the derivatives markets.
The SEC is also requesting seven new positions for the Division of Investment Management to implement key policy objectives. These personnel would conduct ongoing data analysis, including new data that would be submitted to the SEC as part of the investment company reporting modernization initiative. In addition, they would monitor issues related to asset management risks (including those related to liquidity, derivatives, stress testing and transition planning rulemaking initiatives), provide interpretive advice, and respond to exemptive applications.
Conclusion
Thank you again for the opportunity to present the President’s FY 2017 budget request. The SEC has made great progress with the recent funding increases approved by Congress, and I deeply appreciate the President’s and Congress’ continued support of the agency. I look forward to working with the Subcommittee to provide the SEC with the resources it needs to fulfill its important responsibilities to investors and our capital markets. I would be happy to answer any questions.
Modified: April 12, 2016
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Press Release
SEC Announces 2016 Examination Priorities
New Areas of Focus Include Liquidity Controls, Public Pension Advisers, Product Promotion, Exchange-Traded Funds and Variable Annuities
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
2016-4
Washington D.C., Jan. 11, 2016 — The Securities and Exchange Commission today announced its Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations’ (OCIE) 2016 priorities. New areas of focus include liquidity controls, public pension advisers, product promotion, and two popular investment products – exchange-traded funds and variable annuities. The priorities also reflect a continuing focus on protecting investors in ongoing risk areas such as cybersecurity, microcap fraud, fee selection, and reverse churning.
“These new areas of focus are extremely important to investors and financial institutions across the spectrum,” said SEC Chair Mary Jo White. “Through information sharing and conducting comprehensive examinations, OCIE continues to promote compliance with the federal securities laws to better protect investors and our markets.”
“For the last four years, OCIE’s transparency and information sharing has helped inform the industry,” said OCIE Director Marc Wyatt. “We hope that registrants will use this information to inform the evaluation of their own compliance programs in these key areas.”
The 2016 examination priorities address issues across a variety of financial institutions, including investment advisers, investment companies, broker-dealers, transfer agents, clearing agencies, and national securities exchanges. Areas of examination include:
Retail Investors – Protecting retail investors, including those investing for retirement, remains a priority in 2016. OCIE will continue several 2015 initiatives to assess risks to retail investors seeking information, advice, products, and services to help them plan for and live in retirement. It also will undertake examinations to review exchange-traded funds (ETFs) and ETF trading practices, variable annuity recommendations and disclosure, and potential conflicts and risks involving advisers to public pension funds.
Market-Wide Risks – To help fulfill the SEC’s mission of maintaining fair, orderly, and efficient markets, OCIE will continue its focus on cybersecurity controls at broker-dealers and investment advisers. New initiatives for 2016 include an evaluation of broker-dealers’ and investment advisers’ liquidity risk management practices, and firms’ compliance with the SEC’s Regulation SCI, designed to strengthen the technology infrastructure of the U.S. securities markets.
Data Analytics – OCIE’s enhanced ability to analyze large amounts of data will assist examiners’ ongoing initiatives to assess anti-money laundering compliance, detect microcap fraud, and review for excessive trading. Data analytics also will help examinations focused on promotion of new, complex, and high-risk products.
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The published priorities for 2016 are not exhaustive and may be adjusted in light of market conditions, industry developments and ongoing risk assessment activities. OCIE selected the priorities in consultation with the Commission, the SEC’s policy divisions and regional offices, the Division of Enforcement, the SEC’s Investor Advocate, and other regulators.
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Related Materials
• | Examination Priorities - 2016 |
• | Letter to National Securities Exchanges |
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Examination Priorities for2016
I. Introduction |
This document identifies selected 2016 examination priorities of the Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations (“OCIE,” “we,” or “our”) of the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC” or “Commission”). In general, the priorities reflect certain practices and products that OCIE perceives to present potentially heightened risk to investors and/or the integrity of the U.S. capital markets.1
OCIE serves as the “eyes and ears” of the SEC. We conduct examinations of regulated entities to promote compliance, prevent fraud, identify risk, and inform policy.2 We selected our 2016 examination priorities in consultation with the Commissioners, senior staff from the SEC’s regional offices, the SEC’s policy-making and enforcement divisions, the SEC’s Investor Advocate, and our fellow regulators.
This year, our priorities are organized around the same three thematic areas as last year:
1. | Examining matters of importance to retail investors, including investors saving for retirement; |
2. | Assessing issues related to market-wide risks; and |
3. | Using our evolving ability to analyze data to identify and examine registrants that may be engaged in illegal activity. |
This document does not address OCIE’s examination priorities for the national securities exchanges, which we are addressing separately.
II. Protecting Retail Investors and Investors Saving for Retirement |
Protecting retail investors and retirement savers remains a priority in 2016, and it will likely continue to be a focus for the foreseeable future. Retail investors of all ages face a complex and evolving set of choices when determining how to invest their money. Additionally, as investors are more dependent than ever on their own investments for retirement,3 the financial services industry is offering a broad array of information, advice,
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• | ReTIRE. In June 2015, we launched a multi-year examination initiative, focusing on SEC-registered investment advisers and broker-dealers and the services they offer to investors with retirement accounts.4 We will continue this initiative, which includes examining the reasonable basis for recommendations made to investors, conflicts of interest, supervision and compliance controls, and marketing and disclosure practices. |
• | Exchange-Traded Funds (“ETFs”). We will examine ETFs for compliance with applicable exemptive relief granted under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Investment Company Act of 1940 and with other regulatory requirements, as well as review the ETFs’ unit creation and redemption process. We will also focus on sales strategies, trading practices, and disclosures involving ETFs, including excessive portfolio concentration, primary and secondary market trading risks, adequacy of risk disclosure, and suitability, particularly in niche or leveraged/inverse ETFs. |
• | Branch Offices. We will continue to review regulated entities’ supervision of registered representatives and investment adviser representatives in branch offices of SEC-registered investment advisers and broker-dealers, including using data analytics to identify registered representatives in branches that appear to be engaged in potentially inappropriate trading. |
• | Fee Selection and Reverse Churning. We will continue to examine investment advisers and dually-registered investment adviser/broker-dealers that offer retail investors a variety of fee arrangements (e.g., asset-based fees, hourly fees, wrap fees, commissions). We will focus on recommendations of account types and whether the recommendations are in the best interest of the retail investor at the inception of the arrangement and thereafter, including fees charged, services provided, and disclosures made about such arrangements. |
• | Variable Annuities. Variable annuities have become a part of the retirement and investment plans of many Americans.5 We will assess the suitability of sales of variable annuities to investors (e.g., exchange recommendations and product classes), as well as the adequacy of disclosure and the supervision of such sales. |
• | Public Pension Advisers. We will examine advisers to municipalities and other government entities, focusing on pay-to-play and certain other key risk areas related to advisers to public pensions, including identification of undisclosed gifts and entertainment. |
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III. Assessing Market-Wide Risks |
The SEC’s mission includes not only protecting investors and facilitating capital formation, but also maintaining fair, orderly, and efficient markets. We will examine for structural risks and trends that may involve multiple firms or entire industries. In 2016, we will focus on the following initiatives:
• | Cybersecurity. In September 2015, we launched our second initiative to examine broker-dealers’ and investment advisers’ cybersecurity compliance and controls.6 In 2016, we will advance these efforts, which include testing and assessments of firms’ implementation of procedures and controls. |
• | Regulation Systems Compliance and Integrity (“SCI”). We will examine SCI entities to evaluate whether they have established, maintained, and enforced written policies and procedures reasonably designed to ensure the capacity, integrity, resiliency, availability, and security of their SCI systems.7 This will include, among other things, assessing the resiliency of their primary and back-up data centers, evaluating whether computing infrastructure components are geographically diverse, and assessing whether security operations are tailored to the risks each entity faces. |
• | Liquidity Controls. Amidst the changes in fixed income markets over the past several years, we will examine advisers to mutual funds, ETFs, and private funds that have exposure to potentially illiquid fixed income securities. We will also examine registered broker-dealers that have become new or expanding liquidity providers in the marketplace. These examinations will include a review of various controls in these firms’ expanded business areas, such as controls over market risk management, valuation, liquidity management, trading activity, and regulatory capital. |
• | Clearing Agencies. We will continue to conduct annual examinations of clearing agencies designated systemically important, pursuant to the requirements of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. Areas for review will be determined through a risk-based approach in collaboration with the Division of Trading and Markets and other regulators, as applicable. |
IV. Using Data Analytics to Identify Signals of Potential Illegal Activity |
Since our examination program is risk-based, we are always striving to detect risks across those industries and within those firms that we oversee. In all of our examination initiatives, including those highlighted in this section, we utilize data and intelligence from our own examinations, as well as from regulatory filings, to identify registrants that appear to have elevated risk profiles. A few of our initiatives that leverage our capabilities in the area of data analytics include:
• | Recidivist Representatives and their Employers. We will continue to use our analytic capabilities to identify individuals with a track record of misconduct and examine the firms that employ them. For example, we will assess the compliance oversight and controls of investment advisers that have employed such individuals after they have been disciplined or barred from a broker-dealer. |
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• | Anti-Money Laundering (“AML”). We will continue to examine clearing and introducing broker-dealers’ AML programs, using our analytic capabilities to focus on firms that have not filed the number of suspicious activity reports (“SARs”) that would be consistent with their business models or have filed incomplete or late SARs. We will also continue to assess broker-dealers’ AML programs, with a particular emphasis on (1) the adequacy of the independent testing obligation, to ensure that these programs are robust and are targeted to each firm’s specific business model, and (2) the extent to which firms consider and adapt, as appropriate, their programs to current money laundering and terrorist financing risks. |
• | Microcap Fraud. We will continue to examine the operations of broker-dealers and transfer agents for activities that indicate they may be engaged in, or aiding and abetting, pump-and-dump schemes or market manipulation. We will also assess whether broker-dealers are complying with their obligations under the federal securities laws when publishing quotes for or trading securities in the over-the-counter markets. |
• | Excessive Trading. We will continue to analyze data, including data obtained from clearing brokers, to identify and examine firms and their registered representatives that appear to be engaged in excessive or otherwise potentially inappropriate trading. |
• | Product Promotion. We will focus on detecting the promotion of new, complex, and high risk products and related sales practice issues to identify potential suitability issues and potential breaches of fiduciary obligations. |
Through collaborative efforts with the Division of Economic and Risk Analysis, we will continuously enhance our analytic approach and capabilities in these areas through the use of new technologies and risk-based initiatives.
V. Other Initiatives |
In addition to examinations related to the themes described above, we expect to allocate examination resources to other priorities, including:
• | Municipal Advisors. We will continue to conduct examinations of newly-registered municipal advisors to assess their compliance with recently adopted SEC and Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board rules. This initiative will continue to include industry outreach and education.8 |
• | Private Placements. We will review private placements, including offerings involving Regulation D of the Securities Act of 1933 or the Immigrant Investor Program (“EB-5 Program”)9 to evaluate whether legal requirements are being met in the areas of due diligence, disclosure, and suitability. |
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• | Never-Before-Examined Investment Advisers and Investment Companies. We will continue conducting focused, risk-based examinations of selected registered investment advisers and investment company complexes that we have not yet examined.10 |
• | Private Fund Advisers. We will examine private fund advisers, maintaining a focus on fees and expenses and evaluating, among other things, the controls and disclosure associated with side-by-side management of performance-based and purely asset-based fee accounts. |
• | Transfer Agents. In addition to our examinations of transfer agents’ timely turnaround of items and transfers, recordkeeping and record retention, and safeguarding of funds and securities, we will examine transfer agents providing paying agent services for their issuers, focusing on the safeguarding of security-holder funds. |
VI. Conclusion |
This description of OCIE priorities is not exhaustive. While we expect to allocate significant resources throughout 2016 to the examination issues described herein, our staff will also conduct examinations focused on risks, issues, and policy matters that arise from market developments, new information learned from examinations or other sources, including tips, complaints, and referrals, and coordination with other regulators.
OCIE welcomes comments and suggestions about how we can better fulfill our mission to promote compliance, prevent fraud, monitor risk, and inform SEC policy. If you suspect or observe activity that may violate the federal securities laws or otherwise operates to harm investors, please notify us at http://www.sec.gov/complaint/info_tipscomplaint.shtml.
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Statement on Financial Stability Oversight Council’s Review of Asset Management Products and Activities
Chair Mary Jo White
April 18, 2016
I support the publication of the Council’s Update Statement on its review of asset management products and activities for potential financial stability risks. The summary of analysis set forth in the update gives a current snapshot of FSOC’s work in this area, which the Council is making public today. I commend that transparency and the tireless work of the staff that has led to today’s update.
As I have commented before, I believe FSOC’s work on this topic is complementary to the regulatory reforms the SEC is currently undertaking in our oversight of the asset management industry as I announced and described in December 2014.[1]
Since 1940, under the authority of the Investment Company Act and Investment Advisers Act, the SEC has been the primary regulator of the vast majority of the asset management industry. And we are currently engaged in a very consequential set of initiatives to modernize and enhance our asset management regulatory regime, including in the areas of enhanced reporting of data, liquidity risk management and use of leverage, on which the Commission issued four rule proposals in 2015.[2] Those proposals are outstanding, and I expect proposals on transition planning and stress testing to follow.
Although there is overlap in the topics covered in FSOC’s update and the SEC’s proposed reforms, it should be understood that the SEC’s analysis of foundational asset management issues, including liquidity management and use of leverage, is set forth in the Commission’s proposals and accompanying white papers of the SEC’s Division of Economic and Risk Analysis.[3] In developing the SEC’s final regulations, we will consider and rely on our analysis of the input we receive from the public through the notice and comment process. Today’s FSOC update thus should not be read as an indication of the direction that the SEC’s final asset management rules may take.
The Council views set forth in the update describe certain relevant principles and next steps for consideration. The topics it takes on are complex, nuanced and dynamic. This exercise has also highlighted for me other important issues not directly or solely within the SEC’s jurisdiction, some of which were raised by commenters on the Council’s request for public comment – including the interaction of asset managers with other financial institutions, the use of economic substitutes across the industry, and the behavior of market participants both before and after the financial crisis. Careful examination of these and other issues by both FSOC and the relevant regulators is important for analyzing both risks to financial stability and the materiality and likelihood of such risks.
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I again commend the staff’s hard work, and look forward to continued dialogue with my colleagues on the Council.
Modified: April 18, 2016
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Testimony on “Examining the SEC’s Agenda, Operations, and FY 2017 Budget Request”
Chair Mary Jo White
Before the Committee on Financial Services
United States House of Representatives
Washington, D.C.
Nov. 18, 2015
Chairman Hensarling, Ranking Member Waters, and Members of the Committee:
Thank you for inviting me to testify regarding the recent activities and current initiatives of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).[1] As you know, the SEC has a three-part mission: to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation. Since I last testified before this Committee eight months ago, the SEC has advanced significant rulemakings, continued to bring strong enforcement actions against wrongdoers, and made significant progress on our initiatives involving the asset management industry, equity market structure, and disclosure effectiveness.
As described in more detail below, the Commission has adopted or proposed 17 substantive rulemakings in the past eight months, including rules required by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act) and the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (JOBS Act). These efforts have included final rules addressing over-the-counter derivatives; new means for small businesses to access capital (including rules to update Regulation A and permit securities-based crowdfunding offerings); executive compensation disclosures; and the removal of references to credit ratings from our rules. In addition to implementing congressionally mandated rules, we have also advanced other important programs, including rules to enhance oversight of high-frequency traders and our supervision of investment advisers and mutual funds.
Our enforcement program also continued to deliver very strong results, with the Commission bringing 807 enforcement actions and obtaining monetary remedies of approximately $4.2 billion in Fiscal Year 2015 (FY 2015). These results included high-quality, “first-ever” cases in a number of important areas, including protections for whistleblower communications; violations by financial institutions under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act; misconduct by underwriters in the primary market for municipal securities; and the fee practices of private equity advisers. In addition, the Commission brought cutting edge market structure enforcement cases, including an action against a dark pool operator for running a secret trading desk and an action against a high frequency trading firm for violating the market access rule and Regulation NMS. The Commission also continued to seek admissions, including the first-ever admissions settlement with an auditing firm, and to pursue complex cases with criminal authorities, including a recent action charging dozens of defendants with a global scheme to profit from hacked non-public information about corporate earnings announcements.
Going forward, we plan to continue to focus on completing our mandatory rulemakings while pursuing other initiatives that are critical to our mission, including those relating to asset manager oversight, equity market structure, and our disclosure effectiveness review. We will also continue to strengthen our enforcement and examination programs, striving for high-impact efforts that protect
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I deeply appreciate the serious responsibility we have to be prudent stewards of the funds we are appropriated, and we strive to demonstrate how seriously we take that responsibility by the work we do. We continue to place a high priority on allocating our resources efficiently and effectively, and we were very pleased that the Commission recently received an unmodified audit report, the agency’s best-ever audit opinion from the Government Accountability Office, with no material weaknesses or significant deficiencies identified in FY 2015. With Congress’ continued assistance, we plan to build on these improvements and continue to enhance the execution of our mission.
Implementing Remaining Congressional Mandates and Other Significant Rulemakings
Since I last testified, the SEC has continued to make substantial progress implementing the rulemakings mandated by the Dodd-Frank and JOBS Acts, completing significant rulemaking in key areas under the Dodd-Frank Act and finishing all major rulemakings under the JOBS Act. Specifically, since the hearing on March 24, 2015, the Commission has:
• | Adopted final rules to update and expand Regulation A (commonly referred to as Regulation A+), an exemption from registration for small offerings of securities, to facilitate smaller companies’ access to capital; |
• | Adopted new rules under Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act to provide a comprehensive, efficient process for security-based swap dealers and major security-based swap participants to register with the SEC and proposed new procedures addressing statutorily disqualified associated persons; |
• | Adopted new rules to permit securities-based crowdfunding offerings by issuers and the operation of funding portals to intermediate such offerings; |
• | Adopted amendments to remove credit rating references in the principal rule that governs money market funds and the form that money market funds use to report information to the Commission each month about their portfolio holdings; |
• | Adopted a rule that requires public companies to disclose the ratio of the compensation of their chief executive officer to the median compensation of its employees; |
• | Proposed rules governing the application of certain requirements to security-based swap transactions connected with a non-U.S. person’s dealing activity in the United States; |
• | Proposed rules to require companies to disclose the relationship between executive compensation and the financial performance of a company; |
• | Proposed rules directing national securities exchanges and associations to establish listing standards requiring companies to adopt policies that require recovery of incentive-based compensation erroneously awarded to executive officers; and |
• | Proposed amendments related to regulatory access to security-based swap data held by security-based swap data repositories. |
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The Commission has also acted in the last eight months to advance other important rules central to investor protection, market integrity, and capital formation, a number of which are connected with the larger initiatives described in detail below. The Commission:
• | Proposed rules to require that broker-dealers trading in off-exchange venues become members of a national securities association to enhance regulatory oversight of active proprietary trading firms, such as high-frequency traders; |
• | Proposed two sets of rules to modernize the reporting and disclosure of information by investment companies and investment advisers to enhance the quality of information available to investors and allow the Commission to more effectively collect and use data provided by investment companies and investment advisers; |
• | Proposed rules designed to promote effective liquidity risk management for open-end funds (except money market funds) and permit the use of swing pricing for open-end funds (except money market funds and exchange-traded funds (ETFs)); |
• | Proposed amendments to Securities Act Rule 147 to modernize the rule for intrastate offerings, including through intrastate crowdfunding provisions, and to Rule 504 to increase the aggregate limit on offers and sales and to provide additional investor protections; |
• | Proposed two sets of amendments to the SEC rules governing its administrative proceedings that, if adopted, would among other things adjust the timing of administrative proceedings and permit parties to take depositions of witnesses as part of discovery; |
• | Issued a request for comment on the effectiveness of financial disclosures about entities other than the registrant under Regulation S-X; and |
• | Issued a concept release about possible revisions to audit committee disclosures. |
Vigorous Enforcement of the Securities Laws
The SEC’s vigorous enforcement program is at the heart of its efforts to protect investors and instill confidence in the integrity of the markets. The Division of Enforcement (Enforcement) advances these efforts by investigating and bringing civil charges against violators of the federal securities laws. Successful enforcement actions impose meaningful sanctions on securities law violators, result in penalties and disgorgement of ill-gotten gains that can be returned to harmed investors, and deter further wrongdoing.
Enforcement continued to deliver very strong results on behalf of investors in FY 2015. The SEC filed a record 807 enforcement actions covering a wide range of misconduct, and obtained orders totaling $4.19 billion in disgorgement and penalties. Of the 807 enforcement actions filed in Fiscal Year 2015, a record 507 were independent actions for violations of the federal securities laws, and 300 were either actions against issuers who were delinquent in making required filings with the SEC or administrative proceedings seeking bars against individuals based on criminal convictions, civil injunctions, or other orders.
More important than the numbers, these actions addressed meaningful issues for investors and markets, spanned the securities industry, and included numerous “first-of-their-kind” actions. Significantly, approximately two-thirds of our substantive actions in FY 2015 also included charges against individuals. A few other important features of our enforcement program drawn from the last eight months also bear highlighting.
Leveraging Data Tools and Analysis
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Enforcement’s leveraging of data and quantitative analytics contributed significantly to the year’s strong results. Specifically, Enforcement has focused on ways to harness in-house expertise and data infrastructure to analyze massive data sources and identify conduct that potentially violates the federal securities laws. For example, Enforcement is partnering with our Division of Economic and Risk Analysis to develop a tool to enable staff to detect anomalous financial results disclosed in public company filing data. Enforcement staff is also implementing new analytical tools to detect suspicious trading patterns to assist with insider trading and microcap fraud investigations. These tools can streamline investigations significantly and, in some cases, identify misconduct that previously might not have been detected. These efforts have facilitated a number of cases filed during the past six months.
Executing the Admissions Policy
The Commission continues to aggressively seek admissions in cases where heightened accountability and acceptance of responsibility by a defendant is particularly important and in the public interest. These types of cases include those involving particularly egregious conduct; where large numbers of investors were harmed; where the markets or investors were placed at significant risk; where the conduct undermines or obstructs our investigative process; where an admission can send an important message to the markets; or where the wrongdoer presents a particular future threat to investors or the markets. Since adopting the admissions protocol in 2013, the SEC has obtained admissions in more than thirty cases (and from a total of 47 entities and individuals), including a number involving a major financial institution and a national auditing firm and requiring charged individuals to admit liability in a world-wide pyramid scheme targeting the Asian-American community. As we indicated when we adopted the admissions protocol, the majority of cases continue to be resolved on a “neither admit nor deny” basis.[2] We continue, however, to increase the use of our evolving, “first-of-its-kind” policy to require admissions or other acknowledgements of wrongdoing where appropriate, and will be prepared to litigate those cases if necessary.
Focusing on Key Areas of Misconduct
The Commission also continues to focus resources on key areas of misconduct. One critical area is financial reporting and issuer disclosure. Comprehensive, accurate, and reliable financial reporting is the bedrock upon which our markets are based, and our Enforcement Division is focused on pursuing violations in this area. The SEC brought a series of significant financial reporting cases in FY 2015, including four important actions in September, each of which also involved charges against senior executives.
Another key area is investment management, where the SEC has continued to bring actions addressing a wide range of issues, such as performance advertising, undisclosed conflicts of interest, compliance issues, and private equity fees and expenses. These include “first-of-their-kind” actions for failures to report material compliance matters to fund boards and the improper allocation of expenses by private equity advisers.
Enhancing the Whistleblower Program
The SEC’s Whistleblower program continues to have a transformative impact on our enforcement program. The SEC’s Office of the Whistleblower is currently tracking over 700 matters in which a whistleblower’s tip has caused a matter under investigation or an investigation to be opened, or which have been forwarded to Enforcement staff for consideration in connection with an existing investigation. In FY 2015, the Commission paid more than $37 million to eight whistleblowers who provided original information that led to successful enforcement actions resulting in an order or
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Building New Initiatives for Facilitating Capital Formation
On this strong foundation of rulemaking and enforcement, we have continued to advance programs to address issues central to the Commission’s mission using all of the tools available to us. These programs have sought to expand capital formation for small businesses, review the effectiveness of our disclosure regime, enhance the oversight of asset managers, enhance our equity and fixed income market structure, and catalyze consideration of a uniform fiduciary duty for investment advisers and broker-dealers.
With the adoption of the rules for both Regulation A+ and crowdfunding, the Commission is moving beyond the program set forth by the JOBS Act to develop a number of ongoing initiatives that are designed to facilitate capital formation, particularly for small businesses.
Last month, the Commission issued a rule proposal seeking to modernize Rule 147, a safe harbor to a statutory exemption for intrastate securities offerings, which would establish a new exemption to facilitate capital formation through intrastate offerings. Many market participants and state regulators have raised concerns that the current requirements of Securities Act Section 3(a)(11) and Rule 147 have not kept up with changes in the business environment and technology, which limits the usefulness of the exemption for capital-raising, especially for smaller state and local businesses. The rule proposal would retain the key feature of existing Rule 147 — its intrastate character, which permits companies to raise money from investors within their state without concurrently registering the offers and sales at the federal level. In recognition of the transformative nature of the internet and other technologies, however, the rule would, among other things, eliminate the existing intrastate restriction on offers, but — critically for the state-based nature of the offering and its regulation — would require that sales be made only to residents of the state or territory of the issuer’s principal place of business. The proposal would also ease some of the issuer eligibility requirements to make the rule available to a greater number of businesses seeking financing in state, but ensure that such financing can only occur with a set of baseline investor protections and that issuers have a strong and identifiable presence within the state of offering.[3]
In May of this year the Commission also approved a proposal, submitted in response to a Commission order, by the national securities exchanges and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) for a two-year pilot program that would widen the minimum quoting and trading increments — or tick sizes — for stocks of some smaller companies. The SEC plans to use the pilot program to assess whether wider tick sizes enhance the market quality of these stocks for the benefit of issuers and investors.
In addition, as described in more detail below, the Division of Corporation Finance currently is engaged in a comprehensive review of the disclosure requirements for public companies, including smaller public companies, with the goal of making recommendations on how to update the requirements to facilitate timely, material disclosure by companies and shareholders’ more usable access to that information. The staff is also engaged in a comprehensive review of the “accredited investor” definition. That review and the feedback received through that process will inform the SEC’s consideration of whether to change the definition of accredited investor, including whether net worth and annual income should be used as tests for determining whether a natural person is an accredited investor, and at what levels. As part of that review, the staff also plans to independently
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The Office of Small Business Policy within the Division of Corporation Finance also continues to provide extensive guidance to small businesses seeking to raise capital or comply with our reporting requirements. Each year the office responds to over 1,000 requests for interpretive advice, provides guidance through speaking engagements and meets frequently with interested parties about pending rulemakings that could impact small businesses.
Disclosure Effectiveness Review
As discussed above, as follow-up to the Regulation S-K[4] study required by the Dodd-Frank Act, I directed the staff to develop specific recommendations for updating disclosure requirements. The goal is to comprehensively review the existing disclosure requirements and make recommendations to the Commission on how to update the requirements to facilitate timely, material disclosure by companies and shareholders’ more usable access to that information. The staff is currently considering ways to improve the disclosure requirements, including those in Regulation S-K and Regulation S-X,[5] for the benefit of investors and companies.
The staff is reviewing the disclosure requirements in phases. In the first phase of the review, the staff is focusing on the business and financial disclosures required by periodic and current reports, Forms 10-K, 10-Q and 8-K, and updates to certain Industry Guides. The staff also will consider whether disclosure requirements should be scaled for certain categories of issuers, such as smaller reporting companies or emerging growth companies, and, if so, how. In August, as noted above, the Commission issued a Request for Comment for certain disclosure requirements in Regulation S-X.
The staff is also considering how companies file their disclosures and is exploring alternatives that could enhance the way that investors access the disclosures. In the near term, we are working on changes to sec.gov that would make EDGAR filings more accessible to investors and easier for them to navigate. In a later phase of the review, the staff will review and consider recommendations regarding the governance and compensation disclosures required in proxy statements.
To date, we have heard from a number of interested parties about this review, receiving over 50 separate comment letters. We expect this number will increase as the Commission issues additional concept and proposing releases.
Enhancing Risk Monitoring and Regulatory Safeguards for the Asset Management Industry
As our rulemaking efforts since March illustrate, the Commission and its staff have made significant progress in executing a program to enhance risk monitoring and regulatory safeguards for the asset management industry.
On May 20, 2015, the Commission proposed new rules and forms as well as amendments to its rules and forms to modernize the reporting and disclosure of information by registered investment companies. The proposed rules, if adopted, would include the following enhancements:
• | Portfolio Reporting. A new monthly portfolio reporting form, Form N-PORT, would require registered funds other than money market funds to provide portfolio-wide and position-level holdings data to the Commission on a monthly basis. |
• | Census Reporting. Registered funds would be required to annually report certain census-type information to the Commission on Form N-CEN, and the form currently used to report fund ====== 2-497 ====== |
• | Structured Data. Funds would report portfolio and census information in a structured data format, which would improve the ability of the Commission and the public both to aggregate and analyze information across all funds and to link the reported information with information from other sources. |
• | Enhanced Disclosure and Website Communications. Funds would be required to provide enhanced and standardized financial statement disclosures, and could provide shareholder reports by making them accessible on their website, while providing shareholders the option of continuing to receive paper copies. |
Also on May 20, 2015, the Commission proposed amendments to Form ADV, the primary investment adviser reporting and disclosure form, that would: (1) provide additional information regarding advisers, including information about their separately managed account business; and (2) address issues that staff has identified since the Commission made significant changes to Form ADV in 2011.[6] In addition, the proposed amendments would, if adopted, require advisers to maintain records of the calculation of performance information that is distributed to any person.
On September 22, 2015, the Commission proposed a new rule that would require open-end funds to adopt and implement liquidity management programs. If the proposed rules are adopted, they would effect the following enhancements, among others:
• | Liquidity Risk Management Programs. Mutual funds and other open-end management investment companies, including ETFs, would be required to have a liquidity risk management program. The proposed rule would exclude money market funds from the requirements because they are already subject to liquidity requirements tailored to their particular structure and operations. |
• | Swing Pricing. Mutual funds (except money market funds or ETFs) would be permitted to use “swing pricing.”[7] |
• | Enhanced Disclosures. Mutual funds and other open-end funds would be required to provide enhanced disclosure regarding fund liquidity and redemption practices, the methods used by funds to meet redemptions, and, if used, swing pricing. Funds would also be required to disclose information regarding committed lines of credit, interfund borrowing and lending, and swing pricing. |
The comment period for the proposed rules on data modernization and liquidity management will be open through January 13, 2016. The Commission has already received substantial public comment, and all comments received will be analyzed in connection with the staff’s development of recommendations to the Commission on final rules.
At my direction, the SEC staff is working on additional initiatives aimed at helping to ensure the Commission’s regulatory program is fully addressing the increasingly complex portfolio composition and operations of the asset management industry. These initiatives include:
• | Use of Derivatives by Investment Companies. SEC staff is working on recommendations to the Commission to propose new requirements related to the use of derivatives by registered funds, including measures to appropriately limit the leverage these instruments may create and enhance risk management programs for such activities. |
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• | Transition Plans for Investment Advisers. Staff is also developing recommendations for the Commission to propose requiring investment advisers registered with the Commission to create and maintain transition plans to prepare for a major disruption in their business. |
• | Stress Testing for Large Investment Advisers and Large Investment Companies. Staff is also considering recommending that the Commission propose new requirements for stress testing by large investment advisers and large investment companies. Such rules would implement in part requirements under section 165(i) of the Dodd Frank Act. |
• | Third-Party Compliance Reviews. At my direction, staff is also preparing a recommendation to the Commission for proposed rules requiring third-party compliance reviews for registered investment advisers. The reviews would not replace examinations conducted by our Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations, but would be designed to improve overall compliance by registered investment advisers. |
Enhancing Our Equity and Fixed Income Market Structure
Since I last testified, we have proceeded with our ongoing assessment of U.S. equity market structure to ensure that our markets remain the deepest and fairest in the world and optimally serve investors and companies of all sizes seeking to raise capital.
As noted above, the Commission approved the initiation of a pilot on different tick sizes, and the SEC staff continues to work with the exchanges and other market participants to implement the pilot. The data generated by this initiative will deepen our understanding of the impact of tick sizes on market quality and help us consider new policy initiatives that can improve trading in the securities of smaller-cap issuers. In addition, the Commission proposed important amendments to Rule 15b9-1 to require broker-dealers that engage in off-exchange proprietary trading to become members of a national securities association, which would extend self-regulatory oversight to a significant portion of off-exchange trading not currently so regulated.
In February, the Commission established the Equity Market Structure Advisory Committee to provide a formal mechanism through which the Commission can receive advice and recommendations on equity market structure issues. The first meeting, held on May 13, 2015, focused on Rule 611 of Regulation NMS, known as the “Order Protection Rule” or “Trade-Through Rule.” The second meeting, held on October 27, 2015, focused on two important market structure topics — the impact of access fees and rebates widely used by stock exchanges and the regulatory structure of trading venues. Following the second meeting, the Committee established subcommittees to look more closely at specific issues identified by the SEC staff and Committee members before presenting them to the full Committee for discussion and deliberation. The staff and the Committee will continue to use a variety of tools to ensure both the transparency of the Committee’s consideration of issues and input from the full range of investors and other interested market participants, as well as from other advisory committees and organizations with remits that overlap with the Committee’s.
In addition, the Commission will shortly take up another important proposal for reform in our equity markets, amending Regulation Alternative Trading System (ATS) to require enhanced transparency with respect to ATSs that trade national market system stocks. In the years since Regulation ATS was first adopted in 1998, our equity markets have undergone significant change. Advancements in technology have fueled the growth in the number of trading centers and trading activity in NMS stocks is less concentrated. ATSs are an important component of our current market structure, as they compete directly with national securities exchanges and account for approximately 15% of the dollar volume in NMS stocks. The proposal that the Commission will soon consider would, if adopted, update our regulation of these trading venues by requiring enhanced public disclosures.
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Beyond Commission rulemaking, in response to requests I have previously made, all of the exchanges have conducted and completed in-depth analyses of order types and have filed proposed rule changes to reflect their findings. All of the exchanges have also now submitted rule filings disclosing how they use securities information processor (SIP) feeds and direct feeds. These filings provide significantly improved transparency for investors and the public on how the exchanges operate. Also at my request, the SIPs have implemented a time stamp in their data feeds, to facilitate greater transparency on the issue of data latency.
The staff also continues to progress on recommendations to the Commission to address, among other things:
• | The registration status of certain active proprietary traders and improvements to firms’ risk management of trading algorithms; |
• | Enhanced disclosure requirements concerning a broker’s order routing practices; |
• | An anti-disruptive trading rule that would address the use of aggressive, destabilizing trading strategies in vulnerable market conditions; and |
• | The development and implementation of a consolidated audit trail. |
With respect to our fixed income markets, I have directed SEC staff to undertake an initiative designed to enhance the public availability of pre-trade pricing information in the fixed income markets. This initiative builds on a recommendation in the Commission’s July 2012 Report on the Municipal Securities Market, and would potentially require the public dissemination of the best prices displayed by market participants on electronic systems, such as ATSs and other electronic dealer networks, in the corporate and municipal bond markets. This potentially transformative change would broaden access to pricing information that today is available only to select parties, and could facilitate enhanced execution, improve market efficiency, and promote price competition. I am mindful, however, of the need to strike the right balance of compelling the disclosure of meaningful pre-trade pricing information without discouraging market participants from producing such information. Accordingly, to help inform our initiative on pre-trade price transparency, we have been actively engaged in discussions with market participants, FINRA, and the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB). Before we take any actions, I also anticipate careful staff analysis of the pricing data already available to assess how best to achieve our regulatory objectives.
On September 24, 2015, the MSRB published a request for comment on a new proposal that would require confirmation disclosure of mark-ups for certain principal transactions with retail customers when the dealer makes a corresponding trade within two hours of the customer’s trade. The MSRB also requested comment on proposed modifications to a November 2014 proposal that would require confirmation disclosure of same-day pricing information for specified principal transactions with retail customers. On October 12, 2015, FINRA published a request for comment on a modified proposal that would require confirmation disclosure of same-day pricing information for specified principal transactions with retail customers.
The comment periods for the FINRA and MSRB requests for comment end on December 11, 2015. Although these proposals differ to a degree, FINRA and the MSRB have represented that they intend to coordinate on their approach to potential rulemaking in this area. Staff in the SEC’s Office of Municipal Securities and Division of Trading and Markets have been closely monitoring these proposed changes and look forward to hearing from commenters in light of the goal we share with the MSRB and FINRA of providing meaningful dealer compensation disclosure to retail investors.
Personalized Investment Advice Standard of Conduct
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Section 913 of the Dodd Frank Act granted the Commission authority under the Exchange Act and Advisers Act to adopt rules establishing a uniform fiduciary standard of conduct for broker-dealers and investment advisers when providing personalized investment advice about securities to retail customers. In March 2013, the Commission issued a public request for information to obtain further data and other information to assist it in determining whether or not to use the authority provided under section 913 of the Dodd Frank Act.
As I indicated previously, my evaluation of the differences in the standards that apply to advice under the federal securities laws has led me to conclude that broker-dealers and investment advisers should be subject to a uniform fiduciary standard of conduct when providing personalized investment advice about securities to retail investors. I recognize that this is a complex issue, and that there are significant challenges that will need to be addressed in proposing a uniform fiduciary standard, including how to define the standard, how it would affect current business practices, and the nature of the potential effects on investors, particularly retail investors.
SEC staff is developing rulemaking recommendations for the Commission’s consideration. As part of its analysis, the staff is giving serious consideration to, among other things, the recommendations of an SEC staff’s 2011 study under Section 913 of the Dodd-Frank Act, the views of investors and other interested market participants, potential economic and market impacts, and the information we received in response to the Commission’s request for data. Ultimately, of course, the Commission as a whole will decide whether to proceed with a rulemaking to implement a uniform fiduciary duty and, if so, its parameters. I will discuss all aspects of this issue with my fellow Commissioners as we proceed.
Conclusion
The Commission’s extensive work to protect investors, preserve market integrity, and promote capital formation is not limited to the above initiatives. But I have tried by example to convey the breadth and importance of the Commission’s ongoing efforts and provide a sense of our progress in the last few months.
Thank you for your support of the agency’s mission and for inviting me to be here today. Your continued support will allow us to better protect investors and facilitate capital formation, more effectively oversee the markets and entities we regulate, and build upon the significant progress we have made.
I am happy to answer any questions that you may have.
Modified: Nov. 18, 2015
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Testimony on “Oversight of the SEC’s Division of Investment Management”
David W. Grim
Director, Division of Investment Management
Before the Subcommittee on Capital Markets and
Government Sponsored Enterprises
United States House of Representatives
Committee on Financial Services
Washington, D.C.
Oct. 23, 2015
Chairman Garrett, Ranking Member Maloney, and Members of the Subcommittee:
Thank you for inviting me to testify today on behalf of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (Commission) about the Division of Investment Management’s (Division) activities and responsibilities.
The tripartite mission of the Commission is to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly and efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation. The Division promotes this mission through regulating the asset management industry. A primary function of the Division is to administer the Investment Company Act of 1940 (Investment Company Act) and Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (Investment Advisers Act) and to develop regulatory policy for both investment companies – including mutual funds, closed-end funds,[1] business development companies,[2] unit investment trusts (UITs),[3] and exchange-traded funds (ETFs)[4] – and investment advisers, all of which play a major role in the lives of Americans and our national economy.
Investors, in particular retail investors, have increasingly come to rely on investments in mutual funds to reach their financial goals. At the end of 2014, more than 53 million households – more than 43 percent of all U.S. households – owned mutual funds. Mutual funds are the largest segment of the investment company industry, accounting for 87 percent of the over $18.7 trillion in total investment company assets. Assets in mutual funds have grown from $94.5 billion at the end of 1979 to $16.3 trillion at July 31, 2015, a more than 173 fold increase. Over the same period, the number of mutual fund portfolios has increased from 526 to 8,059.
Like mutual funds, ETFs also have become increasingly popular as investment vehicles for both retail and institutional investors. ETFs have grown rapidly in recent years, with assets in ETFs increasing from $300.8 billion at the end of 2005 to $2.1 trillion at July 31, 2015, a more than 600% increase.
Protecting investors through the regulation of registered investment advisers is another of the Division’s crucial roles. As of October 1, 2015, there were 11,986 investment advisers registered with the Commission reporting approximately $66.9 trillion in regulatory assets under management, which was an 8 percent increase from the beginning of fiscal year 2015. Approximately 60 percent of these advisers provide investment advice to individuals. Beyond this, approximately 37 percent of these SEC-registered investment advisers provide investment advice to approximately 29,000 private funds (e.g., hedge funds, private equity funds, and venture capital funds) with gross assets of about $10.4 trillion.
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In addition to registered investment advisers, the Commission also receives reports from approximately 3,047 exempt reporting advisers. These are advisers whose only clients are private funds and are exempt from registration with the Commission. These advisers manage over 10,000 private funds accounting for $2.3 trillion.
The Division carries out the Commission’s mission through its dedicated staff, which includes lawyers, accountants, quantitative analysts, economists, industry experts and other employees primarily in Washington, DC, but also located in SEC Regional Offices in New York, Philadelphia, and Chicago. The four core activities of the Division are: (1) crafting rulemaking recommendations to the Commission on matters within the Division’s expertise; (2) reviewing fund filings; (3) providing interpretive and other advice to the asset management industry and the public about the securities laws and corresponding regulations; and (4) monitoring risks in the asset management industry. Below is an overview of those activities.
Recent Investment Management Rulemaking Initiatives
Money Market Fund Reform
In July 2014, the Commission adopted significant reforms to the rules governing money market mutual funds. The amendments were intended to reduce the risk of runs in money market funds, provide important tools to help further protect investors and the financial system in a crisis, and enhance the transparency and fairness of these products for America’s investors.
Under the new rules, “institutional prime” money market funds[5] will be required to maintain a floating net asset value (NAV) based on the current market value of the securities in their portfolios. The rules also provide new tools for boards of directors of money market funds to directly address heightened redemptions in a fund. Specifically, fund boards will be able to impose liquidity fees or to suspend redemptions temporarily, also known as “gates,” if a fund’s level of weekly liquid assets falls below certain thresholds. The Commission provided for approximately a two-year transition period for these new provisions, with the rules becoming effective in October 2016, to enable both funds and investors time to fully adapt their systems, operations, and investing practices.
The new rules also enhance money market fund disclosure requirements. Specifically, money market funds will be required to promptly disclose certain significant events, including the imposition or removal of fees or gates, portfolio security defaults, and instances of sponsor support. In addition, money market funds will be required to disclose additional key information on their website on a daily basis, including funds’ liquidity levels, net shareholder flows, and market-based net asset values per share.
In September 2015, the Commission also adopted amendments related to the removal of credit ratings references in rule 2a-7, the primary rule that governs money market funds under the Investment Company Act and in Form N-MFP, the money market fund portfolio disclosure form. The amendments give effect to section 939A of the Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act).
Investment Company Reporting Modernization & Amendments to Form ADV and Investment Advisers Act Rules
The Commission’s rules should evolve with developments in the asset management industry. To that end, on May 20, 2015, the Commission proposed new rules and forms as well as amendments to its rules and forms to modernize the reporting and disclosure of information by registered investment companies.
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If the proposed rules are adopted, a new monthly portfolio reporting form, Form N-PORT, would require registered funds other than money market funds to provide portfolio-wide and position-level holdings data to the Commission on a monthly basis. Information contained on reports for the last month of each fund’s fiscal quarter would be available to the public. In light of the proposed Form N-PORT, the Commission proposed rescinding Form N-Q, on which funds currently report certain portfolio holdings for the first and third fiscal quarters.
A new annual reporting form, Form N-CEN, would be established if the proposed rules are adopted. It would require registered funds to annually report certain census-type information to the Commission and would replace the form currently used to report fund census information (Form N-SAR). The form would streamline and update information reported to the Commission to reflect current information needs, such as requiring more information on ETFs and securities lending. Reports would be filed annually within 60 days of the end of the fund’s fiscal year, rather than semi-annually as is currently required by Form N-SAR for most funds.
If adopted, funds would report portfolio and census information in a structured data format, which would improve the ability of the Commission and the public both to aggregate and analyze information across all funds and to link the reported information with information from other sources. The Commission currently receives this type of reporting for: (1) money market funds through the publicly available Form N-MFP; and (2) certain private funds through Form PF, which is reported to the Commission.
The proposed amendments also would require enhanced and standardized financial statement disclosures. For example, the proposed amendments would include requirements to provide: derivatives-related information in financial statements similar to what would be required in the proposed monthly portfolio holdings reports;[6] and information in the notes to the financial statements relating to a fund’s securities lending activities.
The proposed amendments also would permit mutual funds and other registered investment companies to provide shareholder reports and the funds’ quarterly portfolio holdings for the past year by making them accessible on their website, unless shareholders specifically request paper copies. Funds currently satisfy delivery requirements by printing and mailing shareholder reports unless investors have affirmatively requested electronic delivery.[7]
Also on May 20, 2015, the Commission proposed amendments to Form ADV, the primary investment adviser reporting and disclosure form. The amendments are designed to: (1) provide additional information regarding advisers, including information about their separately managed account business; and (2) address issues that staff has identified since the Commission made significant changes to Form ADV in 2011.[8] The amendments also would incorporate a method for private fund adviser entities operating a single advisory business to register using a single Form ADV.
In addition, the proposed amendments would, if adopted, require advisers to maintain records of the calculation of performance information that is distributed to any person. Currently, advisers are required to maintain performance information that is distributed to 10 or more persons. The proposed amendments also would require advisers to maintain communications related to performance or rate of return of accounts and securities recommendations.
With respect to all of the proposed amendments, the Commission has received substantial public comment. These comments will be analyzed in connection with the staff’s development of recommendations to the Commission on final rules.
Liquidity Management Programs for Funds
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In addition to these proposals, to further address developments in the asset management industry, on September 22, 2015, the Commission proposed a new rule that if adopted would require open-end funds to adopt and implement liquidity management programs. The proposed amendments also, if adopted, would permit mutual funds to use “swing pricing,” and would enhance disclosure regarding fund liquidity and redemption practices.
Specifically, the proposed rule would require mutual funds and other open-end management investment companies, including ETFs, to have a liquidity risk management program. The proposed rule would exclude money market funds from the requirements because they are already subject to liquidity requirements tailored to their particular structure and operations.
The Commission also proposed amendments that if adopted would permit, but not require, open-end funds (except money market funds or ETFs) to use “swing pricing.” Swing pricing is the process of reflecting in a fund’s net asset value the costs associated with the trading activity of the fund occasioned by shareholders’ redemptions and purchases in order to pass those costs on to the purchasing and redeeming shareholders. Additionally, proposed amendments to the registration form used by open-end investment companies (Form N-1A) would, if adopted, require funds to disclose swing pricing, if applicable, and the methods used by funds to meet redemptions.
Proposed amendments to the census reporting form the Commission proposed in May 2015 also would require funds to disclose information regarding committed lines of credit, interfund borrowing and lending, and swing pricing.
The comment period for the proposed rules will be open through January 13, 2016.
Other Potential Rules to Enhance Risk Monitoring and Regulatory Safeguards
At the direction of the Chair, the Division also is working on initiatives aimed at helping to ensure the Commission’s regulatory program is fully addressing the increasingly complex portfolio composition and operations of the asset management industry. These initiatives include potential new rules concerning the following:
• | Use of Derivatives by Investment Companies – The Division, in close consultation with staff in the SEC’s Division of Economic and Risk Analysis, is considering recommending that the Commission propose new requirements related to the use of derivatives by funds, including measures to appropriately limit the leverage these instruments may create, and measures to enhance risk management programs for such activities. |
• | Transition Plans for Investment Advisers – The Division also is considering recommending that the Commission propose a new requirement that investment advisers registered with the Commission create and maintain transition plans to prepare for a major disruption in their business. |
• | Stress Testing for Large Investment Advisers and Large Investment Companies – In addition, the Division is considering recommending that the Commission propose new requirements for stress testing by large investment advisers and large investment companies. Such rules would implement section 165(i) of the Dodd Frank Act. |
• | Third-Party Compliance Reviews – Division staff, working in conjunction with the staff from the SEC’s Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations (OCIE), is developing a recommendation for the Commission’s consideration that, if proposed and adopted, would establish a program of third-party compliance reviews for registered investment advisers. The ====== 2-507 ====== |
Personalized Investment Advice Standard of Conduct
Section 913 of the Dodd Frank Act grants the Commission authority under the Exchange Act and Advisers Act to adopt rules establishing a uniform fiduciary standard of conduct for broker-dealers and investment advisers when providing personalized investment advice about securities to retail customers. The Commission issued a public request for information to obtain further data and other information to assist it in determining whether or not to use the authority provided under section 913 of the Dodd Frank Act.
In March of this year, Chair White expressed her view that the SEC should act to implement a uniform fiduciary standard of conduct for broker-dealers and investment advisers when providing personalized investment advice about securities to retail customers, and directed staff to prepare such a recommendation for the Commission’s consideration. The issue is a complicated one that has been contemplated in prior years without a rule being proposed, and whether a rule is ultimately proposed and adopted depends on further analysis and action by the full Commission.
Target Date Funds
On April 3, 2014, the Commission issued a release reopening the period for public comment on proposed rule amendments concerning target date fund names and marketing. The release requested additional comment on a 2010 Commission proposal to require that certain marketing materials for target date retirement funds provide better information to investors and reduce the potential for investors to be confused or misled. The Division is continuing to evaluate the comment letters submitted to the Commission and is considering what further actions may be appropriate.
Reviewing Fund Filings and Disclosures
In addition to rulemaking, Division staff helps fulfill the Commission’s mission by reviewing and commenting on the numerous prospectuses, proxy statements, and other disclosure documents filed by mutual funds, ETFs, closed-end funds, business development companies, variable insurance products issuers, and UITs each year.
The staff reviews new portfolios of open-end funds, closed-end funds and UITs, and new insurance contracts.[9] The staff also examines certain post-effective amendments that contain material changes in disclosure or in fund operations, as well as certain preliminary proxy statements. Additionally, the staff continues to fulfill the Sarbanes-Oxley Act requirement to review investment company issuer accounting statements at least once every three years.
In the course of a filing review, Division staff will conduct an evaluation of a fund’s disclosure and will, as appropriate, issue comments to elicit better compliance with applicable disclosure requirements, as well as other applicable statutory and rule requirements under the federal securities laws. In response to Division staff comments, a fund may amend its disclosures to provide additional or enhanced information in the filing that is under review. A fund may also provide Division staff with information that supplements what is contained in the filing so staff can better understand the fund’s disclosure decisions.
Division staff coordinates with other offices and divisions within the Commission on complex or interconnected issues that arise within these reviews. Division staff also identifies new and recurring issues that may need new policy guidance. Where appropriate, Division staff refers matters to the
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To increase the transparency of the filing review process, after Division staff completes its review of a filing, its comments and fund responses to those comments are made public on the Commission’s website.
As part of the filing review process, Division staff also is responsible for: (1) providing advice to help ensure the full and fair disclosure of financial information by investment companies and issuers of variable insurance products; (2) rendering interpretations as to the meaning and application of rules relating to the form and content of financial statements required to be filed by investment companies, issuers of variable insurance products, and investment advisers; and (3) recommending the establishment, in collaboration with the other divisions and offices of the Commission, of sound and uniform standards of auditing and accounting procedures and practices with respect to investment companies, variable insurance products, and investment advisers.
Guidance & Exemptive Relief
The Division also is responsible for issuing no-action letters, interpretive letters, and other guidance under both the Investment Company Act and the Investment Advisers Act (and their related rules), as well as under other federal securities laws that affect the asset management industry. In addition, the Division provides counsel to the Commission, SEC staff, and non-SEC persons on matters involving the interplay of the Investment Company Act and Investment Advisers Act (and their related rules) with other federal and state laws.
Division staff also reviews all enforcement matters that concern investment companies and investment advisers. In carrying out this function, Division staff has extensive contact with other divisions and offices, including the Commission’s regional offices and enforcement and examination staff.
In addition, Division staff reviews applications from entities that request exemptions from provisions of the Investment Company Act or the Investment Advisers Act. By granting exemptive relief, the Commission can encourage innovation in financial products and services while assuring that appropriate investor protections remain in place. Exemptive relief also affords the Commission a means to adapt the application of the Acts to current markets and practices
Risk Monitoring
Pursuant to Section 965 of the Dodd-Frank Act, the Division established a new risk and examinations office. Division staff assigned to this office monitors trends in the asset management industry and carries out the Division’s limited inspection and examination program. In addition, Division staff periodicallymeet with the senior management of large asset management firms and fund boards as part of the staff’s ongoing outreach efforts.
Financial Stability Oversight Council
On December 18, 2014, the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) voted unanimously to release a notice seeking public comment regarding potential risks to U.S. financial stability from asset management products and activities. Division staff has reviewed the comments received on this notice and are working with the staffs of other FSOC members to analyze potential risks, if any, to U.S. financial stability from asset management products and activities.
Conclusion
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Thank you again for inviting me to discuss the Division’s activities and responsibilities. I am happy to answer your questions.
Modified: Oct. 23, 2015
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Speech
Keynote Address Investment Company Institute 2016 General Meeting – “The Future of Investment Company Regulation”
Chair Mary Jo White
Washington, DC May 20, 2016
Introduction
Thank you, Paul [Stevens], for your kind introduction. Today marks my fourth appearance here in as many years as Chair of the SEC, which should come as no surprise. The Commission is the primary regulator of the mutual fund industry, and it is vital that we all work continuously to protect and serve the broad spectrum of America’s investors who depend on your products every day for retirement, for college tuition, and for so many other financial goals.
When we first met in 2013, the industry was anxiously awaiting the SEC’s actions on money market fund reform, the question of how to address potential systemic risk in the asset management industry was still nascent, and the Commission had not yet embarked on its latest effort to enhance its regulatory regime for asset management. Much has happened since, including the adoption of final rules for money market funds and a public statement by the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), issued last month, updating its review of the potential systemic risks in certain asset management products and activities. Today, the Financial Stability Board (FSB) is working toward issuing a second consultative draft analyzing similar issues. And the SEC staff is, at my direction, working hard to finalize recommendations for the rules we proposed last year on fund reporting, liquidity risk management, and the use of derivatives, as well as advancing other proposals and initiatives.
So, there indeed have been many significant issues to discuss with you in the last few years and the spotlight on the asset management industry has been bright. I expect that will continue to be the case, in 2017 and beyond, which is what I want to focus on today. In that future, I believe the asset management industry will continue to evolve and to be of vital importance to investors, providing them a diversity of investment opportunities to meet their financial goals. Dynamic and robust regulation will also be needed that adapts and evolves to meet all of the current and future risks and challenges, while preserving the features that have served investors so well over more than seven decades.
Fostering this kind of dynamic regulation for asset management has been one of the critical responsibilities of the SEC since 1940, and it has been no small task. The 436 registered management companies with 300,000 accounts that had a little more than $2 billion in assets in 1940,[1] has grown to 8,131 mutual funds with approximately $15 trillion in assets held by 54 million U.S. households as of March 2016.[2] The current and future health of our markets and the financial security of investors depend on the success of both our regulatory efforts and how well all of you and other industry participants do your jobs as fiduciaries and responsible leaders of the marketplace.
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The SEC is keenly focused on our share of that weighty responsibility. In 2014, we fundamentally reformed the way that money market funds operate to both make our financial system more resilient and to enhance the transparency and fairness of these funds for America’s investors.[3] Then, building on a series of regulatory initiatives I announced in December 2014,[4] last year we proposed rules to modernize reporting,[5] to strengthen liquidity risk management requirements,[6] and to address the use of derivatives by registered funds.[7] And the staff has been closely focused on developing recommendations for transition plans and annual stress testing for certain funds and investment advisers.
Today, as we consider what the future will demand of investment company regulation, I will briefly discuss these current efforts and then share my vision for the next steps in the evolution of regulation for the asset management industry. Our current regulatory initiatives will, of course, continue to be a key element of that vision, but so too are addressing issues like disclosure effectiveness, the oversight of exchange-traded funds (ETFs), accurate portfolio pricing, and cybersecurity, to name a few. You, too, have major responsibilities in all of these areas.
Asset Management Initiatives
Three of the most significant areas of regulation for the asset management industry are: controls on conflicts of interest; a robust registration, reporting and disclosure regime; and controls on specific fund portfolio composition risks and operational risks.[8] During my tenure as Chair, our rulemaking program has been primarily focused on the third area to address important developments in the industry over the last several years.
Recent Rulemaking on Liquidity and Derivatives
Key among our efforts are the Commission’s 2015 proposals focused on liquidity and derivatives. These initiatives are critical: they will position the SEC to better monitor and protect America’s investors and the integrity of the industry. And it is our responsibility to promptly finalize these rules, which I expect to move forward on this year.
For an investor, a fundamental feature of a mutual fund is that it will promptly honor a redemption request.[9] One of the challenges in managing funds is maintaining sufficient liquidity to meet redemptions while also minimizing the impact of redemptions on the fund’s remaining shareholders. Last December, when a mutual fund focused on investments in high yield and distressed debt could not meet its redemption obligations, we witnessed a demonstration of the impact on fund investors from an illiquid fund portfolio.[10] And FSOC and the FSB have been examining how such a risk in open-end funds could also impact the stability of the broader financial system.[11]
In developing and managing the portfolio of a mutual fund in a changing and competitive environment, funds and their advisers must use all of the tools necessary to effectively fulfill their legal responsibility to meet shareholder redemptions while minimizing the impact on remaining shareholders. Mutual funds need to be developed and managed in a manner that ensures that this core requirement is met, which includes a consideration of the kinds of products and strategies that are appropriate for mutual fund investments and investors. The SEC has the responsibility to see that this is done.
In September 2015, we therefore proposed rules requiring liquidity risk management programs for open-end funds.[12] Although commenters have been generally supportive of enhanced liquidity risk
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In December, we proposed another vital rule to enhance the regulation of the use of derivatives by registered investment companies (including mutual funds and ETFs) by limiting the amount of leverage that funds may obtain through use of derivatives and requiring funds to implement derivatives risk management measures.[13] One core purpose of the Investment Company Act is to protect investors from the potential adverse effects of leveraging a fund’s assets, and the Act specifically limits the ability of funds to borrow money or otherwise issue senior securities. The proposed rule would provide an updated and more comprehensive approach to regulating funds’ use of derivatives in light of the significant growth in the volume and complexity of derivatives over the past two decades and the increased use of derivatives by certain funds.
There has again been support for the Commission to act to provide an updated and more comprehensive approach to the regulation of a fund’s use of derivatives. Many commenters, however, are not in favor of the proposal’s portfolio limitations and some have provided a range of suggested modifications and alternatives. Here, too, I continue to welcome your views as staff works to finalize the recommendations on the rulemaking.
A Look Toward the Future
As we build on the significant actions we have already taken and those I expect to come this year, we are also actively engaged in many other areas where important work remains to be done. And that work is a shared responsibility for the Commission and for fund managers and boards. I will first touch on two of the areas where we are taking the initiative – disclosure effectiveness and ETFs –and then highlight some of the other emerging challenges where your role is front and center.
Disclosure Effectiveness in the Fund Industry
One important area we are focused on is whether the disclosure regime for registered funds has evolved sufficiently in response to the changing types of funds and strategies, as well as the evolving needs of investors. Registration is a core regulatory tool that enables the Commission to identify, monitor, and regulate funds and advisers, and the periodic disclosure about their business arrangements, related conflicts, and compliance practices is a key requirement of registration that provides essential information to investors. The Commission has already taken significant steps to modernize our registered fund disclosure regime, including adopting the summary prospectus to better focus mutual fund investors on the fees and risks of a fund.[14] But more is needed.
Consequently, as we look forward past 2016, I have directed IM staff to undertake a disclosure effectiveness initiative of their own to consider ways to improve the form, content, and delivery of funds’ disclosures. Staff is in the early stages of prioritizing areas of focus, but I expect they will include ways to leverage advances in technology to improve the presentation and delivery of disclosures and ways to enhance disclosure about fund strategies, investments, risks, and fees.
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In particular, a fund’s disclosure of fees and expenses plays a pivotal role in informing investors about their fund investments. The staff will, for example, consider whether improvements could be made to the fee table to facilitate investor comprehension of the information it presents and whether the most helpful information is required. The SEC’s Investor Advisory Committee, at its meeting in April, also recommended that the Commission identify ways to improve mutual fund cost disclosure.[15] I also encourage you to provide your insights to IM staff.
Other areas of staff focus include how funds can present risks most effectively[16] and whether the requirement that a fund disclose certain factors that materially affected the fund’s performance can be improved.[17] And there continues to be concern about whether all of the information in a prospectus or statement of additional information continues to be necessary or helpful to investors. The summary prospectus has helped, but the staff is considering whether further improvements could be made.
IM’s disclosure effectiveness initiative will seek to aid funds and their managers in preparing their disclosure materials. But do not forget that it is a fund’s ultimate responsibility to provide investors with the information they need to make informed investment decisions. You should be continuously reevaluating the purpose and value of all of your funds’ disclosures. Avoid boilerplate and tailor your disclosure as appropriate for each fund. Ask yourselves regularly: What can I do to improve investors’ understanding of the fund’s strategies, risks, and costs? These features of your funds change continuously and so should your disclosures.
Need for Further Review of ETFs
Clearer and more robust disclosures are only part of the current and future picture. The SEC’s authority and focus go considerably beyond disclosure[18] and so should your focus and fiduciary decision-making. We regulate funds’ practices as well as their disclosures, and certain events over the last decade have sharpened our focus on particular types of funds that we believe require our enhanced attention. ETFs are a prime example, and they are the second challenge for the future of investment company regulation that I want to focus on today.
As you know, the evolution and growth of the ETF industry have been astounding. The number of ETFs has grown from 359 in 2006 to 1,594 in 2015, with a corresponding growth in the amount of net assets from $408 billion in 2006 to more than $2 trillion in 2015.[19] Despite the popularity and broad success of these funds, their history is not without some turbulence. Take, for example, the May 2010 Flash Crash, which highlighted the need to review disparities in prices for index ETFs and a decline in prices of U.S. equity securities.[20] Similar issues appeared on August 24, 2015, when the markets again experienced unusual price volatility, including a lack of liquidity in certain securities.[21]
The staff has been focused on analyzing these events and any broader implications they may have for how we regulate ETFs. They are also analyzing the role that authorized participants and market makers play in the operation and trading of ETFs and how much they impact the liquidity in the markets.[22] Staff is looking closely at the interconnectedness of the prices of ETF shares and their portfolio holdings and the impact on investors when the ETF’s arbitrage mechanism does not function efficiently. And staff is considering the sales practices of broker-dealers in the market and how investors understand and use ETFs, particularly as the product landscape continues to diversify. The SEC has taken a number of initial actions to share our thinking on these issues,[23] and further regulatory steps beyond additional disclosures may be needed to address some of these issues. I welcome the input of ETFs, investors, and
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Use of Technology and Service Providers
While the Commission is very actively engaged in enhancing disclosure effectiveness and the regulation of ETFs, there are other emerging challenges that are Commission priorities where your focus, expertise and initiative are particularly essential. One such challenge is the risk in using technology and service providers. This challenge was clearly illustrated for you during the events of August 24th when a fund service provider was unable to timely process system-generated NAV calculations for certain ETFs and mutual funds or to produce current baskets for ETF in-kind creation and redemption orders.[24] The incident created significant issues for funds and highlighted the challenges that can arise from the technology and interdependencies that drive the modern securities market. It is important that a fund is adequately prepared to promptly and effectively respond to risks that may be triggered by service providers and its own use of technology, including implementing alternative and reliable means to satisfy the fund’s regulatory requirements.
Cybersecurity is a particularly critical element of this challenge – as I have said before, it is one of the greatest risks facing the financial services industry. Cyber risks can produce far-reaching impacts, and robust and responsible safeguards for funds and for their investors must be maintained. The Commission has been very active in drawing attention to the issue and examining and enforcing the rules we oversee that relate to cybersecurity.[25] Our regulatory efforts are focused primarily on ensuring that our registered entities have policies and procedures to address the risks posed to systems and data by cyberattacks. In the asset management space, IM staff issued guidance that discussed a number of measures that funds and advisers should consider.[26] While no one can prevent all disruptions from cybersecurity events, you should consider the full range of cybersecurity risks to your funds and consider appropriate tools and procedures to prevent breaches, detect attacks and limit harm.
Portfolio Pricing
Another challenge for funds is pricing portfolio holdings and determining per share net asset values (NAV) accurately. Increasingly, funds have acquired portfolio investments that make it difficult to accurately determine their value, especially in a timely manner each day. Many of these portfolio investments may have legal or contractual restrictions on their sale, others may be complex instruments, and still others may not trade that often. As portfolio strategies and permissible investments for a fund are being developed, it is essential that the accurate pricing of the portfolio holdings and NAV calculations are carefully considered. It is also important that the services used to assist funds with pricing do so accurately, in the manner disclosed in the fund’s prospectus and consistent with the law. This is of high importance to everyone. I, along with your investors, expect that you will get it right.
Of course, these are not the only challenges for funds. Fund governance is another, as are valuation, performance advertising, and issues that may arise when funds make payments to intermediaries for the distribution of fund shares. I encourage you to continue to work to address these challenges and identify others that may impact your funds and their investors.
Conclusion
With all of the developments in the fund industry that I have discussed today, one thing that has not changed since 1940 is the SEC’s duty to ensure that all investors, whether they are investing in mutual
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At the same time, you too bear a weighty responsibility as stewards of the assets of America’s investors. While the SEC regulates investment companies, you, as asset management executives, are the standard bearers for your industry and must foster a culture in your organizations that prioritizes responsibility and fairness and asks first – and last – what is in the best interest of investors. As you develop new products and new strategies, your focus should be on helping to ensure that those products and strategies are designed to best meet investors’ needs and that America’s investors are strongly protected.
Thank you for listening and for all you do, and will do, for your investors.
Modified: May 20, 2016
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Speech
Chairman’s Address at SEC Speaks – “Beyond Disclosure at the SEC in 2016”
Chair Mary Jo White
Washington, DC
Feb. 19, 2016
It is my pleasure to address the 45th annual “SEC Speaks” program – on the day after the Yankees’ pitchers and catchers reported to spring training, which is one way I mark this time of year. This event is another reminder of the season, an early-year conference for the staff, the private sector, and the Commissioners (present and former) to discuss current issues confronting the agency, investors, issuers, and the markets.
It is also a time to celebrate and recognize the tremendous efforts of our staff and those who have preceded them for their extraordinary public service to investors and our capital markets. Continuing a tradition, I would ask that every current member of the SEC staff please stand and be recognized. While the staff remains standing, let me ask that everyone who has ever served on the SEC staff or Commission, please also stand to be recognized. Think of these individuals when you think of the SEC’s important mission and public service at its finest.
It is also part of the tradition here for the Chairman’s address to talk about the state of the SEC and to highlight the agency’s accomplishments in the past year and to forecast the agenda for the coming year. There is much to report on all fronts, and I will try to capture at least the flavor of the volume and importance of what we accomplished in 2015 and what we are already advancing in 2016.
In the course of my remarks, I also want to step back and talk a bit about the bigger picture – my sense of how the SEC increasingly needs to go “beyond disclosure” as we carry out our tripartite mission of protecting investors, maintaining fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitating capital formation. While our all-important disclosure powers are generally at the forefront of what we do, today’s ever-more complex markets – and the multitude of risks they face – require more of us. And our accomplishments and the agenda ahead reflect this changing landscape.
An Agenda for Fair and Strong Markets that Protect Investors
As we enter calendar year 2016, I am pleased that Congress increased our budget and that staff morale is high[1] and continues to rise. At the moment, as you know, we are a Commission of just three members, but – as has occurred in the past – we can carry forward all of the business of the Commission. And, while we look forward to welcoming new colleagues, Commissioners Stein, Piwowar and I are fully engaged in advancing the Commission’s work. I want to thank them for their cooperation and hard work.
Last year was one of great accomplishment for the agency. Enforcement and our National Exam Program again had record years. Not only did we bring an unprecedented number of enforcement cases, secure an all-time high for orders directing the payment of penalties and disgorgement, and perform exams at a level not seen for the past five years, but we also continued to develop cutting-edge cases and exams.[2]
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Aided by enhanced technology to identify and analyze suspicious activity and strengthened by initiatives like self-reporting, our teams were able to identify and target the most significant risks for investors across the market. Areas of focus included cybersecurity, market structure requirements, dark pools, microcap fraud, financial reporting failures, insider trading, disclosure deficiencies in municipal securities offerings, and protection of retail investors and retiree savings.
The imperative of investor protection was also carried forward by tremendous efforts in all of our policy divisions and offices. The Division of Corporation Finance reviewed the annual and periodic reports of more than 4,400 issuers last year, helping to ensure that investors receive full and fair disclosure about the companies in which they invest. The Division of Trading and Markets reviewed more than 2,100 filings from exchanges and other self-regulatory organizations (SROs), standing guard for investors over major changes to the markets in which they entrust their savings. The Division of Investment Management reviewed filings covering more than 12,500 mutual funds and other investment companies, where the great majority of individual investors send their hard-earned money. And our economists in the Division of Economic and Risk Analysis produced more than 30 incisive papers and publications, including two major analyses to inform our work on asset management rules.
These numbers, of course, tell only a small part of the story. The Commission and the staff also engaged in many important exchanges with registrants and investors. The Office of Investor Education and Advocacy this year alone participated in more than 70 in-person events, while investor.gov attracted more than 1.2 million new visitors and had more than 23.6 million page views of investor education content. That Office directly handled nearly 20,000 questions and complaints from investors, which were in addition to the 700 inquiries to our new Ombudsman. I too had the opportunity to get out and engage directly with individual investors this past year, including with members of our military at Fort Dix in New Jersey and with members of the National Diversity Coalition in Irvine, California.
These core activities in executing our mission as the investor’s advocate too often do not get the attention paid to our latest, high-profile rulemaking or enforcement action. But these day-to-day efforts are every bit as critical.
To be sure, the agency’s accomplishments on the rulemaking front over the last year were indeed remarkable. As you are all well aware – in no small part because I constantly remind everyone – since 2010, Congress has given the Commission nearly 100 statutory mandates for a wide range of complex rulemakings. And we have now executed the vast majority of them.
In 2015, with the adoption of Regulation A+ and Regulation Crowdfunding,[3] we completed all of the major rulemakings directed by the JOBS Act. We also moved into the final phase of implementing the Dodd-Frank Act, focusing on the two major remaining areas of mandates: security-based swaps and executive compensation. We marked two key milestones in the first area: first, with the adoption of rules for reporting and disseminating security-based swap information;[4] and second, with final rules for registering security-based swap dealers.[5] We proposed a process for dealing with bad actors in the security-based swap market[6] and adopted rules to help ensure that non-U.S. dealers participating in the U.S. market play by our rules.[7] These reforms will give us powerful tools to oversee an $11 trillion market and provide investors with unprecedented transparency into trading that had long been dangerously opaque.
During the past year, we also issued proposals for the remaining executive compensation rulemakings required by the Dodd-Frank Act, including disclosure of whether a company allows executives to hedge the company’s stock, disclosure of pay versus performance measures of executive compensation, and
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These accomplishments of the last year were, of course, only the latest in an historic undertaking by the agency to execute the most daunting rulemaking agenda in memory. Since I arrived at the agency in April 2013, we have stood up an entirely new regulatory regime for municipal advisors,[10] and implemented sweeping changes in the securitization markets that were at the epicenter of the crisis.[11] We significantly enhanced the rules for credit rating agencies,[12] strengthened the rules for how broker-dealers handle customer funds and securities,[13] disqualified bad actors from private offerings,[14] removed credit rating references from our rules,[15] and, through the Volcker Rule, restricted proprietary trading by financial institutions.[16]
We will continue in 2016 to complete the remaining mandates. Of particular focus and priority will be to finalize the remaining security-based swap rules required of the SEC by Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act, a goal supported by all of the Commissioners,[17] so that the new regulatory regime can become operational. Just last week, we passed another key Title VII milestone, with the adoption of the last set of rules for cross-border dealer activity.[18] Next in line will be to finalize the substantive requirements for security-based swap dealers – in particular, the rules governing their business conduct and the requirements for their capital, margin, and asset segregation.
Importantly, throughout these efforts, we have also continued our discretionary rulemaking in areas that are essential to our mission of protecting investors and the markets. Three of the most prominent of these initiatives that I have directed center on the asset management industry, the structure of the equity markets, and our disclosure regime. Each of these initiatives was marked by Commission action in 2015, and I expect additional actions this year.
First, asset management. After adopting final rules for fundamental reforms to the money market fund industry,[19] we turned to executing the broad-based program I outlined in December 2014 to address the increasingly complex portfolios and operations of mutual funds and ETFs.[20] In May, we proposed enhanced reporting for investment advisers and mutual funds to improve the quality of information that the Commission and investors receive.[21] For the first time, funds would be required to report basic risk metrics, and new information would be required about, among other things, their use of derivatives, securities lending activities, and liquidity of their holdings.
In September 2015, the Commission proposed reforms designed to promote stronger and more effective liquidity risk management across open-end funds and limit the adverse effects that liquidity risk can have on investors and potentially the broader markets.[22] And in December, the Commission approved an important proposal requiring that funds monitor and manage derivatives-related risks and provide limits on their use.[23] Finalizing these rules, as well as advancing proposals for transition planning and stress testing, are among our 2016 priorities for the asset management industry.
In equity market structure, as the Commission considers more fundamental changes, we continue to address specific elements that can be made to work better for investors and public companies.[24] In 2015, the Commission proposed two important rules to enhance our supervision of today’s markets. The first of these would broaden the oversight of active proprietary traders, including high-frequency traders.[25] We also proposed the first-ever major update to the regulations for alternative trading systems.[26] Our proposal would require new detailed disclosures about the operation of these platforms and create a
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Important work also continued on strengthening the infrastructure of the equity markets and the mechanisms for ensuring market stability. In December, the Commission issued an advance notice of proposed rulemaking on transfer agents, the first major action in that important area in more than 40 years.[27] The SROs continued to advance a broad program of improvements to the securities information processors and volatility safeguards, including evaluating the operation of the limit up-limit down plan under various market conditions, such as the volatility that occurred on August 24th. And the SROs submitted their plan for the very important consolidated audit trail,[28] a high priority that I expect the Commission will soon notice for comment.
We also continue to evaluate other fundamental proposals for change, looking to data and empirical analysis to guide us. One example is the Tick Size Pilot for smaller companies, which the SROs are actively implementing and which is scheduled to begin in the fall.[29] And our equity market structure advisory committee continues to provide valuable input to the Commission on a range of other complex market structure issues.
The staff’s review of disclosure effectiveness will also actively continue in 2016. In 2015, the Commission published its first request for comment on what investors, companies, and market participants would like to see with respect to the form and content of financial statement disclosures by entities other than the registrant under Regulation S-X.[30] I expect that this step will soon be followed by several others addressing Regulation S-K and the industry guides.[31] Such work will also complement and serve to further implement the mandates we received last year under the FAST Act to simplify and modernize our disclosure requirements for public companies.[32]
In 2016, beyond these three core areas, we will also look to shorten the settlement cycle from T+3 to T+2 to support industry efforts and reduce a potential source of systemic risk.[33] We will seek to further enhance filings through the expanded use of structured data. We will aim to finalize rules updating the intrastate offering exemption[34] and consider recommendations for a universal proxy.[35] We will also look to consider final rules for resource extraction.[36] In enforcement, we will focus on financial reporting, market structure, and the structuring, disclosure, and sales of complex financial instruments. And I will continue to work to develop support from my fellow Commissioners for a uniform fiduciary duty for investment advisers and broker-dealers, and to bring forward a workable program for third party reviews to enhance the compliance of registered investment advisers.
As you can hear from my partial recitation, the agenda for 2016 is a very busy one and we will work hard to advance as many of these priorities as we can.
Beyond Disclosure
Although it is a subject for more extensive discussion on another day, let me step back for a moment from the array of rules, accomplishments, and agenda setting that I have marched through today to highlight how we are looking beyond mandatory disclosure – still our core authority and lodestar – to carry out our mission. For, in the modern marketplace, the SEC is increasingly challenged to look to carefully targeted substantive requirements – like controls on technology or limitations on activities – to fully discharge our responsibilities.
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While the SEC is often referred to as “a,” or “the,” disclosure agency, it is important to recognize that we are not only a disclosure agency – and never have been. At inception, the Exchange Act granted us extensive substantive authority to regulate the means of trading securities, including broad supervisory authority over stock exchanges and controls on trading practices.[37] The Investment Company Act of 1940 similarly created a series of substantive requirements for registered funds.[38] And our original authorities have been, from time to time, expanded by Congress.
Today, among other responsibilities, the Commission sets financial standards for broker-dealers, reviews the rule filings by exchanges and other SROs, supervises the clearing of securities, and oversees the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board. The Dodd-Frank Act gave us the responsibility to oversee security-based swaps and required us to restrict proprietary trading, mandate risk retention for securitizers, and limit incentive-based compensation for financial institutions.
As we gather here in February 2016, it is important to recognize that authorities such as these have become more important to our mission as the complexity of the marketplace has increased, as technology has brought down barriers to investment, and as financial market participants have become ever-more connected.
You can see this progression in a number of our recent regulatory reforms. For example, the now-effective Regulation SCI – or Systems Compliance and Integrity[39] – imposes requirements for systems controls and technology standards that are essential to the operation of the modern securities markets. The money market fund reforms[40] coming on line in October of this year go well beyond enhancing disclosure and require prime funds to float their NAV after years of a fixed NAV. Regulation A+ and our new crowdfunding rules outline the disclosures required of startups and small businesses raising capital in new ways, but also impose investment limits to strengthen investor protections.
Looking ahead, a number of the Commission’s outstanding proposals and initiatives also reflect the careful consideration of tools beyond disclosure. Aspects of our asset management proposals would impose minimum liquidity requirements and limits on derivatives in addition to greater and more standardized disclosures.[41] While the outstanding proposal for alternative trading systems requires greater investor disclosure, it also provides the Commission with better tools to supervise changes in their operation.[42] Our proposal for clearing agencies would impose new standards for their governance and operation – a particularly important set of requirements given their central role in the securities and derivatives markets today.[43]
In all of our work, we are challenged to look at how our other tools can complement disclosure to better carry out our regulatory objectives. Disclosure is one tool among many, and we need to use the right tools for the right job, whether in overseeing the range of growing and more complex ETFs, in considering changes to the “accredited investor” definition, or in fashioning appropriate requirements and protections for today’s complex asset management industry. And we are seeking robust public comment and input as we do so.[44]
Let me be clear that considering and using other policy tools to strengthen our regulatory regime does not reflect a retreat from our core disclosure powers. Quite to the contrary, enhancing relevant disclosures continues to be a key aspect of all of our new rulemakings – and we are dedicating substantial resources to enhance the effectiveness of our existing disclosure requirements. But more and more, the complexity of products, changes in market participant behavior, pervasive network technology, and systemic risks call
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Conclusion
The capital markets play a critical role in our economy. They are built on taking informed risks in exchange for potential returns on investments that can be used to buy a home, pay for college, and fund a retirement. The capital markets fuel not only macroeconomic growth, but also critical innovations – from new cancer treatments to advanced computers to breakthroughs in agriculture. Risk-taking is essential to this process, and regulators should not seek to eliminate it altogether.
But regulators must safeguard the investment and capital raising process from unacceptable risks that can dilute, distort, or disable the fair playing field that is integral to robust free financial markets. In 1934, just two days after he signed the Securities Exchange Act, President Franklin D. Roosevelt told Congress, “We have sought to put forward the rule of fair play in finance and industry.”[45] That is the core responsibility we carry forward today.
The SEC – and most especially its extraordinary dedicated and talented staff – has the vision, the energy and tools to adapt to the challenges of 2016 and beyond. You will see that on display over the next two days and should always remember that the accomplishments we talk about at “SEC Speaks” each year – indeed, for eight decades – are due to the staff’s tireless commitment and expertise.
Coming from New York, as you might imagine I am used to hearing all sorts of things, including many that I cannot repeat in public. But I have heard a few new phrases in Washington – things like “don’t ever let the law get in the way of what you want to do politically” or “that’s just how Washington works.” Fortunately, such thoughts get no traction at the SEC – and never have. From its founding, the SEC has been an independent agency with a proud, unbroken tradition of protecting the investing public based on hard work and hard data, carrying out our dynamic mission without fear or favor according to the rule of law. That was true in 1934, it is true today, and it will be true when SEC Speaks gathers eight decades from now.
Thank you.
Modified: Feb. 19, 2016
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Keynote Address at the Managed Fund Association: “Five Years On: Regulation of Private Fund Advisers After Dodd-Frank”
Chair Mary Jo White
MFA Outlook 2015 Conference, New York, New York
Oct. 16, 2015
Good morning. Thank you, Richard [Baker], for that kind introduction. I am pleased to be here again to continue our dialogue at this important time for private fund advisers. As I said at this conference two years ago, the Managed Funds Association has been an important and constructive voice representing your industry, and that certainly remains true today.
This past July marked the fifth anniversary of the Dodd-Frank Act, which required the Commission to implement a significant number of regulatory mandates, most of which are now completed.[1] Most prominent for this audience, of course, were the rulemakings creating new registration and reporting requirements for private fund advisers. Since the implementation of these rules, approximately 1,500 new private fund advisers have registered with us. And the Commission now gathers considerable data on these advisers and their funds.
Required registration and reporting have been critical to increasing transparency and protecting investors in private funds. But now, having moved past the financial crisis and the implementation of the post-crisis rules, we are in a new phase of oversight.
The regulatory regime for private fund advisers addresses two broad areas of risks: firm-specific risks and risks that may also affect the broader asset management industry and potentially the financial system. These two sets of risks are often intertwined, without clear distinctions between “firm” and “system.” But it is clear that both current and future rules must focus closely on how threats to the financial system could impact our mandates of investor protection, fair, orderly and efficient markets and facilitating capital formation.
Registration and reporting have given us significant insight into the nearly 30,000 private funds managed by 4,500 registered advisers,[2] which helps us to understand potential risks for both individual firms and the broader financial system. We have learned, for example, a great deal about the size, geographic distribution, and investment concentrations in the industry. We have also begun to analyze data reflecting private fund strategies, including the use of leverage and counterparty exposures. Excessive leverage, lack of liquidity, and asset concentrations have in the past been at the root of financial crises, and we now have the regulatory tools to help better identify and appropriately mitigate potential problems.
Registration and reporting have also enabled our staff in the Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations (OCIE) to conduct targeted presence exams, and when appropriate, the Division of Enforcement to bring actions for the most serious violations. Conflicts of interest and inadequately disclosed fees and expenses are examples of the serious firm-specific risks that have been identified through this process.
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Today, I thought I would highlight some of what we have learned about the risk profiles of private funds that will remain a focus for the Commission going forward. I will start with what we have learned from the data we have collected and how we are seeking to use that data more effectively. Then, I will discuss risks and challenges for private funds and their advisers that can have a systemic impact. And finally, I will focus on some firm-specific risks you should be actively considering in your own business.
Understanding the Industry through Registration and Reporting
Before 2010, the Commission had relatively limited insight into private funds and the business of private fund advisers. We did not know, for example, even how many existed,[3] and we had limited tools to learn more.
The Dodd-Frank Act gave us the ability to see a much more complete picture. The Commission and the public now have census information about private fund advisers and private funds. Form ADV provides details about an adviser’s activities and relationships, as well as basic information about the organizational, operational, and investment characteristics of each private fund the adviser manages. It also provides important information about affiliated entities and service providers that perform critical roles as “gatekeepers.”
As you know, Form PF is also filed confidentially with the SEC by private fund advisers that each manage more than $150 million in private fund assets. Form PF, provides rich data about private funds to the Commission and other regulators, including the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC). A number of robust safeguards are employed to protect the integrity and confidentiality of this data. This information enables us to assess potential risks to the U.S. financial system. When I last spoke to you, we had only received our first full set of data. We now have three full sets of annual PF data, as well as data from 11 sets of quarterly Form PF filings.
With this data, we are also able to monitor trends in the industry. For example, while the number of private fund advisers reported on Form PF has not changed appreciably since 2013, the number of large hedge fund advisers with at least $1.5 billion in hedge fund assets has increased by approximately 15 percent in the same period.[4] We have also observed an 8 percent increase in the number of private funds reported from 2013 to 2014, and their total gross assets have increased by nearly $1 trillion, now totaling just shy of $10 trillion.[5] Of that $10 trillion, about $6.1 trillion was reported by hedge funds.[6] In terms of net assets, private funds had $6.7 trillion at the end of 2014 and hedge funds had $3.4 trillion.[7]
These statistics, which have already been made public in annual reports to Congress, are just a small sampling of the information that is available on the form. Form PF data also allows the staff to monitor investment strategies among private funds and to understand the potential effects of certain market or global events. We have used it to assess funds’ reliance on derivatives and leverage, their exposure to certain international markets, and their use of high frequency trading strategies.
Now that the reporting infrastructure is in place and we have begun to analyze the data, we have turned our focus to making aggregate data from Form PF public, while also protecting proprietary information of individual firms that file.
Just this morning the Commission staff published a “Private Funds Statistics” report that provides certain aggregated and anonymized census data and statistics derived from Form PF data.[8] These statistics include, for example, the distribution of borrowings, an analysis of hedge fund gross notional exposure to net asset value, and a comparison of average hedge fund investor and hedge fund portfolio liquidity.
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While this is highly aggregated data, the statistics illustrate trends and practices in the industry. Consider just a few examples. First, although the total notional value of derivatives reported on Form PF has increased, from about $13.6 trillion to about $14.8 trillion, that value has decreased relative to total net assets from the beginning of 2013 to the end of 2014, from about 256% of net asset value to about 221% of net asset value.[9] Second, more than half of all large hedge fund advisers report aggregate economic leverage less than two and a half times their total reported hedge fund net assets.[10] And finally, the data indicates that fewer than 100 reporting hedge funds—representing less than $70 billion in combined net assets—manage some portion of their funds using high-frequency trading strategies.[11]
The public availability of aggregated information should help to address persistent questions, and to some degree misconceptions, about the practices and size of the private fund industry. As I said in 2013, this type of information helps investors understand your business and investment approach. When investors have that kind of information, they can make more informed choices and the transparency benefits your entire industry.
We are publishing this aggregate data to help facilitate constructive feedback and additional analysis to deepen the knowledge of the Commission and other regulators. As we publish more information derived from Form PF data, we encourage your input on how we can make the information as useful as possible and what it demonstrates to you in terms of trends and risks.
Risks Beyond the Firm
The data we are now receiving is giving us a better understanding of not only the risk profiles of individual firms, but also the broader fund industry and potentially the financial system as a whole.
The financial crisis re-focused financial regulators, including the Commission, on addressing risks that could have a systemic impact. To my mind, addressing these risks is fundamental to our longstanding mission to protect investors, maintain market integrity, and promote capital formation. Simply put, investors are not protected if broad and interconnected segments of the financial system are at risk.
Private funds and their advisers obviously play an important role in the financial system. The newly public Form PF statistics show that there are about 2,600 private fund advisers that each manages more than $150 million in private fund assets.[12] Some of the largest groups of private fund investors include individuals, pension plans, and non-profit organizations, and large hedge funds turn over trillions of dollars in listed equity and futures transactions each month.[13] It is therefore natural for the characteristics of your funds – their leverage, their concentration, their size – to be of interest to the SEC and our fellow regulators.
Risks Arising from Services and Activities
One insight is that potential risks can cut across the asset management industry, arising from the services provided to investors and the activities of a range of financial market participants. The request for comment from FSOC earlier this year thus addressed the client services and activities of asset managers with vastly different profiles.[14] The SEC staff was very active in the preparation of the request, which I thought was a constructive shift in FSOC’s focus from firm-specific analyses to considering activities that may pose potential systemic risks. It was also a demonstration of the utility of FSOC as a unique forum for gathering regulators with different missions and information to identify potential systemic risks, which by definition can extend beyond market participants regulated by a particular regulator. This collaboration among regulators is essential for better coordinating our actions and closing any gaps in oversight.
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For our part, the Commission is in the midst of proposing a series of important measures to help ensure that our regulatory program for investment advisers and mutual funds is addressing the challenges and risks of the evolving marketplace. Just last month, the Commission unanimously proposed new rules for liquidity management programs and swing pricing at mutual funds.[15] And in May, the Commission unanimously proposed extensive new data reporting requirements for registered funds and advisers.[16]
Operational Risks
Another industry-wide risk that our current program focuses on is operational risk, which can arise from inadequate or failed processes and systems that provide services to the adviser or funds. As highlighted by the recent incident this summer where a major third party service provider did not provide end of day values for mutual fund portfolio holdings, problems in these processes and systems can have real consequences for funds and their advisers. No doubt most of you are closely focused on mitigating operational risks, including how you deal with operational risks of third party service providers, and our efforts in this area will likely bear directly on the efforts of all advisers. I would like to briefly highlight three specific operational risks that merit close attention.
First are the operational risks surrounding the transition of client accounts from one adviser, often winding down, to a new adviser. The Commission staff is developing recommendations to help advisers assess and plan for the impact on investors when an investment adviser is no longer able to serve its clients.
In the event of an abrupt change in the management of a private fund, unique issues may arise in the transition to another adviser or, more likely, the liquidation of the fund. For example, private funds may be invested in asset classes that are harder to sell and where there are fewer alternative advisers— a problem not typically faced by advisers to large equity funds. Investors in private funds are also more likely to have special contractual rights that other advisers may be unwilling to accept or that may limit the adviser’s ability to transfer management or liquidate the fund without further action by the investors. And investors in private funds tend to have confidentiality concerns that may make finding a replacement adviser more difficult. These issues can be fairly readily addressed, but they should be thought through in advance rather than in a stress or wind-down scenario. A clear, well-defined transition plan will, of course, benefit investors and should also safeguard the market in crisis scenarios.
A second universal operational risk is cybersecurity. Staff guidance earlier this year encouraged advisers to assess their ability to prevent, detect and respond to attacks in light of their compliance obligations under the federal securities laws, and detailed a number of measures advisers may wish to consider.[17] Pay careful attention to the areas discussed in the guidance.
A September settled enforcement case also illustrates the problems investment advisers can face in this space. In that case, a hacker stole sensitive information about more than 100,000 individuals from an investment adviser’s web server. The adviser was charged with not having written policies and procedures reasonably designed to protect customer records and information, in violation of Regulation S-P.[18] That rule generally requires registered investment advisers to adopt written policies and procedures reasonably designed to ensure the security of customer information, and to protect against anticipated threats to and unauthorized use of that information.[19]
The potential impact of these risks is not confined to individual firms. Stolen information or compromised infrastructures can spill over into the financial system, potentially putting at risk assets and information far outside the hacked firm. Cybersecurity is the shared responsibility of all regulators and market participants, including investment advisers, to guard the broader financial
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The final operational risk I will highlight is market stress. I have spoken before about how the Commission staff is considering ways to implement the Dodd-Frank requirements for annual stress testing by large registered investment advisers and registered funds.[20] International bodies such as IOSCO are also considering these issues as they look at the asset management space. Our initial focus is on registered funds and their advisers, but there are important questions about how to address this issue for other registered advisers that meet the Dodd Frank asset threshold, including private fund advisers.
A key challenge is tailoring our implementation of this mandate to the specific risks and business models of diverse asset managers. Regulatory stress testing is a new concept for most asset managers, with the exception of money market funds, and the traditional models of stress testing for banks and broker-dealers may not be transferrable. Indeed, since the financial distress of an investment adviser may affect only the assets of the adviser, rather than the finances of the likely much larger funds it manages, there are real questions about precisely what the goal of stress testing should be for advisers.
It is too soon to draw any conclusions about what our stress tests will look like for advisers, but we have received some useful inputs from certain of the Form PF questions addressed to existing stress testing practices. As the staff develops their recommendations, we welcome your thoughts on how you currently address these issues and how current approaches could be improved and, where appropriate, standardized.
Changes in the Broader Regulatory Framework
Before turning to a discussion of firm-specific compliance risks, I want to reverse my lens and touch briefly on how shifts in the broader regulatory framework have affected private fund advisers. Due in part to the renewed focus on systemic risk, there are a number of significant new rules in recent years that – while not directly applicable to private funds – have profound effects on them.
A prime example is the Volcker Rule. While not directly aimed at private fund advisers, it certainly had a significant impact on who can own and sponsor private funds, requiring some advisers to substantially alter their activities. Another example is clearing. While funds are generally not members of clearing agencies, the manner in which clearing agencies manage risks can nonetheless have a significant impact on funds – including through margin requirements, collateral protections, and the portability of positions.
As regulators maintain their focus on assessing systemic risk, there likely will continue to be efforts like these that will directly impact your business. Your input is vital to ensuring that such consequences are fully understood, and that regulatory measures to address these broader risks are appropriately calibrated to achieve the desired objective in the most cost-effective way.
Risks Within the Firm
The kind of risks that, at least in their everyday perception, mean the most to investors are those close to home, tied to issues within a specific firm. These are the risks that can harm investors most directly and clearly, shaking confidence in a firm and raising questions about practices in the broader industry.
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I will highlight a few of the recurring, specific compliance risks our examiners have seen that each private fund adviser should be addressing every day. I will start with fiduciary duty, the cornerstone of our regulatory framework for asset managers. As part of that duty, investment advisers must serve the best interests of their clients and seek to avoid, or at least make full disclosure of, conflicts of interest, including those related to their organization, operation, and management of client assets. This duty is the bulwark of investor protection.
On completing their presence exam initiative last year, our examiners identified several areas where cracks in this bulwark were found.
Marketing was one area. Staff was concerned that some hedge fund advisers may have used marketing materials that included back-tested performance numbers, portable performance numbers, and benchmark comparisons without key disclosures.
Disclosure of conflicts was another area. Examiners observed that some hedge fund advisers may not be adequately disclosing conflicts related to advisers’ proprietary funds and the personal accounts of their portfolio managers. Examiners saw, for example, advisers allocating profitable trades and investment opportunities to proprietary funds rather than client accounts in contravention of existing policies and procedures.
In exams of private equity advisers, examiners also observed instances of conflicts involving fees and expenses. For example, staff was concerned that some advisers may have been improperly shifting expenses away from the adviser and to the funds or portfolio companies by, for example, charging a fund for the salaries of the adviser’s employees or hiring the adviser’s former employees as “consultants” paid by the funds. Examiners also continue to observe advisers collecting millions of dollars in accelerated monitoring fees without disclosing the practice.
Our fee and expense observations go beyond private equity advisers. Our Private Funds Unit in OCIE is completing a review of private fund real estate advisers, many of which may be hiring related parties. Staff is concerned that disclosure about these arrangements may be non-existent or potentially misleading, particularly with regard to whether or not the related parties charge market rates.
In addition to these exam findings, I urge you to focus on a number of recent, important enforcement actions by the Commission against private fund advisers. Many of these actions also center on disclosure and conflicts of interest, including advisers misallocating expenses to funds;[21] failing to disclose loans from clients;[22] using funds to pay their operating expenses without authorization and disclosure;[23] and failing to disclose fees and discounts from service providers.[24]
These cases underscore the value of our oversight and exam program, which identifies practices that would have been difficult for investors to discover by themselves. They also illustrate that investment advisers to funds – including private funds catering to sophisticated investors – must disclose material facts to clients. Investors, regardless of their sophistication level, must have, and deserve to have, the information necessary about their adviser and funds to make an informed investment decision – including their adviser’s actual or potential conflicts of interests.
Conclusion
The last five years have been a busy and important time for your industry and for us at the Commission. As we move beyond the initial phase of post-Dodd-Frank rules, it is essential that we continue to work together to build a strong regulatory framework that addresses both these firm-specific risks and the risks that can have an impact on the broader financial system.
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These risks are intertwined, and the strong compliance culture that individual private fund advisers build in carrying out their fiduciary duty is fundamental to the strength of the industry – and its ability to work with regulators, investors, and other market participants to foster a robust, resilient financial system. As we continue to address broader risks to that system, your insights and participation in the regulatory process is essential to developing sustainable, efficient rules and guidance that make sense within individual firms.
Five years on, while the intensity of the specific changes precipitated by the Dodd-Frank Act may have lessened, we have continued to build a strong regulatory framework that protects investors while preserving the vibrant diversity of private funds. I believe that the next five years must do the same.
Thank you.
Modified: Oct. 16, 2015
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The SEC as the Whistleblower’s Advocate
Chair Mary Jo White
Ray Garrett, Jr. Corporate and Securities Law Institute-Northwestern University School of Law Chicago, Illinois
April 30, 2015
Introduction
Thank you, David, for that kind introduction. I am very honored to address the Garrett Institute, one of the most important programs in the country for corporate and securities lawyers, and to be in David’s home territory of Northwestern Law School where he served as Dean before going on to serve as a very distinguished Chairman of the SEC in the late 1980s.
Although the Garrett Institute was established 35 years ago to honor former SEC Chairman Ray Garrett, Jr., I really first came to learn about him when I did a bit of research for a speech I gave in honor of former SEC Commissioner Al Sommer on the importance of the SEC as an independent agency.[1] Mr. Sommer, himself a legendary Commissioner, was recommended by Chairman Garrett to succeed him as Chairman. Seemingly, that did not come to pass because Commissioner Sommer was a Democrat during a Republican administration. That, however, did not stop Chairman Garrett, a Republican, from recommending the person he thought would be the best for the job.
Things have changed some since Ray Garrett chaired the Commission, although the core mission and many of the important issues have not. The SEC remains the Investor’s Advocate and there continues to be an emphasis on important issues related to corporate governance, disclosure, and market structure.
But what I have chosen to talk to you about today is a topic and program that was not part of Chairman Garrett’s SEC in the mid-1970s – the SEC’s whistleblower awards program, established by the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010. The program, while clearly still developing, has proven to be a game changer.
Whistleblowers and awards for their information were, of course, around long before Dodd-Frank.[2] The IRS and OSHA have had whistleblower programs for many years; the False Claims Act has had a whistleblower provision dating back to 1861; and the Dutch enacted a law in 1610 that banned naked short selling – defined then as selling more shares than were owned in a registered account – and provided for whistleblower awards. Offenders could have their sales cancelled and be assessed a penalty amounting to one-fifth of the value of the transaction, a third of which could be awarded to a whistleblower, with another third going to relief for the poor.[3] The remaining third went to the officer who imposed the fine – I am glad I do not have to oversee that particular aspect of the incentive structure.
There have always been mixed feelings about whistleblowers and many companies tolerate, at best, their existence because the law requires it. I would urge that, especially in the post-financial crisis era when regulators and right-minded companies are searching for new, more aggressive ways to improve corporate culture and compliance, it is past time to stop wringing our hands about whistleblowers. They provide an invaluable public service, and they should be supported. And, we at the SEC increasingly see ourselves as the whistleblower’s advocate.
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It has been nearly four years since the SEC implemented its whistleblower program. While still evolving and improving, we have enough experience now to take a hard look at how the program is working and what we have learned. Overall, I am here to say that the program is a success – and we will work hard at the SEC to build on that success.
The volume of tips has been greater and of higher quality than expected when the program was first adopted. We have seen enough to know that whistleblowers increase our efficiency and conserve our scarce resources. Importantly, internal compliance programs at companies also remain vibrant and effective ways to detect and report wrongdoing. But despite the success of our program, the decision to come forward, especially in the face of internal pressure, is not an easy one.
The ambivalence about whistleblowers can indeed sometimes manifest itself in an unlawful response by a corporate employer and we are very focused at the SEC on cracking down on such misconduct. We want whistleblowers – and their employers – to know that employees are free to come forward without fear of reprisals. In 2014, we brought our first retaliation case and, this month, our first case involving the use of a confidentiality agreement that can impede whistleblowers from communicating with us. This latter case has generated some controversy, which I will address shortly. But, first, let’s look a bit closer at the four-year track record of the program.
The SEC’s Whistleblower Program’s Successful Start
Increasing Volume of Tips
Our Whistleblower Office was fully operational by mid-2011. The number of tips we have received is high and has increased by more than 20 percent.[4] In Fiscal Year 2014, the SEC received over 3,600 tips (about ten a day), which is up from about 3,200 tips in 2013. In the first quarter of this year, we have seen the numbers increase again – by more than 20 percent over the same quarter last year. And tips have come from whistleblowers from all fifty states and sixty foreign countries.[5]
The tips span the full spectrum of federal securities law violations. Most commonly, they relate to corporate disclosures and financial statements, offering fraud, and market manipulation, but we have also received important tips about, for example, investment adviser fraud and broker-dealer rule compliance.
Increasing Quality of Tips and Assistance
As the program has grown, not only have we received more tips, but we also continue to receive higher quality tips that are of tremendous help to the Commission in stopping ongoing and imminent fraud, and lead to significant enforcement actions on a much faster timetable than we would be able to achieve without the information and assistance from the whistleblower. The program has also created a powerful incentive for companies to self-report wrongdoing to the SEC – companies now know that if they do not, we may hear about the conduct from someone else.
Whistleblowers have provided us with original information leading to the opening of new investigations, “insider” views as to how a company approaches its disclosures to investors and highly technical analyses of rapidly evolving fraud schemes. Whistleblowers have also testified at TRO or asset freeze proceedings, enabling our staff to stop fraud schemes before investor losses mount; they have identified additional witnesses and encouraged those witnesses to come forward; and they have explained documents to enhance our understanding of cases.
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Making Substantial and More Frequent Awards
In order for a whistleblower to receive an award, he or she must voluntarily provide the Commission with original information that leads to a successful SEC enforcement action or related action with monetary sanctions exceeding $1,000,000.[6] If those criteria are met, the whistleblower may apply for an award, which can range between 10% to 30% of the amounts collected in the case.[7] When deciding how much to award in that range, we consider a number of factors. Factors that favor a greater percentage include highly significant information, crucial assistance by the whistleblower, the importance of the law enforcement interest advanced, and the whistleblower’s cooperation with the company’s internal compliance systems. Factors that weigh against a higher award include the culpability of the whistleblower, delay in reporting, and interference with a company’s internal compliance system.[8]
A total of seventeen whistleblowers have thus far received awards. Payouts have totaled nearly $50 million and we have made individual awards in excess of $1 million three times. Our highest award to date is over $30 million.[9] In the last fiscal year, the Commission issued more awards to more people for more money than in any previous year – and that trend is expected to accelerate.[10]
None of this would have happened without the hardworking and dedicated staff in our Office of the Whistleblower, many of whom joined at the inception of the program and have worked diligently to build it from the ground up, as well as our General Counsel’s Office and the Enforcement staff who work on the cases and deal with the whistleblowers on a day-to-day basis. And, I should not make any of this sound easy.
Administering the whistleblower program has presented a number of challenges for us. For example, our Whistleblower Office must address claims from “serial submitters” who file a claim for virtually every case in which over $1 million in sanctions is awarded when there is no connection between their tip and the case. But staff is required to thoroughly assess every claim and make recommendations to the Commission even when the award claims have no basis. And, because this is a new program, we have needed to address several issues of first impression. We, of course, have a responsibility to whistleblowers and the investing public to carefully consider the novel issues that will shape the contours of the program for years to come.
One of the issues of first impression that the Whistleblower Office and the Commission are addressing relates to the circumstances under which officers and directors[11] and compliance and internal audit personnel[12] may be eligible to receive whistleblower awards. These individuals are generally not eligible to receive a whistleblower award, but the rules provide an exception to the general prohibition if the information is reported to the SEC at least 120 days after providing it to the employer’s audit committee, chief legal officer, chief compliance officer, or a supervisor.[13] These otherwise excluded personnel can also become eligible to receive an award where they have a reasonable basis to believe that disclosure to the SEC was necessary to prevent imminent misconduct from causing substantial financial harm to the company or investors.
Awards have recently been made under both of these exceptions. In March 2015, the Commission announced a payout of approximately $500,000 to a former company officer who reported information about a securities fraud at the company after reporting internally and
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Supporting Internal Compliance
Let me say a bit more about company compliance programs. When the Commission was considering its whistleblower rules, concerns were raised about undermining companies’ internal compliance programs. Some commenters urged that internal reporting be made a pre-condition to a whistleblower award. That was not done, but the final whistleblower rules established a framework to incentivize employees to report internally first. A whistleblower’s participation in internal compliance systems is thus a factor that will generally increase an award, whereas interference with those systems will surely decrease an award.[16] And, a whistleblower who internally reports, and at the same time or within 120 days reports to the Commission, will receive credit for any information the company subsequently self-reports to the SEC.[17]
All indications are that internal compliance functions are as strong as ever – if not stronger – and that insiders continue to report possible violations internally first. Although there is no requirement under our rules that the whistleblower be a current or former employee, several of the individuals who have received awards were, in fact, company insiders. Notably, of these, over 80% first raised their concerns internally to their supervisors or compliance personnel before reporting to the Commission.[18]
Many in-house lawyers, compliance professionals, and law firms representing companies have told us that since the implementation of our program, companies have taken fresh looks at their internal compliance functions and made enhancements to further encourage their employees to view internal reporting as an effective means to address potential wrongdoing without fear of reprisal or retaliation. That is a very good thing, and, so far, we believe that the whistleblower program has achieved the right balance between the need of companies to be given an opportunity to address possible violations of law and the SEC’s law enforcement interests.
Preventing and Punishing Retaliation
Dodd-Frank expanded the protections and remedies for retaliation against whistleblowers that were first laid out in Sarbanes-Oxley.[19] The scope of the prohibition against retaliation is appropriately broad: employers cannot “discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass, directly or indirectly, or in any other manner discriminate against, a whistleblower in the terms and conditions of employment because of any lawful act done by the whistleblower” to provide information or assistance to the Commission.[20] Dodd-Frank establishes both a private right of action for the whistleblower and authority for the Commission itself to bring an action for retaliation against an employer. This provision reflects Congress’ recognition of the severe chilling effect retaliation has on whistleblowers if their company is able to fire or demote them because they have reported a possible violation of law to the SEC.[21]
We at the SEC take these whistleblower protections very seriously and companies should too. In June 2014, we brought and settled our first action against a company for retaliating against a whistleblower who had reported a possible securities law violation to the Commission.[22] In that case, the head trader of a hedge fund advisory firm reported trading activity to the SEC that demonstrated the firm was engaged in prohibited principal transactions. After the trader notified the company of the report to the Commission, the company immediately began
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The Commission charged the firm and its principal with engaging in prohibited principal transactions and making a false filing with the Commission, and charged the firm with retaliating against the employee. Among other relief, the hedge fund and its principal paid over $2 million in monetary sanctions. And, I am pleased to report that just this week, we awarded the full 30% – over $600,000 – to the whistleblower who was the victim of that retaliation.[24]
The SEC also has intervened in several private cases to argue that the anti-retaliation protections of Dodd-Frank should apply to individuals who internally report potential securities laws violations as well as to those who make disclosures directly to the Commission.[25] Strong enforcement of the anti-retaliation protections is critical to the success of the SEC’s whistleblower program and bringing retaliation cases will continue to be a high priority for us.
Rigorous Attention to Ensure Open Lines of Communication between Whistleblowers and the SEC
In addition to protecting whistleblowers from retaliation once they have reported information to the Commission, Rule 21F-17 also prevents individuals and entities from taking steps to silence potential whistleblowers before they contact us, including through the threatened enforcement of confidentiality agreements.[26]
The Enforcement Division has been focused on companies that use agreements or other mechanisms to improperly stifle whistleblowers from coming forward. On April 1, 2015, we announced our first enforcement action against a company for using confidentiality agreements that could potentially stifle the whistleblowing process. We charged the company with violating Rule 21F-17 because it required witnesses in certain internal investigations to sign confidentiality statements with language warning that employees could face discipline, including termination, if they discussed the subject matter of the interview with outside parties without prior approval.[27] Under the rule, the Commission is not required to establish that the confidentiality agreement actually prevented employees from communicating with the SEC. The potential and significant chilling effect of blanket prohibitions on reporting information is also prohibited by the rule.
This case has prompted considerable discussion. Some have asserted that the Commission has applied an overly broad interpretation of the rule and engaged in rulemaking by enforcement, which, in turn, has created uncertainty as to the enforceability of all confidentiality agreements.[28] Neither concern is warranted.
Rule 21F-17 clearly states that no action may be taken to impede an individual from communicating directly with the Commission staff about possible securities law violations, including by enforcing or threatening to enforce confidentiality agreements that could be read to limit such communications. The agreement in question ran afoul of the prohibition by, among other things, covering underlying facts and requiring pre-approval by the company’s legal department before reporting information and threatening disciplinary action for violating this pre-approval requirement. Requiring pre-approval before reporting may have, among other chilling effects, discouraged a potential whistleblower who wished to remain anonymous, which is an enormously important safeguard. This confidentiality agreement, in our view, violated the plain language of Rule 21F-17. And enforcing a rule for the first time does not mean that we are engaged in rulemaking by enforcement.
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The rule is not, however, a sweeping prohibition on the use of confidentiality agreements. Companies conducting internal investigations can still give the standard Upjohn warnings that explain the scope of the attorney-client privilege in that setting. Companies may continue to protect their trade secrets or other confidential information through the use of properly drawn confidentiality and severance agreements.
The SEC is not trying to dictate the language of these agreements or warnings – that is the company’s responsibility. But a company needs to speak clearly in and about confidentiality provisions, so that employees, most of whom are not lawyers, understand that it is always permissible to report possible securities laws violations to the Commission.
In our recent 21F-17 action, the company addressed the issue by changing the violative language to say explicitly that the agreement does not prevent individuals from reporting possible violations of the law to federal law enforcement agencies.[29] And to remedy any potential harm already done, the company also undertook to notify employees who had signed the original agreement that they are not required to seek permission before communicating with any governmental agency concerning possible violations of federal law.[30] Companies would be well-served to review their own agreements and policies to ensure that they are consistent with Rule 21F-17 and all of the whistleblower rules.
As we have intensified our focus in this area, a number of other concerns have come to our attention, including that some companies may be trying to require their employees to sign agreements mandating that they forego any whistleblower award or represent, as a precondition to obtaining a severance payment, that they have not made a prior report of misconduct to the SEC. You can imagine our Enforcement Division’s view of those and similar provisions under our rules.
Overall Assessment
To sum up, after nearly four years of experience, what is our assessment of the Dodd-Frank whistleblower program and how should companies be responding?
First, we know that the regime does, in fact, create powerful incentives to come to the Commission with real evidence of wrongdoing that harms investors and it meaningfully contributes to the efficiency and effectiveness of our Enforcement program. And whether the whistleblowers are reluctant or eager, motivated by a desire to do what’s right or by the prospect of financial reward, or both, they have, and will continue to, come forward.
This reality should create at least equally strong incentives for companies to build truly effective compliance programs and to foster atmospheres where internal compliance reporting is not only tolerated, but actively encouraged. To that end, companies should take a hard look at whether their boards and senior management are promoting these priorities. By some accounts, there is more work to be done. In one survey of 2,500 executives world-wide, as few as 7% of companies say whistleblowing is important for their organization and 44% say they do not have whistleblower policies or fail to publicize them.[31] If that is so, it is little wonder that we are still wrestling with troublesome corporate cultures.
We also know that retaliation against whistleblowers occurs, sometime starkly, sometimes more subtly – and that is very troubling. For the SEC’s part, we are working hard to foster a safe environment for whistleblowers by investigating and charging those who retaliate as well as those who, whether inadvertently or not, take actions or use agreements that could chill the willingness of employees to report violations of law to the SEC. Companies should be asking themselves if they have created an environment where employees can report internally
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As with any enforcement program, the ultimate goal of our whistleblower program is to deter further wrongdoing. It is no doubt too early to draw conclusions about whether the program has altered corporate behavior and reduced wrongdoing. But we certainly hope it has and will continue to do so. And we are not alone in this hope and expectation.
One early measure of our program’s success is how many other regulators are seeking to replicate it. Last fall, then-Attorney General Eric Holder suggested that legislation was needed to enhance the whistleblower provision in the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act (FIRREA), which is currently capped at $1.6 million, to improve DOJ’s ability to gather evidence of wrongdoing in complex financial crimes.[33] And, in February, the New York State Attorney General called for legislation to establish a state program modeled on the SEC’s.[34]
Conclusion
The bottom line is that is that responsible companies with strong compliance cultures and programs should not fear bona fide whistleblowers, but embrace them as a constructive part of the process to expose the wrongdoing that can harm a company and its reputation. Gone are the days when corporate wrongdoing can be pushed into the dark corners of an organization. Fraudsters rarely act alone, unobserved and, these days, the employee who sees or is asked to make the questionable accounting entry or to distribute the false offering materials may refuse to do it or just decide that they are better off telling the SEC. Better yet, either there are no questionable accounting entries or false offering materials to be reported in the first place or companies themselves self-report the unlawful conduct to the SEC.
Thank you for listening and enjoy the rest of your conference.
Modified: April 30, 2015
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Remarks at the Securities Enforcement Forum
Chair Mary Jo White
Washington D.C.
Oct. 9, 2013
It is a pleasure to be here. The website posting for this event says I am talking about “the most important issues” that you as inside and outside counsel will face.
So what exactly are those issues?
Let me spare you any suspense – we want you to start thinking that every issue you face in the SEC’s space is a very important one.
There is a good reason for my saying that. One of our goals is to see that the SEC’s enforcement program is – and is perceived to be – everywhere, pursuing all types of violations of our federal securities laws, big and small.
Striving to be Everywhere
I mentioned this goal in a speech I gave two weeks ago in Chicago. There were questions raised afterwards about what I really meant. Today I will flesh out the theme.
In the first instance, we of course recognize that our resources are not infinite. Indeed, they are not nearly sufficient to the enormity and scope of the responsibility we have. But we are making better and better use of our resources, new data tools and other “force multipliers.”
In today’s fast moving, complex and changing markets, it is important that we strive to be everywhere to enforce our securities laws and to protect investors.
It is important because investors in our markets want to know that there is a strong cop on the beat – not just someone sitting in the station house waiting for a call, but patrolling the streets and checking on things.
They want to know that would-be fraudsters are spending more time looking over their shoulders, and less time stepping over the line.
Investors do not want someone who ignores minor violations, and waits for the big one that brings media attention.
Instead, they want someone who understands that even the smallest infractions have victims, and that the smallest infractions are very often just the first step toward bigger ones down the road.
They deserve an SEC that looks at its enforcement mission in exactly that way.
This approach is not unlike the one taken in the nineties by then New York City Mayor Rudy Giuliani and Police Commissioner Bill Bratton, back when I was the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York.
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They essentially declared that no infraction was too small to be uncovered and punished. And, so the NYPD pursued infractions of law at every level – from street corner squeegee men to graffiti artists to subway turnstile jumpers to the biggest crimes in the city.[1] The strategy was simple. They wanted to avoid an environment of disorder that would encourage more serious crimes to flourish. They wanted to send a message of law and order.
The underpinning for this strategy was outlined in an article, which many of you will have read or heard of, titled, “Broken Windows.”[2] The theory is that when a window is broken and someone fixes it – it is a sign that disorder will not be tolerated. But, when a broken window is not fixed, it “is a signal that no one cares, and so breaking more windows costs nothing.”[3]
The same theory can be applied to our securities markets – minor violations that are overlooked or ignored can feed bigger ones, and, perhaps more importantly, can foster a culture where laws are increasingly treated as toothless guidelines. And so, I believe it is important to pursue even the smallest infractions. Retail investors, in particular, need to be protected from unscrupulous advisers and brokers, whatever their size and the size of the violation that victimizes the investor.
That is why George Canellos and Andrew Ceresney, our co-directors of the Division of Enforcement, are working to build upon the strength of the division by ensuring that we pursue all types of wrongdoing. Not just the biggest frauds, but also violations such as control failures, negligence-based offenses, and even violations of prophylactic rules with no intent requirement, such as the series of Rule 105 cases that we recently brought. I’ll say more about these cases in a minute.
But this does not mean we will not continue our vigorous pursuit of the bigger violations. Cases like the ones we brought recently against the likes of SAC Capital, Harbinger, J.P. Morgan, Oppenheimer, and the City of Miami not to mention the scores of significant financial crisis cases have always been, and will continue to be, important cases for us.
I believe the SEC should strive to be that kind of cop – to be the agency that covers the entire neighborhood and pursues every level of violation.
An agency that also makes you feel like we are everywhere. And we will do our best not to disappoint.
We recognize that we cannot literally be on every corner, looking over the shoulder of every trader, or watching each CFO as they certify their financial results.
But we can allocate our resources in such a way so that market participants understand we are at least looking and pursuing charges in all directions.
So how are we doing that?
First, we are expanding our field of vision and reach – by leveraging the strength of our exam program, incentivizing individuals to step forward, collaborating with our regulatory colleagues, and harnessing the power of our enhanced technological capabilities.
Second, we are focusing on deficient gatekeepers – pursuing those who should be serving as the neighborhood watch, but who fail to do their jobs.
Third, we are looking for the “broken windows” in our markets – and not overlooking the small violations to avoid breeding an environment of indifference to our rules.
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And finally we are continuing to prioritize the bigger cases – pursuing and punishing major offenses by significant and high-profile market participants, sending a strong message of deterrence to the industry and boosting the confidence of investors.
We can do this because we have an extraordinary team at the SEC – a team, as many of you know, that has had great successes over the past several years – both with respect to cases related and unrelated to the financial crisis.[4]
Because of the many policy changes and structural enhancements in recent years, I began my tenure as Chair with an enforcement team that I believe to be the finest in all of government. We have an extremely strong platform on which to build.
Expanding our Reach
Striving to “be everywhere” is finding a way to have a presence that exceeds our physical footprint and to be felt and feared in more areas than market participants would normally expect that our resources would allow. And here is some of what we have been doing.
Leveraging Our Exam Program
We are taking advantage of the boots we have on the ground at registered entities – broker-dealers, investment advisers and exchanges – to enhance our presence in the marketplace. Those boots are part of our National Exam Program, which, executing on its core function, allows us to work with registrants to improve compliance, understand and monitor the latest risks posed by and facing these entities, and provide effective oversight.
But at the same time, our exam program gives us a real-time look into developing industry practices that may sometimes constitute violations that warrant further investigation and enforcement action.
More than ever before, the exam and enforcement teams are able to move quickly and effectively in response to suspected violations. Right now, for example, we have initiatives in the asset management and broker-dealer space where this coordination is happening.
Whistleblower
Another tool that we are using with growing frequency and success is our whistleblower authority, which enables us to award those who come forward with evidence of wrongdoing.
As you know, the SEC’s whistleblower program allows us to give monetary rewards for valuable information about securities law violations. And, it has rapidly become a tremendously effective force-multiplier, generating high quality tips and, in some cases, virtual blueprints laying out an entire enterprise, directing us to the heart of an alleged fraud.
Just last week, one whistleblower was paid more than $14 million – the largest amount to date – for providing our investigators with this kind of very specific, timely and credible tip that we expect the whistleblower program to incentivize. The tip led directly to the opening of an investigation, and allowed us to bring, in just a few short months, a case that resulted in the return of tens of millions of dollars to investors.[5]
That is the benefit of significant whistleblower incentives.
They persuade people to step forward.
They put fraudulent conduct on our radar that we may not have found ourselves, or as quickly.
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And they deter wrongdoing by making would-be violators ask themselves – who else is watching me?
The program also incentivizes companies to report misconduct before a whistleblower comes to us first.
When our whistleblower program was being set up, many in the securities bar – perhaps some here today – worried that the program would undermine internal compliance efforts. It seems, however, that the program may be having the opposite effect.
Today, we hear that companies are beefing up their internal compliance function and making it clear to their own employees that internal reporting will be treated seriously and fairly. And most in-house whistleblowers that come to us went the internal route first.
We believe this program is already a success. And, as more awards are made, we expect more people to come forward, which will dramatically broaden our presence.
Collaboration
Of course, we are not alone in our enforcement effort. We collaborate continuously and effectively with our partners at the Department of Justice, FINRA, and the state securities regulators. We have, for example, worked side-by-side with the criminal authorities on the high profile insider trading cases of the last couple years; our Rule 105 initiative involved close coordination with FINRA whose market surveillance efforts often spot troublesome trades; and we work with our state partners in many areas, including the regulation of unregistered offerings.
Technology
Whistleblower incentives, examiners and collaborating with our various law enforcement partners are not the only force multipliers in our toolbox. We also are leveraging technology to make it easier for us to spot fraud early on.
Insider trading is a case in point.
Over the last four years, we have filed an unprecedented number of insider trading actions – some 200 actions – against more than 450 individuals and firms charging illicit trading gains of nearly $1 billion. In these types of cases, one of the most challenging issues is establishing the relationship between tippee and tipper.
So to deal with that, we have developed what we call the Advanced Bluesheet Analysis Program (ABAP).
This program analyzes data provided to us by market participants on specific securities transactions. It identifies suspicious trading before market-moving events. It also shows the relationships among the different players that are involved in the trading – relationships that might not have been apparent at first.
We plan to step up our use of this program, but we have already seen significant results on the insider trading front.
The technology we are using is assisting us in many areas. We are using data analytics and related technology to enable us to conduct predictive analysis and spot trends, streamline our investigative efforts and leverage new data sources such as Form PF, which collects information from private funds – hedge funds, private equity funds – on, among other things, the type and size of assets they hold.
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Pursuing G atekeepers
In addition to finding ways to be more places, we also are focusing more on those who play the role of gatekeepers in our financial system.
Cases against delinquent gatekeepers remind them, and the industry, of the important responsibilities that gatekeepers share with us to protect investors.
Investment Company Boards
Recently, for instance, we brought actions related to the investor protection role played by the boards that oversee investment funds. One such action involved trustees whose responsibilities include approving investment advisory contracts on behalf of a mutual fund’s shareholders. The Commission’s case, which was settled, charged that the review of the contract by the trustees of the funds was inadequate. The core of the claim was that the reports to shareholders from the trustees contained misleading information or omitted material information about how the trustees evaluated certain factors in reaching their decision to approve the contracts on behalf of the funds.[6]
Investment company boards serve as critical gatekeepers and we will focus on ensuring that they appropriately perform their duties.
It has been suggested that our focus on gatekeepers may drive away those who would otherwise serve in these roles, for fear of being second-guessed or blamed for every issue that arises. I hear and I am sensitive to that concern. But this is my response: first, being a director or in any similar role where you owe a fiduciary duty is not for the uninitiated or the faint of heart. And, second, we will not be looking to charge a gatekeeper that did her job by asking the hard questions, demanding answers, looking for red flags and raising her hand.
Operation Broken Gate
We are also continuing our focus on auditors. Auditors serve as critical gatekeepers – experts charged with making sure that the processes that companies use to prepare and report financial information are ones that are built on strength and integrity. Investors rely on auditors and need them to do their job and do it very well.
As part of this focus, we recently launched Operation Broken Gate – an initiative to identify auditors who neglect their duties and the required auditing standards. This initiative probes the quality of audits and determines whether the auditors missed or ignored red flags; whether they have proper documentation; and, whether they followed their professional standards.[7]
Just last week, this initiative produced its first set of charges against three auditors. Two of them have already been suspended from the industry. You should expect more of these cases.[8]
Fixing Broken Windows
As I have said, we are casting our nets wider, and using nets with smaller spaces, paying attention to violations and violators regardless of size.
We are able to do this by streamlining our investigations, particularly those involving strict liability violations where we do not need to prove intent, like the Rule 105 cases.
The idea is to bring these cases quickly and establish a consistent approach to disgorgement and penalties, which allows us to incentivize parties to settle quickly.
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Rule 105 of Regulation M
We used this new streamlined approach most recently when we brought actions against nearly two dozen firms for violating Rule 105 of Regulation M.
For those of you who do not know what it is, Rule 105 is a provision of the Exchange Act. It is an important rule that bans firms from improperly participating in public offerings soon after short selling those same stocks.
The rule is intended to protect a stock offering from potential manipulation by short sellers who artificially depress market prices and, in the process, guarantee themselves a profit while reducing the company’s offering proceeds and diluting shareholder value.
We obtained disgorgement from nearly two dozen firms ranging from $4,000 to more than $2.5 million – showing that no amount is too small to escape our attention, and that going after smaller infractions will not distract us from larger ones.[9] Even the cases with modest disgorgement amounts still translated into some sizeable sanctions, as we obtained a minimum penalty of $65,000 for the smallest violations.
In the process, we sent a message that we will not tolerate any violations – big or small – that threaten the integrity of the capital raising process. And we think that the message is being heard.
Microcap
We also continue to make clear to the microcap community that, there too, we are watching and acting.
Abuses in this area frequently involve entities that use false or misleading marketing campaigns and manipulative trading strategies, largely at the expense of less sophisticated investors. Over time, these abuses have proliferated due to the increased use of the Internet and, in particular, social media to publicize fraudulent schemes and lure in unsuspecting investors.
To stay on top of this, the division recently created a Microcap Fraud Task Force to ensure that the appropriate expertise and attention be brought to bear on these types of frauds.[10]
This task force targets broker-dealers, transfer agents, attorneys, accountants and other market participants who unfortunately often have key roles in facilitating these schemes. The Task Force’s aim is to develop real-time enforcement so that we can stop schemes in their early stages, with tools like trading suspensions and asset freezes. These cases also often involve cooperation with criminal authorities.
Prioritizing the Bigger Cases
All of this talk about being everywhere should not be taken to suggest that the SEC’s investigative flashlight will shine only or mostly into the dark corners and hidden nooks of the financial system.
Quite the opposite. It is critical that we continue to focus on the larger, tougher, and more complicated cases.
There are many examples that I could cite, and you may have read about some of the Enforcement Division’s recent successes, but I will today just add a few words about our newly created Financial Reporting and Audit Task Force.[11]
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This task force brings together an expert group of attorneys and accountants who are developing state-of-the art techniques for identifying and uncovering accounting fraud. This group relies on the latest data analytic tools to identify high-risk companies, as well as on “street sweeps,” where appropriate. These cases often involve large, resource intensive investigations that I know keep many in this audience busy.
In all our cases, we will strive for settlements that have a deterrent effect, and where appropriate, the added measure of public accountability that an admission often brings.[12]
In addition, we will continue to aggressively seek monetary penalties whether against corporations or individuals. Strong penalties play an important role in a strong enforcement program.
With respect to corporate penalties, it is important to note that the decision to seek a corporate penalty, and how high it is, is something that is left to my judgment and that of each of my fellow Commissioners after a consideration of all the facts. And we will all have our own perspectives on this issue. In the end, each of us will, within our legal authority, exercise our individual discretion in making this assessment.
One final note, I appreciate that some in the defense bar may not want the SEC to be a tough cop, and believe that the SEC, as a regulator, should play more of a remedial role.
I disagree with the first half of this observation. The SEC is, in very important part, a law enforcement agency, and should be seen by investors to be “their cop.” And, the SEC must continue to be the tough cop because in many cases, particularly when there is no criminal violation, it is the only agency that can play that role.
Although some of those who defend parties against SEC actions may have forgotten it was Congress in 1990 that gave the SEC broad authority to assess penalties and to punish the wrongdoer. Taking actions as simply a regulatory body is not enough to achieve its goals. The SEC must employ its tools to achieve the maximum amount of deterrence.
Let me not finish these remarks, however, without making clear that a critical part of a strong enforcement program is also to act only when the evidence justifies acting and to always go about our investigations and cases fairly, and with the mindset of doing the right thing in the right way.
Conclusion
So to conclude, I recognize the SEC cannot literally be everywhere, but we will be in more places than ever before. Our aim is also to create an environment where you think we are everywhere – using collaborative efforts, whistleblowers and computer technology to expand our reach, focusing on gatekeepers to make them think twice about shirking responsibilities, and ensuring that even the small violations face consequences.
Investors feel more confident about participating in our markets if they know we are doing more than waiting for something to happen, if they know we are trying to be one step ahead of the fraudsters, rather than one step behind, and if they know we are out there protecting them and the integrity of our markets. They deserve no less.
Modified: Oct 9, 2013
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Speech
Securities Enforcement Forum West 2016 Keynote Address: Private Equity Enforcement
Andrew Ceresney, Director, Division of Enforcement
Securities Enforcement Forum West San Francisco, California
May 12, 2016
I. Introduction |
Thank you for that kind introduction Bruce. At the outset, let me give the requisite reminder that the views I express today are my own and do not necessarily represent the views of the Commission or its staff.[1]
I am very excited to be here in San Francisco and am honored to be part of this terrific program for the second time. As you know, we have two offices here in California, the San Francisco and Los Angeles offices, and they are a critical part of our enforcement team. So I seize every chance I get to come out here, visit those offices and underline our presence on the West Coast.
Today, I am going to talk about the Enforcement Division’s focus on private equity, which has expanded significantly over the past three years. I am frequently asked how I measure the success of the SEC’s enforcement program. Among the several ways we measure our success is the impact of our actions on particular sectors or markets. Our work in the private equity space provides a concrete example of how our actions have led to real change in a market that has benefited investors enormously.
I plan to do three things today. First, I will share with you some background on Enforcement’s work in the private equity industry and our collaboration with our partners in the Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations (OCIE) and the Division of Investment Management, and explain why it is important for the Enforcement Division to dedicate resources to this asset class. Second, I will highlight certain problematic conduct and practices we have uncovered through our private equity enforcement actions, and note some of the common arguments we have rejected that have been advanced by some of the defendants in some of these actions. Third, I will discuss how the industry has responded to our actions in altering certain practices and increasing transparency, all to the benefit of investors.
II. Background |
Investments in private equity funds have increased significantly in recent years. Preqin estimates that, as of June 2015, private equity advisers worldwide managed $4.2 trillion, much of it in the United States, compared to just over $700 billion in 2000.[2] Many investors have invested in private equity based on their expectation that private equity returns would be uncorrelated with and/or exceed public equity market returns, and in certain cases, they have been proven correct.[3]
Private equity has certain unique characteristics, particularly in its investment structure. In most funds, on day one, investors are required to commit capital for investments that might not produce returns until 10 years or more down the road. Prior to committing capital, investors enter into certain agreements that are
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It is thus critically important that advisers disclose all material information, including conflicts of interest, to investors at the time their capital is committed. While most private equity funds have a Limited Partner Advisory Committee (known as a LPAC), or similar oversight body, made up of sophisticated investors, unaffiliated with the adviser that is sometimes explicitly tasked with reviewing conflicts of interest by the fund’s formation documents, as we will see, certain private equity fund advisers have failed to provide the LPAC members with sufficient disclosures to make such determinations.
In addition, private equity fund investments themselves are different than other asset classes. Private equity advisers typically purchase controlling interests in portfolio companies and frequently take a hands-on approach to managing those investments by serving on the company’s board; selecting and monitoring the management team; acting as sounding boards for CEOs; and sometimes stepping into management roles themselves. Advisers typically charge the fund and the portfolio companies fees to compensate for these services.
I think it is fair to say that the investment structure of private equity and the nature of private equity investments can lend themselves to some of the misconduct that we’ve observed. As you’ll see in some of the enforcement actions I reference, investors in certain circumstances do not have sufficient transparency into how fees and expenses are charged to portfolio companies or the funds. Sometimes fees are not properly disclosed, conflicts are not aired, expenses are misallocated, and investors are defrauded. Private equity advisers are fiduciaries and need to fully satisfy the duties of a fiduciary in all of their actions.
Now, why is the SEC spending its limited resources on the private equity industry given the sophistication of most investors? Because it is important to understand that retail investors are significantly invested in private equity. For example, public pension plans frequently invest the retirement savings of their plan beneficiaries — which include teachers, police officers and firefighters — in private equity funds. Similarly, institutional investors have increased their investments in private equity funds, often on behalf of retail investors who themselves are saving for retirement.[4] Further, university endowments — which fund scholarships and other important academic programs — invest in private equity funds. So, if an adviser defrauds a private equity fund, the underlying victims frequently include retail investors, who in many cases are not in a position to protect themselves. In addition, while the managers of these pension funds and other institutional investors who invest in private equity can be sophisticated, even experienced investors can be defrauded if they lack transparency into the various fees, expenses, and practices - which has been the case in the past. There is thus little question that private equity is an appropriate focus for the SEC.
Prior to 2010, private equity fund advisers typically did not register with the Commission, and the Commission staff often had limited visibility into their practices. However, in 2010, two significant events occurred: (i) Dodd-Frank was enacted; and (ii) the SEC’s Division of Enforcement announced the creation of specialized units — including the Asset Management Unit. Dodd-Frank required many private equity fund advisers to register with the Commission and be subject to periodic examination by OCIE, giving us increased visibility into the advisers. At the same time, the Asset Management Unit began developing the expertise necessary to understand private equity fund advisers and their practices. In October 2012, OCIE launched the Presence Exam Initiative, which included extensive engagement with the private equity
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In 2014, Andrew Bowden, then-Director of OCIE, publicly identified a number of industry practices that OCIE had observed during these examinations.[5] He observed that over fifty percent of the examined private equity fund advisers had compliance issues.[6] Among the problematic practices he identified were advisers’ allocation of expenses, hidden fees, and issues related to marketing and valuation.[7] OCIE shared its findings with the Asset Management Unit and, where appropriate, the Unit opened investigations. The AMU has now brought eight enforcement actions related to private equity advisers — with more to come — and it is an appropriate time to step back and evaluate what we have learned thus far.
III. Enforcement Actions |
Our actions against private equity fund advisers fall into three interrelated categories, which I will discuss in turn:
1. | Advisers that receive undisclosed fees and expenses; |
2. | Advisers that impermissibly shift and misallocate expenses; and |
3. | Advisers that fail to adequately disclose conflicts of interests, including conflicts arising from fee and expense issues. |
One issue we have seen in our cases is undisclosed fees and expenses and the Blackstone case vividly illustrated these issues. In 2015, the Commission charged three private equity advisers within The Blackstone Group for two distinct breaches of fiduciary duty, and Blackstone paid approximately $39 million to settle the matter, $29 million of which was distributed to harmed investors.[8] First, according to the SEC Order, Blackstone terminated certain portfolio company monitoring agreements between Blackstone and its funds’ portfolio companies, and accelerated the payment of future monitoring fees. Although Blackstone disclosed in its offering documents that it might receive monitoring fees from portfolio companies, it failed to disclose to its funds, and the limited partners prior to their commitment of capital, that it might accelerate future monitoring fees upon termination of the monitoring agreements. In most instances, Blackstone terminated the monitoring agreement upon a portfolio company’s IPO, and accelerated monitoring fee payments, while maintaining some ownership stake in the company. In some instances, Blackstone terminated the monitoring agreement, and accelerated monitoring fee payments, even where the relevant Blackstone-advised fund had completely exited the portfolio company, meaning that Blackstone would no longer be providing monitoring services to the portfolio company. In other words, the payments to Blackstone essentially reduced the value of the portfolio companies prior to sale, to the detriment of the funds and their investors. It is important to emphasize that our action took no position on the propriety of accelerated monitoring fees. Instead, our concern was making sure that the adviser complied with the fund offering documents and made timely, accurate and full disclosure of conflicts of interest and other material facts. In many ====== 2-580 ====== Second, according to the Order, Blackstone fund investors were not informed about a fee arrangement that provided Blackstone with a substantially greater discount on legal services provided by an outside law firm than the discount that the law firm provided to the funds. The law firm performed a substantial volume of work for Blackstone and the funds, and, despite the fact that the funds generated significantly more legal fees than Blackstone, Blackstone negotiated an arrangement with the law firm where it received a discount substantially larger than the discount it negotiated for the funds. The issue here was that Blackstone breached its fiduciary duty by securing greater benefits for itself than the funds it advised, without properly disclosing and obtaining informed consent for the arrangement. The message of this case is that full transparency of fees and conflicts of interest is critical in the private equity industry.[9] |
We have also been focused in our enforcement actions on expense shifting. Today, I will highlight three enforcement actions touching on this issue: the first concerning an adviser that allocated broken deal expenses entirely to its flagship funds; a second concerning an adviser that misallocated portfolio company expenses between two funds that it managed; and a third concerning an adviser that misallocated expenses between the adviser and the fund. In June 2015, the Commission charged KKR with misallocating more than $17 million of “broken deal” expenses to its flagship private equity funds in breach of its fiduciary duty.[10] Broken deal expenses are diligence and other legal costs related to unsuccessful buyout opportunities and can run into the tens of millions of dollars. In many cases, broken deal expenses are paid by the fund, but that dynamic is more complicated at large advisers where there may be co-investors, separate accounts, friends and family vehicles, and others contemplating investing alongside the funds in portfolio companies. Unless otherwise disclosed to investors, it is important for advisers to ensure that the costs of each potential investment are paid by those that might benefit from that potential investment’s return. In KKR’s case, that did not happen. According to the SEC Order, KKR did not allocate any portion of these broken deal expenses to its separate accounts or their own investment vehicles, even though KKR invested alongside the funds. Nor did KKR disclose in its offering materials that the flagship funds would pay all broken deal expenses. This breach of fiduciary duty is particularly troubling because a sizeable amount of co-investment capital came from KKR-affiliated vehicles, such that the firm had the funds foot the bill for deal sourcing activity that inured directly to its benefit. KKR ultimately paid a total of $30 million to settle the matter, including a $10 million penalty. In 2014, the Commission charged Lincolnshire Management for misallocating expenses between two portfolio companies.[11] Lincolnshire had integrated two portfolio companies — each owned by a different Lincolnshire-advised fund with different investors — and managed them as one company. However, according to the Order, Lincolnshire caused one portfolio company to pay more than its proportionate ====== 2-581 ====== The misallocation that occurred in Lincolnshire could be described as horizontal misallocation, as the misallocation occurred across funds. Another enforcement action — Cherokee[12] — could best be described as vertical misallocation, as the misallocation occurred between the adviser and the funds it managed. In Cherokee, the Commission charged two private equity fund advisers with improperly allocating their own consulting, legal, and compliance-related expenses to their private equity fund clients in contravention of the funds’ organizational documents. Cherokee ultimately reimbursed the funds for such expenses, and paid a $100,000 penalty. |
Finally, I will focus on two cases in which the respondents failed to disclose conflicts of interest to their funds’ LPAC. As I had discussed earlier, private equity funds typically have LPACs consisting of independent investors with the authority to approve or disapprove of conflicts of interest on behalf of the fund. In each of these cases, however, the respondents failed to disclose conflicts of interest, which arose after the initial capital commitments by the investors, to the LPACs. In 2015, the Commission charged Fenway Partners and four executives with failing to disclose several conflicts of interest to a private equity fund they advised.[13] In this case, we could trace the failures to particular individuals who we found had failed in their duties to investors in a number of ways and therefore charged individuals as well, which is a priority for us. First, Fenway Partners had initially entered into monitoring agreements with its portfolio companies, and the resulting fees paid to Fenway Partners were offset against Fenway Partners’ management fee paid by the fund. According to the SEC Order, Fenway Partners and four executives caused certain portfolio companies to terminate their payment obligations to Fenway Partners and enter into consulting agreements with an affiliated entity named Fenway Consulting Partners LLC. Fenway Consulting Partners provided similar services to the portfolio companies — often through the same employees — but the fees paid to Fenway Consulting Partners were not offset against the management fee that the fund paid to Fenway Partners. This altered arrangement was not disclosed to the LPAC or investors. Second, Fenway Partners and three respondents asked fund investors to provide $4 million in connection with an investment in a portfolio company without disclosing that $1 million of the investment would be used to pay its affiliate, Fenway Consulting. Third, without disclosure to the LPAC or investors, Fenway Partners and two respondents caused three former Fenway Partners employees to receive $15 million in incentive compensation from the sale of a portfolio company for services that they had almost entirely provided when they were Fenway Partners employees. Finally, Fenway Partners failed to disclose each of these payments as related-party transactions in the financial statements they provided to investors. This case illustrates the multiple ways in which advisers can, through relationships with affiliates and portfolio companies, benefit themselves at the expense of their investors. None of these payments that ====== 2-582 ====== In the second case, the Commission charged JH Partners with failing to disclose and obtain fund advisory board consent for a series of transactions, including: (a) a series of loans to the funds’ portfolio companies, resulting in the adviser obtaining interests in portfolio companies that were senior to the interests held by the funds; (b) causing more than one of its funds to invest in the same portfolio company at differing priority levels, potentially favoring one fund client over another; and (c) causing certain of the funds’ investments to exceed concentration limits set forth in the funds’ governing documents. JH Partners agreed to a cease and desist order and a $225,000 penalty as part of its agreement to settle the case.[14] These two cases drive home a fundamental principle: as fiduciaries, private equity fund advisers must make full disclosure of all material facts relating to its advisory services, including all material conflicts of interest between the adviser and its clients. This obligation requires private equity fund advisers to disclose sufficiently specific facts such that the client is able to understand the conflicts of interest and business practices, and can give informed consent to such conflicts or practices. Now, during the course of private equity investigations, we have heard a number of arguments advanced by the private equity fund advisers, each of which we have ultimately found unavailing. First, some potential defendants have argued that it is unfair to charge advisers for disclosure failures in fund organizational documents that were drafted long before the SEC began its focus on private equity and before many advisers were required to register. But, although private equity fund advisers typically did not register until after Dodd-Frank was enacted, they have always been investment advisers and subject to certain provisions of the Investment Advisers Act. All investment advisers, whether registered or not, are fiduciaries[15] and are subject to the Advisers Act antifraud provisions. Second, potential defendants have argued that, even if the adviser failed to disclose a conflict of interest, the investors benefited from the services provided by the adviser. While this may be a factor to consider when assessing any potential remedy, it is not a relevant argument for assessing liability. As a fiduciary, an investment adviser is required to disclose all material conflicts of interest so that the client can evaluate the conflict for itself. The fact that a conflicted transaction or practice might arguably benefit the client simply does not relieve an adviser of its duty to inform and obtain consent. Third, some advisers have pointed to advice they received from counsel, for example in connection with disclosures to investors. The involvement of counsel varies in each case, and assuming the adviser waives the privilege and discloses the advice completely, we will consider this advice in evaluating the appropriateness of an action and the remedies we will seek. However, the adviser is still ultimately responsible for its conduct — including its disclosures of conflicts to its clients — and cannot escape liability simply by pointing to the actions of counsel. |
IV. Impact on the Private Equity Industry |
To close today, I want to focus on the impact that our actions have had on the private equity industry. Our sense is that through the Commission’s focus on the industry, we have helped to significantly increase the level of transparency into fees, expenses, and conflicts of interest, and have prompted real change for the benefit of investors.
As a preliminary matter, beginning in 2014, a number of advisers revised their Form ADV filings to more fully disclose their fee and expense practices.[16] Perhaps more significantly, certain private equity
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Finally, there has been a significant and encouraging uptick in investors seeking additional transparency concerning advisers’ fee and expense practices. For example, the Institutional Limited Partners Association (ILPA) released a Fee Transparency Initiative in 2015 which aims to establish consistent standards for fee and expense reporting and compliance disclosures.[17] Similarly, a group of comptrollers and treasurers has sought clearer and more consistent disclosures in order to strengthen their retirement systems’ negotiating position, which they believe will result in more efficient investment options.[18]
Indeed, some have said that the Commission’s actions have shined light on private equity practices, including fees that investors believed were not appropriately charged to funds and portfolio companies and, by extension, investors. While our actions have taken no position on the propriety of these fees, the increased transparency has fostered a healthy dialogue between investors and advisers on what sorts of fees are appropriate and who should receive the benefits of those fees. I have been asked before whether we will bring a case asserting that a particular type of fee constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty. Whether we will or not, it is my belief that awareness and transparency of fees generally will lead investors and advisers to reach an appropriate balance in terms of types and allocation of fees. In short, I think our private equity actions have led to significant change in the private equity industry, all to the benefit of investors.
V. Conclusion |
I hope that this has given you a better sense of the SEC’s recent enforcement work concerning the private equity industry. The message should be clear: we have the expertise and will continue to aggressively bring impactful cases in this space. We also hope that our actions send a clear signal to industry participants that their practices must comport with their fiduciary duty and disclosures in their fund organizational documents.
Thank you for the opportunity to speak with you today.
Modified: May 12, 2016
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Speech
Remarks to the Investment Company Institute’s 2016 Mutual Funds and Investment Management Conference
David W. Grim, Director, Division of Investment Management
Orlando, Florida March 14, 2016
Introduction |
Good morning, everyone, and thank you, David, for that kind introduction, as well as for inviting me to speak here today. Before I begin, let me remind everyone that the views I express here today are solely my own, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission, the Commissioners, or any of my colleagues on the staff of the Commission.[1]
I am very pleased to be here with all of you today, and to deliver the keynote address for this year’s conference. It is also a pleasure to be joined at the conference by several of my colleagues from the Commission’s staff, who will participate in a number of panels over the next few days. In addition to staff members from other Divisions at the Commission, you’ll have the opportunity to hear from several talented and experienced members of the Division of Investment Management. They include Diane Blizzard, Associate Director of the Division’s Rulemaking office, who will anchor the regulatory panel for, I believe, the third year running; Sarah ten Siethoff, an Assistant Director in our Rulemaking office, who will participate in what I am sure will be an informative discussion of liquidity risk management; Matt Giordano, the Division’s Chief Accountant, who will update you on various accounting matters; Chris Stavrakos, a senior analyst in our Risk and Examinations office, who will discuss the Commission’s data analytics initiatives; and Dan Townley, an Attorney Fellow in our New York office, who will discuss the use of derivatives. I know each of them will have useful insights to offer on these and other topics.
The past few years have marked an especially eventful time for the Division of Investment Management (the “Division”). In fact, these years have been one of the most vibrant and innovative periods for the Division that I can recall. The past year alone witnessed the Commission’s proposal of several important rulemakings in the investment management space, including a proposal that would modernize reporting and disclosure by registered investment companies,[2] a proposal that would promote effective liquidity-risk management throughout the open-end fund industry,[3] and, most recently, a proposal to update and enhance the regulation of funds’ use of derivatives.[4]
In addition, the Division continued its Senior Level Engagement program last year, which allows us to have productive and candid discussions with the executive leadership and boards of a variety of funds and asset managers on a range of topics, including the novel challenges posed by an increasingly complex investment landscape. Moreover, over the past twelve months, the Division issued approximately 26 no-action letters, acted on approximately 156 applications for exemptive relief, and published five guidance updates, including one addressing the challenging issue of cybersecurity. During the 2015 calendar year, Division staff also reviewed filings that covered over 12,000 funds. And, despite all of that, the Division’s hardworking staff still found time to prepare for and host a celebration of the 75th
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Periods of especially intense activity, like the past year, tend to put me in a contemplative frame of mind. I find it useful at such times to pause and reflect on what we as a Division have achieved, what lessons can be gleaned from our experiences, and how we can better fulfill our core mission of protecting investors; maintaining fair, orderly and efficient markets; and facilitating capital formation. In that vein, I thought I would devote my time today to sharing with you some views on the various initiatives the Division is currently pursuing, as well as my thoughts on some recent occurrences in the investment management space.
Pending Rulemakings |
I’d like to begin by discussing some of the proposed rulemakings from the past year. I am sure everyone here understands that I cannot go into too much detail on matters that may come before the Commission in the near future. But I do want to share with you some initial impressions regarding the comments the Commission has received on some of these rulemakings.
But before I do that, I want to thank commenters for providing such fulsome and thoughtful responses to our recent proposals. In my experience, the rulemaking process works best when it involves a dialogue between the Commission and all of the various stakeholders. Accordingly, I encourage you to weigh in whenever you think you have information, expertise, or insights that would inform the staff’s thinking about a proposed rule. And I would especially urge you to furnish the Commission with any data or analyses that could provide a unique empirical perspective. Your vigorous participation in the rulemaking process is crucial.
Now, it seems that many of you have already followed this advice with regard to the Commission’s liquidity-risk management proposal. In fact, we received almost 80 comment letters in response to this proposal alone.[5] We are still in the process of giving these comments the careful and thorough analysis that they warrant. Our initial review has revealed that a number of commenters recognized the benefits of requiring open-end funds to implement robust liquidity-risk management programs. These commenters noted that proper oversight of liquidity risk is a vital aspect of prudent fund management. Several commenters also acknowledged that swing pricing could be a worthy endeavor, since it holds the promise of a more equitable allocation of transaction costs, as well as the possibility of enhanced fund performance over the long term. A number of commenters also focused on certain aspects of the proposal’s suggested approach to overall liquidity management. Among the issues raised by some commenters is whether the proposal’s goals could be better achieved through alternative approaches, especially with regard to the proposal’s liquidity classification framework and the three-day minimum liquidity requirement. We appreciate these comments, and are closely reviewing the various alternatives to the proposed approaches that have been suggested. As I mentioned, I cannot speak to the relative merits of the issues that have been raised by different commenters. I can assure you, however, that we understand your concerns, that we are taking them very seriously, and that they will inform the Division’s thinking as we move toward crafting final rules. Simply put, we hear you. ====== 2-587 ====== The spirited response to the liquidity-risk management proposal is certainly understandable. But I think many would agree that recent events, particularly in certain areas of the bond markets, have led some advisers to renew their focus on liquidity risk management. Mutual funds witnessed sharp spikes in outflows during periods of intense market volatility in August and December of last year,[6] and last December also saw global bond funds incur their largest outflows since June 2013.[7] And, as you all know, last December also witnessed the total suspension of redemptions by one open-end fund. Fortunately, that situation ultimately proved to be limited. Yet, it certainly underscores the hard truth that prudent liquidity management has become even more vital in today’s markets. |
I’d like to turn now to the proposal to modernize and enhance the reporting framework for investment companies and investment advisers. I view this proposal as vital to the Division’s mission, since it would allow the Division to broaden and deepen its understanding of funds and the manner in which they operate. Few would dispute that the investment management industry has witnessed transformational changes in the past decade, not only in terms of the products it offers, but also in terms of the investment strategies it pursues, and even the technology on which it relies. To keep pace with such a rapidly evolving industry, both the Commission and investors should have access to more substantive and more uniform information about funds and their advisers. A review of the comments we have received reveals that, here, too, a number of commenters acknowledge the potential benefits of the proposed approach. At the same time, some commenters urged the Commission to consider certain possible ramifications of the proposal. For example, some commenters questioned whether, in collecting portfolio information from funds, the Commission could become a target for cyber criminals looking to exploit this cache of information. I want to emphasize again that the Division appreciates your comments. The staff is thoroughly assessing commenters’ input as it plans to develop a final rule for the Commission’s consideration. Although I cannot address any specifics about the approach the Division may recommend for the final rule, I would like to briefly discuss some of the ways the Commission is addressing cybersecurity, particularly for the information that it collects. Chair White has acknowledged the critical importance of cybersecurity on a number of occasions, and has taken steps to ensure that the Commission’s cybersecurity protocols are as robust as possible. For example, to help the Commission continue its efforts to strengthen its cyber security posture, Chair White has requested funds from Congress to maintain and enhance the Commission’s cyber capabilities.[8] Furthermore, consistent with the federal government’s Information System Continuous Monitoring methodology, the Commission remains focused on enhancing awareness of its information security status, including its vulnerabilities and the threats it faces. Such awareness is an essential component of any effective cybersecurity regime, as it supports risk-response decisions, and offers insights into the effectiveness of the Commission’s security controls. The Commission is also implementing certain cybersecurity protocols that are consistent with those recommended by the National Institute of Standards and Technology, which develops frameworks for cybersecurity risk mitigation. Finally, the Commission plans to focus on bolstering its ability to respond rapidly and effectively to any unauthorized intrusions that may occur.[9] In sum, I believe the Commission remains focused on cybersecurity, and that it is working diligently to continue to be a responsible steward of the information it collects. The Commission also continues to assess the comments received on the reporting modernization’s proposal to permit mutual funds and other registered investment companies to provide shareholder ====== 2-588 ====== |
Reflections on Recent Events |
I’d like to turn now to Third Avenue Management’s decision last December to wind down its Focused Credit Fund. Those events highlighted a number of longstanding issues that have broader relevance for the investment management industry. Division staff is analyzing the events of last December carefully to distill the lessons that can be learned. Although that analysis remains ongoing, I do have some initial thoughts that I’d like to share with you.
First, I want to emphasize my view that any fund contemplating the extraordinary step of suspending redemptions should approach the Division as soon as possible. I believe investors fare best when a fund facing acute liquidity pressures brings the Division into the conversation at the earliest possible juncture.
Second, the events of last December have led me to spend some time thinking about the contours of the open-end fund structure. Some have expressed the view that certain assets are simply too illiquid to be held in large concentrations by open-end funds.[10] Under such an assumption, I believe certain investment strategies—such as those focused heavily on distressed debt—may be more suitable as closed-end or private funds, rather than as funds that are subject to daily redeemability. I think this issue is one that fund management and boards ought to weigh carefully. This issue also highlights for me how important it is for funds to implement robust policies and procedures to ensure that their investment strategies are appropriate for an open-end structure, both at a fund’s inception and throughout the life of a fund. I would encourage fund management and boards to view the events of last December as an invitation to revisit the adequacy of their own protocols for vetting new funds that will be subject to daily redeemability.
Finally, the events of last December have crystallized for me just how effective the liquidity risk proposal could be in enhancing funds’ ability to manage the liquidity risks of their portfolios. For example, if adopted, the liquidity proposal would require open-end funds to apply a standard set of factors when assessing their liquidity risks, including cash flow projections that take into account historical redemptions. Open-end funds would also be required to adopt a written program reasonably designed to assess and manage these risks. In addition, a fund’s board would review the fund’s liquidity risk management protocols, providing an added layer of objective oversight to management’s determinations. And, equally important, if adopted, the proposal would also provide Commission staff and investors with more detailed information about open-end funds’ liquidity profiles. This information could be particularly useful in helping staff to identify and monitor sections of the fund industry that could pose heightened liquidity risk.
Risk Disclosure |
So what else has the Division been doing to ensure that the Commission remains an effective regulator of
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Lincoln once said that important principles must be inflexible, and in my view, ensuring that fund disclosures are accurate and complete is just such a principle. Effective fund disclosures are a pillar of the Investment Company Act’s investor protection framework. And I believe nowhere is the need for effective disclosure more acute than with respect to the various risks that funds face. As we all know, however, risk has a fluid quality. Changing market conditions can dramatically heighten certain risks, while simultaneously causing other risks to wane. As a result, whenever market conditions begin to shift materially, I believe funds should consider whether their funds’ risk disclosures need to be revised to warn of a changing risk profile.
To help ensure that funds provide adequate risk disclosures during changing markets, the Division’s recent guidance emphasizes basic practices that funds should consider.[11] For example, the guidance stresses the importance of routinely monitoring market conditions and gauging the impact of changing conditions on the fund and its investments. The guidance goes on to note that funds should determine whether any significant market developments rise to the level of being material to investors. If so, the guidance encourages funds to review their existing risk disclosures and determine if they continue to accurately describe the risks confronting their funds.
In the event that a fund deems it necessary to update its risk disclosures, the guidance encourages funds to consider all appropriate avenues for communicating with investors. Specifically, the guidance recommends that funds consider not just the more traditional methods of shareholder communication, such as prospectuses and shareholder reports, but also less formal methods, including posting updates to the fund’s website or sending letters directly to shareholders.
The guidance also shares examples of how some funds have revised their risk disclosures in an effort to keep pace with recent market developments, including rising interest rates and Puerto Rico’s struggles to service its debt.[12] I hope these examples will help other funds gain insights into how they can disclose other consequential events. As always, if you have additional views on this topic, I encourage you to share them with me or the staff.
Thoughts on Other Initiatives |
I’d like to turn now to some other issues that I have been thinking about in recent months. As Chair White recently noted, the Commission is increasingly looking to tools beyond disclosure requirements to address the novel challenges posed by a constantly shifting investment management landscape.[13] Consistent with that approach, the Division is working to develop proposed rules for the Commission’s consideration that would require registered investment advisers to create and implement transition plans. In addition, as required by the Dodd-Frank Act, the staff is also developing a recommendation for new requirements for stress testing by large investment advisers and investment companies.
Again, I’m limited in what I can say about these potential rulemakings, but I did want to share some thoughts about how one recent market event underscores the importance of mitigating operational risk, particularly through proper business continuity planning. Funds are relying increasingly on technologies and services provided by third parties to conduct their daily operations. But this convenience comes at a cost. For example, last August, a computer malfunction at one financial institution prevented it from calculating accurate net asset values for hundreds of mutual funds and exchange traded funds. The
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Reflecting on these events, I think some useful lessons can be drawn. First, when fund complexes outsource critical functions to third parties, they should conduct thorough initial and ongoing due diligence of those third parties. An important component of such due diligence is to explore the service provider’s business continuity and disaster recovery protocols, and to understand how your own business continuity plan addresses the risk that a key service provider could suffer a significant business disruption. In the case of last August, the service provider had a backup system in place, but that system also failed. In light of that, I think it is appropriate for funds to focus on their oversight of key service providers and the robustness of such vendors’ business continuity plans, including how they intend to maintain operations during a significant business disruption.
Equally important, fund complexes may want to consider how they can best monitor whether a service provider has experienced a significant disruption (such as a cybersecurity breach or other continuity event) that could impair its ability to provide uninterrupted services, the potential impacts such events may have on fund operations and investors, and the communication protocols and steps that may be necessary to successfully navigate such events.
In addition, I believe fund complexes should consider having a detailed playbook for responding to various scenarios, whether those disruptions occur internally or at a key service provider. If history teaches us one thing, it is that once a crisis strikes, it is already too late to being formulating a response.
Conclusion |
I’ll conclude my remarks today by again thanking the ICI for inviting me to speak. As I prepared for this event, it occurred to me that I am approaching my one-year anniversary as Director of the Division of Investment Management. Looking back on the past year, I was struck by the tremendous dynamism of the Division that I now lead. To keep pace with an ever-evolving industry, the staff of the Division of Investment Management has had to evolve, as well. It has done so in a variety of ways, including by collecting new forms of data, using that data in different and more creative ways, and by acquiring additional skillsets and expertise. The staff has achieved much in the past few years, and I hope I have conveyed to you all today how proud I am of it.
Thank you.
Modified: March 14, 2016
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Speech
Remarks to the PLI Investment Management Institute – 2016
David Grim, Director, Division of Investment Management
New York, NY
March 3, 2016
Thank you, Paul, for your kind introduction. Good morning and thank you for inviting me to speak to you today. Before I begin, let me remind you that the views I express are my own and do not necessarily reflect the view of the Commission, any of the Commissioners, or of my colleagues on the staff of the Commission.[1]
Almost exactly a year ago today, I addressed this conference about the initiatives we were working on. I think it’s fair to say that we’ve been pretty busy in the past twelve months.
Today, I am here to talk about the past, present and future of our industry, by discussing themes we heard from the retrospective look we took at the industry and regulation while commemorating the 75th Anniversary of the Investment Company Act and Investment Advisers Act.
Regulating the Asset Management Industry
Let’s begin by looking at the past 75 plus years of the two Acts that govern the asset management industry.
We start with the American investor. Americans invest in asset management products and rely on professional advice from investment advisers for critical and core reasons — to pay for a house, to invest for a college education or to provide income for retirement.
Back in 1940, SEC Commissioner “Judge” Robert Healy said to Congress that the Investment Company Act would “provide safeguards without undue restrictions so that those who desire to put their savings to work in this manner may do so with greater confidence.”[2]
The leadership of the Commission and the adaptability of the Acts since then have resulted in rules and regulatory responses that protect investors even through substantial changes in the market and the asset management industry.
For those who were not able to make it there in person, I encourage you to take a look at the archive of our celebration of the 75 years of the Investment Company Act and Investment Advisers Act on the Commission’s website—it was truly a historic gathering.[3]
In 1940, when the Acts were passed, industry leaders sat down with government representatives to think constructively about the solutions of the day. Last year’s commemoration also included industry pioneers and government representatives, as well as academics and thought leaders.
The discussion was wide-ranging, but four topics really have stood out for me because they are topics rooted in the adaptability which the authors gave the 1940 laws governing the asset management industry. These topics continue to present vital issues in the present day, and pose considerations for
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Exchange-Traded Funds
The existence and growth of exchange-traded funds could not have been predicted by Judge Healy and others back in 1940. ETFs are permitted to operate by Commission orders granting exemptions from certain provisions of the Investment Company Act. Like mutual funds, ETFs issue shares representing interests in a pool of investments. However, unlike mutual funds, ETF investors buy and sell those shares on a national securities exchange at a market determined price.
ETFs have grown rapidly in recent years, with assets in ETFs increasing from $300.8 billion at the end of 2005 to $2.1 trillion at July 31, 2015, a more than 600% increase.[4] The asset classes and investment strategies offered within ETF structures have also expanded. While historically ETFs have tracked the performance of specific equity indexes, ETFs today track fixed income securities indexes and international securities indexes. In addition, over time, the indices that ETFs track have, in many cases, become narrower and more specialized, resulting in many niche funds that no longer reflect a broad cross-section of the securities market. And some ETFs are actively managed — that is, they do not merely seek to passively track an index, and instead seek to achieve a specified investment objective using an active investment strategy—with transparency of their portfolios. Current actively managed ETFs operate with full portfolio transparency.
ETFs are an area of focus for the Commissioners, the staff and industry observers. To give you some flavor:
First, they were a hot topic during our 75th Anniversary event. We heard at our 75th Anniversary event about the relatively quick growth of ETFs and questions as to how they fit in to the current regulatory regime. We also heard how ETFs serve as an example of how the adaptability of the Investment Company Act facilitates the creation of innovative products, even 75 years later, through the Commission’s exercise of its exemptive authority.
Second, in June 2015 the Commission issued a request for comment to help inform its review of the listing and trading of new, novel, or complex ETFs and other exchange traded products.[5] Commission staff is in the process of reviewing comments received in response to the request for comment.
Third, while Commission staff members are considering a range of issues surrounding ETFs, the Commission also has incorporated ETFs into several rules advanced as part of the agenda to address the increasingly complex portfolios and operations of mutual funds and ETFs. The Reporting Modernization rulemaking proposal in May 2015, for example, proposed collecting more tailored data for ETFs.[6] The Commission also recently proposed rulemaking requiring mutual funds and ETFs to implement liquidity risk management programs and enhance disclosure regarding fund liquidity and redemption practices.[7] Most recently, the Commission proposed to limit the use of derivatives in registered funds, and discussed how the proposed rulemaking could affect certain alternative strategy ETFs. The release also asked commenters to weigh in as to whether certain types of ETFs should be subject to different limitations.[8]
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Finally, ETFs also came to the forefront on August 24, 2015 when the equity markets experienced volatility, trading pauses were triggered, and certain ETFs, including some of the largest and most-liquid, traded at prices that diverged from the value of their portfolio holdings. This event raised questions among regulators and market participants. A Research Note released by staff in the Division of Trading and Markets assessed the operation of the equity markets under the stressed conditions on August 24.[9]
As you can discern from this list, we in the Investment Management Division have been thinking a lot about ETFs and the significant role they play in the marketplace. To that end, we’ve leveraged significant expertise into the ETF space with staff focused on keeping abreast of emerging ETF developments and designing appropriate policy recommendations.
As we move forward to formulate recommendations for these rules and as we consider our priorities for this year, we continue to remain focused on ETFs.
Disclosure and Reporting
Disclosure is one of the critical pieces of the Acts — the “safeguards” as Judge Healy called them. A core function of both the Investment Company Act and Advisers Act is to promote informed decision making by investors by collecting information on funds and investment advisers and making that information publicly available.
The amount of information available to investors about funds and advisers, through publicly available forms, disclosures in prospectuses and offering documents, and information from third party sources, has increased exponentially since 1940. Today, we have 65 people in the Division who work full-time to review filings that cover over 12,000 funds a year.
At the 75th anniversary event, we heard about successes with and potential improvements to our disclosure regime.
As originally enacted, the Advisers Act sought to create a compulsory census of the investment adviser industry. The Commission has enhanced reporting over time to address an evolving investment advisory industry, including the effort in 2000 to have Form ADV be electronically filed through IARD, the changes in 2010 to Form ADV to provide clients with and file electronically greater information about the individuals who provide them with investment advice, the creation of Form PF in 2011 to collect data about private funds, and the current rule proposal to enhance data collection about separately managed accounts.
Similarly, on the registered fund side, we have historically acted to modernize our forms and the manner in which information is filed with the Commission and disclosed to the public in order to keep up with changes in the industry and technology.
And we consistently look to other ways to improve disclosures. IM staff published guidance on staff’s observations from reviewing summary prospectuses and ways in which staff believe disclosure can be improved.[10] Staff have also provided guidance on fund names that could potentially be misleading to investors.[11]
As you know, in May, the Commission voted unanimously to propose new reporting forms, N-PORT and N-CEN. If ultimately adopted, the Commission staff would be able to use the data collected from these proposed forms to help better understand the industry and products; and the data could also be used by investors directly or those who service them as a supplement to traditional disclosures to help them better understand products and make more informed choices.[12]
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I strongly believe in the data and disclosure mandate and we in the Division of Investment Management continue to think constructively about how to improve the effectiveness of disclosure. Meaningful information helps investors make informed choices, and that transparency benefits the entire industry.
Private Fund Advisers
The third hot topic at the 75th Anniversary Event was how Dodd-Frank changed the Commission’s authority over private fund advisers. Immediately prior to Dodd-Frank, the Commission had relatively limited insight into the business landscape of private fund advisers.
As a result of the Dodd-Frank Act, however, many private fund advisers registered with the Commission and filed Form ADV for the first time - advisers that before Dodd-Frank’s passage had not either voluntarily registered or otherwise had a requirement to register. This new set of registered advisers gave the Commission a bigger and more complete picture of the industry. Since these rules required by Dodd-Frank were implemented, approximately 1,500 new private fund advisers have registered with the Commission.
With registration, private fund advisers became subject to the full scope of the Advisers Act. Staff in IM’s private funds branch—specialized experts in this field— reviewed the Act and its rules and provided guidance on their application to private fund advisers.[13]
We also have benefited from key data collection component of the Dodd-Frank Act was Form PF, which is filed confidentially by private fund advisers that each manage more than $150 million in private fund assets. Form PF, provides rich data about private funds to the Commission and is intended by statute to be a tool to inform the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) in its analysis of financial stability issues. We collect data from Form PF data, among other things, on private funds’ use of leverage, counterparty credit risk exposure, and individual hedge fund trading practices. We have used the information in various ways — for example, OCIE staff uses Form PF to understand an adviser’s business and investment strategy as part of its pre-examination evaluations, and Enforcement staff members obtain and review Form PF filings in connection with their investigations. IM staff also uses Form PF filings directly to monitor investment strategies among private funds and to understand the potential effects of certain market or global events. And we have now published on our website four quarters of private funds statistics that provide highly aggregated and anonymized census data and statistics derived from Form PF data.[14] These statistics include, for example, the distribution of borrowings, an analysis of hedge fund gross notional exposure to net asset value, and a comparison of average hedge fund investor and hedge fund portfolio liquidity.
I believe this new era of increased transparency about private fund advisers has been ultimately beneficial not only for the Commission and investors, but also for private fund advisers. The public availability of aggregated information should help to address persistent questions, and to some degree misconceptions, about the practices and size of the private fund industry. Also, when investors have this kind of information, they can make more informed choices and the transparency benefits the entire industry.
The Role of Fund Boards
And finally, a topic that is always at the front of my mind and one that was discussed at length at the 75th anniversary event: fund directors.
So, what is the role of a fund director? It’s the critical job of oversight. “Oversight” does not equal day-today management of a fund. I recognize that if directors are overly burdened with a management function, they can’t effectively serve in their intended capacity. But that role means overseeing those who provide
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Our recent staff guidance update on fund distribution and “sub-accounting” fees is a prime example of this.[15] The guidance focuses on distribution—related issues that arise when funds pay intermediaries, like broker-dealers, who provide services for shareholders. The staff gave its views not only on the appropriate process a board should have in place to properly evaluate these fees, but also the responsibilities of a fund’s adviser and other service providers to provide sufficient information to boards of the overall picture of intermediary distribution and servicing arrangements for the funds.
Another example is our staff guidance on cybersecurity. Cybersecurity is clearly a timely issue. Our recent conversations with boards and senior management at advisers have stressed the need for firms to review cybersecurity measures. And our staff published guidance that outlined measures funds and advisers may want to consider as they think about cybersecurity risks.[16]
In the Commission’s recent rulemaking initiatives, the board’s role is yet again vital and focused on oversight. The recent rule proposal designed to promote stronger and more effective liquidity risk management across open-end funds would require a fund’s board to approve a liquidity risk management program, but this program would be administered on a day-to-day basis by the fund’s adviser or officers who the board has designated responsible for administering the program. The proposed rule also would require the board to review a report each year prepared by the fund’s adviser that describes the adequacy of the program. The Commission’s December proposal to provide a more comprehensive approach to funds’ use of derivatives also would require the board to play an important oversight role. The board would be charged with approving the portfolio limitation with which a fund will comply and approving policies and procedures to determine risk-based coverage. And for funds that use derivatives to a greater extent, the rule would require the board to approve a risk management program and designate a risk manager to oversee that program.
As we look forward to developing guidance and our policy recommendations, we continue to think critically about the board’s oversight function.
And to further make a point about our rulemaking initiatives — I can’t emphasize enough how important it is to receive thoughtful comments from stakeholders. When President Roosevelt signed the Investment Company Act and Advisers Act into law in 1940, he lauded the role of the industry in recognizing that a regulator “that has been given flexible powers to meet whatever problems may arise” would be a boon to investors and the industry alike.
Engagement with industry stakeholders was crucial in the past when the Investment Company Act and Advisers Act were passed in 1940. It is irreplaceable in the present during our outreach to the industry. Hearing from stakeholders also helps us — the rule-writers and regulators — in the future by formulating better policies.
I appreciate the opportunity to share with you these areas of focus that were highlighted during the 75th anniversary celebration and the work of the staff in the Division of Investment Management. Thank you for your attention and I hope you enjoy the program.
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Modified: March 3, 2016
[1]. | A copy of the SEC’s FY 2017 Congressional Budget Justification can be found on our website at http://www.sec.gov/about/reports/secfy17congbudgjust.pdf. |
[2]. | The views expressed in this testimony are those of the Chair of the Securities and Exchange Commission and do not necessarily represent the views of the President, the full Commission, or any Commissioner. In accordance with past practice, the budget justification of the agency was submitted by the Chair and was not voted on by the full Commission. |
[3]. | Section 991 of the Dodd-Frank Act requires the SEC to collect transaction fees from self-regulatory organizations in an amount designed to directly offset our appropriation. |
[4]. | The SEC will continue in 2016 to complete its remaining mandates. Of particular focus and priority will be to finalize the remaining security-based swap rules required of the SEC by Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act. In February, the agency passed another key Title VII milestone with the adoption of the last set of rules for cross-border dealer activity. Adoption of the substantive requirements for security-based swap dealers – specifically, the rules governing their business conduct and the requirements for their capital, margin, and asset segregation – are expected to be adopted soon. |
[5]. | The SEC has actively advanced discretionary rulemaking in a number of areas essential to our mission. Three of the most prominent of these initiatives center on the asset management industry, the structure of the equity markets, and the SEC’s disclosure regime. The Commission took action on all three in 2015, and I expect additional actions this year. Going forward, additional rulemaking initiatives to be considered will likely also include: shortening the securities transaction settlement cycle to support industry efforts and reduce potential systemic risk; further enhancing filings through the expanded use of structured data; and finalizing rules to update the intrastate offering exemption and recommendations for a universal proxy. In addition, I expect to continue to develop support from my fellow Commissioners for a uniform fiduciary duty for investment advisers and broker-dealers, and to bring forward a workable program for third party assessments to enhance the compliance of registered investment advisers. |
1. | This document was prepared by SEC staff, and the views expressed herein are those of OCIE. The Commission has expressed no view on this document’s contents. It is not legal advice; it is not intended to, does not, and may not be relied upon to create any rights, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by any party in any matter civil or criminal. |
2. | The regulated entities that OCIE examines include investment advisers, investment companies, broker-dealers, municipal advisors, transfer agents, exchanges, clearing agencies, and other self-regulatory organizations. |
3. | For decades, employers have shifted from offering defined benefit pensions to defined contribution plans, such as 401(k) accounts, that place funding and investment risk directly on participants. Today, it is estimated that approximately $16.5 trillion is invested in defined contribution plans (including individual retirement accounts and annuity reserves), while approximately $8.2 trillion is invested in defined benefit plans. See Nari Rhee, “Retirement Savings Crisis: Is it Worse than We Think” (June 2013), a publication of the National Institute on Retirement Security; see also “Retirement Assets Total $24.8 Trillion in Second Quarter 2015” (Sept. 2015), a publication of the Investment Company Institute. |
4. | See OCIE Risk Alert, “Retirement-Targeted Industry Reviews and Examinations Initiative,” June 22, 2015, http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/ocie/retirement-targeted-industry-reviews-and-examinations-initiative.pdf. |
5. | See SEC Investor Publications, “Variable Annuities: What You Should Know,” April 18, 2011, http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/varannty.htm. |
6. | See OCIE Risk Alert, “OCIE’s 2015 Cybersecurity Examinations Initiative,” Sept. 15, 2015, https://www.sec.gov/ocie/announcement/ocie-2015-cybersecurity-examination-initiative.pdf. |
7. | For the definitions of “SCI entities” and “SCI systems” see Regulation Systems Compliance and Integrity, Release No. 34-37639, http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2014/34-73639.pdf. |
8. | See OCIE’s Industry Letter for the Municipal Advisor Examination Initiative, August 19, 2014, https://www.sec.gov/about/offices/ocie/muni-advisor-letter-081914.pdf. |
9. | The EB-5 Program is a federal visa initiative, administered by United States Citizenship and Immigration Services. It provides a path to legal U.S. residency for foreign investors who make a qualifying investment in a commercial enterprise in the United States that creates or preserves at least ten permanent full-time jobs for qualified U.S. workers. See EB-5 Immigrant Investor Program description at http://www.uscis.gov/eb-5. |
10. | See OCIE’s Letter to Never-Before Examined Investment Advisers, February 20, 2014, http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/ocie/nbe-final-letter-022014.pdf. See also OCIE Risk Alert, “OCIE’s Never-Before-Examined Registered Investment Company Initiative,” April 20, 2015, http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/ocie/ocie-never-before-examined-registered-investment-company-initiative.pdf. |
[1]. | See Chair Mary Jo White, “Enhancing Risk Monitoring and Regulatory Safeguards for the Asset Management Industry,” Dec. 11, 2014, available at https://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370543677722. |
[2]. | See Investment Company Reporting Modernization, Investment Company Act Release No. 31610 (May 20, 2015), available at https://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2015/33-9776.pdf; Amendments to Form ADV and Investment Advisers Act Rules, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 4091 (May 20, 2015), available at https://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2015/ia-4091.pdf; Open-End Fund Liquidity Risk Management Programs; Swing Pricing; Re-Opening of Comment Period for Investment Company Reporting Modernization Release, Investment Company Act Release No. 31835 (Sept. 22, 2015), available at https://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2015/33-9922.pdf; Use of Derivatives by Registered Investment Companies and Business Development Companies, Investment Company Act Release No. 31933 (Dec. 11, 2015) , available at https://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2015/ic-31933.pdf. |
[3]. | See Paul Hanouna, et al., Liquidity and Flows of U.S. Mutual Funds (Sept. 2015), available at https://www.sec.gov/dera/staff-papers/white-papers/liquidity-white-paper-09-2015.pdf; Daniel Deli, et al., Use of Derivatives by Registered Investment Companies (Dec. 2015), available at https://www.sec.gov/dera/staff-papers/white-papers/derivatives12-2015.pdf. |
[1]. | The views expressed in this testimony are those of the Chair of the Securities and Exchange Commission and do not necessarily represent the views of the full Commission, or any Commissioner. |
[2]. | In many cases, the Commission, like other federal agencies with civil enforcement powers, determines that it is appropriate to continue to settle on a “no admit, no deny” basis. This practice allows the Commission to obtain significant relief, eliminate litigation risk, return money to victims more expeditiously, and conserve enforcement resources for other matters. |
[3]. | While the proposed rule could be used for any intrastate offering meeting its conditions, more than 25 states have enacted some form of intrastate crowdfunding, and this provision could facilitate capital raising through those state provisions. |
[4]. | Regulation S-K is the central repository for the Commission’s non-financial disclosure requirements. It is intended to foster uniform and integrated disclosure for registration statements under the Securities Act of 1933, registration statements under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act), and periodic and current reports filed under the Exchange Act. |
[5]. | Regulation S-X contains disclosure requirements that dictate the form and content of financial statements to be included in filings with the Commission. It addresses both registrant financial statements and financial statements of certain entities other than the registrant. It also requires that domestic issuer financial statements filed with the Commission be prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles. |
[6]. | For example, the proposals would, if adopted, require aggregate information related to assets held and use of borrowings and derivatives in separately managed accounts and provide additional information about an adviser’s advisory business, including branch office operations and the use of social media. |
[7]. | Swing pricing is the process of reflecting in a fund’s net asset value the costs associated with the trading activity of the fund occasioned by shareholders’ redemptions and purchases in order to reflect those costs in the prices paid and received by purchasing and redeeming shareholders. |
[1]. | Closed-end funds generally do not continuously offer their shares for sale and are not required to repurchase or redeem them. Rather, they sell a fixed number of shares at one time (in an initial public offering), after which the shares typically trade on a secondary market, such as the New York Stock Exchange or the Nasdaq Stock Market. |
[2]. | Congress created business development companies in 1980 as a specialized type of closed-end investment company (i.e., a fund that is not required to repurchase or redeem its securities) whose principal activities consist of investing in, and providing managerial assistance to, small, growing, or financially troubled domestic businesses. |
[3]. | A UIT is a type of investment company which (a) is organized under a trust indenture contract of custodianship or agency or similar instrument; (b) does not have a board of directors; and (c) issues only redeemable securities. |
[4]. | Like mutual funds, ETFs offer investors a way to pool their money in a fund that makes investments in stocks, bonds, or other assets and, in return, to receive an interest in that investment pool. Unlike mutual funds, however, ETF shares are traded on a national stock exchange and at market prices that may or may not be the same as the net asset value of the shares, that is, the value of the ETF’s assets minus its liabilities divided by the number of shares outstanding . Some ETFs track the performance of specific U.S. equity indexes, while others track indexes of fixed-income instruments and foreign securities. In addition, many newer ETFs are actively managed – that is, they do not merely seek to passively track an index, and instead seek to achieve a specified investment objective using an active investment strategy. |
[5]. | These funds include all money market funds except retail and government money market funds. |
[6]. | Current requirements do not include specific information for many types of derivatives, such as swaps, futures, and forwards. |
[7]. | Under the proposed rule, funds would be required to send notices to investors regarding the change to electronic delivery and online availability of shareholder reports on a regular basis, and the notices would need to inform investors how to receive free of charge paper copies of shareholder reports. |
[8]. | For example, the proposals would, if adopted, require aggregate information related to assets held and use of borrowings and derivatives in separately managed accounts and provide additional information about an adviser’s advisory business, including branch office operations and the use of social media. |
[9]. | Division staff reviews all new fund and UIT portfolios except those for which the disclosure is substantially identical to disclosures previously reviewed by the staff. |
[1]. | Securities and Exchange Commission, Report of the Division of Investment Management, Protecting Investors: A Half Century of Investment Company Regulation (May 1992), available at https://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/guidance/icreg50-92.pdf. |
[2]. | ICI, Trends in Mutual Fund Investing March 2016, available at https://www.ici.org/research/stats/trends/trends_03_16. |
[3]. | Money Market Fund Reform; Amendments to Form PF, Release No. 33-9616 (Jul. 23, 2014), available at https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2014/33-9616.pdf. |
[4]. | Chair Mary Jo White, Securities and Exchange Commission, Enhancing Risk Monitoring and Regulatory Safeguards for the Asset Management Industry (Dec. 11, 2014), available at https://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370543677722 (“Chair White Dec. 2014 Speech”). |
[5]. | Investment Company Reporting Modernization, Release No. 33-9776 (May 20, 2015), available at https://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2015/33-9776.pdf. |
[6]. | Open-End Fund Liquidity Risk Management Programs; Swing Pricing; Re-Opening of Comment Period for Investment Company Reporting Modernization Release, Release No. 33-9922 (Sep. 22, 2015), available at https://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2015/33-9922.pdf (“Liquidity Management Proposal”). |
[7]. | Use of Derivatives by Registered Investment Companies and Business Development Companies, Release No. IC-31933 (Dec. 11, 2015), available at https://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2015/ic-31933.pdf. |
[8]. | See Chair White Dec. 2014 Speech, supra note 4. |
[9]. | See Section 22(e) of the Investment Company Act. |
[10]. | Third Avenue Trust and Third Avenue Management LLC; Notice of Application and Temporary Order, Release No. IC-31943 (Dec. 16, 2015), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/ic/2015/ic-31943.pdf. |
[11]. | FSOC, Notice Seeking Comment on Asset Management Products and Activities, FSOC-2014-0001 (Dec. 24, 2014), available at https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2014-12-24/pdf/2014-30255.pdf; FSOC, Update on Review of Asset Management Products and Activities (Apr. 18, 2016), available at https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/news/Documents/FSOC%20Update%20on%20Review%20of%20Asset%20Management%20Products%20and%20Activities.pdf. |
[12]. | Liquidity Management Proposal, supra note 6. |
[13]. | Derivatives Proposal, supra note 7. |
[14]. | See Enhanced Disclosure and New Prospectus Delivery Option for Registered Open-End Management Investment Companies, Release No. IC-28584 (Jan. 13, 2009), available at https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2009/33-8998.pdf. |
[15]. | Securities and Exchange Commission, Recommendations of the Investor as Purchaser Subcommittee Regarding Mutual Fund Cost Disclosure (Apr. 14, 2016), available at https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/investor-advisory-committee-2012/recommendation-mf-fee-disclosure-041916.pdf. |
[16]. | IM Guidance Update, Fund Disclosure Reflecting Risks Related to Current Market Conditions, No. 2016-02, (Mar. 2016), available at https://www.sec.gov/investment/im-guidance-2016-02.pdf. |
[17]. | See Form N-1A, Item 27(b)(7) (requiring that a fund’s (other than a money market fund) annual report to shareholders “discuss the factors that materially affected the Fund’s performance during the most recently completed fiscal year, including the relevant market conditions and the investment strategies and techniques used by the Fund’s investment adviser.”) |
[18]. | Chair Mary Jo White, Securities and Exchange Commission, Chairman’s Address at SEC Speaks -“Beyond Disclosure at the SEC in 2016” (Feb. 19, 2016), available at https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/white-speech-beyond-disclosure-at-the-sec-in-2016-021916.html. |
[19]. | ICI, Investment Company Fact Book (2016), available at https://www.ici.org/pdf/2016_factbook.pdf. |
[20]. | Report of the Staffs of the CFTC and SEC to the Joint Advisory Committee on Emerging Regulatory Issues, Preliminary Findings Regarding the Market Events of May 6, 2010 (May 18, 2010), available at https://www.sec.gov/sec-cftc-prelimreport.pdf; Report of the Staffs of the CFTC and SEC to the Joint Advisory Committee on Emerging Regulatory Issues, Findings Regarding Market Events of May 6, 2010 (Sep. 30, 2010), available at https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2010/marketevents-report.pdf. |
[21]. | Division of Trading and Markets, Research Note, Equity Market Volatility on August 24, 2015 (Dec. 2015), available at https://www.sec.gov/marketstructure/research/equity_market_volatility.pdf (“2015 Research Note”); Chair Mary Jo White, Securities and Exchange Commission, Opening Remarks to the Investor Advisory Committee (Oct. 15, 2015), available at https://www.sec.gov/news/statement/white-investor-advisory-commitee-10-15-2105.html (“Remarks to the Investor Advisory Committee”). |
[22]. | Remarks to the Investor Advisory Committee, supra note 21. |
[23]. | Request for Comment on Exchange-Traded Products, Release No. 34-75165 (Jun. 12, 2015), available at https://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2015/34-75165.pdf; 2015 Research Note, supra note 21. |
[24]. | See, e.g., BNY Mellon, Transcript of the BNY Mellon Teleconference Hosted By Gerald Hassell on the Sungard Issue (Aug. 30, 2015), available at https://www.bnymellon.com/_global-assets/pdf/events/transcript-of-bny-mellon-teleconference-on-sungard-issue.pdf; Chris Dieterich, Barron’s, BNY Mellon Is Still Having NAV Pricing Problems With Hundreds of Funds (Aug. 27, 2015), available at http://blogs.barrons.com/focusonfunds/2015/08/27/bny-mellon-is-still-having-nav-pricing-problems-with-hundreds-of-funds/. |
[25]. | For example, in March 2014 the SEC hosted a Cybersecurity Roundtable and in 2015, our Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations (“OCIE”) conducted examinations of registrants concerning various cybersecurity issues. See also National Exam Program, Risk Alert: Vol. IV, Issue 8, OCIE’s 2015 Cybersecurity Examination Initiative (Sep. 15, 2015), available at https://www.sec.gov/ocie/announcement/ocie-2015-cybersecurity-examination-initiative.pdf; Regulation Systems Compliance and Integrity, Securities Exchange Act Rel. No. 73639 (Nov. 19, 2014); available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2014/34-73639.pdf. |
[26]. | IM Guidance Update, Cybersecurity Guidance, No. 2015-02 (Apr. 2015), available at https://www.sec.gov/investment/im-guidance-2015-02.pdf. |
[1]. | See Best Places to Work 2015, Partnership for Public Service, available at http://bestplacestowork.org/BPTW/rankings/overall/mid. |
[2]. | See Press Release No. 2015-245, SEC Announces Enforcement Results for FY 2015 (Oct. 22, 2015), available at https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-245.html; U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Agency Financial Report Fiscal Year 2015, pp. 3, 50, available at http://www.sec.gov/about/secpar/secafr2015.pdf. |
[3]. | See Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions under the Securities Act (Regulation A), Release No. 33-9741 (Mar. 25, 2015), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2015/33-9741.pdf and Crowdfunding, Release No. 33-9974 (Oct. 30, 2015), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2015/33-9974.pdf. |
[4]. | See Regulation SBSR – Reporting and Dissemination of Security-Based Swap Information, Release No. 34-74244 (Feb. 11, 2015), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2015/34-74244.pdf; Security-Based Swap Data Repository Registration, Duties, and Core Principles, Release No. 34-74246 (Feb. 11, 2015), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2015/34-74246.pdf. |
[5]. | See Registration Process for Security-Based Swap Dealers and Major Security-Based Swap Participants, Release No. 34-75611 (Aug. 5, 2015), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2015/34-75611.pdf. |
[6]. | See Applications by Security-Based Swap Dealers or Major Security-Based Swap Participants for Statutorily Disqualified Associated Persons To Effect or Be Involved in Effecting Security-Based Swaps, Release No. 34-75612 (Aug. 5, 2015), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2015/34-75612.pdf. |
[7]. | Application of Certain Title VII Requirements to Security-Based Swap Transactions Connected with a Non-U.S. Person’s Dealing Activity That Are Arranged, Negotiated, or Executed By Personnel Located in a U.S. Branch or Office or in a U.S. Branch or Office of an Agent, Release No. 34-74834 (Apr. 20, 2015), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2015/34-74834.pdf. |
[8]. | See Disclosure of Hedging by Employees, Officers and Directors, Release No. 33-9723 (Feb. 9, 2015), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2015/33-9723.pdf; Pay Versus Performance, Release No. 34-74835 (Apr. 29, 2015), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2015/34-74835.pdf; and Listing Standards for Recovery of Erroneously Awarded Compensation, Release No. 33-9861 (Jul. 1, 2015), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2015/33-9861.pdf. |
[9]. | See Pay Ratio Disclosure, Release No. 33-9877 (Aug. 5, 2015), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2015/33-9877.pdf. |
[10]. | See Registration of Municipal Advisors Release No. 34-70462 (Sept. 20, 2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2013/34-70462.pdf. |
[11]. | See Asset-Backed Securities Disclosure and Registration, Release No. 33-9638 (Sept. 4, 2014), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2014/33-9638.pdf; Credit Risk Retention, Release No. 34-73407 (Oct. 22, 2014), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2014/34-73407.pdf. |
[12]. | See Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, Release No. 34-72936 (Aug. 27, 2014), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2014/34-72936.pdf. |
[13]. | See Financial Responsibility Rules for Broker-Dealers, Release No. 34-70072 (Jul. 30, 2013) available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2013/34-70072.pdf; Broker-Dealer Reports, Release No. 34-70073 (Jul. 30, 2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2013/34-70073.pdf. |
[14]. | See Disqualification of Felons and Other “Bad Actors” from Rule 506 Offerings, Release No. 33-9414 (Jul. 10, 2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2013/33-9414.pdf. |
[15]. | See, e.g., Removal of Certain References to Credit Ratings and Amendment to the Issuer Diversification Requirement in the Money Market Fund Rule, Release No. IC-31828 (Sept. 16, 2015), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2015/ic-31828.pdf; Removal of Certain References to Credit Ratings Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Release No. 34-71194 (Dec. 27, 2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2013/34-71194.pdf; Removal of Certain References to Credit Ratings Under the Investment Company Act, Release No. 33-9506 (Dec. 27, 2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2013/33-9506.pdf. |
[16]. | See Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and Certain Interests in, and Relationships with, Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds, Release No. BHCA-1 (Dec. 10, 2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2013/bhca-1.pdf. |
[17]. | See, e.g., Commissioner Luis A. Aguilar, Finishing the Work of Regulating Security-Based Derivatives (Sept. 16, 2015), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/statement/finishing-the-work-of-regulating-security-based-derivatives.html; Commissioner Daniel M. Gallagher and Commissioner Michael S. Piwowar, Statement Regarding Security-Based Swap Rules (Sept. 25, 2015), available at https://www.sec.gov/news/statement/gallagher-piwowar-security-based-swaps.html; Commissioner Kara M. Stein, Statement at Open Meeting on Final Rules Regarding Application of Title VII Dealer De Minimis Requirements to Security-Based Swap Dealing Activity in the United States (Feb. 10, 2016), available at https://www.sec.gov/news/statement/stein-statement-021016.html. |
[18]. | See Security-Based Swap Transactions Connected with a Non-U.S. Person’s Dealing Activity That Are Arranged, Negotiated, or Executed By Personnel Located in a U.S. Branch or Office or in a U.S. Branch or Office of an Agent; Security-Based Swap DealerDe Minimis Exception, Release No. 34-77104 (Feb. 10, 2016), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2016/34-77104.pdf. |
[19]. | See Money Market Fund Reform; Amendments to Form PF, Release No. 33-9616 (Jul. 23, 2014), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2014/33-9616.pdf. |
[20]. | See Chair Mary Jo White, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Enhancing Risk Monitoring and Regulatory Safeguards for the Asset Management Industry (Dec. 11, 2014), available at https://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370543677722. |
[21]. | See Amendments to Form ADV and Investment Advisers Act Rules, Release No. IA-4091 (May 20, 2015), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2015/ia-4091.pdf; Investment Company Reporting Modernization, Release No. 33-9776 (May 20, 2015), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2015/33-9776.pdf (together, “Data Modernization Proposals”). |
[22]. | See Open-End Fund Liquidity Risk Management Programs; Swing Pricing; Re-Opening of Comment Period for Investment Company Reporting Modernization Release, Release No. 33-9922 (Sept. 22, 2015), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2015/33-9922.pdf (“Liquidity Proposal”). |
[23]. | See Use of Derivatives by Registered Investment Companies and Business Development Companies, Release No. IC-31933 (Dec. 11, 2015), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2015/ic-31933.pdf (“Derivatives Proposal”). |
[24]. | See Chair Mary Jo White, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Enhancing Our Equity Market Structure (June 5, 2014), available at https://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370542004312. |
[25]. | See Exemption for Certain Exchange Members, Release No. 34-74581 (Mar. 25, 2015), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2015/34-74581.pdf. |
[26]. | See Regulation NMS Stock Alternative Trading Systems, Release No. 34-76474 (Nov. 18, 2015), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2015/34-76474.pdf (“ATS Proposal”). |
[27]. | See Transfer Agent Regulations, Release No. 34-76743 (Dec. 22, 2015), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2015/34-76474.pdf. |
[28]. | See Letters to Brent J. Fields, Secretary, Commission, dated February 27, 2015 and December 23, 2015, available at http://www.catnmsplan.com/web/groups/catnms/@catnms/documents/appsupportdocs/p602500.pdf and http://www.catnmsplan.com/web/groups/catnms/@catnms/documents/appsupportdocs/cat_nms_plan_12_23_15.pdf. |
[29]. | See Order Approving the National Market System Plan to Implement a Tick Size Pilot Program, Release No. 34-74892 (May 6, 2015), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/nms/2015/34-74892.pdf. See, e.g., Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change to Adopt FINRA Rule 6191(b) and Amend FINRA Rule 7440 to Implement the Data Collection Requirements of the Regulation NMS Plan to Implement A Tick Size Pilot Program, Release No. 34-76484 (Nov. 19, 2015), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/finra/2015/34-76484.pdf; Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change to Adopt FINRA Rule 6191(a) to Implement the Quoting and Trading Requirements of Regulation NMS Plan to Implement A Tick Size Pilot Program, Release No. 34-76483 (Nov. 19, 2015), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/finra/2015/34-76483.pdf. |
[30]. | See Request for Comment on the Effectiveness of Financial Disclosures about Entities other than the Registrant, Release No. 33-9929 (Sept. 25, 2015), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2015/33-9929.pdf. |
[31]. | See Chair Mary Jo White, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Keynote Session at the 43rd Annual Securities Regulation Institute: “A Conversation with Mary Jo White” (Jan. 26, 2016), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/securities-regulation-institute-keynote-white.html; Chair Mary Jo White, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Keynote Address at the 47th Annual Securities Regulation Institute: “Building a Dynamic Framework for Offering Reform” (Oct. 28, 2015), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/building-dynamic-framework-for-offering-reform.html. |
[32]. | For the first step in our implementation of these mandates, see Simplification of Disclosure Requirements for Emerging Growth Companies and Forward Incorporation by Reference on Form S-1 for Smaller Reporting Companies, Release No. 33-10003 (Jan. 13, 2016), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/interim/2016/33-10003.pdf. |
[33]. | See Letter from the Hon. Mary Jo White, Chair, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission to the Investment Company Institute and the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (Sept. 16, 2015), available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/chair-white-letter-to-sifma-ici-t2.pdf. |
[34]. | See Proposed Rule Amendments to Facilitate Intrastate and Regional Securities Offerings, Release No. 33-9973 (Oct. 30, 2015), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2015/33-9973.pdf. |
[35]. | See Chair Mary Jo White, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Building Meaningful Communication and Engagement with Shareholders (June 25, 2015), available at https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/building-meaningful-communication-and-engagement-with-shareholde.html. |
[36]. | See Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers, Release No. 34-7720 (Dec. 11, 2015), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2015/34-76620.pdf. |
[37]. | See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq. |
[38]. | For example, the Investment Company Act limits funds’ issuance of debt and other senior securities, and includes requirements related to valuation, redemptions of fund shares, and dealings with service providers and other affiliates. It also gives the Commission broad discretion to grant exemptions from requirements. These provisions reflect a congressional recognition of the need for substantive protections in addition to disclosure requirements. See, e.g., Report accompanying H.R. 10065 from the Subcomm. of the Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce House of Representatives, 76th Cong. 3d Sess. (Jun. 18, 1940), at 3863 (“The Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 have not acted as deterrents to the continuous occurrence of abuses in the organization and operation of investment companies. Generally these acts provide only for publicity. The record is clear that publicity alone is insufficient to eliminate malpractices in investment companies.”); Report Accompanying S. 4108 from the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (Jun. 6, 1940), at 3839-3840 (“…the record before the committee is clear that publicity alone, which in general is the remedy provided by [the Securities Act and Exchange Act], is insufficient to eliminate the abuses and deficiencies which exist in investment companies…this bill (S. 4108) will materially abate, if not virtually eliminate, the malpractices and deficiencies in these organizations.”). |
[39]. | See Regulation Systems Compliance and Integrity, Release, No. 34-73639 (Nov. 19, 2014), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2014/34-73639.pdf. |
[40]. | See supra note 19. |
[41]. | See Liquidity Proposal, supra note 22; Derivatives Proposal, supra note 23. |
[42]. | See ATS Proposal, supra note 26. |
[43]. | See Release No. 34-71699, Standards for Covered Clearing Agencies (Mar. 12, 2014), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2014/34-71699.pdf. |
[44]. | See Request for Comment on Exchange-Traded Products, Release No. 34-65165 (June 12, 2015), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2015/34-75165.pdf; Report on the Review of the Definition of “Accredited Investor” (Dec. 18, 2015), available at http://www.sec.gov/corpfin/reportspubs/special-studies/review-definition-of-accredited-investor-12-18-2015.pdf; Data Modernization Proposals, supra note 21; Liquidity Proposal, supra note 22; Derivatives Proposal, supra note 23. |
[45]. | Message to Congress Reviewing the Broad Objectives and Accomplishments of the Administration (June 8, 1934), available at https://www.ssa.gov/history/fdrcon34.html. |
[1]. | The Commission’s implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act is summarized at http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dodd-frank.shtml. |
[2]. | Investment Advisory Registration Data (IARD), as of September 30, 2015. Investment advisers report general information about the private funds that they manage under Item 7 of Form ADV Part 1A. |
[3]. | Former Chairman Mary Schapiro testified in 2010 that these limitations meant that the Commission had “no detailed insight into how [private fund advisers] manage their trading activities, business arrangements or potential conflicts of interest.” Chairman Mary L. Schapiro, Testimony Concerning the State of the Financial Crisis Before the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (Jan. 14, 2010), available at https://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2010/ts011410mls.htm; see also Chairman Christopher Cox, Testimony Concerning the Regulation of Hedge Funds Before the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs (Jul. 25, 2006), available at https://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2006/ts072506cc.htm. |
[4]. | Annual Staff Report Relating to the Use of Data Collected from Private Fund Systemic Risk Reports (Aug. 13, 2015), available at https://www.sec.gov/investment/reportspubs/special-studies/im-private-fund-annual-report-081315.pdf; Annual Staff Report Relating to the Use of Data Collected from Private Fund Systemic Risk Reports, (Aug. 15, 2014), available at https://www.sec.gov/reportspubs/special-studies/im-private-fund-annual-report-081514.pdf, and Annual Staff Report Relating to the Use of Data Collected from Private Fund Systemic Risk Reports, (Jul. 25, 2013), available at https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2013/im-annualreport-072513.pdf(together, the “ PF Annual Reports”). A large hedge fund adviser is defined as an adviser with at least $1.5 billion attributable to hedge funds. See Form PF, General Instruction 3. |
[5]. | See PF Annual Reports. |
[6]. | See PF Annual Reports. |
[7]. | See PF Annual Reports. |
[8]. | Private Funds Statistics, Fourth Calendar Quarter 2014, October 16, 2015, available at https://www.sec.gov (“Private Fund Statistics”). |
[9]. | Private Funds Statistics, at Tables 18, 19. |
[10]. | Private Funds Statistics, at Figure 5. |
[11]. | Private Funds Statistics, at Tables 20, 21. |
[12]. | Private Funds Statistics, at Table 2. |
[13]. | Private Funds Statistics, at Tables 10, 11, 23. |
[14]. | Financial Stability Oversight Council, Notice Seeking Comment on Asset Management Products and Activities FSOC-2014-00001 (Dec.18, 2014), available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/rulemaking/Documents/Notice%20Seeking%20Comment%20on%20Asset%20Management%20Products%20and%20Activities.pdf. |
[15]. | Open-End Fund Liquidity Risk Management Programs; Swing Pricing; Re-Opening of Comment Period for Investment Company Reporting Modernization Release, Release No. IC-31835 (Sept. 22, 2015), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2015/33-9922.pdf. |
[16]. | Amendments to Form ADV and Investment Advisers Act Rules, Release No. IA-4091 (May 20, 2015), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2015/ia-4091.pdf; Investment Company Reporting Modernization, Release No. IC-31610 (May 20, 2015), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2015/33-9776.pdf. |
[17]. | Cybersecurity Guidance, IM Guidance Update No. 2015-02 (Apr. 2015), available at http://www.sec.gov/investment/im-guidance-2015-02.pdf. |
[18]. | In the Matter of R.T. Jones Capital Equities Management, Inc., Release No. IA-4204 (Sept. 22, 2015), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2015/ia-4204.pdf. |
[19]. | Rule 30(a) of Regulation S-P. |
[20]. | The Dodd-Frank Act requires the Commission to establish methodologies for stress testing of financial companies such as broker-dealers, registered investment companies and registered investment advisers with $10B or more in total consolidated assets—including baseline, adverse, and severely adverse scenarios—and to design a reporting regime for this stress testing, which must be reported to the Commission and the Federal Reserve Board. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, section 165(i)(2), 124 Stat. 1423 (2010) (codified at 12 USC 5365). |
[21]. | The Commission settled charges against a private equity fund adviser for misallocating more than $17 million in so-called “broken deal” expenses to its flagship private equity funds, thus breaching its fiduciary duty. In the Matter of Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. L.P., Release No. IA-4131 (Jun. 29, 2015), available at https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2015/ia-4131.pdf). |
[22]. | The Commission settled charges against an adviser in August 2015 for breaching its fiduciary duties by failing to disclose a $50 million loan that a senior executive received from an advisory client. In the Matter of Guggenheim Partners Investment Management, LLC, Release No. IA-4163 (Aug. 10, 2015), available at https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2015/ia-4163.pdf. |
[23]. | The Commission settled charges against a private fund adviser and its principal for using funds to pay for the adviser’s operating expenses in a manner not clearly authorized under the funds’ governing documents or accurately reflected in the funds’ financial statements. In the Matter of Alpha Titans, LLC, et al., Release No. IA-4073 (Apr. 29, 2015), available at https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2015/34-74828.pdf. |
[24]. | The Commission settled charges against three advisers for violations of their fiduciary duties to private equity funds. The charges involved inadequate disclosures related to the acceleration of certain monitoring fees paid by the funds’ portfolio companies and legal fee discounts the advisers received that were substantially higher than the discount received by the funds. In the Matter of Blackstone Management Partners L.L.C., et al., Release No. IA-4219 (Oct. 7, 2015), available at https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2015/ia-4219.pdf |
[1]. | Chair Mary Jo White, The Importance of Independence, remarks at the 14th Annual A.A. Sommer, Jr. Corporate Securities and Financial Law Lecture (Oct. 3, 2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370539864016. |
[2]. | Prior to the SEC’s current whistleblower program, Section 21A(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”) authorized the Commission to make a monetary award to persons who provided information leading to the recovery of civil penalties for insider trading violations. This provision was repealed by Section 923(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act. |
[3]. | Lodewijk Petram, “The World’s First Stock Exchange,” (2014), at 66. |
[4]. | 2014 Annual Report to Congress on the Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Program, p. 20 (Nov. 17, 2014), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/owb/annual-report-2014.pdf (“2014 Annual Report”). |
[5]. | Id. at p. 22. |
[6]. | 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(1)-(6). |
[7]. | 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b). |
[8]. | 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-6(b). |
[9]. | Press Release No. 2014-206, SEC Announces Largest-Ever Whistleblower Award (Sept. 22, 2014), available at http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370543011290. |
[10]. | 2014 Annual Report at p. 10. |
[11]. | 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(b)(4)(iii)(A). |
[12]. | 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(b)(4)(iii)(B) and § 240.21F-4(b)(4)(v)(A) and (C). |
[13]. | 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(b)(4)(v)(C). |
[14]. | Press Release No. 2015-45, Former Company Officers Earns Half-Million Dollar Whistleblower Award for Reporting Fraud Case to SEC (Mar. 2, 2015), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-45.html; see also Press Release No. 2014-180, SEC Announces $300,000 Whistleblower Award to Audit and Compliance Professional Who Reported Company’s Wrongdoing (Aug. 29, 2014), available at http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370542799812. |
[15]. | Press Release No. 2015-73, SEC Announces Million-Dollar Whistleblower Award to Compliance Officer (Apr. 22, 2015), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-73.html. Another issue of first impression is whether the Commission will pay awards to foreign national whistleblowers. The Commission answered in the affirmative in September 2014, awarding more than $30 million to a foreign whistleblower who provided key original information about an ongoing fraud that would have been very difficult to detect. This was the fourth award to a whistleblower living in a foreign country. See Press Release No. 2014-206, SEC Announces Largest-Ever Whistleblower Award (Sept. 22, 2014), available at http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370543011290. |
[16]. | 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-6(a)(4) and (b)(3). |
[17]. | 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(b)(7). |
[18]. | 2014 Annual Report, at p. 16. |
[19]. | The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 gave employees of publicly traded companies the right to sue for reinstatement and back pay if they were discharged or otherwise discriminated against for providing information to law enforcement related to potential violations of, among other provisions, the federal securities laws. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 806, 18 U.S.C. §1514A. Sarbanes-Oxley also obligates audit committees of public companies to establish procedures for employees to report on a confidential, anonymous basis concerns regarding questionable accounting or auditing matters. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 78f (m)(4). |
[20]. | 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1). |
[21]. | 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A). |
[22]. | Press Release No. 2014-118, SEC Charges Hedge Fund Adviser With Conducting Conflicted Transactions and Retaliating Against Whistleblower (June 16, 2014), available at http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370542096307. |
[23]. | Id. |
[24]. | Press Release No. 2015-75, SEC Announces Award to Whistleblower in First Retaliation Case (April 28, 2015), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-75.html. |
[25]. | Many of these cases are still pending, see, e.g., Safarian v. American DG Energy, Inc., Case No. 14-Civ.-2734 (3d Cir.) (argument scheduled for 6/2/2015), SEC amicus brief available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/briefs/2014/safarian-americandg.pdf (arguing that, in a wrongful termination case brought by a worker who was fired after internally reporting alleged double-billing of customers, the whistleblower protections apply regardless of whether that individual makes a separate whistleblower report to the Commission), Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, Case No. 14-4626 (2d Cir.) (argument scheduled for 6/17/2015), SEC amicus brief available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/briefs/2014/liu-siemens-0214.pdf (arguing the same in a case where a former finance director was fired after reporting alleged accounting irregularities and fraud to supervisors); see also Liu v. Siemens AG, 763 F.3d 175 (2d Cir. 2014), SEC amicus brief available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/briefs/2015/daniel-berman-020615.pdf (arguing that, in a case where a whistleblower reported suspected inadequate bribery prevention measures internally and was subsequently terminated, the term “whistleblower” encompasses employees who report possible violations internally only. Court decided case on other grounds). |
[26]. | Exchange Act Rule 21F-17(a), 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-17(a), provides that no action may be taken “to impede an individual from communicating directly with the Commission staff about a possible securities law violation, including enforcing or threatening to enforce, a confidentiality agreement … with respect to such communications.” |
[27]. | Press Release No. 2015-54, SEC: Companies Cannot Stifle Whistleblowers in Confidentiality Agreements (Apr. 1, 2015), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-54.html. |
[28]. | See, e.g., Letter from Center for Capital Markets Competitiveness to Chair Mary Jo White (Apr. 9, 2015), available at http://www.centerforcapitalmarkets.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/2015.-4.8-SEC-Whistleblower.pdf. |
[29]. | Exchange Act Release No. 74619, In re KBR, Inc. (Apr. 1, 2015) at ¶6, available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2015/34-74619.pdf. |
[30]. | Id. at ¶ 10. |
[31]. | Fair Game or Foul Play? Tackling the Rising Tide of Global Whistleblowing, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP, Global Whistleblowing Survey 2014, available at http://www.freshfields.com/uploadedFiles/SiteWide/News_Room/News_/02268_MBD_MBD_Whistleblower_Interactive%20PDF_AW2.pdf. |
[32]. | Id. |
[33]. | See Attorney General Eric Holder, Remarks on Financial Fraud Prosecutions at NYU School of Law (Sept. 17, 2014), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-holder-remarks-financial-fraud-prosecutions-nyu-school-law. |
[34]. | See A.G. Schneiderman Proposes Bill To Reward And Protect Whistleblowers Who Report Financial Crimes (Feb. 26, 2015), available at http://www.ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-schneiderman-proposes-bill-reward-and-protect-whistleblowers-who-report-financial. |
[1]. | http://www.nytimes.com/1996/03/27/nyregion/bratton-resignation-legacy-bratton-hailed-pioneer-new-style-policing.html?ref=williamjbratton; http://articles.latimes.com/2006/apr/20/opinion/oe-harcourt20 |
[2]. | “Broken Windows,” http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1982/03/broken-windows/304465/ |
[3]. | Ibid. |
[4]. | |
[5]. | http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370539854258 |
[6]. | http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1365171514096 |
[7]. | http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370539850572 |
[8]. | Ibid. |
[9]. | http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370539804376 |
[10]. | http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1365171624975 |
[11]. | Ibid. |
[12]. | |
[1]. | The Securities and Exchange Commission, as a matter of policy, disclaims responsibility for any private publication or statement by any of its employees. The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission or of the author’s colleagues on the staff of the Commission. |
[2]. | See “2016 Preqin Global Private Equity and Venture Capital Report Sample Pages” available at https://www.preqin.com/docs/reports/2016-Preqin-Global-Private-Equity-and-Venture-Capital-Report-Sample_Pages.pdf). |
[3]. | See, e.g., “Private equity begins to entice ordinary investors,” (May 26, 2015), found at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/e85240c4-b150-11e4-831b-00144feab7de.html#axzz44xp6hRzp (“Investors able to take a long-term view, who are seeking returns potentially higher and uncorrelated to the equity markets, could find private equity an intriguing, if risky, alternative.”) |
[4]. | See “‘Wall of Committed Capital’ Heads for Private Equity,” found at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/8ca3e3f6-ed2f-11e5-bb79-2303682345c8.html#axzz44CPqsKqR. |
[5]. | Andrew J. Bowden, Director of OCIE, “Spreading Sunshine in Private Equity,” May 4, 2014, available at https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2014—spch05062014ab.html; see also Marc Wyatt, Acting Director of OCIE, “Private Equity: A Look Back and a Glimpse Ahead,” May 13, 2015, available at https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/private-equity-look-back-and-glimpse-ahead.html. |
[6]. | See, e.g., “SEC Finds Illegal or Bad Fees at 50% of Buyout Firms,” (May 6, 2014), found at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-05-06/sec-finds-illegal-or-bad-fees-in-50-of-buyout-firms. |
[7]. | See id. |
[8]. | In the Matter of Blackstone Management Partners, L.L.C., et al., Advisers Act Release No. 4219 (Oct. 7, 2015). |
[9]. | Press Release 2015-235, “Blackstone Charged With Disclosure Failures” (Oct. 7, 2015), available at https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-235.html. |
[10]. | In the Matter of Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co., L.P., Advisers Act Release No. 4131 (June 29, 2015). |
[11]. | In the Matter of Lincolnshire Management, Inc., Advisers Act Release No. 3927 (Sept. 22, 2014). |
[12]. | In the Matter of Cherokee Investment Partners, LLC and Cherokee Advisers, LLC, Advisers Act Release No. 4258 (Nov. 5, 2015). |
[13]. | In the Matter of Fenway Partners, LLC, et al., Advisers Act Release No. 4253 (Nov. 3, 2015). |
[14]. | In the Matter of JH Partners, LLC, Advisers Act Release No. 4276 (Nov. 23, 2015). |
[15]. | See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963). |
[16]. | E.g., “Buyout Firms Disclose More Fees,” (Nov. 20, 2014), found at http://www.wsj.com/articles/buyout-firms-disclose-more-fees-1416510945. |
[17]. | “ILPA releases Fee Transparency Initiative,” (Sept. 3, 2015), found at https://www.pehub.com/2015/09/ilpa-releases-fee-transparency-initiative. |
[18]. | “States, Cities to Ask SEC to Beef Up Disclosures for Private-Equity Firms,” (July 21, 2015), found at http://www.wsj.com/articles/states-cities-to-ask-sec-to-beef-up-disclosures-for-private-equity-firms-1437522627. |
[1]. | I would like to thank my colleague, Neil Lombardo, for the valuable assistance he provided in assisting with the preparation of these remarks. The Securities and Exchange Commission disclaims responsibility for any private publication or statement of any Commission employee or Commissioner. This speech expresses the views only of the speaker, and do not necessarily reflect those of the Commission, the Commissioners, or other members of the staff. |
[2]. | Investment Company Reporting Modernization, Investment Company Act Release 31610 (May 20, 2015) [80 FR 33589 (June 12, 2015)], available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2015/33-9776.pdf. |
[3]. | Open-End Fund Liquidity Risk Management Programs; Swing Pricing; Re-Opening of Comment Period for Investment Company Reporting Modernization Release, Investment Company Act Release No. 31835 (Sept. 22, 2015) [80 FR 62273 (Oct. 15, 2015)], available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2015/33-9922.pdf. |
[4]. | Use of Derivatives by Registered Investment Companies and Business Development Companies, Investment Company Act Release No. 31933 (Dec. 11, 2015) [80 FR 80884 (Dec. 28, 2015)], available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2015/ic-31933.pdf. |
[5]. | The comment file for this proposal can be found at the following address: https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-16-15/s71615.shtml. |
[6]. | Sean Collins, High-Yield Bond Mutual Fund Flows: Some Perspective, Investment Company Institute (Dec. 16, 2015), available at https://www.ici.org/viewpoints/view_15_hybf_flows; Charles Stein, Investors Withdraw Most from U.S. Mutual Funds Since June 2013, BloombergBusiness (Sept. 2, 2015), available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-09-02/investors-withdraw-most-from-u-s-mutual-funds-since-june-2013; Charles Stein, Investors Pull Out of Mutual Funds at Fastest Rate in Two Years, BloombergBusiness (Dec. 15, 2015), available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-12-23/investors-pull-most-money-from-u-s-mutual-funds-in-two-years. |
[7]. | Jenny Cosgrave, Bond funds see record outflows after junk jitters, CNBC (Dec. 18, 2015), available at http://www.cnbc.com/2015/12/18/bond-funds-see-record-outflows-after-junk-jitters.html. |
[8]. | See U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission FY 2017 Congressional Budget Justification, 127, available at http://www.sec.gov/about/reports/secfy17congbudgjust.pdf. |
[9]. | Id. |
[10]. | See, e.g., Amy Feldman, How Mutual Funds Should Handle Illiquid Investments, Barron’s (Jan. 9, 2016) available at http://www.barrons.com/articles/how-mutual-funds-should-handle-illiquid-investments-1452316627. |
[11]. | Fund Disclosure Reflecting Risks Related to Current Market Conditions, IM Guidance Update, No. 2016-2 (Mar. 2016), available at https://www.sec.gov/investment/im-guidance-2016-02.pdf. |
[12]. | To further illustrate how funds can highlight current market conditions in a manner the Division believes can make their risk disclosures more timely, meaningful, and complete, the guidance provides examples of how funds dealt with recent market events. For instance, the guidance discusses how some funds bolstered their risk disclosures to explain in detail how the end of an extended period of historically low interest rates could affect their funds’ performance, and even lead to heightened risks. Some funds went still further, providing numerical examples clarifying how rising interest rates could potentially inhibit the performance of longer-term securities. In addition, the guidance also discusses some of the approaches that funds took when updating their disclosures to deal with Puerto Rico’s financial struggles, such as by including disclosures in prospectuses, shareholder reports, and fund websites as the territory has experienced financial difficulties. Id. |
[13]. | Chair Mary Jo White, Chairman’s Address at SEC Speaks, Beyond Disclosure at the SEC in 2016 (Feb. 19, 2016), available at https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/white-speech-beyond-disclosure-at-the-sec-in-2016-021916.html. |
[1]. | I would like to thank my colleague, Bridget Farrell, for her valuable assistance in helping to prepare these remarks. The Securities and Exchange Commission, as a matter of policy, disclaims responsibility for any private publication or statement by any of its employees. The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission or of the author’s colleagues on the staff of the Commission. |
[2]. | See Investment Trusts and Investment Companies: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 76th Cong. 58 (1940) (Statement of Robert. E. Healy, Commissioner, Securities and Exchange Commission). Judge Healy supervised the study of investment funds and investment advisory services that the Commission began in 1935 and testified before Congress in support of the Investment Company Act and Investment Advisers Act in 1940. See Investment Trusts and Investment Companies: Hearings before a Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on Banking and Currency, 76th Cong. 33 (1940) (Statement of Robert. E. Healy, Commissioner, Securities and Exchange Commission). |
[3]. | 75th Anniversary of the 1940 Acts, U.S. Secs. and Exch. Comm’n, http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/75th-anniversary-iac-ica.shtml. |
[4]. | See David W. Grim, Dir., Div. of Inv. Mgmt., Testimony on “Oversight of the SEC’s Division of Investment Management” Before the Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Financial Services (Oct. 23, 2015), available at https://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/testimony-oversight-of-im-102315.html. |
[5]. | See Request for Comment on Exchange-Traded Products, Release No. 34-75165 (Jun. 12, 2015), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2015/34-75165.pdf. |
[6]. | Currently, ETFs are subject to the same comprehensive information reporting requirements on Form N-SAR as are other open-end funds or UITs, and they are not required to report additional, more specialized information because Form N-SAR predates the introduction of ETFs to the market and has not been amended to address ETFs’ distinct characteristics. See Investment Company Reporting Modernization, Release Nos. 33-9776; 34-75002; IC-31610 (May 20, 2015), available at https://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2015/33-9776.pdf. |
[7]. | See Open-End Fund Liquidity Risk Management Programs; Swing Pricing; Re-Opening of the Comment Period for Investment Company Reporting Modernization Release, Release No. 33-9922; IC-31835 (Sep. 22, 2015), available at https://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2015/33-9922.pdf. |
[8]. | See Use of Derivatives by Registered Investment Companies and Business Development Companies, Release No. 34-76620 (Dec. 11, 2015), available at https://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2015/34-76620.pdf. |
[9]. | Staff of the Office of Analytics and Research, Division of Trading and Markets, Research Note: Equity Market Volatility on August 24, 2015 (2015), https://www.sec.gov/marketstructure/research/equity_market_volatility.pdf. |
[10]. | Guidance Regarding Mutual Fund Enhanced Disclosure, IM Guidance Update No. 2014-08 (June 2014), available at https://www.sec.gov/investment/im-guidance-2014-08.pdf. |
[11]. | Fund Names Suggesting Protection from Loss, IM Guidance Update No. 2013-12 (Nov. 2013), available at https://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/guidance/im-guidance-2013-12.pdf. |
[12]. | See Investment Company Reporting Modernization, supra note 6. |
[13]. | See Managed Funds Ass’n, SEC No-Action Letter, Managed Funds Association (February 6, 2014), available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/noaction/2014/managed-funds-association-020614.htm; Guidance on Private Funds and the Application of the Custody Rule to Special Purpose Vehicles and Escrows, IM Guidance Update No. 2014-07 (June 2014), available at http://www.sec.gov/investment/im-guidance-2014-07.pdf; Exemption for Advisers to Venture Capital Funds, IM Guidance Update No. 2013-13 (December 2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/guidance/im-guidance-2013-13.pdf; Status of Certain Private Fund Investors as Qualified Clients, IM Guidance Update No. 2013-10 (November 2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/guidance/im-guidance-2013-10.pdf; Privately Offered Securities under the Investment Advisers Act Custody Rule, Investment Management Guidance Update, No. 2013-04 (August 2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/guidance/im-guidance-2013-04.pdf. |
[14]. | Division of Investment Management Risk and Examinations Office, “Private Fund Statistics,” available at https://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/private-funds-statistics.shtml. |
[15]. | Mutual Fund Distribution and Sub-Accounting Fees, IM Guidance Update, No. 2016-01(Jan. 2016), available at https://www.sec.gov/investment/im-guidance-2016-01.pdf. |
[16]. | Cybersecurity Guidance. IM Guidance Update, No. 2015-02 (April 2015), available at https://www.sec.gov/investment/im-guidance-2015-02.pdf. |